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PREFACE 
Despite the great interest which the South African flag controversy evoked 
in 192 6-7, historians have given it little a,ttention. Brief reference to the 
struggle is often made in general histories or other works - such as 
biographies - covering the period, but there have been only three attempts 
to deal with the subject in some detail. The first of these was Dr. D.F. 
Malan's series of articles in Die Burger in January/February 1957, which 
were published two years later as a chapter of some forty pages entitled, 
1 Die Vlagstryd' in his book Afrikaner Volkseenheid. As Minister of the 
Interior, Malan was responsible for the introduction of flag legislation and 
his account is based on his record of the controversy made some months after 
the conflict. 1 Unfortunately, despite his intimate involvement in the 
controversy - or perhaps because of it - his is a highly tendentious account. 
Motives which Malan attributes to himself are often questionable and incomplete, 
while his treatment of his opponents lacks objectivity, sympathy and depth. 
Useful though the work is as a guide to the labyrinthine events of the flag 
controversy, it remains little more than a short apologia. 
The second work on the subject, completed one year after Malan's book was 
published, is F. J. Human' s M.A. thesis, Die Totstandkoming van die Unievlag. 
1. D. F. Malan, Afrikaner Volkseenheid, pages 102-3. 
Viii 
Based on limited primary source material, the author has leant heavily on 
Malan' s account and uncritically accepted the biased views of poiiticians 
and the press. The result is a very superficial study which adds little to 
an understanding of the flag conflict. Of somewhat more merit is the last 
study, M.J.Williamson's, Natal and the Flag Issue, 1925-1928, another 
M.A. thesis. This work is naturally limited to the relationship between 
Natal and the flag controversy; it is based only to a very limited degree 
on private papers (in this case frequently unreliable), often lacks depth 
and is not sufficiently critical - accepting at its face value, for instance, 
Heaton Nicholls' version of the controversy even though it was written from 
memory some thirty years after the events. 2 Unfortunately, the work 
cannot be said to sketch more than an outline of the controversy. Other 
secondary sources are brief and almost always unreliable. 
Thus no satisfactory secondary source for the flag controversy exists 
and the historian trying to write a history of the controversy must rely 
heavily on such primary source material as he can find. In this work ,a 
large number of private papers - some thirty in all, have been consulted. 
They include the papers of the leaders of the three political parties of the 
time - Generals J.B.M.Hertzog ( Nationalist Party) and J.C.Smuts ( South 
African Party) and Golonel F. H.P. Creswell ( Labour Party), as well as those 
2. G.H.Nicholls, South Africa in my time, page 19. 
ix 
of other Cabinet Ministers - N.C.Havenga, C.W.Malan, J.C.G.Kemp, 
P. G. W. Grobler and T. Boydell, prominent parliamentarians, and leading 
public figures who were active in the conflict. Together with the McPherson 
( labour !arty) Papers and the papers of the Private Secretary to the Minister 
of the Interior, W. H. Louw, these collections proved indispensable to an 
understanding of the controversy. 
Only the collections of two leading participants in the struggle could 
not be obtained - those of Malan and Tielman Roos, Minister of Justice in 
the first Pact government. Whereas Roos's papers are not to be found in any 
public repository and, apart from a few letters in private hands, are probably 
not extant, Malan's papers remained closed to me. Notwithstanding repeated 
application to the trustees of the Malan papers at Stellenbosch, access was 
denied. However this was probably not as unfortunate as might at first 
appear, for in view of Malan' s published work on the conflict, his papers 
are unlikely to contain material significantly at variance with it. 
The other main primary source material used in this work has been 
newspapers. Nationalist Party organs and a wide range of the English 
language press were consulted and perhaps a few remarks should be made 
concerning their use in the thesis. Because newspaper accounts bearing 
on the controversy were so often partisan and tendentious, in order 
to reach a more balanced conclusion several newspapers have often 
had to be consulted, and therefore cited, as sources of textual information. 
X 
Then too, because it was not unusual for many weeks to pass between the 
occurreroe of an event in the platteland - say, a party branch meeting - and 
a report of this in the press, newspaper dates may occasionally seem not to 
tally with the event reported. Finally, a good deal of the strident battle 
of words in the controversy was fought through the press; it both expressed 
and helped to mould public opinion on the flag question. Quotations have 
therefore been introduce~ rather freely to impart the temper of the time in 
the belief that they transmit feelings more perfectly and vividly and often 
more succintly than do paraphrases. 
A good deal of the battle of words was also fought in parliament - during 
the second reading of the 1927 Flag Bill, for instance, almost every Opposition 
M. P. addressed the Assembly in a debate which lasted several days - and 
here the writer of a history of the controversy is confronted with a difficult 
problem. How much space should he allot to the interminable debates over 
flag legislation which today seem little more than tediously reJ:etitious? 
If he is to tell the full story of the controversy and recreate the feeling of 
the times, with its intense public interest in the debates, he hcS to accord 
them due prominence. If his yardstick is purely the relevance of the debates 
to the final outcome of the conflict, then the debates (though important in 
convincing members of the Government that further compromise was called 
for) must receive less prominence. In this work, an attempt has been made 
to strike a balance between the two positions. 
xi 
The purpose of this work is to produce a comprehensive history of the flag 
controversy. Narrative, analysis and description are the stuff of written 
history and their blend must vary according to the nature of the topic tackled. 
In a comprehensive history of a most complex subject such as the flag 
controversy, a story which has never been fully told and in which numerous 
committees, commissions, conferences, deputations, pressure groups and 
different compromise proposals make their appearance, narrative and description 
are inevitably prominent. 3 But it is hoped that analysis has not been neglected. 
It is also hoped that in the telling of the story of the flag controversy, 
much that is of interest to, and characteristic of, South African history in 
the twentieth century will emerge. In the introduction to his article on the 
flag struggle, Malan observed that the conflict provided a valuable image 
of the political conditions which then reigned and of the forces, individual 
as well as collective, which influenced them; it disclosed nearly all the 
conflicting political viewpoints of the time. This is true, for inter alia 
----
the flag controversy reveals: the divisions within the Nationalist, Labour 
and South African Parties and the influence of these divisions on parties 
and policies; the divisions within the Cabinet itself and their consequences; 
the decline of the Labour Party; the fear of racial domination, Afrikanerization 
and secession; the degree of elitism prevailing in South African politics; 
the appeal of racialism; the abiding desire for toenadering and a centre party; 
3. Because of the unusual complexity of the flag controversy, the unusual 
step has been taken of including a diagram of the most significant 
developments in the conflict. See pages xviii-xix. 
xii 
the masking of political aims - the real aim being hidden behind a more 
avowable one which is more suited to winning the approval of the 
electorate; the desire of political parties to save face; the dangers of 
a junior partnership in a coalition government; the emergence and importance 
of pressure groups; the consequences of an ideological style of politics 
and a clash between ideologies: extreme partisanship and ready distortion, 
a 'righteous passion' for one's own cause and 'virtuous indignation' at 
another's, the equating of one's own interest with that of the nation and 
one's opponents' with the 'enemies of the country', the dilution of the rational 
element in politics, the decline in political sensitivity, the resort to violence -
all of which serve to reduce the manoeuvreability of party leaders and render 
compromise more difficult. Needless to say not all of these features have 
repeated themselves in South African history, but many have. 
In his inaugural lecture, Maurice Cranston submitted that nearly all 
political conflicts turned around the questions of justice, prudence and 
public gain - each side insisting that its policies were fair, prudent ( in 
the sense that they were the fruit of intelligent foresight used to avert future 
harm) and in the general interest. 4 This is clearly evinced in the flag 
controversy and one would be hard put to find a political conflict in which 
the various parties were more insistent that their policies were just, prudent 
and in the general interest. But though a general interest may manifest itself 
4. Politics and ethics, pages 18ff. 
xiii 
from time to time, it does not always exist; it is neither reliable nor constant. 
Instead, the head of state must feel his way through opposition, prejudice, 
Objections, threats, wounded interests and dissatisfied and sometimes alienated 
supporters. For a democratic government, the normal political process 
remains one of accommodation and conciliation. This too the flag controversy 
reveals. 
xiv 
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CHAPTER I 
MOVES TOWARDS A NATIONAL FLAG, 1910-1924 
Ihe Unionts first flag 
In 1908-9 when the National Convention met to explore 
the possibility of Union, the question of a national flag 
was not discussedo It had not been forgotten; rather, it 
was tacitly recognized as wiser to leave the subject in 
abeyanceo However, less than six months a:fter Union, the 
South African Government found itself in need of a distinc-
tive flag and obliged to fill this gap in the devices of 
the young state without delayo For, as Lord Crewe, the 
Colonial Secretary, pointed out in April 1910, the 
impending visit of the Duke of Cormaught to open the 
Union's first Parliament, made a distinguishing flag for 
South Africa imperative. 1 The correspondence which Crewe 
1. House of Assembly Debates (hereafter cited as Hansard), 
vol. 9, 4230-1, J.B.M. Hertzog, 27 May 1927; A 2-25, 
pp. 1-2, Crewe to Viscount Gladstone, 27 April 19100 
Crewe's views were forwarded to the South Af'rioan 
Government on 1 Jwie 1910 -- after Union. 
,, 
, 
The earliest call f'or a flag for South Africa appears 
to have been made by S.J. du Toit in 1879 (J.Do du Toit, 
Ds. S.J. du Tait in Weg en Werk, PPo 199 ff.). Presi-
dent F.Wo Reitz in 1891 suggested a flag which included 
the Union Jack for a united South Af'rica (Cape Times, 
19 November 1895; The Friend, 12 J~ne 1926; ~sard, 
Volo 9, 4349, Jo Henderson, and 4353-4, Lto-Colo N.J. 
Pretoriu3, both 31 May 1927). 
initiated oL this subject soon bore fruit. 2 In September 
-- barely two months beforE Connaught's arrival -- the 
S01.J.th African Government reque stec. and received permission 
to use a modifjed version of the Red Ensign as the South 
African flagoJ The approved modification was the 
insertior ... in the Ensign's bottom right corner of the 
Union's new coat-of-arms: the insignia of the four 
provinces4 on a shield surmounted by a red lion and 
supportec. by two antelope, with the motto Ex Unitate Vires 
below. 5 This flag never became popularo It was not 
flmm. on the 'vast majority' of government buildings so 
that most South Africans seldom saw it; it remained an 
2 
6 
unfamiliar flag. Though the Government's minute inviting 
2o A 2-25, pp. 1-J. 
J. Ibid. Po Jo The Red Ensign is the plain red flag of 
the British Mercantile Marine with the Union Jack in 
the top left corner. (The thesis avoids the use of 
the Union Jack's official designation, 'Union Flag', 
because of possible confusion in the South African 
context.) 
4. The lady of Good Hope (Cape Colony), two running wilde-
beest (Natal), a tree of liberty (orange Free State), 
and the ox-wagon (Transvaal). 
5. See page 2 62 
60 Hansard, vol. 9, 4055, Tielman Roos, 23 May 19270 Its 
use appears to have been limited. to government ships, 
magistrates' courts on public holidays (ibido 4043, 
Brig.-Gen. Byron, 23 May 1927) and a few other build-
ings such as the Treasury in Cape Town. Sir Thomas 
Smartt alor ... e clai.med that it had flown over Parliament 
and schools(~. 3655, 19 May 1927)0 On 28 January 
1925 the Natal Mercury reminded i ti: readers that South 
Africa already had a flag but that tfor various reasons 
it is rarely seen.• 
The flag f'lown. over the Union's government offices 
abroad was the Blue Ensign (Hansard, volo 9, 4470-1, 
Dr. DoF. Malan, 2 June 1927). 
the Colonial Secrc·tary' s approval for its design spoke of 
•the Flag of United South Africat, 7 Dr. DoFo Malan was 
later to insist that it had never been intended as a 
J 
national flag: it had been cbosen without reference to the 
people, without Cabinet discussion, and without the 
approval of Parliament; it was, he said, an ensign, not a 
symbol of natio~ality. 8 Even more forthright were the 
terms in which General Hertzog rejected the flag: 'Have we 
ever yet heard of a flag of any country which was so still-
born?' he a.sked the House of Assembly in May 1927; a flag 
so 'absolutely dead' that apart from General Smuts and him-
sel.f possibly no-one in the House knew anything about it. 9 
To Afrikaans-speaking South Africans its flaw was clear: 
its Union Jack meant that from the start it was tan English, 
10 
a purely English flag.' But wheth~r it was so or not, 
most English-speakers ignored. it. Just as many Afrikaners 
preferred the flags of the former Transvaal and Free State 
Republics, so too did English-speakers prefer the Union 
Jack of the former colonies of Natal and the Capeo 
was anomaly indeed, for despite a Union brought about 
Here 
voluntarily by its peoples, pre-Union sectional flags were 
still preferred to the 'Flag of United South Africa'o 
At the time of Union, this sectionalism had been 
7o A 2-25, Po J, Minute No. 465, signed by Hertzog, 6 
September 1910. 
80 Hansard, volo 9, 4470, 2 June 1927. 
9o Ibido 42J1, 27 May 19270 
1 O. Ibid. 
4 
submerged in a wave of' goodwill; the former Boer generals 
Botha, Hertzog, and Smuts, had reflected this goodwill when. 
they included the Cnion Jack in the 'Flag of' United South 
Africa' • But this spirit was shortlived. Hertzog's 
break away and f'ormatior .. of the National Party in 1914 
stimulated the growth of' Afrikaner nationalism and thereby 
increased the diff'icul ties of' the South African Partyo 
Botha's conciliation policy relied on the support of 
English-speakers, and therefore imposed certain restraints 
on the Afrikaners' drive towards full economic, social and 
lt l l ·t 11 cu ura equa 1 y. Furthermore, even though the con-
ciliation policy had placed political power in the hands of 
Afrikaners, the symbols of' that power -- the King, the 
Governor General, the Empire, the Flag -- were British. 
In competing against a Party whose support was exclusively 
Afrikaner, these were distinct liabilitieso 
This disadvantage was demonstrated in the election 
results of 1915 when the Nationalist Party polled nearly 
one-third of the total vote -- only 16 000 short of the 
12 S.A.Po's poll. With many English voters supporting the 
S.A.Po it was reasonable to conclude that the Nationalist 
Party, in less than two years, had won the support of half 
the Afrikaner voters 013 In the face of this growing 
11. WoK. Hancock, Smuts The Fields of' Force 1 0 
(hereafter cited as Hancock, PPo 2J-4o 
120 Ibid. Po 25. In the interests of brevity S.A.P. 
replaces South African Party wherever convenient. 
1Jo .!.2i£o PPo JO-J1. 
5 
threat, Botha had to tread warily to avoid further seepage 
f'rom his Partyo If' it was dangerous to raise issues on 
which the Dutch and English sections of' his Party might 
take opposing standpoints, this was even more true of' 
emotional issues related to the Union's symbolso 
Additionally, f'rom March 1915 Botha could govern only by 
grace of' the ~nionist Party; wherever possible their views 
had to be accommodatedo It is not surprising therefore 
that when in 1917 Botha was asked to advocate a national 
f'lag containing the Union Jack and a former republican 
f'lag, he refused to do so. It was inadvisable, he 
explained, to raise, at that time, a question so beset with 
dif'f'icultyo So long as 'this agitation for a republic, 
and particularly for the restoration of the vierkleur, is 
on the tapis', he said, •it would be dangerous to raise the 
t . I 14 que f:. iono 
Smuts, the S.A.P. and a new flag 
Botha died at the end of August 1919. At the 
beginning of the same month Smuts had returned to South 
Africa after an absence of three and a half yearso 
Acceding to the premiership on J September, he found himself 
faced with a hereniging movement he could not afford to 
ignore and it is against this background that Smuts's and 
14. Forward, 17 June 1927, letter to George Hay. 
his Party's pronouncements on the need for a new flag must 
be seen. 
From 1915 onwards Afrikaners from both main Parties 
had been meeting each other in hereniging congresses; the 
armistice had given the movement fresh impetus for it was 
held that the ending of the war had removed the major 
source of division among Afrikaners, while Bothais 
declining health had eliminated the complication of his 
personal conflict with Hertzogo 15 Enjoying much support, 
the movement was largely out of the control of Party 
6 
leaders. In the wake of the war two congresses had already 
been held in the first half of 1919; a third was to take 
place in October -- one month after Smuts became Premiero 
Smuts was secretly opposed to the proposed reunion. 
He believed that while it might unite Afrikaners in one 
party, it would destroy co-operation between British and 
Dutch and shatter the edifice that Botha had built, that is, 
a Party representative of both British and Dutcho It 
woi.::.ld be a betrayal not only of Botha and the British, but 
also of his own principles if he agreed to the formation of 
a purely racial partyo To purchase reunion at the cost of 
recognizing the right of the Union to secede, could 
15. N.Go Garson, The Role of Smuts in the South African 
Party-Unionist Fusion of 1920 (hereafter cited as 
9:~r~~12;), unpublished papero I am much indebted to 
this work for the explanation in the next few para-
graphs of Smuts's attitude towards hereniging. 
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threaten the country's unity and peace. If reunion of the 
nature suggested were to occur, he told Lord Buxton, the 
Governor General, it would be pure racialism and might 
possibly lead eventually to civil war. 
There were also practical considerations that dis-
couraged hereniging. Smuts's own Afrikaner supporters 
would be dominated by HertzogYs more numerous followers so 
that, particularly in the Cape (where the reunion movement 
was strongest), the Nationalists would be likel.y to have a 
majority of their nominees selected as parliamentary 
candidate so Then too, having fewer followers in the new 
party, Hertzog and not Smuts would be its leader and there-
fore Prime Ministero However, bearing in mind Smuts's 
later conduct, particularly in 1933, it seems unlikely that 
personal ambition caused him to reject hereniging. 
Whatever his reasons for opposing reunion, Smuts could 
not resist it openly. To do so was to risk a split in the 
S.A.P. His great stature in and his grip over the Party 
had yet to be establishedo Furthermore, his long absences 
during the war meant that he was out of touch with local 
politics; it meant too that he lacked the immediate 
personal following that Botha had enjoyed. In September 
1919 he confided to Buxton that he could not oppose reunion; 
he would have to humour ito The strength of the movement 
and Smuts's own position relative to the Party demanded 
that he deal with ~reniging tactfully. 
Accordingly, while reviving the idea of' best man 
government but hoping ideally to f'orm a central party on 
non-racial lines, Smuts, in public, espoused the cause of' 
hereniging. In keeping with the latter, it is not 
8 
surprising to f'ind him declaring bef'ore the end of' the year 
that he was not opposed to a new f'lag. This was a subject 
which Smuts had not raised since Union but between the end 
of' September and December he touched on it f'our timeso 16 
In his concluding address to the Central Congress of' the 
S.A.P. at Bloemf'ontein on 12 December, Smuts said that the 
hereniging congress at Paarl had taken a decision on the 
flag and that soon all sections would agree on this subject.17 
16. At Calvinia -- De Volkstem, 3 October 1919; at 
Ventersdorp -- ~...Y.2..~tem, 2 December 1919; at 
Rustenburg (in response to a question) -·- 0::1s Land, and 
Cape Times -- 6 December 1919; at Bloemfontein -- Ons 
Land, 16 December 1919, De Volkstem, 19 December 19~ 
Both Die Burger (25 May 1927) and Soath African 
Nation (25 May 1927) erred in insisting that Smuts also 
dealt with the flag question at Caledon at the end of' 
Septemher; this was his Calvinia speech. 
·17. Ons Land, 16 December 1919; De Volkstem, 19 December 
1919. Smuts's memory was at f'ault. It was not the 
hereniging Congress that had taken a decision on the 
f'lag. · A Congress of' the Cape Province branch of' the 
S.A.P., which was meeting cor,.currently at Paarl, had 
taken the decision. When during a meeting between the 
hereniging representatives of' the two Parties, the 
S.A.P. representatives were. asked whether they were 
willing to allow the Union Jack to be superseded by a 
South African f'lag, they replied that the S.A.P. Con-
gress had accepted this on the previous day and on 
another occasion. Die Nasionale Party van die Kaap-
Provinsie v:i.erde .jaar ko:':lgres gehou op Paarl, van 2 tot 
4 Oktober, 1919, met versla van die hereni ins-
konferensie wat daar plaasgevind het hereafter cited 
as Nasionale Part van die K,P. kon res ·ehou o Paarl 
.12.l.9. , p. 19. The qw" st ion aaswer procedure adopted 
by the hereniging delegates was humorously referred to 
by the S.A.P. representatives as ''n katekisasieles'o 
It would not be 10~1.g, he told them, bef'ore a Union f'lag 
18 
would fly over South Africa. 
Yet, in the followi:.:1g year, Smuts dropped the flag 
questiua from his speeches; on no occasion did he raise 
th , . ,_ 1 9 e suoJec,:;. It was the i'o.te o:f this questi•)n in 1920, 
as in 1919, to be gov0rned by more important political 
considera tio:..1s • On 24 D9cember 1919, Sir Thomas Smartt, 
.leader of' the Unionis~ Party, bad voiced concern 8Ver the 
9 
Disturbed by I a:..1.other suggestiont of a new flag for 
the Un.Lon, this time from tho S.A.P. 1 s Bloemfcntein 
h t t . 20 Congress, he cautioned against as y ac inno The 
question of a national flag, he told the Western Province 
Unionist Council, wo•-1ld have to be handled with great care: 
it could be interpreted as the first step towards breaking 
the British co1u-1ection -- under no circumstances, even to 
the death, would tho British sectlo~ tolerate this, 21 
These loudly applauded :-..~emarks doubtless reflected the 
views of many in a Party which had no desire for change in 
a flag status quo which enabled its supporters to use the 
18. 0.ns LmlS!, 16 December 1919; De Volkstern, 19 December 
1919G 
19. However on two occasions he was forced to reply to 
questions put to him on the flag: at Paulpietersburg 
(Hansard., Volo 9, 4154, 25 May 1927), and in the House 
of Assembly (Jo Albert Coetzee, Na.sieska en Politieke 
Grae erin in Suid-A:frika 16 2-1 8 , p. 253 o 
20. Cape Times, 23 December 1919; Ons Land, 25 December 
1919; De V8.1.kstem, .30 December 19190 Smartt was 
probably ref'errinc- to Smuts Is remarks in his cm1cluding 
address to the Congress. 
210 Ibido 
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Union Jack. Smartt's remarks could not be overlooked, 
least of all by Smuts. As early as October 1919 he had 
told Buxton that coalition between the S.A.P. and the 
· b t t . t 22 Unionists would come a ou as acer ain y. Having 
acceptod a future combination of' these two Parties as 
inevitable if' the Nationalists were to be kept out of power, 
it required little insight to see that pursuit of this 
issue would be foolhardyo 
Smuts's attitude to the possibility of chanee in tl1e 
Union's flag during 1919-1920 was intimately related to the 
questions of h~reniging and party realignments; it did not 
indicate that he felt any urgent need for a new flag. 
Much the same may be said of the S.A.P. ·rhe final 
resolution passed in favour of a national flag before the 
flag controversy by a SaA.Po congress (that of its Cape 
Province bran.ch in October 1919) w·as closely related to the 
hereniging movement; only one other SuA.Po congress had 
ever re.so.lverl in favonr of a fJ ag chane;e., 23 It would seem 
therefore that within the Party too there was no urgent 
24 desire for a new national flag. 
However, if Smuts fou~d it impolitic to make public 
220 Garson. 
2J. Ji~ionale Party yan die K.Po kongres gehou op Paarl 1 
1919, Po 19. 
24. Compare, Oo Pirow, ,James Ba.rr_y MWlllik Hertzog, Po 120: 
tit is true that the s.A.Po had for yea.rs declared it-
self in favour of a "national flag". t 
11 
statements on the need £or a new flag in 1920, 25 he did not 
abandon the principle of a distinctive flag for the Uniono 
In 1921, when he attended the Conference of Prime Ministers 
in London, he took with him a long memorandum which towards 
its close emphasized the need for symbolic recognition of a 
proposed change from Empire to ColllI!lonwealtho Accordingly, 
it recommended that besides a common Imperial flag {which 
could be the Union Jack), each nation should adopt its own 
26 h distinctive national flag. Whether Smuts hoped tat the 
acceptance of his proposals by the Conference would help to 
overcome opposition to a new flag from former Unionists in 
his recently enlarged Party, must remain an open question. 
In all events, he met with no success in this matter, and 
left the question of a new national flag in abeyanceo 
The desire f'or a new flag amongst Nationalists 
Amongst the Nationalists, however, there were those 
who were not prepared to leave the question in abeyance. 
A complex compound of reasons drove them towards the goal 
of' a r1ational flag for, ue.ing no different from ardent 
nationalists elsewhere, they could see no valid reason for 
250 For Smuts's need to treat delicately with the Unionists 
see Smuts Papers (hereafter cited as~), vol. 102, 
noo 201, Smuts to CoPo Crewe, 25 March 1920: also in 
Jean van der Poel (edo), Selections from the Smuts 
Papers, volume v, September 1919 - November 1934 [here-
after cited as van der Poel), no. 23. 
260 Hancock, pp. 46 ff; Hansard, volo 9, 4211, Hertzog, 27 
May 19270 
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maintaining symbols that were incompatible with their own 
sense of pride, dieni ty and indi vii1iali ty o The Union Jack 
was par~excellen~ such a symbolo It offended pride 
because it was a reminder of hw:1iliation and defeat o It 
offended dignity because it implied obeisance to the emblem 
of' those who had persecuted their ancestorso It offended 
individuality because it was alien and stood for values 
which were repugnant. Liberalism, philanthropy, 
imperialism -- all had advanced under its shadow. 
SlachterVs Nek., Jopie Fourie2 7 and the concentration camps 
were its fruitso The path o:f British imperialism was 
strewn with similar historical grievances and at each mile-
stone had stood the Union Jack. So long as it survived in 
the Unio~, so long, they believed, would it be a divisive 
in:flue:nce in the South African body politico 
Many of these sentiments were revealed when Dro D.Fo 
Mala.n addressed a Joint Congress of the Nationalist Party 
in January 19190 He insisted that if they were to become 
a happy and prosperous people in South Africa, they must 
have a wiifying flag. The British :flag that f'lew was the 
flag of only one section: 
Dit is geen vlag wat verenig nie, maar wat skei. 
in Vlag moet die uitdrukking wees van die vrij 
siel van In volko Maar die Britse vlag is vir 
ons die teken van Britse gesago Dis vir die 
27. Executed in December 1914 for his part in the Rebellion. 
The affair aroused strong feelings for many years. 
See, for example, Ons Land, 2, 4 December 1919, ~ 
Y2_lkstem, 5 December 1919; Ons Vaderland, 21 December 
19.260 
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Engelsman die simbool van sij volksielo Vir die 
Afrikaner beteken dit die heerskappij van tn volk 
6000 mijle ver oor die see; dis die teken van 
poginge, telkens aangewend, om sij nasionaliteits-
gevoel te onderdruk. Die Afrikaner voel, dat 
hij eers Engelsman moet word, om die vlag te kan 
aanneem as sij vlago 
Daarom kan daar nie 'n verenigde volkssiel wees 
van albei die seksies nieo Daarom is daar tn 
diep klowe in ons land. Dis nie alleen waar in 
die teorie nie, maar waar ook in die praktijk. 
Dis tn gevolg van daardie vr~gmde vlag, dat ons 
in Suidafrika rassehaat het. 
In the United States, the F.nglishman 'fowid another 
f'.lag and another national cpiri t and was soon assimilated .. 
But in South Africa, Malan :mai.ntaIDed, he found his own flag 
and felt that he could remain an Englishman; England 
remained his homeo To the one side the British f"lag was a 
symbol of racial domination, to the other a sign of 
inferiorityo Only when both sides had one flag that was a 
symbol of •vrijheid en van die eie algemene volksielt would 
there no longer be racial hatred. 29 In the following 
month Malan made an appeal in similar vein in the House of 
JO Assembly and was supported by FaW. Beyers. 
Two years later, in January 1921, Die Burger declared 
28. Toespraken geleverd door de leiders van de Nationale 
Partij bij het geEamentlike, kongres van de Nationale 
Partij der vier provincies te Blomefontein op 16 
~anuarie 19-1.2., PP• 56-7, in ,T .P • .J'ooste Collection, 
vol. 286. 
29. !..2.!s!.o PP• 57-8. 
30o Die Burger, 13 February 19190 Beyers was M.Po for 
Edenburg and was to become Minister of Mines and Indus-
tries in the next Goverrunento See also the poem •Die 
Suider-kruis Vlagt at the end of the report. I am 
indebted to Professor A.M. Davey for this referenceo· 
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that the British f'lag was undoubtedly a symbol o.t' murder 
and rapine to Free Stater and Transvaaler and the sooner 
their British compatriots realized this the better it would 
be for the future of the countryo Every Englishman who 
reviewed the facts of the last century without prejudice 
woald agree that in this respect the Free Stater and 
Transvaaler were right. A few days later, Malan declared 
at Vryburg that to the Afrikaner the Union Jack represented 
d . t. 31 race orruna iono 
Was there a general qemand for a national flag? 
Yet, can it be said that the Nationalist Party, in 
opposition, agitated strongly for a new flag, or that its 
rank-and-file urgently desired one? It is unlikely that a 
Nationalist leader would have thought it wise to press f'or 
a new flag while the First World War raged. By 1919 this 
obstacle had been removed and in January Malan made a call 
for a new flag at the first post-war Joint Congress of' the 
Party. He was the only leader to do so; Hertzog, Roos 
and other prominent speakers preferred to stress the 
quest ion of' the Union's status o Though later in the year 
the Nationalist Party in the Cape Province resolved in 
32 favour of a new flag, Malan's call failed to evoke a 
31. N~ern New~, 15, 28 January 19210 
32. The motion was broueht .t'orward by Beyers and H0 E. s. 
Fremantle. Beyer~ had wanted the motion to specifi-
cally exclude the Union Jack from the new flag but 
Fremantle's obje~tion to this led to a final resolution 
15 
sustained response. For in the years before the National-
ists came to power, no other resolution calling for a new 
flag was submitted to a Cape Co~gress of the Nationalist 
Party.)3 Similarly, both the Transvaal and Natal 
Congresses of the Party do not appear to have raised the 
question.34 Only in 1921 did an Orange Free State con-
gress resolve in favour of a. new flag;35 and this was not 
~6 
repeated in the following year~o~ Thus it would appear 
that, while in oppositio~, only two Nationalist Party con-
gresses ever resolvec. in fave,ur of a new flago In the 
w.idst of the 1927 controversy, the s.A.Po representative 
for Hospital, HoB. Papenfus, told the House of Assembly: 
33. 
34. 
. 
'I have not noticed any great public demand :for 
a national flag. It is the work of politicians. 
At all the meetings I.have held throughout the 
which deliberately left the question of the Union 
Jack's inclusion or exclusion in a new flag openo 
Fremantle Collection corres ondeLce re the national 
flag~ 192 -1928 hereafter cited as Fremantle Collec-
~, Fremantle to ~iichael, 4 June 1926; Die Burger, 
13 June 1927, letter to the editor from Fremantle. 
H.E.S. Fremantle, a former professor of English and 
Philosophy at the South African College, had been one 
of the fol.Ulders of the Nationalist Party from which he 
resigned in 1920 because of his objection to secession. 
Minutes of the following years' congresses were 
examined: 1917, 1920-19230 Newspaper reports of the 
Cape Party's congresses up to 1923 were also consulted. 
No reference to flag resolutions passed by these bodies 
(before the 1926/7 controversy) has been found in news-
papers which reported their congresses or in other 
sources. 
350 M.P.A. Malan, Die Nasionale Party, PPo 100-10 
J6o See Nasionale Party OoV.So verslag van die agste .~aar-
lilcse kongress, gchou op Bloemfontein op 11-12 Oktober 
1922; Nasionale Party OoV.S, verslag van die negende 
jaarJikse kongress gehou op Kroo~stad op 11-18 Oktober 
1.fil. 
cowitry, and I have £ought six elections -- and 
in my constituency there is a large section of' 
Dutch-speaking people -- I have not heard of' any 
such demand. There has not been any urge. To 
me it is something new.37 
N.Jo de Wet told the Senate in 1927 that af'ter some 
twenty years of' public lif'e he could not recall ever having 
been asked a question on the f'lag, while Deneys Reitz 
claimed that in his f'it'teen years as a politician he had 
not heard even ta chance ref'erence' to ito38 Many other 
S.A.Po parliamentarians expressed similar viewso 39 'I 
never heard much of' a f'lag in the Transvaal', complained 
Lo Geldenhuys: 'The people were never much occupied with 
it, and where does the scheme come f'rom now? It comes 
chief'ly out of' the brain of' the Minister of' the Interior 
40 
and other leaderso• Certainly, in the period bef'ore 
their accession to power in Jwie 1924, no Nationalist 
leaders other than Malan and Beyers came f'orward strongly 
as champions of' a new f'lago And in the election campaign 
of' 1924, the question was totally ignored by audiences and 
37. Hansard, volo 9, 4248, 27 May 1927. 
22 Ju..YJ.e 1 927. 
See also 5550, 
JS. De Wet -- Senate Debates, 28 January 20 June 1927, 
919, 24 June 1927; Reitz The Star, 12 October 1927. 
De Wet was the Leader of' the SoAoPo in the Senate; 
Reitz was MoPo f'or Port Elizabeth (Central). 
390 For example see Hansard, vol. 9, 4255, H.EoKo Anderson 
(Klip River), JO May 1927; 4432, c.B. Heatlie (Wor-
cester), 1 Jwie 1927; 4425, Wo Rockey (Parktown), 1 
June 1927; 4450, Sir Thomas Watt. (Dundee), 2 Jwie 1927; 
5451, Smuts, 21 June 1927; 5558, Nicholls (Zululand), 
22 June 1927. 
40. Ibid. 4245, 27 May 19270 Geldenhuys was M.Po f'or 
Johannesburg (North). 
41 
speakerso 
17 
All in all, it would probably be true to say that 
though South Africa possessed a flag which its people had 
not embraced, and though some wanted a new flag, neither in 
the Nationalist Party, nor in the S.A.P., nor in any other 
large group was there an urgently felt need for a new flag 
before the change in government in 1924. 42 
41. See Hansard, vol. 9, 5451, Smuts, 21 June 19270 
C.EoMo O'Dowd, 'The General Election of 1924•, South 
African Historical Journal noo 2, November 1970 
(hereafter cited as O•Dowd~, makes no reference to the 
questiono 
42. For contrary viewpoints see, inter alia, MoP.Ao Malan, 
opo cit. pp. 100-1; o. Pirow, James Barry MWlllik 
Hertzog, Po 120. 
CHAPTER II 
FLAG LEGISLATION IN 1~ 
The pa.ce quickens, JLU1e-December 1924 
The coming to pov;·er of the NationaJ.ist-Labour coalition 
1 in JLU1e 1924 stimulated the quest for a new national flag. 
Stimulation also came from two outside sources - Ireland and 
2 Canada. Both these states had ~ecently passed legislation 
defining the nationals of their respective states3 and had 
lo The description inew national flag' implies that South 
Africa already possessed a national flag. From the 
strictly legal point of view it rr..ay be argued that she 
did, since in 1910 the union Cabinet had adopted a flag 
which it de scribed as 'the FJ.ag of Uni tee. Sou th Africa' 
and as w the Union Flagi o (Ironically, and fortuitously, 
Hertzog- had signed the minute inviting approva.l for its 
design - A2-25, p.J; Eansard, volo 9, 4228-32, Hertzog, 
27 May 19270) Thus, the assumption of champions of the 
GovernmeLtis flag legislation that South Africa did not 
possess a national f'lag did not rest on soLU1d legal 
grounds. All the same, no Party denied that the 1910 
flag had never been embraced by the people and in. this 
sense it was certainly not a truly 'national flag'. 
For this reason, and to conform with the usage of the 
times which almost always ignored the existence of the 
1910 flag, the thesis hereafter uses inational flag' 
synonymously with 'new flag'. (For various statements 
as to whether or not South Africa had a national flag 
see, ca.pe Times, 28 May, 20 September 1927; Hansard, 
volo 9, 4042-J, Byron, JOJ-4, Coulter; Senate Debates, 
28 January-29 June 1927, 907-8, Malan.) 
2. Die Nasionale Party _van die Yaapprovinsie notule van 
negende kongres gehou op De Aar op 7 tot 10 Oktober ~ 
(her~after cited as Notule Kaa 1 2~), PPo 28-9, Mala.n's 
address, in flertzog Papers hereafter cited as H.Po) 
vclo 270 
J. Ireland in 1922 and Canada in 1921. 
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4 
also adopted or considered the adoption of new flagso If 
Canada, a fellow Dominion, bad seen fit to pass a 
nationality act, tbere should be no objection to South 
Africa fellowing suit with a similar measureo 5 More 
significant for our purposes was the use in the Irish Free 
State from 1921 of a flag from which all reference to the 
imperial connection had been excludedo The anti-British 
struggle waged by the Irish nationalists could hardly have 
failed to encourage local Nationalists and the call for a 
national flag by the Free State Congress of the Party in 
this year, and not before, was probably not unrelated to 
events in Ireland. 
6 Three months after the Pact came to power Malan drew 
4. The Irish (tricolour) flag was recognised by official 
usage from 1921/22; its position as the national flag 
was con£irmed by the Constitution of Ireland of 1937, 
Article 7 (An Bhratach N~isilhlta (Irish government 
publication with English translation), Po 6). 
In Canada attempts were made in the 1920's to 
persuade Government to appoint a conunittee to study 
designs for a distinctive Canadian flag. The strong 
opposition of pro-British patriotic societies precluded 
Government from pursuing the matter; however some 
Canadian nationalists were still campaigning for a new 
;flag in 1926 ( ::.:ee R.P., vol. 28, letter from G.A. King, 
editor of The Canadian, to Hertzog, N.Do [192~)0 When 
Canada adopted a new flag in 1965, the parliamentary 
debate was protracted and bitter. 
5. In Parliament, Malan took pains to stress the 
similarities between the Canadian Act and the Pact•s 
proposed legislation. 
6 o The term 'Pact' is used. throughout to denote the 
Nationalist-Labour coalition and 'Pactitea to denote a 
supporter of this coalition. 
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the attention of a Graaff-Reinet audience to the fact that 
Ireland and Canada had passed nationality acts and suggested 
that South Africa should have a national flag. 7 In the 
same month Die Burger also took up the call, rhetorically 
asking its readers if they could be ''n selfstandige, 
selfbewuste volk, die gelyke van antler volke, sonder 'n 
nasionale vlag?' and answered that without a flag: ''n volk 
is 'n weeskind. in die volkerery - 'n weeskind met tn 
ongestilde gemoedshonger, wat nog skerper word wa.nneer hy 
sien hoe antler volke hul eie vlag hulde toebringo, 8 The 
question had been deliberately posed with an eye on the 
forthcoming Cape Congress of the Nationalist Party which, 
in October 1924, for the first time since 1919, passed a 
resolution calling for a new flag.9 
Indicative of the growing interest in the possibility 
of a new flag was the competition held by the Sunday Times 
in September/October 1924 to find a design for a South 
African flag and the great response to it. 10 
7o Natal Witness, JO September 19240 
80 24 September 19240 
9o Notule Kaap 1924, Po 12. 
The last 
100 At the most recent Transvaal Congress of the Nationalist 
Pa.rty a resolution had been passed requesting the 
Government to hold such a competition (Ons Vaderland, 
26 October 1924). 
21 
flag competition in South Africa had been held in 19100 11 
Then the number of designs submitted had been some 250, now 
over ten thousand were allegedly received. 12 The Sunday 
Times awarded first prize to a design which contained no 
Union Jack or symbol of the British connectiono Nonethe-
less, a large number of entries contained the Union Jack or 
variants of it. 
As events soon showed, the decision of the judges was 
more a reflection of the thinking of the Sunday Times, 
where the moderate views of Sir Abe Bailey were often 
strongly felt, 13 than of English-speakers in many parts of 
the countryo However, the result of the competition 
14 
unquestionably pleased Malano It probably also led him 
to believe that he could rely on a large measure of support 
from the English section in legislating for a new flago 
Perhaps confidence in this support (together with his 
110 It had been held by the magazine The State of South 
Africa (see its vol. IV, no. 3, September 1910)0 The 
competition had been inspired by a similar one held in 
Australia on its gainine of Dominion status. 
I am indebted to Mr. JoFo Preller of the State 
Archives, Pretoria, for drawing my attention to this 
competition. 
12. The State of' South Africa, Vol. IV, No. 3, September 
1910, PPo 337, 338; Rand Daily Mail, 20 September 1925 
- for the figure of ten thousando (The Sunday Times 
merely stated that thousands of entries had been 
received). 
Several inmates of lunatic asylums sent in designs; 
one submitted a design daily for several weeks. 
13. See chapters v'11 o,1J x.,1'. 
140 See Ons Vaderland, 5 December 19240 
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failure to anticipate difficulties from Smuts) 15 encouraged 
him to draft a Bill whose terms, in effect, gave the 
Goverrunent the right to decree a national flag by executive 
fiato His miscalculation in presenting a Bill that 
granted the Government such wide powers was to have serious 
16 
consequences. 
The 1925 legislation and reaction to it 
Thirty-two years later Malan maintained that the 1925 
South African Nationality and Flag Bi11 17 was straight-
forward and reasonable. So far as the flag was concerned 
it simply declared that the Governor General could, by 
notice in the Government Gazette, prescribe the national 
flag. Although Malan later maintained that after 
Parlia.mentis acceptance of the Bill he had intended to 
15. See D.F. Malan, A .rikaner-Volkseenheid en m ervarin s 
O£ die pad daarheen hereafter cited as Malan), p. 103: 
also in articles on the flag controversy by DoF. Malan 
in Die Burger (hereafter cited as Die Burger (Malan)}, 
29 January 1957. 
16. As Minister of the Interior it was Malanis respon-
sibility to handle flag and nationality legislation. 
17. A10-25o Between 1925 and 1928 several South African 
Nationality and Flag Bills were drawn upo Except 
where clarity demands otherwise, in the interests of 
brevity they are referred to as Flag Billso 
There was as yet no legal definition of South 
African nationality. Malan maintained that nationality 
and flag legislation had to be linked; without the 
former the latter would not have a proper foundation; 
on the other hand, a national flag was essential to 
express South African nationalityo 
2J 
appoint a representative committee to advise on a suitable 
design, the Bill made no provision for this. In all 
events, the final decision would rest with the Pact 
Government. The merits of this plan, Malan argued, were 
that Vthe dangers of a party-political approach in and 
outside parliament' would be avoided and the committee 
18 
could discuss the matter in a calm atmosphereo 
The publication of the Bill on 22 January19 evoked a 
mixed editorial response amongst the Nationalists' three 
ma.in organs - the Free StateWs Die Volksblad, the Trans-
vaal Is Ons Vaderland, and the c.ape Province's Die Burger.' 
The first remained silento Ons Vaderland took three 
weeks to comment, and then reflected the priorities of 
many Transvaal Nationalists when it declared that self-
respecting citizens would welcome the Bill - the first 
step towards the realization of Article 4o 20 Only~ 
Bureer gave full and immediate support. It was quite 
satisfied that the Government would do its best to obtain 
a design in a way that would give the greatest possible 
t . f t. 21 sa is ac ion. 
18. Malan, p. 104: 
Translation. 
Such confidence was not shared by the 
Die Burger (Malan), 29 January 1957. 
19. Government Gazette Extraordinary 22 January~ 19250 
20. 17 February 1925. Article 4 of the Nationalist 
PartyVs constitution was widely interpreted as 
advocating a repubJ_ic. 
21 o 2J January ·1925. 
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oppo3ition press. They had no objection to a new flag 
provided it reflected the wishes of the people, and the 
proposed method of enactment was no guarantee of this. 
Replying to Die q_urger, the Cap,3 Time..§. on 24 January 
24 
cond,~mned the clause 'which proposes to give the Government 
the right to -l::hru:3t upon the people of South Africa a':ly 
kind of design it may select without any reference to the 
This would breate a wholly wishes of the peop~e'. 
Q'1.acceptable positiono From the outset the national flag 
would enter the political arena to a most undesirable 
degree. The Rand Daily Ma.il shared these viewso Among 
the mass of ill-conceived legislation., it considered that 
possibly non·3 would aro:ise mot:'e discussion than this. 
There was no objection to a distinctive national flag, 
provided the method of selection was acceptable to the 
bulk of the people; however any attem1')t · to impose a flag 
selected in accordance with the po.litical bias of a 
particular Party would certainly be mo;3t strongly resented. 23 
Even stronger was the col1dem:.1.atory tone of Ons Land; it 
denouncerl a fl,1.g by proc.lamation as an insult, and added: 
Vfioe heerlik eenvoudig1 Een vaderlike, 
autokratise Regering gebiedt en het staat er. 
D:::-o Malan vraagt volmacht om zelf te bepalen 
22. By 'opposition press' is meant those newspapers that 
were generally hostile towards the GovernmentWs f:iag 
• • 
mnasureso Similarly, 'opposition' includes all those 
who opposed these measureso 
23. 28 January 1925. 
25 
hoedanig de Natio.:iale Vlag van de Unie z1Jn zal 1 
En dit wordt gedaan in naam van demokratie. Een 
partijdige partijregering zoek volmacht om aan 
bijna de meerderheid •• ovan die volk een national~ 
vlag op te dringen. Dit is pragtig voo.rwaar!t24 
Like The Friend of 27 January it believed that the Bill in 
its present form wou.ld bring nothi:n.g but unhappiness to 
the country. 
On the question of the future of the Union Jack, three 
viewpoints were expressed. On 28 January the Easter~ 
Province Herald maintained ,:hat on technical grounds there 
was no reason why the Union Jack should not be excluded: 
Looking at the matter from the sentimental stand-
point we personally shall regret the passing of 
the Union Jack~ But at the same time we are not 
thoughtless of the sentiments which animate other 
fellow South Africans, and if a new flag to which 
all South Africans can bow will assist i~ the 
great work of fusing the races ••• we shall join 
loyally in doing honour to the new emblem. 
However, on the same day the Natal Mercury made it 
clear that if the new flag was to be accepted the Union 
Jack would have to be included. One week later the Daily 
Despatch pointed o:1t the dilenuna inherent in the problem 
of the Union Jack's i11.cl:1.sion or exclusion wheri it ob served 
that one section of the people would not be satisfied if 
sufficient prom.i.nence was not given to the Union Jack, 
whereas the other wo~ld be equally dissatisfied it if was 
given any prominance at alle Unless one section of the 
Pact sacrificed its cherished principles, it predicted that 
24. 2 January 1925. 
. 25 the Pact would not survive. Thus, the reception of a 
measure for which it was essential to have general agree-
ment if it was to achieve its goal had been anythi:ig but 
promisingo 
The withdrawal of the Bill 
0:':1. 16 February 1925 t.he South African Nationality and 
Flag Bill was i:..1. troduced :in Parliament. Although the 
second reading was listed for 25 February, it was not read 
again. On 21 July Malan rose to tell the House that the 
Bill was being withdrawn. He explained that the Govern-
ment was convinced as ever of' the need for a national f'lag 
and legislation should theref'ore not be delayed longer than 
the beginning of 1926. Since the national flag should 
bind the different groups together and occupy a place above 
division.s of race and politics, the Government would take 
every possi~le step to secure the greatest agreement on 
questions of procedure and design. With this end in mind, 
the Prime ML1.ister had approached the Leader of the 
Opposition who had agreed to the principle of a national 
:flag and was willing to co-operate in obtaining a no:::i-party 
flag. As a result of these exchanges the Bill was being 
withdrawn, and it was now hoped that after consultations a 
Bill wouJ_d be introduced at the beginning of the next 
25. 6 February 19250 The sectio:i of the Pact alluded to 
was, of course, the Labourite. 
27 
session which would embody the design of the new flag. It 
was hoped that this design would be 'generally accepted as 
the u:1.ited choice of all sections of the nation through 
their recognised political leaders., 26 
Malan later attributed the Bill's withdrawal to Smuts's 
persuasive powerso Smuts, he said, had persuaded Hertzog 
that it would be wiser to postpone the question :for a year, 
invite designs, submit them -co a Joint Committee, and allow 
it to make the final choice. In Malan's view, Smuts's 
motives were simply those of a.D Opposition leader anxious 
to share as much as possible in the Government's credit for 
a good measure 0 2 7 
This exp]_anation hardly suffices. Assuredly it was 
28 in Sm:.its2 s interests to co1.L1.sel delay. But it was 
probably clear to Hertzog and other leading Pactites that 
the proposed method of' legislation for a natio:aal flag was 
unwise. The immediate hostility of some opposition news-
papers had made this plain. The choice of a national flag 
was a particularly delicate one in South Africao If the 
Government were to press a.head on this sensitive question 
by legislation which had been condemned at the outset as 
dictatorial, it could offend many otherwise well-disposed 
26. Hansard, vol. 5, 6370-1; The Star, 21 July 1925; ~ 
Burger, 22 July 19250 
270 Malan, p. 104: Die Burger (Malan), JO January 1957. 
28. See below. 
28 
English-speakerso Claims to moderation and reasonableness 
might be forfeited from the start. Unquestionably it was 
highly desirable to obtain a national flag by general 
agreement, even if this meant delayo 2 9 Executive fiat 
could decree a national flag; it could never force the 
nation to em~race it. Once the opposition press had nade 
this clear, it hardly required the persuasive powers of 
Smuts to convince Hertzog of the need for a new approach. 
Approaching the problem through a Joint Committee 
could well provide the answero As it would contain 
representatives of all three Parties, its unanimous choice 
of a :flag could solve the problem. Even a majority decision, 
though obviously less satisfactory, was bound to reflect 
the views of both Nationalists and Labourites and it could 
therefore be claimed that their flag was not a strictly 
Party oneo Nationalists and English-speakers would have 
participated in its choice and the Government would at 
least have a flag to proceed with should it wish to do so. 
Since Pactites would be in the majority in the Committee 
there appeared to be no need to fear its choice. Whatever its out-
come, the Committee was likely to prove an asset to the 
Government: here was concrete evidence of its desire to 
meet the wishes of the people; hereafter it could maintain 
that a real effort had been made to arrive at a general 
290 See ~ vol. 27, Hertzog'_s draft reply on letter from 
Secretary of the Nationalist Party, Cape Town branch, 
27 June 19250 
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agreement o Thus HertzogYs decision to postpone legislation 
and convene the Committee was probably determined as much 
by genuine desire to reach agreement as by sound political 
strategy. 
There was another cogent reason for delay. The S.A.P. 
controlled the Senate. It could reject the Bill. The 
Government had no means of enacting the Bill in the present 
session. And a national flag born out of the conflict of 
a joint session could never be a truly national flago 
Once opposition to the measure became known, it was far 
wiser to consult the Leader of the Opposition and to try 
and reach some agreement as to procedureo 
legislative project had been injudicious; 
Malan 1 s 
it was far 
better for Hertzog to tacitly admit this and to make a 
fresh start. 
It may be asked why, if strong opposition to the Bill 
became known as early as January, the measure was not re-
drafted and a Joint Committee swnmoned during the session. 
Several reasons may be suggested. Apart from the brief 
six weeks' July-September session of 1924, the Pact 
Government had had little experience in initiating and 
carrying through legislation. Perhaps this helps to 
account for the fact that in the firE-t months of the 1925 
session, Parliament was not at all active.JO In its final 
JO. Cfo Hansard, vols. J, 4, and 5. 
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months it had to work hard to try to get through a heavy 
load of bills. Many Pactites probably thought that these 
should take precedence over flag and nationality legis-
lation. When Parliament was prorogued, the South African 
Nation reported that whereas at the start of the session 
the Opposition had declared that the Government had no 
~olicy, it later complained that the Government was 
attempting too much, while the Eastern Province Herald 
observed that the 'youngest political baby' might have 
warned the Government of the folly of putting forward a 
long list of measures and expecting to carry them in one 
. 31 
sessiono 
This list included some measures that were 'highly 
experimental and conte~tioust 32 and that were raising 
feelings in many parts of the country, such as Natalo 
During the Easter recess, Major G.Ro Richards spoke of the 
possibility of Natal seceding and warned: 
The manipulation of the language requirements, 
giving advantage in the Public Service to those 
whose tongue is Afrikaans, the resuscitation of 
all the rancour which was disappearing under the 
guidance of General Louis Botha, the vindictive 
nature of Nationalist legislation, which is 
mildness itself to what is to come, the attack on 
preference to British goods, the injury sought to 
be done to Great Britain, which has for years been 
our best customer, the removal of the King's head 
from our stamps, the hauling down of the Union 
Jack, the substitution of a South African 
31. South African Nation, 25 July 1925; Eastern Province 
Herald, 23 July 1925. The nwnber of bills withdrawn 
in the session was larger than usualo 
J2. Eastern Province Herald, 23 July 1925. 
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nationality for a purely British.nationality, and 
so on and so forth - all are proof of the 
domination of this Pact Government by a reckless 
and ruthless anti-British sentimeuto 33 
Hertzog and other Ministers may have decided that it would 
be wiser to slow down the pace in certain sensitive spheres. 
l h d ft h . h 34 In Par iament tempers a o en run ig o The •bullying 
and insulting tone' and •racial spirit' which had sometimes 
marred debates hardly provided a conducive background for 
flag discussionso Indeed, on 23 July Die Burger told its 
readers that the Government had informed it that, with 
Party strife raging in the Assembly, it had decided that 
the atmosphere was definitely not favourable for discussions 
on the flago 
There were hence several cogent reasons for the 
Government to delay. Once strong criticisms had been 
raised of the Bill the unwisdom of pressing the measure 
must have become apparent. A national flag had to be 
generally acceptable - not imposed; the Senate had a 
S.A.P. majority and the Bill's rejection was certain; the 
atmosphere was not favourable; the legislative program 
was heavy; and the issue was a sensitive oneo Probably 
all of these issues played a part in the decision to with-
draw the Bill. It is impossible to gauge with precision 
the relative weight of the various factors, but we can at 
JJ. Rand Daily Mail, 16 April 1925. (Richards was M.P. for 
Weeneno) See also Natal Witness, 4 March 1925. 
J4o Daily Despatch, 28 July 1925, commenting on the session. 
J2 
least confidently suggest that an important part was played 
by Malan's ill-judged legislative proposal, and qualify his 
assertion that Hertzog's decision to withdraw the Bill was 
due to the persuasive powers of Smutso 
Smuts, at the time, probably saw the question of a new 
flag chiefly as a potential source of difficulty for his 
Party and his support for delay and the new course can be 
readily understoodo More than ever since fusion with the 
Unionists in 1920, it was necessary for him to heed the 
sentiments of his English-speaking supporters; they con_. 
stituted a much larger percentage of his following than 
beforeo, As already noted, in December 1919 Smartt had 
warned against the hasty adoption of a new flag and strongly 
stressed the 'British section's' attachment to the imperial 
connection. In the popular mind this tie was symbolized 
by the Union Jack and it would have been naive for its 
champions to believe that a flag by executive fiat would 
not be a threat to its future in South Africa. Their 
views had to be consideredo And some did not hesitate to 
let Smuts know themoJ5 At the same time Smuts had to 
consider the views of his Afrikaans-speaking followers. 
Many had fought against the Union Jack and their sentiments 
towards it could be very different from those of his 
English-speaking supporters. In April 1920 Smuts 
J5. See .§..Po vol. 31, noo 140, from Sons of England, 19 
February 1925. 
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confided to a friend that 'the bulk of my own Dutch people 
are republicans and wish to secede from the British 
Empire,. 36 Though the views of some may have changed 
since then, it was clearly wise to move cautiously in a 
question so closely linked to the symbol of that Empire. 
An attempt to exclude the Union Jack from the new flag 
could create an uproar among Smuts's English-speaking 
supporters and force him to champion an emotional cause 
popular with one section of his Party but perhaps unpopular 
with the othero A policy of caution and delay was the 
wisest course for the S.A.Po 
Smuts's suggestion that flag designs should be invited 
from the public favoured this course. The plan had the 
merit of allowing people to put forward ideas that might 
prove useful and perhaps too of enabling them to feel that 
they were participating in the choice of the nation's flag. 
But, most of all, it favoured delay. Whereas a Joint 
Conunittee could be appointed and convened during the 
session, an invitation to the public to submit designs 
meant that time had to be allowed for their preparation, 
collection and the making of a flnal selection. And the 
completion of this, as will be seen, could be delayed for 
many months. 
36. ~ VO.lo 98, no. 112, to A. Clark, 9 April 1920: ~ 
der Poel, no. 240 
34 
Response to the Bill's withdrawal 
The possibility of a flag storm, and the emotions 
aroused by the introduction of certain other measures 9 37 
had exacerbated feelings in some places on both sidesa 
This may be seen in the reE,ponse to the Bill. 1 s withdrawal 
of two newspapers whose tones had been far more moderate 
six months ea.rlier when the Bill was first published. A 
preparedness to compromise had characterized the Eastern. 
Province Heraldls leading article on that occasion: now it 
said: 
Numbers of us in South Africa are content with 
the British flag; it is our own flag, we are 
proud of it, and love it, and it is very dis-
tasteful to us to be called upon to change it. 
While we live in a British Colony, or Dominion, 
we consider ourselves entitled to use the Brjtish 
flag, and we prefer it to any other now existing, 
or likely to be inventedo We have no objection 
to urge to those who like to see the fauna of 
South Africa on flags, but we see no reason to 
displace the British flag for one depicting any 
one or more of our antelopes, or bits of our 
sceLeryo If that sentiment gives offence we are 
sorry, but most emphatically we cannot help it~ 
and we have no intention of changing our flag.JS 
On the other side, six months earlier Ons Vad.erland 
had waited three weeks before commenting on the Flag Bill. 
~Tow it '\\ai t ed. only three days. Then its treatment of the 
measure had been short and unexcited; now it doubted 
whether the Government had been wise to withdraw the Bill 
and asserted that for the great majority the Union Jack was 
370 See Chapter TII. 
J8o 2J July 19250 Compare page 250 
a symbol of emasculation and ruin. Some wanted it in 
order to taunt them constantly with: 'Daar is ons ou-ma 
se vlaggie, waaronder julle moes buk., vergeet dit nie.' 
The same old spirit was confronting them: 1 Nog altyd die 
Jingo-gees, nog altyd die sug om te oorheers, om te 
domineer.ooeOns se beslis: NEE, NEEx, 39 
No such disappointment marked the opposition press's 
response. On the contrary, the Cape Argus of' 22 July 
35 
considered that no ministerial statement during the session 
would bring more satisfaction to moderate men than Malan's. 
The Cabinet had shown moral courage and its recognition 
that the feeling of all sections should be considered, 
tho~gh tardy, was welcome. To the Cape Times the new 
course was one of the wisest as well as one of the most 
conciliatory acts of the Government, and both it and the 
Daily Despatc~ praised Malan. 40 
These expressions of pleasure reflected the relief of 
those who had seen the immediate threat to their flag 
recedeo For a short while a storm had threatened to 
burst over the Union Jack. There could be no doubt, the 
Daily DesQatch warned, that had the Government persisted in 
pressing the measure in its original form tan immense 
39. 24 July 1925. Emphasis in original. For Die Burger's 
disappointment at the Bill's withdrawal see 23 July 
1925. Die Volksblad made no editorial commento 
4o. Cape Times, 22 July 1925; Daily Despatch, 28 July 1925. 
amount of' feeling wo11ld have been engendered'; this, it 
f'eared, would have done more to intensify racial dif'f'eronces 
41 than. anythi:i.g else that had happened f'or ma.-riy years o 
The immediate danger had passedo The opportunity now 
existed for the public arid their representatives to join in 
an effort to obtain a truly natio~al flag. If reason 
prevai.led, this did n.ot appear to bo an impossible task. 
41. 28 July 19250 
CHA~ER III 
THE FAILURE _.r_o REACH AGREE~"I\J"T 1 
AUGUST 1925 - MAY 1926 
The parliamentary session ended on 24 July 19250 Sy 
February 1926 the Government had marle little progress 
towards a national f'lag. In the seven months between 
these two dates, it had advanced only one small step: f'lag 
designs had been invited and received from the publico 1 
Some J 000 poured in to ·the office of W oDo Norval, Secretary 
.for the Interioro 2 Yet, by March 1926 they had still to 
be sorted; a selection had yet to be made; even the Select 
Committee3 had still to meeto The Government's advance had 
been minimal. 
1. Government Gazette Noo 1510, p. 157, 17 October 1925. 
A reward o:f £25 11Tas o-ff'ered :for t the best and most suit-
able' de sign .• 
2o Norval Papers. Norval was also Secretary of' the 1926 
Select Committee which examined the designso He had 
been MaJ.an' s Private Secretaryo 
J. This was the name u.sually given to the Joint Committee 
that met in February 1926 to choose a flag design. It 
was also sometimes referred to by Smuts and Hertzog as 
the Political Committee. To avoid conf'usion the thesis 
hereafter uses only the term Select Conunitteeo 
Smuts procrastinates between parliamentary sessions 
Between the en.«i of the ::;e.s:Jion and the end of 1925, 
both Hertzog and Malan tried to expedite the choice of a 
flago Smuts procrastinatedo When Malac1 proposed 1 
November as the closing date for the flag competition, 
Smuts counter-suggested 1 Dece,nber, t to avoid the appear-
a.nee of haste in so important a matterot Also, as the 
members o.f the Select Com.i-uittee would probably include 
M.P.'s, he doubted whether the Committee could start work 
before Parliament convenedo Finally, it was quite poss-
38 
ib.le that in order to reach general agreement the Comm.Lttee 
might wish to consult Hertz,)g and h.im. 4 There were thus 
several reasons, he argued, for the Select Corrunittee to 
begin its work only at the start of the next session. 
When Hertzog tried to hasten matters he enjoyed no 
more succeso than Malan had. ()n 10 November Hertzog told 
3mut s that he was anxious f'or the Se.le ct Cormni ttee to meet 
be.fore o~ immediately after 1 December - the date now 
agreed as final for .flag entrieso The Select Committee, 
he presumed, would be composed of' political leaders and be 
helped by a Heraldic Conm1i ttee of experts. Would Smuts 
suggest a member of the Heraldic Committee? He would be 
glad :for a quick reply; they had no time to lo:.:;e. 5 
·---
4o S!Po vol. 32, no. 209, Malan to Smuts, 28 August 192.5, 
and, VO.lo J4, no. 210, Smuts to Hertzog, 9 September 
19250 
5. S.Po vol. 32, no. 114, Hertzog to Smuts. 
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Smuts obliged with a quick reply - but not with the 
nom.ination. Both Conu:nittees should meet at the same time 
and not (as had been suggested) the Heraldic Committee 
first - to sift the designs - and the Select Committee 
latero The advice of the Heraldic Committee might be 
needed for the Select Conunitteeis own designso He was 
hesitant to ;,:iominate membera of either Committee u."'1.til he 
had consulted his friends; this would have to lvait till 
they came to Gape 'T'o~"1Il. In thifl matter he doubted 
whether greater haste would mean more speedo 6 Hertzog and 
Malan had little option bnt to acquiesce.7 
Clearly Smuts wished to dP.lay. Que st.ion.a thc1t 
threatened Party unity had to be treated with the greatest 
circum.5pection. One such threat came from Hertzog's 
Native Bills. Hertzog had made several statements on 
~ative policy in 1923-4 and in September 1925 F'.So Malan 
warned Smuts that there were differences of opinion on the 
Native question in the S.A.Pa, especially between its 
supporters in the Cape Province and Transvaal; they should 
8 be careful that it was not allowed to break up the Party. 
Then, on 13 November 1925, at Smithf'ield, Hertzog made his 
first comprehensive public statement on his opinions and 
60 SoP •. volo 34, no. 2J5, Smuts to Hertzog, 11 November 
1925. The Heraldic Committee finally consisted of 
Wo Blommaert and E.A. Walker, Professors of History at 
Stellenbosch and Cape I'mvn, respectivelyo 
7. S.Po vol. 32, noo 115, Hertzog to Smutst 23 November 
1925; Malan, Po 106: Die Burger (MalanJ, 29 January 19570 
8. SoP. vol. 32, noo 212, 11 September 1925: van der :e,Q,.~, 
no.-1690 
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plans with regard to Native policy. Smuts had no need of 
an additional divisive issue - such as the flag questiono 
Already the British Empire Service League (B.EoSoLo) 9 and 
10 Sons of England (S.OoE.) were pressing for the inclusion 
of the Union Jack in the new flago The response of some 
newspapers to the 1925 Bill was a further potent reminder 
of the strone feelings a flag dispute might evokeo Yet, 
whi.J e the ntmnst caution seemed desirable, the Nationalists 
were eager to move ahead. 
made Smuts suspiciouso 
Why? Their apparent haste 
Believing that the country was 
still anxious to give the Pact a chance, he wished to avoid 
an early general election11 and began to wonder whether the 
Nationalists¥ anxiety to advance was not related to oneo 
If an election occurred, a flag act would be a distinct 
19250 The BoEoS.Lo in 
in August 1921. By 
9. S.Po vol. 31, no. 95, 31 October 
South Ai'rica came into existence 
1926 it had abo:it 2 500 memberso 
the new title of the South African 
Empire Service League. 
In 1941 it adopted 
Legion of the British 
10. S.P. volo 31, nos. 140 and 142, 19 February and 27 Oc-
tober 1925, respectively. The full title of this 
Society was 'Sons of England Patriotic and Benevolent 
Societyv. The first South African lodge was established 
in Uitenhage in 18810 Later in the controversy the 
SoO.E. became extremely vocal. It appears to have had 
about 140 lodges and over 10 000 members at this time; 
its Grand President during most of the controversy was 
WoH. Pitcher, Town Clerk of Estcourt. See S.P. vol. 34, 
no. 169, nodo £"March 19207, Vere Stent to Smuts; Sons 
of England 1 Pat£Lotic ~.-1?.fill~ent Society What it isl 
What it stands forl; Dai~y Despatch, 11 September 1926. 
110 S.Po volo 102, no. 217, to Crewe, 18 December 1925: van 
der Poel, no. 182. At the end of the 1925 session 
Duncan thought the Government had improved its position 
in the co•.mtry (D 1.l.Ilcan Paper~, to Lady Selborne, 23 July 
1925)0 
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asset to the Pact. On 12 November he wrote to Smartt: 
The Nationalists seem in a mood to hurry this 
matter on, which makes me think they may contem-
plate a General Election in 1927 (after passing 
the flag next session). The Native Question may 
force them to an early General Election and ... they 
want to do some f'lag wagging of their own when 
that comes off. We shall have to deal very 
warily with this question which presents diffi-
culties and troubles of a delicate nature.12 
The linking of flag legislation to a general election gave 
an added dimension to the flag question and meant that for 
the S.A.Po the best policy was to press for the withdrawal 
of the Bill or, failing that, the incorporation of the 
Union Jack in the new flag in a way that would satisfy its 
English-speaking followers., As it was a multi-racjal 
Party, this in turn meant an insistence on the inclusion of 
the former republican flags of the Transvaal and Free State, 
for not only did this seem equitable, but in this way the 
support of thA Party's A.f'rikaB..ns-s:pea."k.ers could beet be 
attracted. 
The Select Committee .Qf_J.2..26 
When Parliament met on 22 Ja~uary 1926, its members 
were to face a mass of bills: fifty-six new acts were 
ultimately passed; 1 J much intended .legislation had to be 
12. S.,P •. volo J4, no. 2J8: van der Poel, noo 1760 
1J. By co~parison, in the following year, forty-four acts 
were placed on the statute book; these included five 
passed during the November joint session (cf. Statut~....§. 
of the Union of South Africa, 1926 and Statutes of the 
Un_ion of_§_QE-th 4-frica, 12n). 
wi thrl.rawno 14 And there were so~e stormy debateso The 
temper of these debates was plea::;mitly absent from the 
di_scnssinns of the Select CoEnittee which first met on 26 
Februaryo Under the chairmanship of Malan its talks 
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continued intermittently till 7 May, and four days later a 
short statement to the press was issued by himo 15 Apart 
from Malan there were seven members: for the Nationalist 
Party NoJo van der Merwe and WoHo Rood; for the Labour 
Party - H.W. Sampson and G. Reyburn; and for the SoA.P. -
Joel Krige, Sir Charles Smith and Duncano 16 
From the start there was a cleavage in the Committeeo 
Malan's view, and that of his supporters, was that the flag 
should not recall the strife of the past. The view of the 
SoAoPo members, and Reyburn, 17 was that the flag should 
14. Particularly stormy debates occurred during t~e passage 
of the Mines and Works Act 1911 Amendment Bill (Colour 
Bar Bill) and the Flag Billo 
15. D~e Burger, 8, 11 May 19260 No minutes were kept of 
the proceedings and it was agreed to publish nothing on 
what took place in the Committee (Hansard vol. 7, 4062, 
Joel Krige, 25 May 1926)0 
16. yalan, p. 107: Die Burger (Malan), JO January 19570 
17. Though a Pact:Lte, Reyburn ardently championed the 
inclusion of the Union Jacko Shortly after the Commit-
tee dissolved, van der Merwe told the Assembly in 
ReyburnYs presence: 'It is no secret what the hono 
member for UmbiloYs fReyburnv§] feeling is for the old 
:flag, anfl his knowledge of the pP-ople o-f Natal compelled 
him to say that the Union Jack should be includedo If 
there was one man who stuck out for the flag, it was the 
hon. member for Umbiloo' (Hansard vol. 7, 4057, 25 May 
1926). See also Ho Nicholls, South ~~ in My~-' 
p. 1800 Compare MalanYs: 'Die verteenwoordigers van 
die S.AoP., min of meer gesteun deur Reyburn 0 0 0 1 (Malan, 
p. 107)0 Did Malan not wish to admit the Pactite 
representative's O'.l.tright support for the Union Jack? 
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include some symbol of the British link - possibly the 
Crown or the Union Jack. 18 A way out of the impasse could 
not be foundo Though it appeared from private talks that 
a design submitted by Professor Eric Walker - a flag with a 
green vertical stripe and red, yellow and blue transverse 
stripes - met with the most artistic approval, the question 
of symbolising the imperial connection could not be 
resolved. 19 
At this point van der Merwe put forward a compromise 
--·-------
18. !1_alan, po 107: Die BurgE2£ {Malan), JO January 19570 
It would seem that one of the two Labourites suggested 
the incorporation of a portion of the royal standard 
with the British lion and crown in the national flag as 
a symbol of the British tie, but that the Nationalist 
representatives rejected the idea (Hansard, vol. 9, 936, 
Sjr Charles Smith, 24 June 1927). 
19c Malan, 107-8: ~Burger (Malan), JO January 1957. 
As early as 8 February 1925 Walker sent a design to 
Malan with the following explanationo WRed stands for 
the Cape Province. It is the royal colour of the Union 
Jack and one of the distinctive colours of the Nether-
lands flag; it iR associated by long use and wont with 
the Old Cape Colony; finally, it is a good striking 
colour which wears well •• ooBlue stands for Natalo It 
represents the sea to which that province has always 
looked; it is also the other predominant colour of the 
Union Jack and the Dutch flag; it also appeared in the 
republican flags. It is moreover, St. Andrews colour, 
the Scottish colour, and would thus appeal to the many 
Scots in the Garden Province and elsewhere in South 
AfricaoooaThe arrangement of the flag is the epitome of 
the history of South Africa - the red of the old Colony 
is the basis of' the colours of the three Trek states 
arising out of it. Incidentally, it is more or less 
geographically corrector Norval Papers, copy of letter 
to Malano 
Walker maintained that the orange bars of the Free 
State flag were unknown to heraldry and recommended the 
substitution of the yellow stripe. He had also sub-
mitted the above design with a crown. 
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plano Because a nlean flag20 would be seen as a step 
towards secession, he proposed that there should be two 
flagc. 
Af'rir.::i. 
One, the Walker :flae;, could be thA symbol of' South 
The other, the Union Jack, could be acknowledged 
as the symbol of the imperial cormection and flown on the 
th . 1 t. h" 21 occasions that expressed is re a ions ip. 
appears to have met with interest and sympathy. 
His plan 
Malan 
accepted it, while the three SoA.P. representatives 
22 
apparently expressed open or qualified approval. Their 
---------·---------
20. This term, used throughout the controversy, was 
generally taken to mean a fla~ that contained no 
unpleasant references to the past and therefore to 
exclude the Union Jack from a national flag. 
210 ~§:!l, 108; Hansa~i, volo 7, 4057-8, van der Merwe, 
25 May 19260 
22. Because it was later alleged, with much recrimination, 
that the SoAoPo representatives, and particularly Duncan, 
had reneged, some examination of this stage of the 
negotiations seems desirableo Malan, for instance, 
later maintainAd that all three SiAoPo representatives 
gave their personal assent to van der Merwe's idea and 
even agreed that, while they were obtaining their 
Party's concurrence over the week-end, Malan could give 
legislative form to their provisional agreement(~, 
pp. 108-9). Nicholls maintained that Duncan in effect 
agreed to a national flag without the Union Jack' 
(Nicholls, op.cit., p.180)0 However, during the con-
troversy Duncan denied that he 'had agreed or practically 
agreed' to the proposal (Hansard, vol. 9, 9455-6, June 
1927), while van der Merwe stated: 'It is true that 
ffiunc~ never stated definitely that he agreed with me. 
Even on the day when we decided to propose the Bill I 
asked, "Do you think that it does such violence to 
British sentiments?" Then he said he could not say, 
but that in any case he would consult his friends.• 
(Hansard, vol. 9, 5458, 21 June 19270) 
Duncan's private preferenr,e was for a national flag 
whir.h contained some symbol of the British connection, 
but he did not think this symbol had to include the 
Union Jack (PW!can Paper~, letters to Reyburn and Malan, 
25 June and JO August 1926, respectively, and letter to 
Lady Selborne, 2J Juno 1926). Duncan probably entered 
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sympathetic attitude apparently cut the ground from under 
the feet of Reyburn who, as a Pactite, could hardly reject 
a plan Opposition members were prepared at the very least 
to considero 2 3 
This hopeful situation was brought to an end during 
the Easter vacation when leading members of the SoA.Po made 
it clear to their representatives that a national flag 
withont the Union Jack would not be acceptable to many 
English-speakerso 24 Hence, when the Select Committee met 
again the SoA.Po represAntatives objected to the restricted 
use of the Union Jack and also insisted on its inclusion in 
the national flago They were prepared to incorporate the 
republican flags tooo But this was a poor bargaining 
counter; any enthusiasm Nationalists like Malan may have 
fe1 t for the.se ±'lags - and Malan was later to claim that he 
felt none - was more than counter-balanced by their aversion 
to the Union Jack.. Further negotiation was useless and on 
7 May the Committee dissolved. 2 5 
the discussion with this idea in mindo When van der 
Merwe put forward his plan, Duncan might have seen it as 
a way out of the impasseo However, Duncan was probably 
far too cautiouc a man - as.Nicholls himself describes 
him in a draft manuscript of his book - and too 
1\Y.:perienced a polit.ician to have 1:;iven his assent to 
van ,1er Merweis iden. without first consulting w:i.th Smuts 
and other colleagueso 
2Jo Nicholls, opo cit., Po 1800 
24e ~sard, volo 7, 4062, Jo~l Krige, 25 May 1926. 
25. Malan, Po 109; ~ansard, vol. 7, 4058, van der Merwe, 
25 May 19260 
46 
The Government decides to proceed with flag legislation. 
Despite the Select Committee's failure, the Goverrunent 
decided to press ahead with a flag bill .. Malan maintained 
that one o:f its main reasons for doing so was that the idea 
of possessing a national :flag in the immecliate future, 'Die 
26 diepste snare in d:Le volkshart geroer hett. As will be 
seen later, the contention that such a demand existed must 
be seriously challanged. r;nquestionably, one of the 
Government's main reasons for proceeding with the Bill was 
the belief that its withdrawal would result in a loss of 
f'ace. 27 Already the Bil.!. had '::>een withdrawn once; a 
whole year had passed since then. Another withdrawal 
would ::,e tantamowit to an admission of defeat on the qt1es-
tion, and coald be seen as a sign of weaknesso The S.A~P., 
Malan said, would have gained a weapon which it might use 
2fi 
against the Pact. Doubtles:3 this argument was pressed 
by Malan i::1 both Cabinet and Caucua where its merits could 
be readily appreciated., 
If this was the chief reason for proceeding, Malan 
could also argui3 that further delay was unlikely to result 
in a flag agreement with the s.A.P. A Select Committee 
had already failed to agree. He believed that within the 
S~A.Po a dominating sect.im.1. existed which did not wa":lt a 
26. Malan, p. 110: Dte Burger (Mala~), JO January 1957. 
27. See Duncan Papers, letter to Lady Selborne, 20 May 19260 
23. Mala.."l, Po 110: Die Burge~ (Malan), JO January 1957. 
J1.ation.al flag and, ii' forced, would only accept one that 
symbolized the Union's attachment, ii' not permanent 
subordination, to Englando 29 rhe -views of' the two groups 
were incompatible; delay was therefore futileo 
Then too, in an issue such as this, the Nationalist-
Labour coalition had an advantage which paradoxically seemed 
to oatweigh that of' even a purely Nationalist governmento 
For with Labo~r's help, Malan believed, they had every 
chance of' gaining the support of' a significant section o:f 
the English-speakers. 30 A flag passed with their help 
could not be stigmatized as the flag of one racial groU?o 
And such a flag already existed - the Walker flag, the 
choice of' both Nationalists and Labourites in the Select 
Cot11n.i t tee o 
But, colouring all thought on the problem of' with-
drawal or advance, was the question of' ideologyo The 
necessary concomitant of' nationalism is an ideological 
style o:f politics and for Malan ideology demanded that the 
Bill should be pressed. If' it were not, I.L.Ltold harm would 
have been done to their volksontwikkelingo 31 What did 
Malan mean by this? Certainly he looked forward to the 
growth of' a single South African patriotism and saw the 
flag as a means towards this end. But was this the f'lagts 
29. Malan, Po 11J: Die Burger (Malan), JO January 1957. 
JO. Ibido Both. 
31. Ibid. 
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only end? Volksontwikkeling could also mean the develop-
mcnt of the Afrikanervolk, of' the Boerenasie, of' Af'rika...-rier-
dom.32 There can be no doubt that when, earlier in the 
same paraeraph, Malan declared that the Bill co1.1ld not be 
withdrawn becan.se the idea of' their own national f'lag in 
the immediate f'utu.re had movod •die diepste snare in die 
volkshartr, the heart referred to was not that of' the 
people of' South Africa bu~ of' the Af'rikanervolk. It could 
not have been overlooked that what moved the volksh~ was 
in the interests of' Afrikaner nationalism, and these 
interests, for the ardent Nationalist, were the principal 
concern. Thus the flag conflict embraced a struggle for 
dorm:mt political souls, f'or the redemption of those 
Afrikaners still immersed in an alien envirorunent - such as 
the So~oPo provided. For Malan, the attairunent of a 
national flag was a step in a crusade. The final goal of 
this crusade was the gathering together of all those who 
by language, culture, religion and race belonged together 
in one volk - and one political party. And in the attain-
ment of this goal only the strongest necessity could 
32. For a discussion of the meanings given to the term volk 
by Afrikaner intellectuals, see D.F. du T. Malherbe-;---
Af'rikaner-Volkseenheid. After discussing distinctions 
drawn between nasie and Y.2.!!s,, Malherbe writes (p. 24): 
'As iemand praat van "Ons Volk," dan weet elkeen hy 
bedoel die "Boerevolk" of "Boerenasie" of "Afrikaner-
volk"o' Professor L.J. du Plessis is quoted as follows 
(p. 26): '0ns verwerp geheel-en-al die opvatting dat 
al.le S1.1id-Afrikaners saam as een volk gereken moet word: 
Die Afrikanerdom is vir ons die Volk van Suid-Afrika, 
en die res van die Suid-Af'rikaners is, vir sover hulle 
blank is, ~f' potensiele Af'rikaners, ~f' vreemdelinge.' 
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justify another year's delayo 
These views were not confined to Malan: they permeate 
all nationalist ideology and were shared in the Nationalist 
Party. When its Caucus met a few days after the Select 
Com..~ittee dissolved, it decided wianimously to push ahead 
with a flag billo The Bill was to provide for the Walker 
flag as the national fla6 and the hoisting of the Union Jack 
with the national flag on 'any official occasion which is 
intended specifically to indicate or represent the relation 
of the Union to the British commwiity of nations•o 33 The 
Caucus, Malan declared, in approving the Bill was almost 
'onkeerbaar geesdrif'tig,.34 
We may take leave to question Mala.n's picture of' Party 
enthusiasm. One week before the first reading of the Bill 
on 20 May, Smuts asked Hertzog if the Government would 
introduce any further legislation that session; Hertzog 
replied: 1 The Bills that still have to come are merely of 
an administrative charactero,35 
commented: 
Later that day Smuts 
From this I gather that it cannot be the intention 
JJ. A.B. 72- 26o 
J4o Malan, Po 111: Die Burger {Malan), 30 January 1957. 
The exact dates on which Natalists and Labour Caucuses 
decided to proceed with flag legislation were not 
reportedo Almost certainly the Nationalist Caucus 
decided on 15 May. On 11 May Nationalist and Labour 
Party Caucuses met; these however merely confirmed the 
prize-winning designs in the Government's flag com-
petitiono First prize went to Walker's designo 
350 Hansard, vol. 7, J499o 
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to proceed with the Flag Billo But of course 
one can never tell. With Hertzog it is the tail 
that wags the dogo And the poison of the 
Nationalist party is distinctly in its tail, where 
the racial animosity al~hough usually suppressed 
is very bitter indeed.J 
Hertzog's reply seems to indicate that at least the 
most importa~t member of the Nationalist Party was not 
uncontrollably enthusiastic about pursuing a flag billo 
Another was the Deputy Prime Minister, Tielman Rooso Malan 
could not recall whether Roos spoke in the Cabinet meeting 
on the flag37 a.:.~d certainly Roos•s undisguised coolness on 
the need for a new flag throughout the controversy makes it 
difficult to visualize him, and some of his Transvaal 
colleagues - Grobler, for example - as participants in a 
flag caucus that was 'byna onkeerbaar geesdriftigo,JS 
Both Hertzog and Roos had priorities that came before the 
flag and they (and others) may have been prodded into 
supporting the Bill, as Smuts thought possible, by the more 
ardent flag advocates. In its final decision, then, the 
Caucus may well have been unanimous; but Malan's picture 
of almost uncontrollable enthusiasm is misleading, obscuring 
the degrees of enthusiasm - or lack of it - within the 
Nationalist Partyo 
J6. S.Po, vole J6, no. 172, to Crewe, 14 May 1926: ~ 
der Poel, noo 197. 
37. Malan, ppo 110-111: Die Burger (Malan), JO January 
19570 
J8. P.G.Wo Grobler was Minister of Landso He was later to 
exhibit little enthusiasm for a new flago 
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If lack of enthusiasm was hidden in the Nationalists' 
Caucus, it was not so in the Caucus of their Labour allies. 
The latter's failure to reach wianimity on the need to 
press a flag bill evidences thiso At least one Labour 
MoPo opposed the Billo Malan understood this to be GaA. 
Hay.39 and as Hay later agitated against the Bill this seems 
highly probable o Yet, it was T.Ga Strachan who expressed 
misgivings about the Bill in the Assembly a few days later 
and it therefore seems likely that at least two Labourites 
opposed the Bill in their Party's caucuso But that others 
doubted whether it was wise to press a measure that might 
offend English-speakers, on whose support the Party 
depended, can hardly be doubtedo 
English-speakers' fear of Afrikanerization 
Neither these dissident Labourites nor Smuts had over-
estimated the English section's attachment to the Union 
Jack. The flag storm that burst over South Africa in the 
following weeks proved this. In the nine days between 11 
and 20 May, that is between the publication of the Select 
Committee's statement and the first reading of the Bill, 
tension mounted rapidlyo This tension was directly 
related to the English section's sentimental attachment to 
39. Malan, Po 111: Die Burger (Malan), JO January 19570 
Hay was M.Po for Pretoria (West). 
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the Union Jacko 40 But this fact must not be allowed to 
obscure two others: tension was intimately related to the 
English section's fear of the Afrikanerization of South 
African society, and to its fear of secessiono 
It was to be expected that under Nationalist dire-ction 
the new Government would entrench the individuality and way 
of life of the Afrikanero In May 1925 Afrikaans was 
41 
recognized as an official language. Equality with 
English in of£icial use was rigidly insisted on and civil 
servants, including those who had no contact with the 
public, had to be fully bilingualo Because fewer English-
speakers were bilingual, they were now at a disadvantage. 
In the four years' period 1920-1924, J 071 English- and 
1 760 Afrikaans-speaking officials were appointed to the 
civil service; in the next four years their numbers were 
3 154 and 3 097 respectively. 42 Complaints soon arose 
that English-speaking officials were being oppressed and 
jockeyed out of positiono 43 Ill-feeling was particularly 
strong in Natal. In December 1924 the Natal Witness 
complained against the 'bi-lingual fetish' of tracialists 
and language fanatics' and in the following March warned 
4o. For expressions of this see below. 
41. Act Noo 2 of 19250 
42. JoH. Conradie, The Fruits of Four Years, A Short Resume 
of the Work of the Hertzog Government.L 1924-1928 {Cape 
Town, n.do), Po 7. Compiled and published by authority 
of the Federal Council of the National Party of S.A 0 
43. Ibido 
53 
that it was time the Government became aware that Natal was 
thoroughly sick of' tthe ecstatic worship of the Afrikaans 
ft . h' 44 e J..S " Who are the people clamouring for this Flag 
Bill? the Natal Mercury asked on 20 May 1926., They were 
the people, it answered, who in every way possible were now 
forcing the pace of the Afrikanerlzation of South Africa; 
they were the people who were using bilingualism as a 
scourge for the backs of British-born civil servants. 
It was not only insistence on language rights that 
caused fear of Afrikanerization., In February 1925 the 
King was requested not to grant titles to subjects domi-
ciled or living in South Africa. 4 5 In July 1925 an Act 
required three yearsi residence .in the Union to qualify for 
railway appointment. 46 The King's head failed to appear 
on a new issue of' postage stamps; 47 the heraldic design of 
the Government Gazette was changed; the crown and lion 
disappeared from coins. All these were seen as ominous 
signs of the Afrikanerization of South Africa and fear and 
44. Natal Witness, 16 December 1924, 4 March 1925. 
45. D.W. Kruger (ed.), South African Parties and Polibi~ 
a Select Source Book, p. 121; Duncan Papers, letter to 
Lady Selborne, 26 February 1925. 
46. Act No. 23 of 1925. 
47. These stamps had actually been approved by the SoA 0 P. 
Government (The Star, JO June 1926, letter from Smartt; 
The Guardian, 25 June 1926, in the Alexander Papers, 
No. 18). 
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resentment were aroused. Here, it was thought, were 
portents of the futureo In April 1925 Richards charged 
that Natalians were being 'slowly and surely ground into a 
position of permanent inferiority, and our birthright in 
land, position, authority and status is being daily filched 
from us before our eyes., 49 The proposed exclusion of the 
Union Jack increased fears. Commenting on the Government's 
intended legislation, the Daily Despatch declared a few 
days before the 1926 Bill was read for the first time: 
Since it came into power, the Government has done 
all it ca~ to weaken the links that bind South 
Africa to the Empire, and to abolish outward and 
visible signs of the British connectiono The 
King's head is removed from our stamps, the "Cnion 
Jack is to go from our flag.aoothe British 
members of the Public Service are gradually being 
eliminated. Where is it all going to end? 
There was a limit, it warned, to the patience of the 
British section; that limit was being approached rapidly.50 
Other newspapers of the time were no less critical. The 
Katal Mercury or ... 15 May complained that Katal had tolerated 
a great deal in the interest of racial accord: she had 
acquiesced in a bilingual policy 'vastly different to that 
set down in the bond of Union' ; she had acquiesced in the 
48. See, £or instance, Lewis Michell Collection,. Diary 1 
December 1925 - J1 December 1926, entry 27 May 1926., 
Michell was a former General Manager of the Standard 
Eank of South Africa and was a. keen observer of the 
South African scene. He was now over eighty years old. 
49. Rand Daily Mail, 16 April 1925. 
50. 15 May 1926. See also issue of 21 May 1926. 
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more subtle Afrikanerization of the educational system of 
the Union. Natal too was approaching the end of l:,er 
patience. The Eastern Province Herald charged on 20 May 
that the solemr_ pact of Unior~ had been undermined, steadily 
and stealthily. It listed symbolE of the British 
connection that had been removed. These removals, it 
assertec., had. increased resentment and suspicion. Then 
too, the Government's new budget policy enabled Germany and 
even lesser Continental countries to undercut Britain for 
Government bulk orders repeatedlyo5 1 All the above, 
prececing and coinciding with the flag issue, had made 
English-speake,rs more suspicious of change, less sure of 
themselves, less certain of their continued power and 
influence in South Africa, and greatly increased the ill-
feeling between the parties during the controversy. 
Fear of secession 
Fec:.r of Afrikanerization. was linked to fear of se-
ce 1::;sion. Although as a price of the Pact Hertzog had 
agreed that no Nationalist parliamentarian would use his 
vote to upset the existing constitutional relationship 
between the Union and the British crown, the Wsecession 
bogy' refused to be laid. The Nationalistsi past pro-
nouncements on the Union's status were too fresh in the 
51. O. Pirow, James Barry Murmik Hertzog, p. 12J. 
public's memory while Hertzog's present ones, and 
Nationalist organ's comments or:. them, often alarmed the 
English section. Hertzog's main political objective, out-
side the field of Native affairs, was to achieve a greater 
international status for the Union so that he continued to 
tackle the question of South Africa's status after coming 
to i:,owero Statements, such as the one he made at Zastron 
in November 1925, that the right to secede f'rom the Empire 
would only be exercised if both sections of the population 
wanted it, failed to reassure English-speakers,52 the bulk 
of' whom felt the statement should not have been made at 
all. Earlier in 1925 Richards had insisted that not one 
parliamentarian with full inside knowledge had the slight-
est doubt that the Government aimed to establish another 
Dutcb republic, while in 1926 the far more moderate 
Fremantle charged that not one of' the Nationalist leaders 
had been 'straight about secession, and not one either has 
or c.eserves the confidence of English South Africanso t .53 
When the Government began to remove British symbols 
suspicions were heightened. The acts were seeu as a 
prelude to the removal of the British connectiono If' the 
request not to grant titles to subjects domiciled or living 
in South Africa - a right which Hertzog could claim was 
52. The Star, 16 Kovemher 19250 
53. Rand Daily Mail, ·16 April 1925; Fremantle Collection, 
volo 9, letter to Michael, 4 June 1926. 
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undemocratic -· was seen as a concession to republican 
54 sentiment, how much more was the removal of a concrete 
symbol of the British tie like the Union Jack likely to 
arouse suspicion? Res-ponding in 1924 to Malan's Graaf'f'-
Reinet speech, the Naill_.Witness confessed that they would 
regard his plan for a new flag with less suspicion if' the 
Nationalists and Q!e BurgEl.£ had not for so long advocated 
absolute independence. •They cannot complain,' it said, 
'•ovif loyal South Africans suspect that there may be some-
thing behind this eagerness f'or "our own f'lag," as the 
symbol of 11 South African citizenship. 11 155 When after the 
f'irst reading of the 1925 Bill Ons Vaderland explained that 
the measure was the t'irst step towards the realization of 
Article 4,56 such suspicions were given added weighto At 
the time of the first reading of' the 1926 Bill the~ 
Daily Mail wrote: 
••• the public has watched with growing concern 
the disposition of' the government gradually to 
whittle away every sign and symbol of' the British 
connection ••• o.Many people today are even inclined 
to think that, though General Hertzog has 
jettisoned the word "secession", he has retained 
the ideal, _and that recent happenings may be only 
cautious and artfully contrived steps in the 
direction of' this realizationo It is, in part, 
this fear which underlies the antagonism to the 
present attempt to foist upon the Union a 
meaningless flag.0057 
54. D 1..mcan Papers, to Lady Selborne, 26 February 1925. 
55. Natal Witness, JO September 1924. 
56. 17 February 1925. 
57. 21 May 1926. 
The Star was no less explicit. It pointed out that the 
past two years had seen the gradual, unobtrusive, but 
methodical elimination of signs of the Union's link with 
Crown and Commonwealth. Some of these things might seem 
58 
trifles, 'but they have their significa.nce'o At Stellen-
bosch tbey had just heard the Prime Minister's claim to 
full national and. international independence in the form 
of' a 'declaration of' rights' - even if' this declaration 
brought about the disintegration of' the Commonwealth. 
Suspicions had been aroused. It had to be recognized 
that a good many things had happened since the Government 
ca.me to power; Hertzog and his colleagues could not 
complain if their motives were suspecto5So 
Hertzogvs Stellenbosch speech on 16 May was particu-
larly ill-timed to sooth fears of secessiono His call for 
the declaration was regarded tby the man in the street' as 
'thinly veiled secession•,59 a belief' endorsed by~ 
Burger's comment that if the declaration was forthcoming 
it could be accepted tbat the Government intended to adhere 
strictly to Article 4, the ultimate object of which was 
'perfect freedom and sovereign independence., 60 Of the 
proposed •declaration' the Rand-Daily Mail said: 
58. 20 May 1926. See also 21 May 1926. Hertzog had 
maintained that a 'declaratioL of' rights' should convey 
to the world the national and international status of 
the autonomous members of the British Commonwealth 0 
590 Duncan Papers, to Lady Selborne, 20 May 1926. 
600 Die Burger, 17 May 1926 (translation)o 
59 
Unfortunately, an impression has gained grol.Uld in 
this col.Ultry, not without good reason, that many 
influential nationalists have not the faintest 
desire to seek for any formula that would keep 
the Union in the British Corrunonwealth of nationso 
To them independence is synonymous with secessiono 
o •• Complete severence from the Empire is their 
goal, and it is because they have attached this 
meaning to independence that other South Africans 
fear the results of their policy, if by any changy 
they should be able to translate it into action. 
To The Star the import of the speech was clear: Hertzog 
had developed a line of thought which led obscurely but 
inevitably to one conclusion: 
adhere strictly to Article 4: 
. 62 independence. 
the Government intended to 
its goal was sovereign 
Thus three interrelated factors must be kept in mind 
if the response of English-speakers to the attempt to 
exclude the Union Jack from the national flag is to be 
understood: prjde in the Union Jack; fear of Afrikaneri-
zation; and fear of secession. Seen against this back-
ground, English-speakersi reaction - sometimes shrill - to 
the Governmentis decision to press flag legislation is 
readily understood. 
Yet another factor worsened the political climate of 
May 19260 This was the ill-feeling created by certain 
bills the Government introduced in the session. Not 
61 . 1 9 May 1 9 2 6 o 
62. 18 May 19260 See also 19 May 1926. 
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since Union had such contentious Bills been brought forward. 
On 2J April The Areas Reservation Bill, an anti-Asiatic 
Bill which reserved certain areas for certain classes of 
persons, with withdrawn. In February, another racial 
measure, The MineE, and Works Act 1911 Amendment Bill 
(Colour Bar Bill}, which restricted the sphere of labour of 
Africans and Asiatic5,was pressed. For the second time 
the Senate rejected it - after it had met strong opposition 
in the Assemblyo The Joint Session on this Bill ended 
only one week before the first reading of the Flag Bill and 
was marked by acrimonious debate. Hertzog made several 
bitter attacks on Smuts. He condemned one of Smuts's 
speeches as Ythe most brazen example of shamelessness' ever 
to occur in the Hou$e; another was •the greatest imper-
tinence' he had ever witnessed. As for Smuts himself, no 
person had been so gu.il ty of immorality in public life and 
. 63 
shown so great a lack of eth1cso 
Hertzog raised the temper of the English section even 
further during this debate by a strongly worded attack on 
the Anglican clergy and otherso The cause of his anger 
was a document appealing for the withdrawal of the Colour 
Bar Bill on the grounds that it infringed moral and 
religious principles. The document had been signed by all 
630 Joint Sitting of Both Houses of.Parliameni, Mines and 
Works Act, 1911 1 Amendment Bill, 7th May to 12th May, 
1926, col. 33, 10 May. 
the Bishops of the Anglican Commwiion in South Africa, 
representatives of missionary bodies and Native Welfare 
Societies, and by many well-known citizens. Hertzog 
insisted that the appeal contained a 'lying attack. 1 which 
no responsible man had the right to make and dismissed 
their petition as a tmost irresponsible document•. 64 
The response of the opposition press was an equally 
strong condemnation of the Prime Minister. 1 Unmannerly', 
'wibalanced', 'stupidly provocative', and 'wildly racial-
istic in its allegations', were some of the descriptions of 
. 65 Hertzog's 'almost hysterical speech'o Hertzog's argu-
ments revealed his 'incredible egoism amowiting almost to 
megalomania,0 66 In a letter to Crewe on 14 May, Smuts 
wrote that Hertzog's attack on the churches and mission-
aries had been 'in shocking bad taster, 67 but had he been 
in possession of the previous day's Daily Despatch he might 
well have added an addendum, for Crewe's own newspaper had 
hit out with the strongest words of all: 
'You are liars,' Gen. Hertzog screamed, like any 
little guttersnipe who is at a loss for a replyo 
'You are lwiatics; you are irresponsible; you 
have made a lying attack,' he shrieked out 
64. Joint Sitting of Both Houses of Parliament, Mines and 
Works Act, 1911 2 Amendment Bill, 7th May to 12th May 2 
1926, col. 39, 11 May 1926. 
650 Cape Times, 15 May 1926; Rand Daily Mail, 12 May 1926 
(quoting other newspaper reports). 
660 Rand Daily Mail~ 12 May 1926. See also Eastern 
Province Herald, 12 May 1926. 
67. ~' volo 102, noo 218. 
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hystericallyo And this abuse is hurled at heads 
of people like the Archgishop and Bishops and 
{other signatorie§loooe 8 
At this wipromising juncture, the Government brought forward 
its new Flag Bill. 
The press in the week before the first reading 
The joint session on the Colour Bar Bill ended on 12 
May; on 11 May the Select Committee's statement was 
published; a few days later the Government decided to 
proceed with flag legislation. The existing tensions in 
and outside Parliament - evoked by long-standing fears and 
exacerbated by recent legislation - were now to be further 
aroused by the press's outcry against, or support for, the 
Flag Bill. In the week before the first reading, leading 
articles became increasingly demanding. They directed 
their attention particularly to (i) the failure of the 
Select Committee, (ii) the decision to carry on with a flag 
bill, (iii) the proposal to fly the Union Jack on two 
specified occasions, and (iv) the Walker flago 
(i) Of the English language newspapers, only The Friend 
criticised the stand of the SaA.Po member·s of the Select 
68. 1J May 19260 C.P. Crewe was Managing Director of the 
Daily Despatch. During the War of 1899-1902 ·he raised 
and trained a volw:iteer corps in the Eastern Province 
and wa~ decorated with the Companionship of the Bath 
for these services. From 1910-16 h~ was M.P. for East 
London. Crewe was active in public affairs and a 
prominent figure in the Eastern Cape. 
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Committee; their Party, it thought, had attached too much 
value to the inclusion of the Union Jack. 69 On the other 
hand, the Daily Despatch believed the S.AoP. representa-
tives' proposal to include both the Union Jack and the 
former r~publican flags in the new flag was fair - even 
generous. Whereas the former republics had covered only 
one-third of the Union's area, the Cape and Natal had 
included two-thirds; and whereas the republican flags had 
flown for not more than fifty years, the Union Jack had 
flown over the Cape and Natal for over two hundred years. 
The offer had been generouso70 
The Rand Daily Mail maintained that the offer to 
include all three flags had been the best. On the surface 
van der Merwe's plan looked good; but it would please 
neither section because neither race was likely to forget 
its past. 71 To the Natal Mercury of 12 May the proposal 
to abolish the flags of the past had been merely a bribe to 
get rid of the Union Jack and the SoA.P. representatives 
had been right to reject it. 
That same proposal to the three Nationalist Party 
ne~spapers seemed particularly fair. On the same day, 12 
May, Die Burger maintained that it reflected the true 
69. 11 May 1926. 
70. 15 May 19260 
71. 11, 13 May 1926. 
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constitutional position and took into account the feelings 
of all. Despite the views of the S.AoP. representatives, 
it was convinced that the great bulk of the people, of all 
Parties, favoured a clean flag. Ons Vaderland on 14 May 
asked why, if the.Sunday Times could award first prize to a 
clean flag, the SoA.P. representatives could not accept one 
too? Die Volksblad found their reason clear: at the 
instigation of 'loyal little Natal' the S.AoPo had insisted 
on the inclusion of the Union Jacko The Party wanted the 
whole matter to fail; it wanted to keep the Union Jack; 
and Vdaarom word voorgestel om ons vlag te verneder tot tn 
lap wat aan die Union Jack vasgeknoop wordov72 
(ii) Convinced of the justness of their cause and the 
fairness of the flag formula, the Nationalist press urged 
the Pact to bring in the Bill.73 It was impossible to go 
back, Die Burger declared on 12 May: the great mass of the 
people enthusiastically hoped for their own flag before the 
end of the se~sion. However there was no sign of this 
enthusiasm in the opposition press. It had been under-
stood, the Daily Despatch protested on 15 May, that the 
Government would not introduce the Bill unless unanimity 
had been gained: the previous July Malan had said the 
Government wished to find a design 'which shall be accepted 
72. 12 May 1926. 
73. Die Burger, 12 May 1926; Die Volksblad, 12, 14 May 
1926; Ons Vaderland, 14 May 1926. 
(iii) 
as the united choice of' all sections of the nationo' But 
this had not been obtained; the Select Committee had 
failed. The whole procedure of' tr.e Government was attacked 
as a breach of' f'aith.7 4 
Enthusiasm f'or flag legislation among English-speakers 
could hardly have been fostered by what was beint.; said in 
the Nationalist presso The same leading article in Die, 
Vo.Lksblad of 14 May applaud.1.ng the decision to proceed with 
the Flag Bill, warned the Governmer.t to provide f'or the 
sparing use of the Union. Jacko Indeed, on the question of 
f'lying the Union J·ack as a cepa.rate Rymbol of the imperial 
connection, there was no harmony. The proposal, greeted 
by orre side as a generous concession, was rejected by the 
other as an intolerable restriction. And each side cited 
the principle on which it was based to prove the justness 
of· its own case o Chiefly, disagreement revolved around 
two points: when was the Union Jack to be flown, and did 
the BillVs provision justify the Union Jack's exclusion 
from the national flag? 
In answer to the first question Die Volksblad was 
frank: VGebruik horn spaarsaamv, advised the title of its 
leading article on the question. Almost every city and 
town was predominantly SoAoPo and already they could 
irr_agine the wranglin{:'; about whether or not the Union Jack 
740 Natal Mercur~, 13 May 1926; ;pretoria News, 20 May 1926 0 
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should be flown on certain occasions; champions of the 
Union Jack "·ould see every occa.sion as being related to the 
British connection. Constantly the British flag would fly 
next to their owno Unless the Government defined the 
occasions·on which.the Union Jack was to be flown very 
carefully, the whole flag business would become a fiascoo 75 
Clearly, for Die Volksblad. the less often the Union Jack 
was seen the bettero 
Two days earlier the ~l Mercury had asked: who 
would decide when the Union Jack was to be flown? '£hey 
could depend on it that the Nationalists would ensure that 
it was scarcely ever seeno This would excite derision and 
distrust; there would be endless debate; the proposal was 
'palpably absurd' 0 76 Wati the Union part of the Empire only 
on special occasions? asked the Daily Despatch. Its denial 
was emphatico The Union was part of the Empire always, 
'on every day, hour and second - and this relationship to 
the Empire should not be forgotten for an instantot That 
was precisely why the Union Jack should form part of the 
South African flago 'And that, of course, is precisely 
·why the Government has excluded it entirelyo t 77 
75. 14 May 1926 o 
76. 12 May 19260 See also The St~£., 20 May 19260 
770 15 May 19260 See also the Rand Daily Mail, 20 May 
1926, on the iindignitya of the Union Jack being flown 
on only two specified occasions. 
(iv) 
Whereas Die Burger claimed that the :flying of the Union 
Jack negated arguments that the new :flag was a mask :for 
secessjon; the Rand Daily Mail argued that the plan proved 
its own superfluousness. For if there was no objection to 
flying the Union Jack as a symbol of the imperial connection 
alongside the national £lag, why should there be an objec-
tion to flying it inside the national :flag?78 Each side 
tt.ought the proposal cut the growid from Wlder the feet of 
its oppor.ents. 
However, the brunt of the attack fell on the design of 
the Walker :flago Not :for an instant, Die Burger assured 
its readers on 12 May, did it doubt that this design would 
meet with general approvalo It was a flag that could 
inspireo The inspiration took different formso A 
'nondescript abortion', a Vtawdry scrap of bunting', a 
Ystriped sugarstickv, a Vpolychromatic patchwork•, were 
some of the phrases with which the design was assailed. 79 
The Natal Mercury of 1 J May rejected this tnor..descript rag 
of mixed ancestryv, declaring: 'It reflects no sentiment, 
recalls no great exploits, and inspires no patriotismo It 
represents nothing in particular and will appeal to no 
section of the community save that which wishes to 
obliterate all recognition of our relatior-ship with the 
78. Die Burger, 12 May 1926; Rand Daily Mai.\_, 13 Nay 1926, 
respectivelyo 
79. Daily Despat2h, 15, 21 May 1926; I,tie Star, Pretoria 
News - 20 May 1926. 
British Empireoi From the standpoint of sentiment, 
tradition and history, The Star declared on 20 May, the 
flag was meaningless. 
The flag's pattern too n::et with severe criticism and 
its resemblance to the Vierkleur brought forth angry 
80 
charge so The Natal Mercuu protested on 15 May that 
the new flag was nothing other than a beautifully~ 
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blending of' the two former republican f'lagso There was no 
doubt whatever that from the moment of its official appear-
ance republicans would accept it as a resurrected Vierkleuro 
But there was no particular surprise in this, not to those 
who knew the tAfrikanderY mentalityo 
This last remark reflected the rising temper of the 
controversy and the exasperation of' those who saw them-
selves as the victims of an insincere compromiseo The 
argument that the design was a compromise was rejected as 
'pure fudgev and the 'former party of secession' was 
accused of' having sacrificed nothinga 81 All the surrender 
had to come from the Briton. And, the Natal Advertiser 
warned: 
There were some things too sacred for men to 
argue about, some sentiment too deep for logic 
chopping. The Briton's love for his flag is one 
such matter, and we will not offend against our 
---------· 
810 
See Daiil..l)espatch, 18 May 1926; Cape Argus, 19 May 
1926. 
~pe Argus, 19 May 19260 See also Natal Mercury, 12 
May 192 • 
own race reticence by babbling what this history 
meanso Any man of British stock ought to be 
above arguing the merits of his flag just as a 
decent man would forbear proclaiming aloft the 
virtue and extolling the graces of his wifeo 
F'aith in these merits should be intertwined in 
the roots of his heart, they should be part of 
his being, and any man should be able to pluck at 
his national standard without his feeling at once 
that the attack is upon the very source of his 
race existenceo •• oif Natal allows the Pact to 
filch its flag away then Natal deserves to have 
the harrows of the Pact triwnphantly drawn 
exultingly backwards and forwards over its supine 
form till in its agony it cries aloud and there 
is none to heed or help it.82 
This fiery cry, raised so close to the first reading of 
the Bill, augured ill for a flag settlemento Soon the 
anger and frustration that had produced it would show its 
face all over the Union. Time and time again the 
opposition press warned against thrusting a generally 
unacceptable flag upon the people; to do so, it protested, 
was to defeat the very object of the Billo 83 On 20 May 
the Pretoria News came out with yet another strong leading 
article; in the light of later events its warnings were 
not extravagent. The Government's determination •to ride 
roughshod over the sentiment of half the European 
populationw was branded as follyo Instead of seeing the 
breakdown of the Select Committee a~ a warning that no 
aereement 'which ignored the historical importance of the 
Union JackW was possible, the Government had chosen to see 
820 Daily Despatch, 18 May 1926 citing Natal Advertiser. 
See also Natal Mercury, 12 May 19260 
8J. See, for instance, Rand Daily Mail, 11, 13, 20 May 19260 
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its failure as justification for substituting a steamroller 
in the place of conciliation. And, it continued: 
oeothey have flung their Vstriped sugar sticki 
design into the arena like an apple of discord, 
and racial and political feeling are being 
stirred in a manner and on a scale t.hat this 
country has not known for half a generationa In 
all parts of the Union protests are being rai3ed. 
Natal is ablaze with indignation, but this is a 
matter on which the English-speaking people in 
the other provinces feel just aa strongly. 
It w~rned that if the Government continued along these 
lines, they were Vsimply asking for troubleV; they were 
taking the shortest cut to racialism of the bitterest kinda 
'The moment had comev, it exhorted, Vfor instant action on 
the part of English-speaking people in every part of the 
countryo' 
Already in Natal the tocsin had been soundeda On 15 
May the Natal Mercury called on Natalians for an outcry 
against the Bill that would force its postponement or with-
drawalo On 18 May in East London the Daily Despatch 
reported that a petition was being signed in Durban urging 
the Mayor to hold a protest meeting against the proposed 
It reported that the response had been enthusiastic; 
one of those circulating the petition was a prominent 
Labourite. Two days later the same newspaper warned that 
the time might have come for the other provinces to join 
Natal in emphatic and organized protesto That afternoon, 
in the Transvaal, the call went out: 
was urged to call a protest meetingo 84 
840 Pretoria News, 20 May 19260 
the Mayor of Pretoria 
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On 20 May, the day of the first reading, opposition 
newspapers raised their voices fervently against the Billo 
The Rand Daily M~ll complained that the Government was 
acting unwisely, 'indeed, almost insanely', by trying to 
f'orce a 'futile and meaningless design' upon the Union; 
Malan had acted 'with almost incredible insolence'; the 
Government's persistence in its present attitude of 'blind 
and stupid disregard' of' deep-rooted sentiment would 
inevitably lead to unhappy consequenceso 
The Cape Times warned that once again bitter 
hostilities would be roused; wounded sentiment would not 
be quiescento Against this Bill, it said, stood the solid 
sentiment of English-speaking South Africa. This senti-
ment, it declared, was neither contemptible nor negligible. 
That afternoon The Star raised its voiceo It was reluc-
tant to believe, it said, that the Government would be 
guilty of 'the incredible folly of forcing on South Africa 
a brand new flag which nobody really wantso' It warned 
that the new flag would be nobody's flag; it insisted that 
two £lags would bring disuniono 'In view of the 
suspicions aroused', it concluded, 'we can scarcely imagine 
a less favourable moment to insist on a new flag of the 
kind proposedo r 
Certainly a more unpropitious moment for the intro-
duction of the Flag Bill could hardly have been f'ound. 
For this, Nationalist Ministers and MoPo's cannot be held 
72 
solely responsible: the agitation of the opposition press, 
particularly in the week before the first reading, 
contrihuted much to the excitement. However this agitation 
was triggered of'f by the decision of' the Government to 
enact a clean flag - despite the Select Committee's 
inability to find a generally acceptable designo The 
over-riding sensitivity of certain Nationalists to their 
own grievances had blunted their awareness o.f the possible 
grievances of others. They underestimated the growing 
anxieties of many English-speakers, their fears of 
Afrikanerization, their suspicion of secession and the real 
attachment of many to the Union Jack. And as counsellors 
to the Cabinet on these feelings, Creswell, Boydell and 
Madeley f'ell s.hortp perhaps relying too much on their own 
.feelings as a guide to those of the English section as a 
wholeo 
On 14 May Smuts observed: 'The flag question has now 
to my mind become a screaming f'arceo The two stream 
policy has now become a two-Pole policy •• ooI await 
developments with amusement and utter contempt for the 
chief actors in this sorry melodramao,S5 Whether the 
dramatic form the conflict later asswned wao melodrama, 
tragedy, or farce, must depend largely on the viewpoint of 
the beholder. But there can be no doubt that by 20 May 
1926, the stage itself had been brilliantly set for a 
Jingo-Nationalist clash. 
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CHAPTER IV 
PARLIAMENTARY READINGS AND PUBLIC PROTEST, MAY 1926 
First reading of the 1926 Flag Bill 
On 20 May, amidst great public interest, the first 
reading of the new South African Nationality and Flag Bill 
took place. The S.A.P. had decided to fight the Bill from 
its first reading, an unusual step which showed the strong 
feelings the measure had evoked. 
his wife: 
On 2J May Smuts informed 
I have no feeling for Eric Walker's flag. I do 
feel for the dear old Vierkleur and also under-
stand the attachment of the English to the Union 
Jack. Both flags are great historical facts. 
But what is Walker's flag? The Natso with their 
crazy secession propaganda want to break with 
everything in our past. But I am not prepared 
to do that. If our people cannot, in both its 
sections, agree on a new flag, I am ready to wait 
until they can 0 1 
The fight from the start was perhaps not unrelated also to 
Smuts's suspicion, which he still held at the end of 
February, that the Nationalists intended to hold a general 
election on the question of Hertzog's Native policy in 1927. 2 
1. ~ vol. 36, no. 184, 2J May 1926: 
~, no. 199. 
and in van der 
2. S.P. vol. 36, no. 125, letter to wife, 25 February 1926: 
in van der Poel, no. 186. For Duncan's fears of an 
early general election see Duncan Papers, letters to 
Lady Selborne, 26 February, 1 April 1926. 
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This was a question which, it was feared, could create 
division in the ranks of the S.AoP. and gain votes for the 
Nationalistso 3 We have already noted that Smuts related 
the passing of a flag bill to such an election and con-
sequently would have preferred to delay an election - the 
longer the Pact remained in power the more likely it was to 
decline in popularity and commit a blundero Refusal by 
the Government to withdraw the Bill would mean its rejection 
in the Senate and ·a joint session would then be required, 
in another parliamentary session, for its final passage. 
The flag question would therefore still be a fresh issue in 
the next general election; and it was an issue which, 
unlike Hertzoe's Native Bills, could work to the advantage 
of the S.AoP. rather than the Pact with its English-speaking 
Labourites' support. 
When Malan applied for leave to introduce the Bill, 
Smuts rose immediately to object. He began by asserting 
that the introduction of so important a measure in the last 
days of the session smacked of levity and contempt for 
public opiniono The Government, he warned, 
must know the strong feelings about this Bill, 
and if they do not, they will soon know it, and I 
say that long before this Bill is through both 
Houses of Parliament, this country will be in a 
3. See p.39 SoP. volo 36, no. 172, letter to Crewe, 14 
May 1926: also in van der Poel, no. 197; S.P. volo 36, 
noo 225, letter to Gillett, 25 March 1926: in van der 
Poel, no. 189; Duncan Papers, 1etters to Lady Selborne, 
1 April, 13 May 1926. 
state of' turmoil and exci temen.t as we have not 
known for a long dayo4 
If tbe Select Committee, whose S.A.P. representatives 
incJ.uded Ythe sanest, most moderate and calmest men in 
South Africav had been unable to agree, how much less so 
75 
would the country at large? Smuts told the House that the 
flag problem was not a matter of mere politicsa It raised 
far-reaching national issues; it tonched historical senti-
ments and traditions that went far beyond present-day 
politic so Tbe Government might force the Bill through 
Parliament, but it would destroy the foundations of racial 
unity; it might impose a flag on the nation, but it would 
be a flag of division - neither honoured nor accepted. 
Rather than abuse power by forcing the views of a majority 
upon a minority, Goverr~ment should prove its wisdom by 
deferring the question for calmer and more mature 
con.siderationo 5 
As Smuts had confined himself largely to condemning 
the timing of the Bill, it fell to Sir Drununond Chaplin to 
deal with the merits of its contentso Chaplin emphasized 
that tbe SoAoPo was not opposed to the adoption of a 
separate national flag, provided proper representation was 
giver.. to the Union Jack - the flag which most people of 
British origin honoured and under which they had been 
4o Eansard, volo 7, 3776g 
5. ~- 3775-80 
brought Upo But the Prime Minister by failing to give 
such assurances, and by apparently surrendering to 
extremists who looked upon the inclusion of the Union Jack 
as an offence to their susceptibilities, was going to 
plunge the country into a state of turmoil. He hoped 
Hertzog would withdraw the Bill and leave the matter over 
6 for calmer thought. 
Labour's support for the Bill was first voiced by 
A.G. Barlow, who accused the Opposition of deliberately 
fostering racialism in order to return to power. The 
Labour Party, he said, would support the Governmento It 
was prepared to pay the price.7 
But whereas the next Labour speaker, H.Bo Waterston, 
echoed these tones, maintaining that the S.AoP• was using 
the Union Jack for Party purposes and exploiting the white 
workingman, 8 ToG. Strachan, who followed, was clearly more 
sensitive to the price Barlow seemed so willing to pay. 
As the representative of a constituency in Natal and not 
the Free State, his position was indeed invidiouso Most 
of his supporters were English-speaking workingmen who, 
though they might share the Afrikaners' suspicion of 
6. Hansard, vol. 7, 3780-J. Chaplin was MoP. for South 
Peninsula. 
7. Ibid. 3778-80. Barlow was M.Po for Bloemfontein 
(North); this was the only Labour constituency which 
had a majority of Afrikaans-speaking voters. 
8. ~- J78J-6. Waterston was M.P. for Brak.pan. 
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financiers and fear of the black proletariat, had no axe to 
grind against the Union Jack. To most of them, this flag 
symbolized not a hated imperialism but their mother countryo 
Strachan would support the Bill, he said, if the Government 
proceeded with it. But, he could not agree with all that 
his Labour colleagues had said. Nor could he express 
enthusiasm on the need or urgency for a national flag. 
Indeed, 'In so far as Natal is concerned, I believe that if 
the Governme~t proceeds with this Bill, not a single member 
on the Labour benches will come back to this House in 
support of' the Pacto' He too appealed to the Government 
for·restraint; it should pause and reconsider.9 
Malan then rose o That the Government was acting in 
haste, he denied. For the past two years people had been 
considering the essential point: was the Union Jack to be 
included in the national flag or not? He rejected the 
claim that the Government had consented not to reintroduce 
a flag bill should the Select Committee fail to agree. As 
for the argument that it was too soon in South Africa's 
history to introduce a flag bi11;0this had been presented 
by perhaps the last man who could justifiably do so. For 
if there was one person who had-raised expectations of' a 
9o Hansard, vol. 7, J78J-8. Strachan was MoPo for 
Pietermaritzburg (North)o 
10. Smuts had maintai~ed that the ill-feeling which existed 
made the Bill undesirable, which was, of course, not 
the same argument. 
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new flag, at least in certain circles in South Africa, that 
man was Smuts. Both in 1910 and 1919 Smuts had supported 
the idea of a flag for the Union. A S.AoP. Congress 
itself had in 1919 favoured a national flag. 11 
Smuts had charged that the new flag would not bring 
racial unity but racial division. Yet that was precisely 
the position at present: in the two northern provinces the 
two former republican flags were used at predominantly 
Afrikaans fw1ctions; similarly, the Union Jack was used at 
predominantly English functions. The past needed to be 
forgotten; the sections in South Africa had to shake hands 
and look to the future. What was required was a flag that 
mirrored these needs. 
Malan alleged that the failure of the Select Committee 
was due solely to the insistence that the Union Jack should 
be included in the flag - by persons outside that Committeea 
Indeed, so long as there was a S.A.Po whose only weapon was 
the raising of racial hatred, there would be no agreemento 
The only path for the Government was to obtain the greatest 
possible agreement, and to carry ono Their absolutely 
reasonable attitude in the Select Committee would ensure 
the support of moderate ·people. If there was anything 
that would make it clear that the S.A.P. was ruled by the 
Sons of England, by the extreme jingo section of the 
11. Hansard, vol. 7, 3788-90. 
cowitry, it would be this Bill. In effect, Malan 
concluded, they had here a trial of strength between the 
'sons of England' and the 'sons of South Africa', and in 
this struggle the latter would show what they were made 
f 12 0 0 The first reading was then put and carriedo 13 
Agitation against the Bill 
79 
Although the bills so far advanced in a busy session 
had revealed a sharp and frequently hostile cleavage of 
opinion in Parliament, it was mild compared with the storm 
which now swept the country. In commenting on the flag 
situation on 14 May 1926, Smuts had predicted that the 
exclusion of the Union Jack from the national flag would be 
14 
seen as a racial challenge. It is not surprising, given 
the existing suspicions,that this prediction should prove 
true. Already, before the first reading of the Bill, both 
overt and implicit appeals had been made to racial solidar-
·t 15 1 y. With the first reading of the Bill, English-
speaking South Africans protested as never beforeo Almost 
at once, in centres both large and small, protest meetings 
12. Hansard, vol. 7, 3791-3. 
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14. 
Voti::1.'s was along Party lines: 
and 48 againsto 
there were 69 votes for, 
~ vol~ J6, noo 172, letter to Crewe: 
~' noo 1970 
in van der 
15. See Natal Mercury, 12 May 1926; ~ly Despat£.h, 15 May 
1926; Cape Times, ~g__J>aily Mail - 20 May 1926; 
~ly Despatc_.h, 18 May 1926 citing Natal Adverti~. 
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erupted.. All within a few days, in Cape Town, Johrumes-
burg, East Londor.., Pretoria, Port Elizabeth, Ui tenhage, 
Ladysmith, Cathcart, Kimberley, Pietermaritzburg and else-
16 
where, enthusiastic ci tizer:.s met in public protest. 
Natal, always the most British of the provinces, led 
the fieldo There, the response to the Bill was immediate. 
In Durban, Union J·acks were to be seen everywhere - on 
lapels, motor-cars, buildings and trams. Letters poured 
in to the newspaperso The mayors of various towns began 
to take the lead and call public meetings. 17 
On the day after the first reading, a protest meeting 
was held in the Durban city hall amidst great enthusiasm. 
A crowd of nearly ten thousand was present - about half' 
hearing the speeches from outside the city hall through 
loudspeakers. The mayor stressed the 'moral and commer-
cial value Y of the Un.ion Jack and the effect of' its removal 
on the native mind. 'We must resist this', he warned, •or 
we shall become outcasts and foreigners in a country where, 
after all, we have a rightful stake and interestG' Other 
speakers emphasized that the flag was 'part and parcel of 
the very fibre of their being; the symbol of freedom and 
16. See Rand Dailv Mail, 21, 22, 2J, 26 May 1926; Die 
Volksblad, 22 May 1926; Daily Despatch, 21, 27 May 
1926; Q.aEe Times, 22, 24, 26, 27 May 1926,; The Star, 
26 May 1926; The Friend., 27 May 1926; Eastern 
Province Herald, 27 May 19260 
170 Natal Mercury, 21 May 1926. 
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justice'; that Natalians were determined to have the Union 
Jack as the flag of the Union.; that the Government was 
sitting on a volcano and that this volca...~o would soon 
erupt. And, challenged Colonel Molyneux, 'I want to meet 
the man who is coming to Natal to pull dovm the Union 
18 Jack.' 
burg. 
Similar ardour marked the protest meeting in Johannes-
Again an overf'lowing crowd of' about- seven thousand 
was present. The new flag was declared to be a threat to 
their liberties and to the basis of' the Act of' Union; it 
would become a tparty badger. The Bill was condemned as 
an attempt to f'orce an unwanted flag on a great proportion 
of' the citizens. However, Malan and his sympathisers wer~ 
attempting something that could never be achieved tw.hile 
500 000 British men, with British blood in their veins, 
walk the streets of' South Africa., And, once again: 
'God help Dr Halan if he comes to JohannesburgJi 19 At 
Cape Town, East London, Pretoria, Kim~erley20 and elsewhere, 
protest meetings followed much the same pattern. Fervent 
sineing of patriotic songs - 'Land of Hope and Glory, 
'God Save the King', •Rule BritaruLia' preceded the 
18. Niltal Mercury, .Q_ape Times - 22 May 1926; London Times, 
24 May 1926. 
19. Rand Daily M&!., Cape Times - 26 May 1926. 
20. Cape Town - Cape Times, 26 May 1926; East London -
Daily Despatch, 26 May 1926; Pretoria - The Friend, 
27 May 1926; Daily Despatch, 28 May 1926; Kimberley 
The Friend, 27 May 1926. 
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speecheso These addresses were sometimes statesmanlike. -
calling for moderation and concern for the susceptibilities 
o:t· all; but often the speeches were jingoistico In all 
cases, the omission of the Union Jack from the national 
flag was deplored. 
Various societies and individuals too were quick to 
condemn the Billo The Very Revo WoAo Palmer, Dean of 
Johannesburg, asserted that nothing was more likely to 
destroy peace and arouse racialism than this Billo The 
Mayors of Boksburg and Brakpan called for the inclusion of 
the Union Jack. A deputation of the Caledonian Society 
urged Malan to postpone the Bill and refer the flag question 
to a joint committee againo The Dominion Chairman of the 
B.E.S.L~ advised Hertzog not to impose a flag that was 
unacceptable to any section.. 21 And the Sons of England, 
having already sent a letter of protest to all English-
ak . MP 1 8 A ·1 22 d t l t h spe ing o o son pri, an e egrams o t e mayors 
of fifty towns urging them to call protest meetings, 23 
again expressed itsstrongdisapprovalo On the day of the 
Bill's first reading, the Society's Grand President, on 
behalf ot' his Executive Council, protested 'most strongly' 
210 Cape Times, 21, 22 May 1926, for Dean and Caledonian 
Society, respectively; Rand Daily Mail, 21, 22 May 
1926, for Mayors and B.E.SoLo, respectivelyo 
220 Hansard, volo 7, 4057, NoJo van der Merwe, 25 May 19260 
2Jo Die Burger, 20 May 19260 
83 
against the exclusion of the Union Jack. 1 In the name of 
the English section of South Africa's population,1 he 
telegraphed Hertzog, •the Society finally appeals to you to 
honour the undertaking, given in Parliament, that the flag 
to be legalised shall be an emblem acceptable to both 
sections of the two white raceso•; 24 'fraught with dis-
aster' would be the forcible creation of a flag unacceptable 
to half the Europeanso 
Of' the greatest importance in moulding English opinion 
in South Africa were the main English language newspapers. 
Many of' their editors, leader writers and directors had been 
born and educated in Great Britain2 5 and still thought of 
the Union Jack largely in Kiplingesque termso They were 
quite out of sympathy with the Afrikaner and Nationalist 
aspirations" To them, any compromise which excluded an 
imperial symbol from the national flag was unthinkable. 
If many English-speaking South Africans were sensitive 
to Af'rikanerization, it was to be expected that these 
journalists would be· even more so, and that a Bill such as 
Malan proposed would alarm them greatly. Their leading 
articles on the flag question before the first reading 
24. Q_aily Despatch, 21 May 1926. 
i W1dertaking1 see pages 26-7. 
For the Government's 
25. For example: GaAoLu Green of the Cape Argus, CoDo Don 
of· The Star, Ba Ko Long and Go Ho Wilson of the £ape 
Times, RoJoKo Russell of the Natal Mercury and CoPo 
Crewe of' the Daily Despatch (K. Donaldson, South African 
Who's Who 1925-1926 and South African Whols Who 1927-
1228) 0 
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evidenced this concerno Now, between the first c:u1d second 
readings of' the Bill (between 20 Eilld 25 May), they made 
every eff'ort to rouse opinion against the measure and bring 
about its withdrawalo 
They attacked Malan, accused the Government of creating 
new difficulties, invoked the spectres of Afrikanerization 
and secession, warned against ruining the country's future, 
branded the 'ultra-Nationalists' as the real jingoes i:Uld 
racialists in South Africa, and stressed that the flag's 
design would never he accepted as a true national flag. In 
the opinion of The Star, Malan's lame apologia, his too 
innocent air of surprise that any feeling should have been 
displayed, were anything but convincing. As for his claim 
that the Bill would commend itself to 'all moderate and 
reasonable' men: 'The only moderate and reasonable men are, 
of course, those who shut their eyes and open their mouths 
and obediently swallow whatever the Government chooses to 
. 26 give them o v 
That the flag question concerned not merely political 
parties but also the future of South Africa, was a point 
made in more than one leading article. The Natal Mercury 
argued that if the flag question dealt with the part 
British associations were to play in the Union, it dealt 
too with the role the Union itself was to play in the 
260 21 May 1926. 
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See also Rand Daily Mail, 21, 22 May 
development o:f African civilizationo 
reached a clear parting of the wayso 
South Africa had 
One road led 'to a 
Big White Africa in which the Union will have leadershipo 
The other leads inevitably to Little Afrikanerdom - a 
backwash state with bywoner morals and a dorp mind., 2 7 
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Characteristically the DailX Despatch did not pull its 
28 punches. There was no room for anything but the plainest 
of plain speaking, it saidu The Bill was being used as a 
weapon of offence, as a deliberate dig at all that the 
British in this cotu1try held most sacredo But South 
Africa was British, ifor the simple reason that she is 
controlled and colonised by the British people. The Dutch 
element has always been honoured, in a perfectly friendly 
spirit, by the British community, and the Nationalist 
Government replies by attacking everything that the British 
hold most dearo' It was unlikely that the patience of the 
British people in South Africa would survive this final 
insulto On the :flag question there could be no compromise; 
they must hold out for the Union Jacka 'This is not the 
thin, it is the thick, end o:f the wedge 0 1 2 9 
27., 22 May 1926. See also Rand Dailx Mail, 22 May ·19260 
280 Its strong views on the :flag question reflected those 
of j ts Managing Director, Sir Charles Crewe, and were 
probably also influenced by the fact that a Labourite, 
James Stewart, had narrowly missed being re-elected to 
Parliament for East London in 1924. 
29. 21 May 1926., See also cape Times, 21 May 19260 
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Equally outspoken and likely to evoke racial feelings 
were the comments of the Cape Time8o It declared that a 
small minority of Dutch-speaking people cherished hatred as 
though it were a treasured national possessiono The more 
heavily they could trample on the traditions of English-
speakers the more pleased they seemed to beo No thought 
for the welfare of South Africa restrained them. They, 
the Nationalists, could not foreet, nor could they forgiveo 
At the sight of the Union Jack inveterate hatred rose in 
them and they were demanding that the national flag should 
register and perpetuate this hatredo But, 
to the English-speaking South African Llt warnecJ] 
the Union Jack speaks of the old land o:f his race, 
the mother o:f freedom, progenitor of great races 
in new lands, mistress of the seas - a parent-
- nation whose offspring, in South Africa as in 
every quarter of the Globe, reverence, admire, 
love hero There is no arguing with a sentiment 
such as thiso It is in the bone; taciturn and 
undaunting; but persistent, stubborn, incontest-
ably admirable, indomitable and enduringo30 
This was the sentiment, it said, that was raising its voice 
in every part of' South Africao 
More significant perhaps than these defiant words, as 
a reflection of growing opposition, was the stand taken by 
a newspaper which thus far in 1926 had refrained from 
comment on the flag questiono On 23 May, the Sunday Times 
condemned Vthe unseemly political wranglei that had arisen 
over the Flag Billo It suggested that the Vracial 
JO. Cape Times, 21 May 19260 
outburst' had possibly been caused by 'the government's 
contempt - we should prefer to say ignorance - of public 
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opinion 0 V People could not be compelled to pay attention 
to any Vnew-i'angled banner' which held no meaning for themo 
South Africa had many problemso 
like and non-Party solutionso 
These required statesman-
'Can we 1 we ask the Govern-
ment, afford to waste precious time, and brawl like 
ux1intelligent savages, over non-constructive legislation?• 31 
A real explosion had taken place and both the Pact 
Parties seem to have been taken by surprise at the storm of 
anger that broke on their proposal to exclude, ;the Union 
Jack. 32 Though some protest meetings had yet to take 
33 place, there was no doubting the strength of the hostility 
that had been aroused. Over 20 000 signatures demanding 
the Bill's withdrawal were obtained in the Johannesburg 
areao Other towns also drew up petitions; by 27 May over 
3 500 people had signed a petition in Kimberleyo 34 When 
Sir David Harris visited Kimberley in June he informed 
Barlow that the agitation there was not artificial: 
Creswell may say until he is blue in the face 
that the SoAoP• is responsible for all the 
opposition and spreading of propaganda, but 
310 Italics in originalo 
320 Round Table, no. 64, Po 859 (September 1926)0 
330 Such as those in Cape Town (25 May 1926) and Pretoria 
(27 May 1926)0 
J4. PoSoMoio volso 13 and 14 (for Johannesburg and 
Kimberley) o 
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believe me it is not true. Since my arrival in 
Kimberley I £ind there is a deep rooted feeling 
against substituting the Vierkleur £or the Union 
Jack (sic), there has been no agitation here, nor 
is there any necessity £or ito3, 
Headings in Die Burger on the day following the first 
reading laid bare the troubled political scene: Die 
Agitasie in Pretoria Hoe dit Opgesweep Word 
Die Geskreeu in Johannesburg Hoe die Gemoedere Op-
gesweep Word Die Woede in Natal Uit-
barsting van die Mercury Natal Dreig Weer met A£-
skeiding Ook Oos-London Gaan Protesteer 
'Op hulle Agterpotet Ywerige Sons of EnglandoJ 6 
No mere wire-pulling by the SoAoPo or journalistic rhetoric 
could of themselves have caused such a conflagrationo 
The Government was forced to halt, to recognize the reality 
0£ the hostility aroused, and to reconsidero 
The Labour Party's difficulties 
For the Labour Party, in particular, the position was 
ominous. Wracked by internal dissension and holding only 
thirteen per cent of the Assembly's seats, it had to move 
cautiously in what had become £er it a potentially dis-
ruptive issueo The Party had no lack of such issueso 
Discord was caused by several £actors. 
35. Arthur Barlow Papers, 21 June 19260 
.'360 21 May 19260 
Many Labourites 
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felt that the Pact had brou€,'ht them little benefit: it had 
fa.iled to obtain an eight-hour ilay; it had not improved 
mi::ling conditions and wages; it had not re-opened an 
inquiry into the 1922 revolt; it had failed to relieve 
civil servants whose salaries had been reduced by the 
previous Government; it had disappointed with its 1926 
budG"et; and it threatened the trade union movement with 
the Sedition Acto37 In June 1926, Forward was to complain 
that during the year there had been no advance in indus-
trial legislation and, later that year, that some promises 
made as the basis of' the Pact had definitely been shelved -
if not already brokenoJB The blame for these failures fell 
largely on Labour's parliame:::itary group., 
Bitterness was increased by personal jealousies between 
leading members of' the Party - i:,oue of' whom aspired to 
37. Forward, 8, 15 January, 19, 26 March, 9 April, 21 .May 
1926., The Detention and Disorders Act of 1926 was 
commonly known as the Sedition Act. 
Forward espoused the cause of' Labour though it was 
not an of'f'icial organ of' the Partyo In May 1926 it 
became the o.ff'icial organ of the South African Mine-
workers' Union, the South African Boilermakers and 
Shipbuilders' Union, and the Building Workers v Indus-
tries Union., It was hoped to increase its circulation 
to 15 000 by the end of' ·1926 (~. 21 May 1926). Its 
editor during 1926-7 was Harry Haynes., 
Copies o:f Guardian, the Natal organ of' the Labour 
Party and the only other Labour newspaper published at 
the time, are no longer extant. 
JS. 11 Jrme, 10 September 19260 
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higher off'ices 0 39 With the PactYs advent to power many who 
had expected the rewards o:f office saw most of' them go to 
~ationalists; when they did come to Labourites, those who 
had been passed over were off'endedo Only a few months 
after the Pact came to power, Je Mullineux, the Labour M.P. 
f'or Roodepoort, inf'o.rmed Barlow: 
There is a widespread idea that our Ministers in 
the Cabinet exist in the present positions for 
the p:irpose of' securing jobs for parliamentarians 
and others and that they are not getting enough 
for Labour men. Certain members of' the Party 
who represent co:-i.stituencies have openly 
criticized the Ministers in public about these 
things and the whole thing should be dealt with 
and some common understanding arrived at.ooeTo 
me and to others, the question of' confidence in 
the honour of' our two Ministers who are said to 
have let us down over Cabinet appointments and 
w1der Secretaryships, should be brought up. 
There is a general atmosphere of' distrusteoo4o 
The appointment of' the third Labour Minister, Madeley, in 
1925, was the cause of' more ill-feeling; Barlow 
particularly was hurt. 'You mu..st know', he reproached 
Hertzog, Y that I, with Tielman Roos, was the originator of 
41 the Pact which put l'.:O}-! into powero' Roos had f'avou.red 
Barlow f'or the post and the latter strongly felt that his 
own Labo~r colleagues had let him dmm by not pressing his 
J9. !he Labour Co:-i.gress 1926, Report of' the Labour Congress 
~ at Port Elizabeth, January 1926 (hereafter cited 
as The Labour Congress 122.~), p. 140 Pamphlet in the 
:Q_uncan. Papers o 
40. Arthur ~ow Paper~, 10 November 1924. See also 
Q.reswell Paper§., vol. J, letter to wife, 2 January 1925. 
41. HoP..!..vo.l. 27, 10 October 1925. Underlining in 
originalo 
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candidatureo 42 
All the above difficulties had come to the :fore at the 
Party's an.""lual Conference in January 19260 There, strong 
feelinB's were expr&ssed that in the past the parliamentary 
group had b.ad a preponderant influ.ence on the Partyis 
National Councilo The view was repeatedly voiced that it 
was the task of the National Cou..."'lcil, reflecting the views 
of the ranJc-and-:file, to determine policy, while the task 
of the parliamentarians was to carry out that policy. 43 
Whon a measure was proposed to exclude undue parliamentary 
in.f'luence .f'rom the National Cow:icil, it was attacked as a 
symptom of the growing suspicion within the Party, ta 
suspicion which had gone a long way to destroy the spirit 
of comradeshipor 44 
CertaJ.nly, as various groups attempted to gain control 
of the Party, there was little evidence of comradeship in 
the numerous personal attacks that were madeo 45 A most 
unpleasant atmosphere developed <;Uld Kentridge complained 
that the discussion 'had degenerated into personal attacks, 
42. See Arthur Barlow Papers, J July 1924 and 13 October 
192.5 - Roos to Barlow, 9 September 1925 - Barlow to 
Boydell, 10 September 1925 - Boydell to Barlowo 
4J. The Labour Congress 1926, pp. 5, 6, 19, passim; 
Forward, 8 January 1926. 
44. Forward, 8 January 19260 Barlow comp.lained that some 
Labour M.Po I s wo11ld not speak to one another {The Labour 
Congress 19?...€,, Po 16)0 
450 The Labour Congress 1926, PPu 14, 15, passimo 
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recrimination and vituperation worthy of a tap room.' But 
he also drew attention. to the failure of the Pact to achieve 
vario1.1s Labour aims, and declared, to applause, that if the 
leaders asked for loyalty and co-operation, they should 
exhibit these qualities themselves to the rank-and-fileo 46 
The price of having become a party to the Pact and supplying 
three Cabinet Ministers had been to raise more suspicion in 
the Party than it had ever known; that price, Boydell said, 
splitting the Partyo 47 was 
Attempts to settle differences at the Congress failed. 
Less than six weeks later, Forward deplored the irecrudes-
cence of bitterness'. It was shocked to read that 
Creswell, in a public speech, had opened old sores by 
referring to 'carping criticisms of those who purport to be 
political supporters'. How lon~, Forward asked, would tthe 
wretched undermining businessooobe kept up? Cannot our 
Parliamentary leaders suppress their personal feelings 
sufficiently to prevent them giving the enemy such a long 
48 handle?' 
Two months before the May flag outburst, Forward itself 
joined in the Party's disputes .. From the day the Pact was 
formed, it complained, their parliamentary leaders had held 
up the Nationalist Party as some sort of ogre that had to be 
46. Forward, 8 January 1926~ 
47 • l.tig,o 
480 5 February 19260 
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placated at all costs if the Labour Party was to survive. 
Somewhat sadly we observe that the brightest 
promises of the Pact are not being kept. Time 
after time we hear repeatedly the now familiar 
phrases, "Time-will-not-serve," "whittle-it-
down-to-make-it-palatable-to-the-Nationalists," 
etc 0 etc., - until we are beginning to wonder 
what will finally become of the Labour Party 
platf'ormo 
In short, we are becoming somewhat disappointed 
at the failure of our fighting men in the front 
line to actually put ~9 the fight we sent them into the ring to win. 
Labour, as represented in the Legislative Assembly, had to 
take stock of itself. It had a duty to preserve the Pact, 
but not tat the cost of continual compromise, which, carr;i.ed 
much further, spells selling out to the Nationalist Partye,50 
Advent to office in 1924 had clearly not strengthened 
the Labour Party; paradoxically, power had weakened it, 
because new disappointments and divisions had arisen from 
the Nationalist-Labour coalition. When the unexpected flag 
storm burst on the political scene in May 1926, this dis-
united Party was confronted with yet another divisive issueo 
It was unquestionably vulnerable to S~A~Po attacks on the 
question, not only because of the Party's existing weak-
nesses but also because of the Party's racial composition. 
The Labour Party was very largely composed of, and relied 
upon the support of, English-speakers. Though the number 
of Afrikaners in the Party had increased as farming 
490 19 March 19260 
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difficulties drove them to the cities where, particularly 
on the Rand, they might replace British workers, by far the 
greater part of Labo~r's national support came from English-
speakers. Amongst its eighteen parliamentarians, not one 
was an Afrikaner., Of the twenty-four members of its 
National Council, none were Afrikaans-speaking. Amongst 
the eighty-seven delegates at its Annual Conference in 
January 1927, not more than a handful had Afrikaans names .. 5 1 
Of the Party's many English-speaking supporters, a large 
number were bound to see the flag issue in the same light 
as other English-speakers. For, beyond a doubt, anti-
secessionist feelings were not confined to members of the 
In March 1920 when Smuts began private talks with 
Party leaders in an attempt to form a •best manw Government, 
Creswell, while rejecting an invitation to join the Govern-
ment, indicated that his Party had no wish to make Smuts 
fa:11. Enjoying no guarantee from the Nationalists on the 
future of the imperial link, Creswell would not risk taking 
votes from him.52 It was only after the SoA.P~-Unionist 
fusion later in 1920 that Labour's parliamentarians became 
uninhibited critics of Smuts's policies: only then did they 
feel that they could safely oppose Smuts without the risk 
51. See Minutes of the aru11.1al conference held at Bloem-
fontein on 1, ~j. January 1927 (hereafter cited as 
Labour's annual conference, 1927). 
52. Garsono 
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o:f furthering . 53 .':iecessiono Though the Pact agreement not 
to change the Union's status during the life of the next 
Parlia~ent allayed the concern of many who had voted for 
Labour, they could not have :forgotten that formerly one o.f 
the main planks in the platform of' the Nationalist Party 
had been the right of' the Union to secede from the British 
Emp.ireo It would require little to arouse all the old 
fearso The demand for a clean flag, and the strong 
emotional protests that had followed, were all that were 
required to revive such fears amongst many Labour voters. 
Labour's leaders had been caught wiawares. 54 They 
had ~ot anticipated the outcry the Bill would evoke: 
neither the National Council nor the Annual Conference of 
1926 had raised the flag question.· Preoccupied with 
internal difficulties and socialist goals, the Party was 
quite t.mprepared for the flag outburst which had thrust 
itself forward onto the political arena. 
All within a few days of the first reading, the 
political climate for Labour became alarmingQ A prominent 
Labour leader was reported to be collecting signatures 
calling for a protest meeting in Durban.55 There were 
530 Garson. 
54. See Dt.mcan Papers, letter to Lady Selborne in which 
Dt.mcan maintained that Creswell had completely mis-
calculated public feeling on the flag, 27 May 1926u 
55. Daily Despatch, 18 May 19260 
warnings that Labour had offended a large part of its 
~6 
constituency.~ The Pact's flag policy was censured by a 
Labour branch; Labour Provincial Councillors in Natal also 
protested against the Bill.5? The leader of the Party in 
the :Natal Provincial Council spoke out against the measure 
at the Durban meeting of protest.58 There was a call for 
'"'9 a special meeting by voters in a Labour held constituency":> 
Letters to the press attacked Labour's parliamentarians for 
raiding and abetting' the Flag Bil1. 60 And the opposition 
press, soon to launch a strong campaign to wean Labourt.s 
61 
'British' vote, began to move to the attack., 
At .this unpropitious mo.ment, divisive issues within 
the Party were once again raisedo On 19 May Kentridge 
declared in Johannesburg that the 1926 parliamentary session 
had been 'riddled with Labour disappointments.,Y He listed 
fields in which the Government had failed to satisfy Labour. 
And he suggested that the Government was perhaps 
Llllconsciously taking advantage of Labour's influence with 
the working classes in not fulfilling pledges to the 
workerso Those who condemned Labourites who criticised 
56. Rand Daily Mail, 20 May 19260 
57., London Times, 24 May 1926; Eastern Province Her~, 26 
May 1926., 
580 London Times, 24 May 1926. 
59., Cape Times, 22 May 1926. 
60., Daily Despatch, 18 May 1926. 
61., See for example Rand Daily Mail, 20 May 1926; Preto~ 
~, Cape Times - 21 May 192b7 
the Government were placing principals before principles: 
'We ooject to the Labour movement being submerged and 
Labour representatives becoming mere place meno1 62 
With disunity in the caucus, and disaffection in its 
ranks, the Party could hardly face a flag controversy of 
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this intensity without great risk to itself. It required 
little perspicacity for Labour MoP.•s to see that before 
continuing with the Bill it was advisable for the Party to 
enjoy some delay during which tempers might be cooledo 
Barlow apparently suggested the appointment of a committee 
which could select another £lag acceptable to the Govern-
mento But Creswell argued that the Pact's ~resent Bill 
was reasonable and would satisfy moderate people. 
that was required was time to explain it to them. 
All 
He would 
conduct a campaign throughout the country during the recess 
and persuade the •sane, sober and moderate• to accept the 
6J . flag. Creswell appears to have been convJ..nced that 
English-speakers' opposition to the Bill was based o~ mis-
conceptions, and that it would not be difficult to him to 
correct themo In all events, the Labour caucus was in 
favour of postponing the Bill. 
In the days immediately foll.owing the first reading 
Creswell pressed his Cabinet colleagues for another yearts 
620 Daily Despatch, 20 May 19260 
6Jo The Star, 2J July 1927, Hay•s speech. 
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postponement. He asserted that in view of the political 
excitement and misrepresentations of the Opposition, it had 
become desirable for M.P.'s to be given the opportunity to 
make matters clear to their constituents. Malan strongly 
opposed postponement. At several Cabinet meetings he 
argued that postponement would only bring weakness and 
confusion. Faced by their predominantly English-speaking 
electors, the Labour Members would be likely to weaken. 
They would return as half-hearted supporters of the Bill in 
the next session, so that postponement, in effect, would 
not strengthen the Government but the Opposition. 64 
However Hertzog supported Creswello So too did Roos, 
•terwyl ander Ministers min of meer ook na daardie kant toe 
oorgehel het., Following Roosts lead, the Transvaal 
caucus also declared. itself' in favour of postponement, but 
several of its members apparently declared that they would 
support Malano 65 
In the ensuing eris.is the mediation of' C.p.aso Malan 
proved successful and Malan agreed to a postponement on two 
conditions: Hertzog was to declare that the same Bill 
would be re-introduced at the beginning of' the next session, 
64. Malan, PPo 111-2: Die Burger (Malan), JO January 19570 
65. Malan, pp. 111-2: Die Burger (Malan), JO January 1957. 
Malan maintained that he was assured by Creswell that 
the latter and his followers would support the Bill even 
if a postponement were not obtained (Malan, Po 111). 
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and the Labourites were to promise that they would help to 
put the Bill through unchanged. These conditions were 
accepted by Hertzog and Creswell, respectively, and the 
. . 66 
crisis was thus overcome. 
The postponement of the Bill 
Malan's reluctance to postpone the Bill and dis-
appointment at having to give way are readily understoodo 
Partly, he had suffered a personal defeat. Since 1919 he 
had periodically championed a new flag and had been the 
only Nationalist leader to do so. It had become a personal 
crusade which, after six years, seemed to have reached its 
goal when he introduced his 1925 Bill. However this had 
had to be withdrawn and that disappointment was being 
repeated in 1926. But it was more than a personal defeat. 
It was also a political one: The legislation he had drafted 
in 1925 had had to be withdrawn because it was unsuitable. 
The co-operation he had hoped to obtain from Smuts during 
the 1925/6 recess had not materialized. The Select 
Committee which was intended to produce a flag by general 
66. Malan, pp. 111-2: Die Burg'll:_ (Malan), JO January 19570 
On 22 May newspapers carried reports of a 'first class 
cabinet crisis' with Creswell, Boydell and Malan all 
threatening to resign over the question of the Bill's 
future (The Friend, Rand Daily Mail, Pretoria News). 
However, Mal.an makes no mention of such threats and it 
would seem that none were made {see E,H. Louw Papers, 
vol. 1, letter from Malan to Louw, 25 June 1926); 
The CoWo Malan Pape~ throw no light on these events. 
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agreement had failedo And his attempt to have his 1926 
Bill passed by the Assembly was being opposed on all sides 
- including his owno But perhaps most of all Malan felt 
that the BillYs postponement was an ideological set-back. 
The postponement of a national flag was not only a denial 
of a peopleYs right, but also of the volksontwikkeling. 
If the postponement became a permanent withdrawal the 
responsibility for this blunting of the volksontwikkeling 
could be hiso Probably all the above help to explain 
Mala.n's reluctance to postpone the Bill and his insistence 
on the promises of Hertzog and Creswell; these promises 
would help to save his political face and salve his 
ideological co~science. 
Neither Hertzog nor Roos shared Mala.n's strong views 
on the need. for a national fl.ago Indeed to Hertzog flag 
67 legislation must have seemed of relatively small importance 
when compared with his plans for comprehensive Native 
legislation. The latter was his most important dome$tic 
goal and to achieve it he would require the support of all 
sections of the electorate. Alienating this support 
through a Flag Bill that awakened fears and aroused 
hostility was hardly politic in the circumstances. 
Additionally, to damage the Labour Party was to jeopardize 
the Nationalists' own chances of' returning to power. It 
67. See pages 49-50. 
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was only by virtue o:f the coalition with Labour that his 
Government ruled, 68 and this might continue to be necessary 
after the next general election. Hertzog may be :forgiven 
i:f he coneluded that Malan was asking him to cut off his 
nose to spite his face. Small wonder that the Prime 
Minister became resentful when Malan proved reluctant to 
assist their Labour partners. 69 
In the end, the politics o:f national consciousness had 
given way to the politics of colour and survival. But in 
doing so Malan had bound the parliamentary leaders o:f 
Labour. He had an undertaking that, irrespective of the 
wishes o:f Labour voters, their parliamentary leaders would 
support his Flag Billo And, as events were to show, this 
was to have important cor~sequer..ces. 
At the second reading of the Bill, on 25 May 1926, 
Malan announced that the Bill was being withdrawno The 
agitation, he said, had made it necessary for the people to 
have more information on the Billo But he emphasized that 
the measure would definitely be re-introduced in the next 
session and that it would provide for a flag which excluded 
68. The results o:f the general election o:f 1924 were: 
Nationalist Party - 63, Labour Party - 18, S.A.P. -·53, 
Independents - 1 (Cape Times, 21 June 1924; O'Dowd, 
p. 72). 
69. Malan, p. 112: Die Burger (Malan), JO January 1957. 
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both the republican colours and the Union Jack. 70 
This was clearly a splendid moment to appeal to 
Nationalist sentiment, and Malan would not have been the 
successful politician he was had he failed to do so. Tho 
South At'rican Nationality and Flag Bill, he told the House, 
was the most important, and also one of the most urgent 
Bills to come before the House for many years, because: 
It has to do with the very existence of the 
nation as a separate entityo It has to do with 
the unity of our national life and sentiment. 
It has to do with our national status.o.It has to 
do with what is more than material possessions, 
with what is after all, even more than our 
fatherland; it has to do with the soul of the 
nation. 71 
A flag, Malan insisted, was not a mere cloth: 
••• a fla.g symbolizes national existence, a flag 
is a living thing; it is the repository of 
national sentimento A flag is able to create 
the greatest enthusiasm; a flag is able to move 
to tears; a flag can stir the deepest springs of 
action, and it can inspire to the noblest efforts. 
For the flag a nation Qan live; for it it can 
fight and it can dieo72 
After dealing with the nationality clauses of the Bill 
which, Malan, explained, followed the same lines as the 
70. Hansard, volo 7, 40J5-6. 
71. Ibid. 4026-7. 
72. Ibid. 4028. Commenting on this section of Malants 
speech, Barlow later wrote: •Many of us in the Labour 
Party now began looking at one another and wondered 
what all this high-faluting tosh was about.Y A.G 0 
Barlow, Almost in Confidence, pp. 196-7. 
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Canadian Act,73 Malan argued that in settling the flag 
question they were settling the race question and thus 
facilitating the settling of all South Africa's problems. 
Indeed, to resolve its great problems, it was essential to 
have racial co-operation. Unfortunately, when these 
problems were brought forward, the question of flags inter-
vened, confused the issue and drove the races into different 
camps. This Bill would bring unity where division now 
existed, for nothing was so powerful a unifying factor in 
the life of a nation - when different sections composed it 
- as a national flag. Without a common national flag, 
which symbolized the nation and inspired it to a common and 
noble effort, no nation could live. Thus, far from not 
being urgent, the securing of a national flag was probably 
'the most urgent and fundamental' of their problems. So 
urgent and important was it, that they wished to have agree-
ment; but, 'if we cannot get co1muon agreement o. o then we say 
it is better to have a flag without agreement - in spite of 
disagreement - than to have no flag at all.,74 
Given the tension in the crowded House and galleries, 
the four hour debate that followed was creditable; on the 
whole, its tone good tempered and moderate. There was much 
7J. Once it was pointed out that South African nationality 
embraced British nationality, there was, throughout the 
controversy, no significant opposition to the national-
ity clauses of the flag bills. 
74. Hansard, vol. 7, 40J0-2o 
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frank speaking and therefore, perhaps inevitably, at times 
feelings ran high and noisy outbursts occurred. 75 The 
debate also provided Creswell, Smuts, Hertzog, Duncan, Joel 
Krige, and N.J. van der Merwe with the opportunity to voice 
their views and to solicit supporto 
meeting ground between the sideso 
But there was no 
What one side advanced 
as reasonable and obvious, the other rejected as unfeeling 
and prejudicedo When Malan argued that the Bill contained 
a double concession - it excluded the republican f'lags,7 6 
and it allowed the Union Jack to fly on certain occasions -
Duncan dismissed the concession as 'profoundly unsatis-
factory~ likely to create division instead of unityo77 
And what were the occasions on which the Union Jack would 
be seen? asked Smut~. Tu his mind only one day (Empire 
Day) would satisfy the terms of the Bill. 
occasion might disappear.78 
And even that 
There was no more agreement on what was a constitution-
ally correct design, than there was on the question of' who 
was to blame f'or the failure to agree. That the inclusion 
of' the Union Jack in the national flag was not con.stitutianally 
75. The fact that the reading took place on Empire Day 
probably exacerbated feelings. 
760 A concession because although they were dead, he said, 
they were not dead in the sense that they were 
enshrined in the hearts of hundreds of thousands 
(Hansard, vol. 7, 40J4-5)o 
770 I_llio 4052. 
780 ills!· 40J8. 
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correct was argued on several grounds. The national flag, 
it was held, should re:flect South Africa's independent and 
common nationhood. Her independent nationhood did not 
permit the inclusion of the Union Jack for several reasons: 
it was the flag of another part of the Empire;79 its 
inclusion, for the Dutch-speaking, would stand for sub-
servience; and, for ninety per cent of those who hankered 
after it, the Union Jack meant the :flying o:f the flag of 
G t B ·t · tl · 80 rea r1,a1n over 1e union. As :for their common 
nationhood, what would he have in common with English-
speaking South Africans, Hertzog asked, if the Union Jack 
was incorporated?; 
it was :for themo 81 
it was not the same symbol :for him as 
But in reply to, and anticipation of, these arguments, 
the Opposition advanced reasons why the Union Jack should be 
includedo It agreed that the South African :flag should 
embody their common South African citizenship. But that 
citizenship should not be confined to the bounds of South 
Africa. It should also represent their common citizenship 
with, :for example, the people of Great Britain, Australia 
82 
and New Zealando The national :flag should represent 
this wider citizenship and not merely part o:f it. Equally 
79. Hansard, volo 7, 4034, Malano 
80. ill£. 4071-2, Hertzogo 
81. ill£. 4071. 
82. Ibid. 4055, Dw-~can. 
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diametrically opposed to the views of Hertzog and Malan, 
was the denial that the former republican flags were dead, 
and that there.fore they could not be included. In love 
and respect they stood as high in the thoughts of the 
Afrikaner as the Union Jack did in the thoughts of the 
English-speakero 8 3 
Yet, for all the debating points, at the heart of the 
matter lay different attitudes towards the Union Jack. 
Emotion rather than reason governed the attitudes of most. 
While the Opposition called for the inclusion of the Union 
Jack so that the national flag might command 'respect and 
affection,, 84 the Nationalists rejected the Union Jack for 
the very reason that it could not command their respect and 
affection. It helped little to argue that the Union Jack 
was in South Africa not merely by right of conquest, but 
also by virtue of what the people who respected it had done 
for South Africa, 8 5 or, in opposing the principle of 
breaking with the past, to cite the words of Paul Kruger 
and call for a flag that was built on the good and noble of 
86 the past. 
What was good and noble? To the Nationalist the good 
SJ. Hansard, vol. 7, 4065, Joel Krige; see also 4039 
Smut So 
84. Ibid. 4038, Smuts. 
85. ~. 4053, Duncan. 
86. Ibid. 4040, Smuts; see also 4054, Duncan. 
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a,nd noble included the struggle against the Union Jacko 
Could it be good and noble to overlook the fact that that 
flag had flown over concentration camps in which 25 000 
people had died? And, irrespective of the ans,-rer to this 
question, was it indeed possible for most Nationalists to 
forgive or forget? For many thousands it was noto N.Jo 
van der Merwe told the Hon!'le: 
Whenever I see the Union Jack - it is indelibly 
impressed on my mind and I cannot get away from 
it - it reminds me of many occasions when I saw· 
it in the Boer War, and I do not want to see ito 
I have always tried not to look at it. I cannot 
look at ito During that war I was only a little 
boy, but I was with my mother and sister in the 
concentration camp. Can I possibly get away 
from the fact that indelibly impressed itself on 
my mind ·;·.rhen I saw the Union Jack waving 
victoriously over the sobbing of women and 
children? •••• How on earth can I love a flagoooif 
there is something in that flag that reminds me 
of the bitter experiences of the past?87 
The debate closed in an atmosphere of disharmony. The 
second round of the flag struggle had ended in another 
victory for the opposition; once again legislation had 
been postponed. Sixteen months had now passed since the 
Government first gave notice of its intention to give South 
Africa a new flag. What had been achieved? Dif'f'erent 
points of view on what the flag should or should not contain 
had been made clear; but this had been done at the cost of 
dividing South Africans into hostile flag camps and 
stimulating racial feelings the very opposite of those 
108 
needed to settle the questiono Loss of goodwill, and time, 
had reduced the room for political manoeuvring. Twice the 
Government had yielded, but could it do so again? And how 
was a solution to be found to the intractable problem of 
the flag's desie.n which even a Select Committee had failed 
to solve? What the uovernment in 1925 had seen as a more 
or less straightforward matter of executive fiat, had 
become a major cause of concerno A potential political 
asset was becoming an incubuso 
CHAPTER V 
Reaction to the Billls postponement 
Though the opposition to the Flag Bill had won a 
victory in May ·1926, the Billls postponement did not 
irrunediately lessen general ill-feeling. Various reasons 
may be found for this. MalanYs insistence that postpone-
ment did not mean any departure f'rom Government policy and 
that if necessary the Bill would be forced through, struck 
many opponents of the Bill as provocative, soured the 
atmosphere and aroused an equally strong determination 
1 
among the opposition to frustrate his plans. Furthermore, 
success in forcing the temporary withdrawal of the Bill 
fortified the opposition and stimulated them to agitate for 
total victory. 2 
The influence of protest meetings also militated 
against a lessening of ill-feeling. Because the Bill had 
been merely postponed and not permanently withdrawn, protest 
meetings which had been called for 25 May and later were not 
1. See SoP. vol. 35, no. 50, letter from Cohn, 9 July 1926; 
Arthur Barlow Papers, letter from Sir David Harris, 21 
June 1926. 
2. See G.D. Scholtz, Dr. Nicholaas Johannes van der Merwe, 
1888-1940, Po 61. 
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cancelled. 3 Thus strong public condenmation of the f'lag 
policy continued. 
And o::i.ce again, press comments aroused feelings. In 
commenting on the second reading, the press on both sides 
was often strongly partisan. While Die Burger's 
parliamentary correspondent on 26 May praised the speeches 
of Malan, Hertzog and Creswell in rapturous terms, 
opposition newspapers were often highly criticalo They 
particularly attacked the two decisions to reintroduce a 
bill in 1927 based on the principle of' two flags for South 
Africa, and to exclude the Union Jack from the national flag. 
Though there were strong warnings against having two 
f'lags, 4 most of' the criticism was directed at the decision 
to reintroduce the Flag Bill. The stupid obstinacy shown 
by Malan was almost incredible, the Rand Daily Mail com-
plained.5 The Government should have dropped the Bill 
altogether, it said, if the spirit behind the movement for 
a new flag was that shown by Malan and Hertzog in the 
second reading; indeed, a note of the most disturbing 
6 insincerity had pervaded all the speeches of the Pacto 
J. For example the meetings, at Cape Town, Pretoria and 
Somerset West. 
4. See for example Natal Mercury, Daily Despatch,~ 
Daily Mail - 26 May 1926. 
5. ~ Daily_ Mail, 26 May 19260 
6. Ibid. Sec also Natal Mercury, 26 May 1926, for Mala.n's 
'offensive tone•. 
1 1 1 
The Star of' 27 May predicted that the position would be 
precisely the same in the next year if' the Union Jack were 
excluded and a flag hill passed. The Pretoria News com-
plained that they would have the whole b!.l.siness all over 
a,~aln in the coming montha and the next year. Old wotmds 
would be kept open. To what purpose? iThe country does 
not want it this year, an<l how ministers can possibly 
suppose that the country will like it any better next year 
passes comprehension.,7 
The reaction o.f the Nationalist press to the postpone-
ment was one of disappointment. They commented particu-
larly on three aspects: they expressed pain at the Bill's 
postponement 7 th0.y condemnl~d Sm·..1t s a.s an opport1mist, and 
they attack.<}d the S.A .. P. as hypocritical. The postpone-
ment was a retreat, Die_j3urgcr said on 26 May, and would 
hurt to the ~one the great flagless section which yearned 
.for a symbol to express all it loved and ,'.::tonoured in the 
fatherland. Die Volks~<l too thought that the nows would 
result in a tldal wave o.f deep disappointment; for yet 
another year the Afrikaner~ would be forced to wait f'or 
soml'thing to which they had a sacred right, and solely 
because the s.1'1...P. was seokin8' dirty (vuil) political gain 
in a matter which should have boon elevated above party 
---·---·-------· 
'7 ? 6 'I· ·1 n 'J 6 • - , .. ty /•- • Sc~ a.~Lso Rand Daily Mail, 2.6 May 1926. 
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dif'f'erer..ce s. 8 
Smuts and the s.A.P. received full blame for the post-
ponemento Smuts was an opportwiist. In October 1919 he 
had declared that they had buried the Vierkleur; now he 
said the Vierkleur was not dead. In December 1919 he had 
asserted that the Union Jack had no pleasant memories for 
them; now he championed that flag. He had won again, 
because, as with all national questions, 'hy die vraag oor 
die boeg van rossehaat gegooi bet.' The inventor of' 
'kor.siliasie' had become the high priest of' racial hatred 
which he exploited against his own people for Party gaino9 
While its two sister organs remained silent on the 
wisdom of' postponement, Die Volk13blad doubted it would have 
been in the best interests of' the people to force the Dill 
through. The possibility of a flag election, with its 
10 
resultant hatred and strife, justified postponemento 
But both it and Die Burge£_ supported Hertzog and Mala.n's 
guarantees of a clean flag in 1927. These guarantees, P..!~ 
Burge:iz. cor:cluded, had made retrea.t in 1927 impossible. 
The word of honour of a self-respecting government could 
r..ot be broken; the retre2.t would have to be turned into a 
80 25 May 19260 
9o Ons Vaderland, 28 May 1926. See also Die Volksblad, 25, 
27 May 192~and 9n.§... Vaderland, 1 Jwie 1926. 
10. 25 May 1926. See also 27 May 1926. 
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victory in 1927 - or the Government would have to resign. 11 
This unyielding approach, expressed in Die Burger, was 
challenged in the f'ollowi.ng months. From the ranks of' the 
Government, as well as the opposition, individuals and 
groups were to do their best to resolve the flag problem 
through compromises in which both altruism and political 
necessity played their part. 
Sir William Campbell•s_appeal 
The first of these efforts to break the deadlock 
through compromise came from a most unexpected source. On 
2 June English-speakers were aggrieved, shocked, and even 
outraged to find that no less a persor.age than Sir William 
Campbell, Dominion Chairman of the D.E.S.Lo, was apparently 
supporting- Malano In a letter to Hertzog and a statement 
to the press, Campbe1.l accepted Malan' s two principles of' a 
clean flag and a Union. Jack flown only on certain days. 
He was prepared to sacrifice the incorporation of the Union 
Jack in a new flag if' this wou.ld kindle ta spirit of unity 
between the races.' However, Campbell insisted that the 
separate flying of the ~nion Jack should be provided for 
'or- generous lines', and that the new flag should be 
11. 26 May 1926. 
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t d t . d 12 arrived at by general agreemen, an no impose o 
Hertzog welcomed the letter and declared that the 
Government was ready to act in its spirit. But Campbell's 
note of magnanimity was almost inunediately drowned in a 
chorus of protest. In an emotional editorial on 2 June 
the Ca2e Times declared itself opposed to any suggestion of 
sacrifice. Campbell's appeal was 'the appeal of an 
intelJectual fascinated by the asceticism of sacrifice and 
wholly out of touch with the deep instinct of ordinary men 
and women. i Strong disapproval was expressed elsewhere 
13 B.E.S,,L. branches, the Grand President of the Sons of 
14 15 En.gland and the press - and within a week of his letter 
calls went out to g·et rid of Campbell 'in a most public and 
16 
~;peedy manner O w 
resign,, 
The.dual flag plan 
Two days later Campbell was forced to 
Though the general temper of the country was better 
reflected in the opposition's rapid retribution than in 
12. Cape Times, The Friend, Cape Argus - 2 June 1926. 
1J. Cape Times, The Friend - 3 Jur..e 1926. 
14. Cape Times, J JWle 1926. 
15. See for example ~al Mercury, Pretoria News - 9 Jtu1e 
1926; Daily Despatch, 10 Jtu1e 1926,, 
16. The words were Col .• CaF• Stallard' s (gape T~, 7 June 
1926)0 First to call for Campbellis resignation was 
the Daily Despatch, on 5 June 1926. 
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CampbellVs magnanimity, the need for compromise had been 
recognized elsewhere too. Campbell's resignation coincided 
with the end o~ the parliamentary session on 8 Jwieo Its 
conclusion was to usher in several months of compromise 
activity. Two co-operating political groups during this 
period were to try to gain popular acceptance for a com-
promise proposal - the dual flag plan. The two groups 
were composed, on the one hand, mainly of Transvaal National-
ists led by Tielman Roos, and, on the other, of National 
Council Labourites. 
At the end of the session Creswell tackled the flag 
problemo As leader of the Labour Party and unconditional 
pledger of his word to Malan, he tried to bring Labourites 
to support the Bill. In a personal. manifesto published on 
9 Jwie, he confirmed his affection for the Union Jack and 
admitted his former belief' that the national flag should 
symbolize the past. But, he now believed that in the 
interests of' national unity, and because it was offensive 
to Afrikaans-speakers, the Unior.. LTack should be excludedo 
He urged Labourites to reject the SoA.P.'s exploitation of 
the issue and to support Malan's Bill. 17 
Creswellis manifesto did not gain the general support 
17. Cape Times, The Friend - 9 Jwie 1926. See also Hansard, 
volo 7, 4043-5, Creswell, 25 May 19260 
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of Labourites. 18 Many preferred to await a statement on 
the question from the National CoWlcil; they suspected 
that if Creswell was prepared to back Malan, other leaders 
were not. This belief was well-founded. Immediately 
after the parliamentary session, several merr.bers of 
Labour's Head Committee, increasingly anxious at the 
possibility of offending supporters, set to work to find an 
acceptable compromiseo 
Into this situation entered Rooso As leader of tbe 
Transvaal Nationalists, Deputy Prime Minister, Minister of 
Justice, and a politician with a strong personal following, 
Roos was an important figure in the Union's politicso One 
of Hertzog's first supporters, he had rendered great service 
in building the Party in the Transvaal and fully merited 
his high standing in the Nationalist Party. All of his 
many attributes were now brought to bear on the situationo 
They contrasted sharply with the qualities of some of his 
colleague so His ready wit and quick brain made men like 
Hertzog and Beyers seem ponderous and awkwardo His 
whimsical, puckish, and cynical ways stood in odd contrast 
to the earnest Malan or the autocratic Creswell. His 
jovial disposition and great personal charm won him many 
friends, not least - once again in contrast to his 
18. The manifesto was, of course, vigorously attacked by 
the opposition press (cee Natal Mercury_, 9 JWle 1926; 
Pretoria New§._, 10 June 1926; Cape Times., 11 June 1926). 
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Nationalist colleagues - among English-speakers. Moreover, 
with the passage of time, Roosts earlier rabid nationalism 
had mellowed considerably. All the above gave him a 
popularity which spread beyond the cor..fine s of language or 
19 party. -
Throughout the 1926-7 controversy, Roos tried his 
utmost to effect a settlement. What were his motives? An 
answer to this question is made more difficult because no 
collection of Roos Papers is to be found in the state 
archives or other public ref.>ositorieso On the face of it, 
it would seem that Roos wished to avoid the risk of a break 
in the Pact, and that this drove him to work consistently 
for a settlemento Yet, bearing in mind Roosts appeal for 
a 'reorientation' of' Parties during and at the end of the 
flag struggle in October 1927, his demand for a National 
Government in December 1932 and his establishment of the 
Central Party of South Africa in August 1934, the possibi-
lity cannot be overlooked that he saw, or came to see, the 
controversy as a means of raising his stature with both 
language groups and of perhaps gaining the leadership of a 
new Party in which moderate members of the Nationalist and 
19. See Ho Reitz, Jhe Conversion of a South African 
Nationalis~, p. 55; T. Boydell, M4 Luck was in: with spotlight§_On General §muts, p. 28; E. Alexander, 
~orris Alexander, p. 132; DoS.A.B 9 ' vol. 1, PP• 679-681; 
o. Pirow, 'Drie manne uit die dae van samesmelting: 
Hertzog, Smuts en Tielman Roos', Die Huisgenoot, 5 
December 1952., 
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S.Ao Parties would feel at home, and from which former 
Unionists like Smartt and Nationalists like Malan would be 
20 
excludedo 
Among Roos's friends were several National Cowicilites 
who were concerned at Creswell's preparedness to steer the 
Party by MalanVs lighto It seemed to them that if the 
Bill were forced through, as Malan proposed, the Labour 
Party might lose the support of thousands of voters. 
concern persuaded a majority of National Councilites, 
encouraged by Roos, not to follow Creswell's lead, and 
This 
instead to put forward what looked like a more equitable 
flag plan Of ti1e1f OWno 
While the above considerations were the overriding 
reason for their action, several other factors probably 
also influenced their decision to challenge Creswell's 
Firstly, no general conference of the Labour 
Party had ever enunciated a policy on the question of a 
20. That Roos was not at home in the Pact Cabinet is 
revealed in several ways. At Cabinet meetings he was 
nearly always silent (Boydell, op.cit., p. 214). He 
appears to have resented alleged attempts by Creswell 
and Malan to dominate the Cabinet (c.M. van den Heever, 
GeneraalJ.B.M. Hertzog, Po 2J5). His relations with 
Hertzog were not always good. And he had a very 
strong dislike of Malan whom he avoided whenever poss-
ibleo During the controversy he would usually leave 
the Assembly when Malan spoke on the flag issue, 
returning only after tho latter had finished (D.S 9 AoBo 
volo 1, Po 680; G.H. Wilson, Gone Down the Years, 
p. 228; LoE. Neame, Some South African Politicians, 
PP• 19, 26-7; S.P. volo 37 , noo 58 , Cohn to Smuts, 
2 5 August 1927). 
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national flag. Nor had the majority of' the National 
CounciliteR (who were not parliamentarians) 21 been consulted 
on the question of' whether Malan's Bill should be supported 
or not. Furthermore, Creswell's autocratic behaviour had 
22 
evoked much resentmento These were all reasons why a 
majority of' National Councilites, believing the National 
Council to be the Party's proper but neglected policy-ma.king 
body, might feel under little or no obligation to endorse 
Creswell's support for Malan's Bill. Additionally, their 
disappointment at the Nationalists' failure to back 
Labour's programme of' legislation may well have influenced 
some members to retaliate in kindo And finally,· complex 
as human motives are, it would be surprising indeed if' 
personal animosities (of which the Party had so many) did 
not play their parto 
For both Roos and his friends in the National Council, 
then, a solution along lines other than those suggested by 
Malan and Creswell was highly desirableo It was therefore 
probably no coincidence that Barlow, a close friend of' Roos, 
together with Kentridge and other friendly National Council-
ites, began to campaign for a compromise settlement at the 
same time as Roos began to express public misgivings on the 
210 Only nine of the Council's twenty-five members were 
parliamentarians (The Labour Congress 1926)0 
22. See The Labour Congress 1926, pp. 11 and 14; M. Cres-
well, An Epoch of the political history of South Africa 
in the life of' Frederic Hugh Page Creswell, Po 1190 
• 
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Flag Bill. 
i\.lmost immediately after the session ended on 8 Jw1e, 
"Roos embarked on a political tour of the Orange Free State 
taking with him none of the standard flag rhetorico Q.uite 
the contrary. In the northern Free State, much to the 
embarrassment and anger of' MaJ_an, he made the startling 
declaration that the flag left him cold~ And, as the tour 
progressed, he repeated this alarming heresy with increas-
ing warmtho 23 
At the same time, his Labo:..ir associates put forward 
the proposal which seemed to herald a reasonable settlement. 
This plan, known as the dual flag plan, provided :for a 
clean national flag, but gave the Union Jack 'equal 
o.fficial recognition r • That is, the Union Jack was to be 
f'lown nor merely on special occasions, but with the 
natio:;.'lal flag, at all timeso At a meeting of the National 
Cou.ncil on 20 Ji.me, an amendment (which embodied this plai."'1) 
to a motion of full support for Malan's Bill was carried by 
·13 votes to 9o 24 Concessions had thus been made to both 
2J. The Star, 12 June 1926; Die 
Q~s Vaderlan1, 18 June 1926; 
vol. 9, 4044, J.J. Byron, 23 
Volk.sblad, 15 Jwie 1926; 
Malan, p. 113; Hansari, 
May 19270 
24~ Forward, 25 .June ·19260 
In February 1965, Louis Karovsky, a prominent Coun-
cilite during the controversy, informed Dr. Do Tictin 
that the dual flag plan had originated with Roos. The 
very incomplete minute:3 of the meeting in the ~ovslfy 
Papers give Barlow as the proposer and Kentridge as the 
seco~der of the amendmento I am indebted to Dro Tictin 
for this iiformationo 
camps: to the opposition who could see the Union Jack 
co:!1.st<"ntly a" a symbol of' the British connection, and to 
the Natioaalists who would not see the Union Jack in the 
national flag. 
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To further strengthen their chances of success, Roos 
had persuaded Louis Karovsky to move an additional amend-
ment to the same motion. 25 The essential part of' this 
anwndment stated Y that all steps {shoulc;!] be taken to 
secure by agreement a national flag which will satisfy the 
great mass of the people in South Africa., 26 This amend-
ment too was carried, and as Ythe great mass of' the people' 
had now to be satisfied, the Labo1.1r Party, without whose 
support Malan' s BiJ_l could not be passed, r1.ppeared to be 
committed to a policy of negotiation. 
On Roosis return to Pretoria from the Free State, the 
Head Committee of the Transvaal Nationalist Party met a 
deputation f'rom Labour's National Cowicilo 2 7 The outcome 
of' their discussion of J.ess than half an hour on 21 June, 
was that a Labour resol1.1tion embodying the dual flag plan 
received the approval of the Executive of the Head Committee 
25. o. Pirow, James Barry MlUlllik 1-Iertzog, p. 1220 
26. Ibid.; Creswell, op. cit., p. 116. 
27. Cape Times, The Friend - 22 June 1926; Die Nasion.ale 
BQ..~k, PPo 179-800 
The Nationalist members were Jack Pienaar, Ben Pien-
aar, O. Pirow, H. Reitz, H.D. van Broekhuizen, c. Te 
Water and Rooso The Labour members were A.G. Barlow, 
J. Christie, B., .Jenkins, L. Karovsky, M. Ken tridge and 
A. Weinstocko 
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of tl1e Transvaal Nationalist Partyo The latter declared 
the proposal to be a way out of the impasse between the two 
extreme groups. Roos had previously assured Labourites of 
his co.::i.fidence that the plan would be acceptable to Free 
State Nationalists. He agreed with the broad principles 
of the resolution, Roos told the press after the meeting 
and he absolutely concurred with the National Council that 
they should avoid anything that might revive racialism in 
28 South Africa. 
Roos had played an important role in swinging the 
majority of the National Council against Creswell and 
Malan. Without full Labour support, it seemed that the 
Government would be forced to consider a reasonable com-
promise. He, together with Barlow, Karovsky, and other 
frie:i.ds, had provided such a compromise. Thus, the 
ground appeared to have been cut from under the feet of 
Malan (and Creswell) and a path cleared towards a com-
promise Aolutiono 
The adoptio~ of a com9romise plan by the Labour Party 
was but the first step towards a flag settlement; the 
public Y s support for the plan had :;1.ow to be secured., 
Certainly during June and July no one worked harder than 
Roos did towards this end. Three days after he gave the 
28. Cape Times, The Frlend - 22 June 19260 
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plan his public blessi:':1.g, he championed it at a mass 
meeting in Johannesburg. Once again Roo.3 insisted that 
the flag in itself was of little importance and that what 
really mattered were the questions of their imperia.l 
connection and national status. 'You know as well as I 
do,' he said, 'that when you have the clothing the label is 
but little matter.1 2 9 On 28 Jlille he embarked on a month's 
political tour of the Transvaal where he addressed thirty-
seven meetingsJO and took every opportunity to soothe 
feelings and advocate the dual flag plan.31 Colleagues 
rallied to support his efforts. Oswald Pirow stated that 
the plan should be acceptable to all Nationalists, Hjalmar 
Reitz declared himself satisfied with it, Charles Te Water 
thought it was a real solutiona 32 And, in the Free State, 
N.J. van der Merwe and Colin Steyn gave it their im..~ediate 
support and held that Natio~alists there would gladly 
support the planaJJ 
But despite the fanfare with which it was introduced, 
the dual flag plan failed to win. general support. From 
29. Cape Times, The Friend, Die Volksblad - 25 ,June 1926; 
Daily Desnatch, 26 JlUle 192~. 
JO. For Roos's itinerary in June, July and August see Ons 
V~derland, 11 and 18 ,June 1926. --
31. See for example Cape Times, JO June (Pietersburg); 
ElE}d Daily _Mail, 2 July (Potgietersrust); Cape T~, 
J July (Louis Trichardt), 16 July (Machadadorp), 17 
July (Nelspruit); Hand Daily Mail, 2 August 1926. 
12. Cape Times, 2J June 1926 (all). 
JJ. ;he Fr~, Capo Times - 22 June 1926; G.Da Scholtz, 
Dr. Nicholaas Johannes van de-r Merwe, 1888-1940, p. 610 
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the start its sponsors met formidable ODposition. Not 
many newspapers were sympathetic. Those that were 
included Tt1e Friend, the Natal Mercury, Ons Vader].~ and 
F~rward..34 The lc1st two welcomed the plan as a complete 
solution. 35 The Frie_11:,9:. maintained that the proposal, 
though not ideal, was a sensible way out of the difficulty,36 
while the Natal Mer~ury conceded that if the country could 
endure dual language and dual nationality, it might also 
accept dual flags; if the plan was endorsed by the 
Cabinet, they would like to hear more about ito37 
Most of the other newspapers, however, were hostile. 
Whether Nationalist or opposition, they condemned the plan. 
On 23 June Die Burger and p.:i_e Volksblad rejected its con-
cept of 'equal official recognition' holding that the TJnion 
Jack should be flown only on those occasions symbolizing 
the British connectiono The plan's compromise sprang from 
the wrong asswnption that there were two nations (volke) in 
South Africa, and two flags instead of lllliting would sym-
bolize this division. 
In the face of the above op~osition, which represented 
34. Non-committal on the merjts of the plan were De Volk-
~ (as cited in ~Frienc!_, 22 June 1926) ~~ 
Sunday T.imes (27 June 1926). The latter urged the 
Government to withdraw its flag proposalso 
35. Ons Vaderland, 22 June 1926; Forward, 25 .June 1926. 
36. 23 and .?.4 June 1926. 
37 o 23 June 1926 o See al so 2 August 1926 o 
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and influenced the views of many Nationalists (particularly 
those in the Free State and Cape), the chances of the plan's 
adoption were seriously reduced. However they were 
further lessened by the failure of any S.A.P. politician to 
support the plan publically and by the strong criticism of 
the oppositjon press. The latter attacked the plan for 
two flags as being inimical to national wiity. In common 
with Die Burger, the Pretoria News argued that half the 
population would fly one flag while the other half flew the 
other so that two flags would be the badge not of the Union 
•but of the Disunion of South Africa., 38 
Additionally, the plan was condemned on the growids 
that it was impracticable, insincere, an attempt to exclude 
the past from the national flag, and a move towards secess-
ion. More serious than the charges of impracticability 
based on the view that wiavoidably one flag would always be 
· · ·1 d ·t· 39 th 11 t· f in a more pr1v1 ege pos1 ion - were ea ega ions o 
insincerityo The plan was insincere for if van der Merwe 
and others abhorred the Union Jn.ck, how could they 
1 swallow 1 a full-sized Union Jack every day? 40 If 
Nationalists were :!_)repared to accept the whole of the Union 
JS. 22 ,Jw-ie 1 92.S. See also The Star, 21 Jwie 1926; Daily 
Despatch, 22 June 1926. 
J9o See Rand Daily Mail, 22 Jwie 1926; Ons Land, 24 June 
1926· Daily Despatch, 26 Jwie 1926. 
40o Rand Daily Mail, 22 June 1926; Cape Times, 2J June 
1926; Ons Land, 24 Jwie 1926, 
126 
Jack when it flew alone, 
it ought not to hurt their feelings immoderately 
when it is flown as part of the national flag of 
South Africa. The Union Jack cannot surely be 
more painful to them when it occupies only 
quarter of a piece of bunting than when it 
occupies the whole of ito41 
The a.~swer to this contradiction seemed clear to the 
opposition: the separate flying of the Union Jack was 
merely a blind for the ultimate goal of secession -
reflected in the clean flago Fear of secession lay at the 
very heart of the objection to the plan. Thus on 24 June 
the Eastern Province Heral<! dismissed the proposal as 
•ingenious quibblings' which would not change the convic-
tion of many thou.sands that a sinister attempt was being 
made to haul down the Union Jack. 'Let us face the 
facts ' , it added, 1 the lowering of the Union Jack will 
mean, can only mean, the virtual abandonment of the 
connection with Great Britain and the Empire. And our 
opponents, Labour and Nationalists alike, in their hearts 
know that this is sol' As~ Star frankly admitted, what 
mattered most in controversies about dominion status was 
not the proposal itself, but the motive behind it: 
We take from one man if he has proved himself 
our friend, what we would not take from anothero 
The whole record of those who are seeking to 
force a new flag on South Africa stands against 
them, and in thA light of that record we are 
41. Daily De6patca, 22 JwLe 1926. June 192 • See also Cape Argus, 24 
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justified in regarding their latest proposal with 
suspicion and misgiving.42 
Certainly on the basis of record, Roos was not a man 
the opposition could trust 43 and it is ironical that the 
leading advocate of the plan should have contributed to its 
demise. Both his republican past and his platteland 
audiences created difficulties for him. From the start 
his bona fides were questioned. How could so ardent a 
former champion of republicanism be trusted as the advocate 
of a plan which promised tequal official recognition' to an 
imperial symbol? How could he be accepted as someone con-
cerned for the dienity of the Union Jack? 44 Even Roosts 
insistence that the flag itself was of little importance 
and that what really mattered were the questions of 
national status and the imperial connection, were inter-
preted as a blueprint for the future - first came the small 
matter of the flag, then would come the real question of 
independence. 45 
The dual flae plan's prospects were further reduced by 
Roos's attempts to advocate the plan and mollify platteland 
audiences at the same timeo He was charged with making 
42. 31 July 1926. See also (for opposition to the 
exclusion of the Union Jack), Cape Argus, 24, 25 June; 
Pretoria News, 22 June 1926. 
43. For suggestions of ulterior motives see Pretoria News, 
22 June 1926; Cape Argus, 24 and 25 June 19260 
44. Rand Daily-Mail, JO July 1926. 
45. cape Times, JO July 19260 
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one class of speech in the backveld, where he left his 
audiences under the impression that secession was a 
practical policy, and another class of speech in urban 
centres where he told audiences that secession was merely 
an abstract political ideal which there was no intention of 
46 putting into practiceo On neither the flag question nor 
secession could Roos be taken seriously: 'In each case he 
alone knows what he really means and what he actually 
wants., 47 
The problem was that Roos•s appeal to republicanism 
had played a major part in his political career and he was 
not able now to avoid the subject of secession in all his 
speecheso 'Why don't we hear you talk about it?' a ques-
tioner asked at one of his meetings, and forced Roos to say 
that the Party still stood for secession. 48 Roos•s reply 
to his opposition critics, namely, that the flag question 
had nothing to do with secession, failed to convince a 
public in whose mind the two were firmly linkedo 49 
When in mid-July Roos was reported to have told an 
46. The Friend, 31 July 1926. ·see also Rand Dail Mail, JO 
July 192b; Cape Times, 19 July 1926. 
47. Rand Daily Mai~, JO July 1926. See also The Star, 29 
July 1926; Cape Times, JO July 1926; Sunday Times, 1 
August 1926; Ho~ vol. 64, Athlone to Hertzog, J July 
1926. 
48. The Friend, 16 June 19260 
49. See Pretoria Ne~, 26 June 1926. 
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audience at Lydenburg that secession would come in the 
future and that nothing could prevent it,5° the Rand Daily 
Mail concluded on 14 July that the dual flag plan, if not 
already dead, had now been killedo RoosYs speech, it 
said, had been the final blowo Whatever the truth of this 
statement, Roos's efforts had produced disappointing 
resul tso Perhaps this is not surprisingo It was all 
very well for Nationalists to insist that the new flag 
should look to the future. But what kind of future did it 
symbolize if it excluded all reference to the British 
Commonwealth? 
Commonwealth. 
Clearly, it was thought, one outside the 
How far could a Party, like Roos's, which 
had developed largely as a protest against imperial involve-
men.t be trusted? And how could the assurances of one o.f 
its chief architects be accepted? Was not Article 4 still 
on his Party's plank? Even before Roos•s Lydenburg 
address, a perceptive political observer in Johannesburg 
wrote to Smuts: 
Feeling is tense and LUldesirable elements are 
becoming manifest even on our side. The whole 
thing is due to the truculent attitude adopted by 
the Government; but for that even the two-flag 
50lution suggested by Labour.oomight have proved 
acceptable. But the Government forgot that the 
English section will not accept a flag at the 
hand of a party which still retains Article 4 in 
its constitution.51 
50. Rand Daily Mail, 14 July 1926 9 Daily Despatch, 15 July 
19260 
510 SoP-!.. vol. 35, no. 50, from AoLo Cohn, 9 July 19260 
Cohn was born in Germany in 1874 and practised as a 
lawyer in the Trausvaa.l f.:'.'om ·1 S98. He founded ..m.c.i was 
Chairman of the Federation of Ratepayers in J"ohanneshurg 
and was a memller o:f tt.e Witwatersrand E:x.ecu.tive of the 
S.AoPo 
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In all events, by the end of July the time was ripe 
for Malan to administer the c.oup de grace to the plano He 
was strongly opposed to it. The coupling of their 
national flag with miother cou..~try's natio~al flag would 
constantly degrade the Union's flag. The Nasionaalgesinde 
section of the people would turn away from this agreement 
with abhorrence, and even worse, the Union Jack would be 
elevated, by implication, to an essential part of the flag 
regulationo 52 Malan had not joined openly in the attack 
on the plan; it was clearly wiser to let the opposition 
check it. But by the end of July, with the plan at the 
nadir ot' its popularity, the time seemed propitious to 
crush it and to reassert the Government's lead in flag 
policy. This he did at a Nationalist meeting at Germiston 
on JO Julyo Emphatically, l:le told the meeting that the 
Government would proceed with its flag legislation in 19270 
A new flag counission would be appointed to consider fresh 
designso These designs would exclude the pasto And the 
Union Jack would be flown on stipulated occasions only.53 
Labour under attack 
The La:iourites who had advanced the dual flag plan had 
done so in order to ueet a certain onslaught on their Party. 
52. Malan, Po 11 J: Die Burger (Malan), 31 January 1957 o 
53. Cape Times, J 1 Ju.ly and 2 August 1 926; Die Volksb~<i, 
Die Burger - 31 July 1926; Natal Mercury, 2 August 19260 
Though smal 1, this Party he.ld the balance of power in 
51} parliament and its disintegration could topple the 
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Governmen. to From the time the Pact came to power, Labour 
was seen by the SoAoPo as the weak link in the legislative 
chain and accordingly drew much of the Opposition's fire. 
In doing so, the SoAoPo was talcing adva..Ltage of the legacy 
of distrust which the Nationalists themselves had helped to 
create for Labouro55 Wherever possible Labour was held 
Tesponsible for political sins - both of commission and 
onission: When industrial legislation was introduced, it 
was attributed to Labour ru1.d tainted with socialismo When 
bilingualism was insisted upon Labo:.ir was still inculpated 
for it had made the discriminatio:i possible.5 6 However it 
was the omission of measures which its voters had promptly 
expected that W13 more directly responsible for the Partyts 
declining popularityo As has been noted, the concomitant 
disappointment and disaffection, coupled with the Partyts 
chronic discord, meant that by Nay 1926 Labour was in a 
vulnerable position to meet a call by the Opposition to 
rally to the flage Though Labour had gained five seats in 
the 1924 general election, an equal nwnber o:f constituencies 
5!+0 Tlle posit.ion of the Parties in the Assembly after the 
1924 general election was as follows: S.AoPo 53, 
Nationalist Party 63, Labour Party 18, Independents 1 
(Govern~~Gazette, vol. LVI, noo 1401 t 27 June 1924; 
Cape Times, 21 Jlllle 1924)0 
55a See for example o. Pirow, .James Barry Munnik Hertzog,_ 
PPo 86-70 
56. See Natal Witness, 16 December 1924, 4 March 19250 
- Bok3b1.1rg, Roodepoort, Langlaagte, Durban (Umbilo) and 
Troyville - was held by majorities of less than 25005'7 
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Any growth of jingoism was likely not only to rui~ Labourts 
prospects of further gains, 58 but also to bring about the 
loss of its newly-won seatso Even elsewhere, Labour's 
chances of retaining its majorities would be reduced. 
With the development of the flag problem this predominantly 
English-speaking Party became an obvious target for a 
strong and sustained attack by the opposition. 
Accordingly, fro~ 25 May 1926, when Malan announced in 
Parliament that the Government was postponing flag legis-
lation but would proceed with it in 1927, definitely, and 
that this legislation would exclude the Union Jack from the 
national flag, the attacks on Labour began to mount. 
Immediately after the Bill's postponement Smuts hit out; 
The Nationalist Party was behaving with the most brutal and 
cold-blooded disloyalty towards its allies. Though the 
Natio:'1.alists knew the Bill would be the death of Labour, 
the latter was being forced to support it; here was con-
clusive proof that Labour's leaders could not control the 
Governmento Hertzog's threat to pass the Bill could only 
57., ~rnment Gazette, volo LVI, no., 1401, 27 June 1924; 
C~e Times, 20 June 1924, Po 10. 
58. For example in the following constituencies: Johannes-
burg (North), Hospital, East London (City), Dundee and 
Durban's Central, Stamford Hill and Point (see Govern-
ment Gazette, vol., LVI, no., 1401, 27 June 1924; Cape 
Times, 20 June 1924). 
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be made with Labour's support: 'That is the brutal fact -
that this outrage could never have been committed on public 
opinion now or in the future, but for the action of Labouris 
leaders o v 
this fact 
He wanted the workers of the country to realize 
that their Parliamentary leaders were pledged 
to this Billo If ever this great atrocity were 
perpetrated, it would be entirely in the hands of the 
workers who belonged to the Labour Partyo59 
In the attacks that followed, the chief targets were 
the Partyvs leaders a standard political practice likely 
to prove particularly rewarding against Labour because of 
the recent history o:f discord among its leadership. 
Accordingly, Boydell, Reyburn, and Strachan all came under 
fire as the Vholy trinity¥ of Labour in Natal who had pulled 
. 60 
a mean confidence trick. Chief' recipient of the 
oppositionVs attacks was Creswello In Natal, where his 
name was linked with those of' local Labour parliamentarians, 
his hope of persuading many English-speakers to his Vpe~-
verted way of thinking' was ridiculedo His manifesto was 
condemned as van elaborate piece of special pleading', and 
his appeal for the exclusion of the Union Jack in the 
interest of racial amity was said to mean the tacit 
590 Cape Argus, 27, 29 May 1926; B&nd Daily Mail, Cape 
Ti!!!~ - 29 May 1926., 
60. Natal Mercury, 31 May 19260 For other attacks on 
these three Labourites, see: Natal Mcrcurg' 4, 8, 14, 
17 June 1926; Daily Despatch, 1 June 192; The Star, 
4 August 1926., 
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acceptance of Yevery foul lie that racial propagandists' 
had told about Great Britain in the past twenty-five yearso 
He, Boydell, Reyburn, and Strachan, were challenged to put 
their <.;onvictions to the test of their constituentso 
2 500 reasons were suggested why Creswell would noto 61 
Creswell, did not understand the view of people of the same 
origin as himself; was out of touch with the rank and file 
of his Party; had blundered in leading Malan to believe 
that he could p.ledge Labour to support the Bill, and had 
bartered principles for powero 62 
At the same time Labo~rYs parliamentaria.~s as a whole 
came under fire for not representing the views of the bulk 
of their supporters and for following the Government and 
not their constituents. 63 The Party had Ysold the pass', 
for had it stood firm, the Labour Party in parliament might 
have forced the Government to withdraw the Bill. As for 
the dual flag plan, this was merely an attempt by the 
National Council to have it both ways. But Labour had to 
say 'yes' or 'no' as to whether it wished to see the Union 
Jack on the national flag. 'Shifts and evasions' were 
61. Natal Mercury:, 8 June 19260 · '2 500' was an allusion 
to the recently increased parliamentary salaries 0 
620 For attacks on Creswell, see: Cape Times, 27 May and 
10, 25 JLL~e 1926; The Star, 9, 12 (report), 17 (un-
signed article) June, and JO July 1926; Cape Argus, 23 
JLL~e 1926; Pretoria News, 9 June 1926; Daily Despatch, 
10 June 1926 (report); The Friend, J1 July 1926 
(report); Rand ~ly Mail, 8 July 19260 
63. Daily Despatch, 28 May 19260 
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useless. 64 
!'he campaic;n against Labour and the Bill was two-
pronged: condemnation o:f Labouris leaders went hand in 
hand with appeals to British sentiment. Immediately 
before the National Collllcil met to consider Crsswellis 
m3Ilifesto, one such appeal appeared in opposition news-
papers throughout the countryo The Grand President of the 
Sons of Engla..~d wrote: 
The public.o.knows full well how the working man 
loves his politics, but please God he loves his 
flag better, and I am persuaded that even to save 
its face the rank and file of' British South 
Af'rican Labour ·will never betray the Union Jacko 
I.f the National Council stands true to the senti-
ments of its constituents all will be well for 
South Africa, for without the aid of Labour there 
~ill be no abortion set over us as a ~ational flago 
Woe betide South Africa if Labouroocfails to see 
where its obvious duty lies •• 065 
But any sharp distinction between general appeals to British 
sentiment and specific appeals to this sentiment amongst 
Labourites would be artificial. Appeals to British senti-
ment were intended to influence all of British origin, 
including Labouriteso And as there were only two Labour 
newspapers, Forward and the Guardian, both o.f' which had 
relatively small circulations, appeared only weekly, and 
gave less news coverage than other English-language news-
papers, it is probable that many Labourites were more 
640 Ca12e Times, 22 June 19260 See also The Star, 21 JlUlC 
19260 
650 Daily Des12atch, ca:12e Times 
-
19 June 1926; The Star, 
18 June 1926. 
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regular readers of the opposition presso When these news-
papers appealed to 'British traditionsv, 'British pridei, 
'British achievement in South Africav, 'British fairplayv, 
and to pride in the British Empire and loyalty to the Union 
Jack, their call was directed at Labourites no less ·than 
other English-speakerso 
The call was effective. In May 1926 Guardian wrote: 
"When the Flag Bill is introduced to the House we echo the 
hope of all who love and honour the splendid tradition for 
which the Union Jack stands, that the flag of the vcommon-
wealth of Nationsi will be given the place of honour it 
deserveso11 66 If socialism had made some Labourites 
indifferent to the British co:':Ulection, there were many 
others who were determined to oppose ~~y step towards 
secession. George Hay, at a public meeting in Pretoria in 
July 1926, complained that the issue of secession was very 
much alive and that Nationalists still adhered to Article l-1-; 
and he expressed misgivings at Hertzogvs intention to ask 
for a proclamation to the world of the 'independence, free-
dom and equality of South Africa., 
I have no desire to strain the relations of the 
Pact [Hay saig7, but my opinion is that there is 
something behind all this question of the flag 
and equa.l status, things have gone on so steadily 
now that there is a belief that at the back of it 
all is a wish for severance from the British 
Commonwealth 0 67 
66. Daily Despatc~, 25 May 1926, quoting Guardian. 
670 Rand Daily Mail, 12 July 19260 
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As was to be expected from the governing partners of the 
Nationalists, public expressions of this fear of secession 
by Labour parliamentarians was infrequento But its 
existence was revealed, indirectly, by Forwardts pains to 
dispel the fearo It insisted that 'the whole business of 
Secession is a Golliwog' which had been invented •to a 
great degree' by former Unionistso Whatever might be the 
policy of the Government on secession, it was no part of 
68 the policy of Labouro 
The cumulative effect of the attacks of the opposition, 
the appeals to British sentiment, and the suspicions of 
secession, when added to the existing Labour difficulties, 
resulted once again in open manifestations of Party dis-
unity. Immediately after Creswell's manifesto was pub-
lished there were reports of' uneasiness amongst Rand 
Labouriteso 69 A canvas of opinion allegedly revealed tan 
unmistakable feeling' that if Creswell's manifesto were 
adopted, the Labour Party would suffer widespread 
desertions; seventy-five per cent of the Party was 
reportedly opposed to the exclusion of the Union Jack.70 
In Natal, the view of many Labourites was said to have been 
68. 25 June 1926. For denials by Creswell that there was 
any intention of seceding, see Cape Times, J and JO 
July 19260 
69. Daily Despatch, 10 June 19260 
70. The Star, Cape Times - 9 June 19260 
Mercury, 16 Ju..~e 1926. 
See also ~atal 
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expressed by a iwell-k.nown Labourite 1 who complained that, 
despite the strong protest from Natal, the Labour Caucus 
had committed the whole Party to support Malan 1 s Bill; but 
they would not be converted as easily as Creswell imagined: 
'Pact or no Pact, we wa."'.1.t the Union Jacki o 7 1 
~~ reported that James Stewart, the former M.P. for 
East London and delegate to the forthcoming meeting of the 
National Council, had threatened that on the issue of the 
flag he was prepared to break with Creswell and, if 
necessary, the Partyo 
The dual flag pla.~ failed to halt the growing discord. 
Many Labourites too had rejected it. As the proposal had 
its origins in the National Council and ran counter to the 
obligations o·f Labour parliamentarians, it was bound to 
receive divided support.72 And as Creswell had already 
pledged his support to Malan and made his opinion known in 
his personal manifesto, he could not but be a lukewarm 
supporter of the plan imposed on him, or, behind the scenes, 
try to influence others against it. Almost inunediately 
after the adoption of the plan, JoWo Coleman, a Natal 
Labour MoP.Co was reported to have declared himself strongly 
71 o Natal Mercury, 16 June 19260 
72. Creswell and Boydell had voted against the proposal at 
the meeting of the Nat.ional Council which adopted it 
( Cape Argus, 22 Jwie 1927). When Malan rejected the 
dual flag plan at Germiston, he enjoyed the backing 
of all three of Labouris Ministers; only Roos had 
supported the plan in the Cabinet (Malan, Po 114)0 
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opposed to it7J a~d by mid-July Forward was forced to con-
clude that the authority of the National Council was being 
questioned because spokesmen of the Party were openly 
ignoring the Council's plano An 'utterly impossible 
indeed ludicrous¥ position had arisen. And it was not, 
the much cursed press {"it saiq] that is keeping 
the flag question alive today. It is, and we 
say it deliberately, the leading members of the 
Labour Party who refuse to abide by the decision 
of the National Council who are making all the 
pother.0074 
During July, disun.i.ty assumed serious proportions with 
further reports of Party dissension. Strachan and 
Waterston had to face stormy constituents. At Boksburg, 
Creswell¥s meeting became very lively when the flag 
question was raised and finally ended in uproaro At 
Pietermaritzburg, his (and Strachan's) meeting was fiery. 
At Durban, which Creswell, Boydell a.~d Madeley visited to 
defend them.selves, the meeting was marked by wild scenes 
and fights. When Creswell arrived in Durban, there were 
rowdy scenes at the station; a Labour Legion escorted him 
to his hotel where a scuffle developed between Creswell and 
a hotel guest who challenged him on his flag policy; 
Boydell had to use his fists and, according to the Natal 
Mercury, it was o~ly with difficulty that the police 
73. Cape Times, 24 June 1926. However, Coleman probab.ly 
rejected it because of its clean flag. 
74. 16 July 19260 
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prevented the crowd from storming the hotelo75 At the 
beginning of July, Kentridge told his constituents that if 
no flag solution could be found, the matter would have to 
be droppedo By mid-July he was warning that flag discord 
. 76 
was threatening to break up the Partyo 
Though the opposition in the hope of furthering dis-
unity, seized every chance to publicize alleged Labour 
disunity so that its reports may sometimes have been a 
mixture of fact and wishful thinking, there can be no doubt 
that by mid-July Labour was seriously dividedo This fact 
is confirmed in Forward. Its faith in 'the commonsense of 
the vast majorityw of Labourites and its attempts to hold 
socialist issues to the fore had proved of little avail and 
it conceded that, whereas some Labourites supported Malan's 
Bill, many would like to see all Unio:".l Jack and nothing 
else. 77 
In August the fortunes of the Party declined further; 
hostility between the two groups increased and disaffection 
grewo When in Durban two branches o.f the Party seceded, 78 
mem~ers of the Durban Typographical Society tabled a 
75. Rand Daily Mail, 7, 8, 14, JO July 1926; Daily 
Despatch, JO, 31 July 1926; The Star, 30 July 1926; 
Natal Mercury, Die Burger - 31 July 1926. 
76. Rand Daily Mail, 1, 2 July 1926; Cape Times, 2, 16 
July 19260 
77. See 28 May~ 18 June, 16 July 19260 
78. Forward, JO July 1926. 
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resolution to follow suit. 79 A prominent Durban Labourite, 
W. Eaton, who represented Labour on both the Provincial and 
City Councils, resigned both seats, reportedly because of 
disciplinary action taken against him for his opposition to 
the Flag Bill, stood again for the City Council, and 
defeated the Party's official candidate. 80 An tuU1anted 
member of the National Council condemned Malan's Germiston 
speech as yet another contemptuous snap of the fingers at 
81 the Labour Party. On 7 August, George Brown, M.P. for 
Gcrmiston, admitted that he was sorry that the Flag Bill 
had ever been raised, while John Christie, MoPo for Lang-
laagte, suggested that if agreement were not possible, the 
82 Bill should be dropped. Conflict within the Party was 
further reflected in conflicting flag resolutions tabled 
for discussion at Party Provincial Conferences, 83 and in 
reports of opposition to Creswell and attempts to oust him 
from the PartyVs leadership 0 84 
However, Labour's difficulties by August 1926 - and 
with it the Party's increasing need to find a generally 
790 London Times, 4 August 1926. See also Cape Argus, 5 
August 1926 for Labour Dissension in Durbano 
80. R~Daily Mail, 5 August 1926; London Times, 4 August 
1926; The Star, 9 August 1926. 
81. Cape ..Lime§_, 2 A,1g.rnt 1926. 
82. R~d Daily Mail-_, 7 .August 1926. 
8J. The ...§.t~t., 5 August (Tra.-isvaal); ~Jl~ly Mail, 6 
August 1926 (Transvaal); Forward, 27 August 1926 
(Cape) a 
84., The Sta:i:_, 13 August 1926; Forwam, 20 August 1926. 
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acceptable flag plan - are best reflected not in the 
reports of the opposition press but in the leader articles 
of Fo_rward. On 6 August it explained that though the 
wo.rkinc- class knew that every national flag was merely the 
emblem of 'militant capitalism', it was not difficult to 
arouse a crowd on such matters as nationality and race. 
Unfortunately, the men they had come to look to for a sa..'1.e 
lead had taken sid1als, become .ho;,elessly sidetracked, and 
allowed everything of real importance to Labour to become 
subrnerged i.n tho flood of sentiment that had broken over a 
matter of only superficial importance. Non-white Labour 
was ton the up-trend as compared with white•, but Labour's 
leaders, their eyes glued to the Union Jack or Vtango 
standard 1, had becor:ie colour bl.ind; they were becoming 
content with mere lip-service to the policy of civilised 
labouro The newspaper urged Labouris leaders to return 
their attention to the things that really matteredo 
However E.2.!J!~'s appeals for single-minded dedication 
to the Party's socialist programme could not submerge 
differences in the Party. On 27 August it reported that 
at a conference between members of the Hational Council and 
Parliamentary Caucus, the question of control of the Party 
between an11.11al conferences was left 'where it wast. As 
the m:1.tter stood at present, Forward added, the National 
Council could reject any policy decided upon by the 
Parliamentary Caucus, and vice versao Yet it was impera-
tive that on this question of control, the Labour Party 
143 
shou.ld put its house in order, and quickly too: iAt this 
very moment rank and file are bemused entirely regarding 
the "yes-no" policy on the Flag Bill. Laboar in South 
Africa, it must bo confessed, sadly needs a clear lead on 
the questions of the dayi. 
When, at the beginning of' September, .~~ learnt 
that the Transvaal Provincial Congress of the Party 
intended to discuss ti.le flag question in committee, it 
objected: the f'la6 issue had become too important a matter 
to be treated as a domestic concern of the Provincial 
Labour Partieso Indeed, it warned, the future of the 
Labour Party now depended very largely on the way the flag 
g· 
question was handledo) 
Thus a matter which many Socialists had seen. as of 
'merely superficial importancei, had gro\m to threaten the 
future of Labour. Race, sentiment and fear were factors 
that had confoW1ded the predictions of doctrinaire 
socialists and made it imperative or so it seemed if 
schism and disintegration were to be avoided - for Labour 
to put forward another compromise plano 
Such a plan would obviously have to accommodate the 
strong objection to the exclusion from the national t'lag of 
the Union Jack - symbol o.f the Brit.ish connection" Fear 
85. J September ·1926. 
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for the future of this re.lationsh:Lp had not decli::i.ed since 
the postponement of the Bill; as the time for Hertzog1s 
departure to the Imperial Conference drew near, it probably 
increased. Indeed, Hertzog agreed to the new flag 
proposal put forward by Labou.rites early in September, 
largely in the hope of meeting this fear of secession, and 
it is therefore necessary to give our attention to its 
growth during August and early September 1926., 
F~:!' o.f secession increases 
If it had been Roos's misfortune to increase fears of 
seces3ion, other Nationalists also assistedo 
Minister of Mines and Industries, was one. 
Co W. Beyers, 
At Philipstmvn 
he reportedly said that there was no question of seceding 
w1.til the majority were in favour of it; tbut I, as a 
Minister, am fighting for secession, because the seeds will 
86 
take root in days to come.' Again, at De Aar he 
deprecated the inequalities in the British-South African 
relationship, complaining of the indirect way in which the 
Government sanctioned foreign consuls, appointed the 
Governor-General and comm1r:1.icated with the Kingo The Rand 
Daily_~ail observed that Beyers's remarks encouraged the 
suspicion that behind the Flag Bill lay a sinister motive. 8 7 
86. Rand Dail)'.: Mail, 7 August 19260 
87. ~. 9 October 1925. 
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Three more Ministers added to the anxiety about 
secessiono PoGoWo Grabler, Minister of Lands, and JoC.G. 
Kemp, Minister of Agriculture, were both reported to have 
denied that there was any change in their Party's ultimate 
goal of secession, while CoW. Malan held that secession, 
•at present', would be a calamity for South Africao 88 In 
the view of Senator Langenhoven, the forcing of the Flag 
Bill was ill-timed; the issue should have waited till 
South Africa obtained its independencee 8 9 These views 
could hardly instil confidence for a future inside the 
British Commonwealth. 
Opposition politicians also inspired alarm over the 
possibility of secession. At a violent political meeting 
in Johannesburg, Smuts demanded that Hertzog should clarify 
his intentions at the Imperial Conference. Hertzog had 
declared that there should be a declaration to the world of 
the Union's independence, and, that if any members of the 
Commonwealth wished to refrain from such a declaration, 
this should not stand in the way of the others proceeding 
with it. 90 But such a declaration could mean the break up 
of the British Empiree What was the use of Hertzog saying 
88. Cape Times, 4 August 1926; Cape Argus, 13 September 
1926. 
89. Cape Times, 8 August 19260 
900 This was a reference to Hertzog's speech at Stellen-
bosch a few days before the first reading of the Flag 
Bill. See p. 58. 
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in Parliament that secession would be a calamity, 91 if the 
declaration he sought from the Imperial Conference meant, 
in effect, the British Empire's disintegration? 92 At 
Port Elizabeth, Smuts wanted to know whether anyone could 
tell him, from the statements of Nationalist leaders, what 
their attitude was to secession?; they had now come 
forward with the flag question and in such a way that one 
wondered if this was simply secession in another form. 93 
Other Opposition parliamentarians also related the flag to 
. 94 
secessiono 
In the fortnight before Hertzog left for the Imperial 
Conference, suspicions of and opposition to secession were 
o~ce more expressed by the opposition presso The S,unday 
Times wrote that in spite of Hertzog's repudiation, 
secession was still a vital plank in the programme of many 
'South African reactionaries' and, 
91. 
92. 
93. 
94. 
950 
there is not the slightest doubt that Dro Malan•s 
Flag Bill and several other Nationalist measures 
are widely regarded, both here and overseas, and 
among their supporters as well as among their 
opponents, as the thin edge of the secessional 
wedgeooooneither now nor at any future time will 
Britons or their loyalist friends allow the Union 
to "secede" from the Empireo95 
A reference to Hertzog's reply to Smuts's questioning 
on 28 May 1926. See Hansard, vol. 7, 4294-8. 
Cape Times, 18 August 1926; London Times, 19 August 
1926. 
Daily Despatch, Cape Times - 1 September 19260 
Duncan: London Times, 19 August 1926; FoJ. Lennox 
(MoPo for Durban-Stamford Hill): Cape Times, 12 June 
19260 
5 September 1926. Italics in originalo 
On the next day the Cape Argus asked Hertzog to explain why, 
despite his parliamentary assurances, secession was still 
openly preached as the ultimate goal of the Nationalist 
Party? He could not allay suspicions by appealing to 
press misrepresentations: 
Upholders of the British connection cannot be 
fobbed off with subtle verbal refinements. If 
the avowed aim is, as is so constantly asserted, 
secession when the time is ripe, they are justi-
fied in treating all disclaimers regarding the 
trend of Ministerial policy as mere "eye-wash11 .96 
In an atmosphere in which suspicion fed suspicion it is 
not surprising that the attempts by Nationalist politicians 
and their press to draw a distinction between isecession• 
and 'independencei, 97 or their assurances that final 
independence would take place only by agreement with all 
parties in the Union and EngJ.and, 98 failed to mollify the 
opposition. The sin was that independence was contemplated 
at all, whether now or in the distant future. This, apart 
from past acts, was sufficient to taint all Nationalist 
assurances. 
970 
6 September 19260 See also The Star, 1 September 
1926; Cape Argus, 7 September 19260 For examples 
earlier leading articles which expressed fear of 
secession, see Dailg Despatch, J1 May, and 10, 14, 
19, 2J, JO Jw1.e ·192 ; Natal Mercury, 8 June 1926; 
Friend, 2 August 19260 
The Star, 1 September 1926 (po 11); South African 
Nation, 11 September 19260 
98. See South African Nation, 28 August 1926. 
of 
The Crown proposal 
In the circumstances, only a concrete flag proposal 
could allay suspicion and help Labour and the Pacto 
148 
Because for many people uneasiness concerning secession was 
the chief obstacle to a flag agreement and lay at the heart 
of their objection to a clean flag, the main problem became 
one of finding a symbol of the British connection that 
could be placed on a new flag and yet meet with the accept-
ance of the bulk of the population. As had occurred two 
months earlier, a group of National Councilites attempted 
to find a solution. Indeed it was because they believed 
they had found one that the Transvaal Provincial Conference 
of the Party had decided, much to Forward's annoyance, 99 to 
discuss the matter in secret. 100 
On J September, a deputation appointed by the National 
101 Council, and led by Kentridge, met Hertzog. It 
proposed that the national flag should incorporate, as a 
symbol of the British connection, the royal crown. Since 
Hertzog had objected to the Union Jack itself and not to 
symbolizing the British connection, this seemed an 
excellent plan and he accepted it. He informed his 
cabinet colleagues that, 'onder die omstandighede', he 
99c See p.143. 
1000 See Sunday Tiwe~, 5 September 1926; Daily Despatch, 6 
September 1920; Cape Times, 7 September 1926. 
101. Sunday Times, 5 September 1926; Daily Despatch, 6 
September 1926; Cape Times, 7 September 1926 (Po 1J); 
Mal an , p. 1 1 4 o 
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favoured the proposal. Also, he supported it because the 
1 • k . 1. d d h . h . d 1 02 Crown, unlike t11e Union Jae , imp ie no on er orig ei. 
In his final public address before leaving for England, 
Hertzog announced the Government's approval of' the plana 
Addressing a large gathering in Cape Town on 6 September, 
he declared that if it was thought desirable to symbolize 
the British connection by means of' a symbol on the national 
flag (in addition to flying the Union Jack separately, as 
in the Bill), he had no doubt that such a proposal - if it 
offered a more acceptable solution - would be favourably 
considered by the Flag Conunission which was soon to be 
appointed. And, if this Flag Conunission were to recommend 
that the crown should be incorporated, he was confident 
103 that the Government would agree. 
What were the iomstandighedei which made Hertzog 
favour the crown proposal? That Hertzog in his final 
public address before leaving for England should devote 
the bulk of a long speech to the flag controversy, reflected 
the degree to which this issue had come to occupy the public 
mind and excite its tempera The warm speeches which had 
characterized the meetings of patriotic societies, protest 
and political meetings had not conduced towards political 
1020 Malan, p. 114: Die Burger (Malan), 31 January 1957. 
103. Daily Despatch, The Friend, Rand Daily Mail - 7 Sep-
tember 1926. 
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calm. Ever since July political meetings had been marred 
by tumult and vio.lence. 104 In August, The Friend warned 
that unless sane counsel prevailed in Pretoria, South 
Africa was at the beginning of a long and bitter racial 
quarrel, 'the end of which no man can see.w 105 At the 
beginning of September, the S.A.P.'s De Volkstem, in 
reviewing the political situation, referred to the output 
of high politics Wby the tonw, 106 while the Nationalist 
Party's South African Nation asserted on 25 September -
shortly after Hertzog's departure - that flag agitation had 
thrown the country into turmoilo 
Hertzog could not fail to see that the electorate's 
preoccupation with a divisive and potentially explosive 
issue was likely to have undesirable results. Apart from 
damaging racial harmony, it was bound to divert attention 
from more important political questions, such as his pro-
posed Native legislation for which he hoped to gain general 
supporto Far from contributing towards such support, the 
flag issue had divided the Government's present 
supporters - a circumstance that could have serious con-
sequences, for a lost Labour vote was almost certainly a 
104. For example, see: Rand Daily Mail, 7, 14, JO July, 
and 4, 18 August 1926. 
1050 2 August 19260 See also, Sunday Times, 1 August 1926. 
1060 2 September 1926 (translation). Malan, Roos, Beyers, 
c.w. Malan and Smuts had all recently undertaken 
political tour so 
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lost Pact voteo Nor could the possibility of schism in 
the Labour Party itself be ignored. 
107 Furthermore, it was clear, and not least to Hertzog, 
that the main battle-cry of the SoAoP• had become: 
'secession in another formto Q t . t t Mi . t 108 ues ions pu o nis ers, 
109 
statements from s.A.P. platforms, and articles in the 
opposition press all testified to thiso As the difficul-
ties in the Labour Party amply showed, this was a highly 
effective rallying-cry, and it would remain the chief 
weapon of the S.A.Po until the next election - unless the 
question could be resolvedg And if Hertzog did intend, as 
110 111 Smuts suspected, and Duncan feared, to hold an 
election on his Native policy in 1927, he could not do so 
l h l d th fl . 1 1 2 now - un ess e reso ve e ag issue. Indeed, no 
election could be faced with confidence by the Pact until 
the question was settled. It is useful to compare Smuts's 
observations on the Pact shortly before, during, and after 
the Flag Bill was in Parliament. 
Bill was introduced he wrote: 
One month before the 
107. See The Star, 1 September 1926 (Hertzog's speech)e 
108. For example, see Cape Times, 4 August (CoW. Malan at 
Vryburg), and 7 August (D.Fe Malan at Riversdale). 
109~ For example, see Daily Despatch, 9 September 1926 
(Deneys Reitz at Johannesburg) and above. 
11 o. See pages 39-41. 
1110 Duncan Papers, to Lady Selborne, 27 May 19260 
112. Ibid. in which Duncan maintained that thanks to the 
withdrawal of the FJ.ag Bill all thoughts of an early 
general election had been dropped by the Government. 
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We are to hold a joint sitting of both houses 
over the Colour Bar Bill, the Senate having once 
more rejected the bill.a After that the Asiatic 
Segregation Bill will come on, as dan.gerous and 
unpleasant a measure as has ever been before our 
parliament. Then Hertzog will bring f'orward his 
Native segregation bills. This will become a 
most ur1happy col.Ultry with policies such as these. 
And yet for the moment these policies are popular 
and the Nat-Labour Pact is no doubt scoring 
heavily and entrenching themselves in public 
opinioni I feel profoundly unhappy over it 
all •• o 1 3 
However, a few days after the Bill ts f'irst reading he 
observed that it was ireally remarkable to see how much 
hmm the Pact has done itself this session. The public is 
really disgusted. And if things go on like this their 
days are numbered and their end sure. Goodo They are 
killing themselvesoi 114 Finally, at the end of June he 
concluded: 
I expect that a grave blQnder of the Pact in 
regard to the flag question will turn people's 
minds to their other first-class bll.Ulders also, 
and that in the end all moderate people will 
turn from them in disgust. 
You must bear in mind that it was the support 
of the non-political moderates which gave them 
victory two years ago. They are now doing 
everything in their power to alienate and disgust 
these people. 115 
Smuts appears to have become more hopeful of an election 
success while Hertzog probably became less soo True, the 
·1130 SoPo vol. 36, noo 225, to M.Co Gillett, 25 March 1926: 
van der Poel, no. 1890 The Areas Reservation Bill 
was often referred to as the Asiatic Segregation Bill. 
11L~o S.Po vol. 36, no. 184, to wife, 23 May 1926: van der 
r_oel, llOo 1990 
115. SeP. volo 102, no. 219, to Crewe, 29 June 1926: van 
der Poel, noo 201. 
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Colour Bar Bill had now been passed, but the Areas Reserva-
tion Bill had not: the troot and branch' treatment 
promised for Indians had not materializedo As for 
Hertzog's much vaunted solution of the Native problem, it 
had barely seen the light of day and had yet to be debated 
in Parliamento Above all, there was the twice withdrawn 
and divisive Flag Bill. As early as July it had been 
noted that even amongst Nationalists there was a growing 
tendency to deprecate the countryts distraction with a dis-
cordant symbol at the expense of the more urgent problems 
of agriculture, poor-whiteism, industrialism and, most o-f 
116 
all, the non-white problem. All the above would be 
valuable ammunition for the Opposition in a general elec-
tion. 
These difficulties probably constituted the omstandig-
gede Hertzog had in mind when he advocated acceptance of 
the crown proposal. For Hertzog it was senseless to 
weaken his Labour allies further, facilitate Smuts's return 
to power and possibly lose the opportunity to pass more 
important legislation - be~ause of the Flag Bill. 
the crown proposal seemed to be a way out of this 
To him 
difficulty, for it appeared to nullify the argument that 
the flag was a move towards secession and therefore to cut 
the growid from Qnder the feet of the oppositiono Under 
the circumstances, the incorporation of the crown did not 
116. Round Table, noo 64, p. 856 (September 1926). 
seem too high a price I'or Nationalists to payo That it 
was a price is certain: it conflicted with earlier 
arguments that the British link was quite adequately 
recognized in the Bill. And though the crown was likely 
to evoke less antagonism than a Union Jack, it was certain 
to be an wiwelcome reminder to many of the British pasto 
The Flag Commission and the referendum proposal 
Malan had now to establish the Flag Commission. The 
first suggestion for this bod.y had come on 7 June in 
Hertzog's reply to Sir William Campbell. 11 7 The Prime 
Minister had stated that the Government, in its desire to 
remove the flag question as far as possible from Party 
politics, would be only too glad to entrust the choice of a 
design to a body of unbiased men in whom the public on both 
"d h d f.d 118 si es a con 1 enceo In his Germiston speech at the 
end of July, Malan confirmed that the Government hoped to 
appoint a representative commission; it would consist of 
members of the public who would consider new designs and, 
. 11 9 he hoped, arrive at a choiceo · Six weeks later, at 
almost the same time as Hertzog suggested that the crown 
might be incorporated, the instructions of the new Flag 
117. See page 114. 
1180 Cape Times, Die Burger - 7 June 1926. 
119. Die Burger, 31 July 1926; Cape Times, 2 August 19260 
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Commission were published: it would advise the Government 
on the selection of a suitable design - but in accordance 
with the principles laid down in Malan's Flag Bill; and, 
its design was to unite 'by symbolizing bonds of union 
120 
rather than conflicts of the pasta' It now fell to 
Malan. to find the stipulated twenty-one members of this 
body to which tbe public were once again invited to submit 
new designso 
For the position of chcdrman of the Commission, 
Campbell appeared from the Governmer ... t' s point of view to be 
eminently suitedo Titled, English-speaking, presumably a 
SoAoP. voter, a former Dominion Chairman of the B.E.SoLo, 
of unquestioned integrity - he 'was a supporter of a clean 
Given the circumstances, to the Government no South 
African seemed more desirableo But when. approached, Camp-
bell would agree to take office only if the chaser.. design., 
after acceptance by the Government, was subjected to a 
referendumo 121 This condition tr..e Government accepted" 
Was Campbell's request the sole reason for the Govern-
mer. t' s acceptance of a referendum? From Malan's account 
it would appear to be so~ 'Hierdie Lcampbell'i/ 
120. Government~ette, volo LXV, no. 1578, 10 SeptC:mber 
1926, p. 508; see also Daily Despatch, 9 September 
19260 
121. Archives of the Private Secretar to the Minister of 
the Interior hereafter cited as P.S.M,I. , letter 
from Campbell, 21 September 1926; Malan, Po 115. 
voorwaarde 1 
' 
he wrote, 'is deur ons aanvaar, en hoe-\\'el dit 
ongetwyfeJ.d tot ~rl)ot mo oil ikl:.ede kon lei, was di t tog 'n 
1~aarborg dat die Hegering nie teen die volkswil kon indru.is 
J ') ') . '-'--n10. Concern for the Y9.J..Jsc;;wil appears in Malan rs 
accoLU1t to have been seen more as a compensation of the 
concession than a t"eason for :it. Certainly neither he nor 
the Govnrnmen.t had shown undue concern for an expression of 
the volkswil in their 1925 flag legislation. 
Probably the GovernmentWs acceptance of a referendum 
was influenced by severaJ. consideratior..s other than a keen-
ness to gain Campbell's services and one of these may have 
been a desire to meet Labouro At a public meeting in 1927 
Hay declared that in May 1926, at the Labour Caucus meeting; 
which decided to ask the Government to postpone the Bill, 
be suggested that 2. referendum should be held. The 
Nationalists had rejected tbe idea but "for once the Labour 
Party asserted itself and said, ¥We shall have a referen-
dum.' They could not face their constituents unless they 
had a referendum", and Labour had finally got its way. 123 
The Labour Partyvs manifestly declining fortunes since May 
1926, may also have influ.enced the Government's decision. to 
hold a referendumo 
In all events, at the tirre the Nationalists probably 
1220 ~alan, po 1150 
12Jo ~ Star, 2J July 1927. 
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felt they had much to gain from a ref'erendumo The 
Cow1ission was advisory only; the Government would deter-
mine its membership; and its terms of' reference precluded 
the choice ot~ a design which recalled. the conflicts of the 
past. Thus, whatever the referendum's result, the 
Nationalists seemed safe: the new flag presected in the 
referendum would first have to be approved by the Govern-
mento The frequent argument that the Government was 
forcing a flag on an unwilling people by means of its 
parliamentary majority, could now be dismissed; similarly, 
the 2.rgument that the Government was proceeding with a 
matter on which it had no rr.andate 124 could be parried. 
Against both charges it could argue that it had referred 
the final decision to tl·~e will of tlle peopleo 
Probably Hertzog and the Governmentis reasons for 
agreeinc to a referendum were also directly related to the 
problem of retaining power, their decision being as much an 
act of poJ.jtical necessity as of goodwillo Whichever way 
the Government turned, it found itself confronted with the 
choice of either a referendum or a general election on the 
flag issue. Even if it withdrew the Bill, suffering the 
consequent l0ss of face, it would still be confronted with 
the flag issue at the next election when a S.A.Po slogan 
was likely to be: wvote for the Party that saved the flagv 
124. See for example The Fr~, 8 September 1926; Dai_!y 
Despatch, 14 September 1926 (Smuts's speech)o 
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-~ a particularly effective cry in Labour and other urban 
constituencies and one which could overshadow more favour-
able - and more important - questions, such as Colour 
poJ.icy. It was politically far wiser to have the flag 
issue sett.led, or at least to have as much of the steam 
taken out of it as possible, by means of a referendum, and 
not only for all the reasor..s given above. In a referendum 
no parliamentary seats were at stakeo The Government 
could survive a rebuttal at a referendum but not at a 
general electiono Hertzog therefore probably chose this 
course because at the time it seemed to serve several needs 
- not merely to gain the services of Cam.pbello 
On 17 September) the day he left South Africa, the 
Prime Minister annoW1.ced that the will of the people would 
prevailo The flag section of the Bill, he said, after 
having been passed by Parliament, would not take effect 
till a referendum had shown Wthat such is the will of the 
125 people.' · He hoped his annowicement would cause 'the 
existing feeling of acrimony' to end. Having provided 
three aids to a settlement - the crown proposal, the Flag 
Commission, and a referendum - Hertzog sailed out of Table 
Bay into the relative calm of the Atlantic hoping, no 
doubt, that during his three months' absence, progress 
would be made towards a settlemento 
125. Natal Mercury, The Star, Die Volksblad - 18 September 
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CHAPTER VI 
FAILURE OF THE COMPROMISE PROPOSALS 
The opposition and the crown proposal 
Any hopes Hertzog may have had of his proposals' 
ability to further a flag settlement, were to be dashedo 
Three months after his departure, be returned to find Malan 
at loggerheads with Campbell and at cross-purposes with 
Roos, wL.ile all three aids to a settlement - crown, referen-
dum and commission - bad been criticized, sometimes by even 
his own Party's press. 
Hertzog must bear some of the responsibility for the 
failure of the proposals to gain general support. If he 
furnished aids to a settlement, he also nourished the atmos-
phere which undermined the value of these aidso Far from 
mollifying the opposition, he contributed to the suspicion 
and racial bitterness that already existed. In the three 
weeks before his departure, he made speeches at Pretoria and 
Cape Town in which he condemned, in outspoken language, 
tho5e who agitated for the inclusion of the Union Jacko 1 
However justified these condemnations may have seemed to 
him, they added to the existing difficulties and encouraged 
1o Cape Times, 1 and 7 September 19260 
2 
equally condemnatory counter-attacks. When in his fare-
well message Hertzog called for I pea.ce and goodwill v, the 
Daily Despatch of 8 September asked whetber anyone had 
mocked peace and goodwill more than Hertzog himself? 
From the time that he left the Botha Ministry he 
has devcted himself to sowing dissension and dis-
cordo•o•And by the Flag Billooobe has done more 
to exacerbate racial feeling and to stir up ill-
will than any man before himo Having set the 
cow1try by the ears, he takes his departure to 
Europe and as he boards the mailboat he exhorts 
the people of South Africa to peace and goodwill& 
To be sure, the Daily Despatch painted a one-sided picture; 
but there can be little doubt that it reflected the view of 
many peopleo Amidst such views the crown proposal stood 
little chance of acceptan.ceo 
This last point was made by several newspapers that 
had condernr.ed previous plans. Now, it was not the plan 
itself they found wanting, but its timing: they praised, or 
refrained from condemning, the crown proposal, but they 
doubted whether it would prove acceptable - in the present 
climateo Thus, neither The Star, nor the Sunday Times nor 
(initially) the Cape Argus, commented on the merits or 
demerits of the crown plan itself,3 while De Volkstem, ~ 
Daily Mail, The Frienct4 and Pretoria News 5 welcomed ito 
2. For example see Daily Despatch, 14 September 1926 
(address of the Grand President of the Sons of England)o 
J. 7, 12 and 7 September 1926, respectivelyo 
14-0 7, 8 and 9 September 1926, respectivelyo 
.So Daily Despatch, 9 September 1926 citing Pretoria News. 
The last two newspapers hoped the plan would receive the 
consideration it deserved while the Rand Daily Mail 
described it as a 'big and significant concessioni which 
would probably have been cordially accepted - had it been 
made in the first placeo Similarly, The Argus on 7 
September regretted that the offer had not been made during 
the last session of Parliament - before strong resentment 
had been rousedo And, as chief rousers of this resentment 
Hertzog and Malan were singled out: Malan for his 
6 
•arrogance and stupidity•, Hertzog for his 'shrill' and 
'undignified' attack, his 'cheap sneers and platform 
invective', and his 'bitter, one-sided and unstatesmanlike' 
tone in dealing with the flag problem.7 
Nevertheless, the cautious welcome given to the crown 
plan by hitherto hostile newspapers, indicated the plan's 
intrinsic me::i:'ito The question was whether this merit could 
be appreciated in an atmosphere of racial ill-feeling. 
Apparently it could not~ In the ranks of the opposition 
the Cape Times was most emphatico •At this time of day!' 
~t exclaimed on 7 September in response to Hertzog's offero 
1After all the bitterness that has been created by the Flag 
Bill 1' Why then was the crown removed from the original 
6. Rand Daily Mail, 8 September 1926. 
9 September 19260 
See also The Friend, 
7o The Star, Cape Argus - 7 September 19260 
Friend, 9 September 19260 
See also '.!2!!Q. 
Walker design?S 
Union Jack not?9 
Why, if a crown was acceptable, was a 
We doubt, too, whether English South Africans -
who have had, through the Flag Bill, a terrifying 
glimpse into the seething pit of race hatred that 
still rages within the hearts of their Nationalist 
fellow citizens - are at all in the mood, at this 
time of the day, to feel much gratitude, or to 
give a very hearty welcome to a belated conces-
siono O O 
Nothing less than the Union Jack would do, the Daily 
Despatch insisted, and, - in the upper canton of the 
national flago lO In Natal there appeared to be a total 
1 1 lack of support for the plan. 
Similarly, patriotic societies rejected the plan. On 
13 September, the S.O.Eo declared the compromise 
i insufficient i: they must have the Union Jacko 12 At the 
end of September, the First Conference of the Flag Committee 
Organization resolved against the crown proposal: it too 
80 Walker bad submitted several designs in the flag 
competition, one of which contained a crown and a lion 
(Deneys Reitz in Daily Despatch, 9 September 1926; 
Natal Mercury, 7 September 1926). 
9. See also Ons Land, 9 September 1926. 
100 9 September 1926. 
11. See The Star, 8 September 1926; Cape Times, 9 September 
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12. Daily Despatch, 14 September 19260 
demanded the Union Jack 0 13 Spokesmen of the SoA.Po were 
~o less definite in their rejectionso Deneys Reitz, on 
the day after tbe offer, me.de it clear that he was opposed 
14 to tbe measureo When, a week later, Smuts was asked 
what !:.e thought of' the pl.an, be replied: 'I think nothing 
of itov 15 Clearly, there would be r.o general acceptance 
of the plan by the oppositiono 
1J. Cape Ti..!!!£§., JO September 1926; Rand Daily Mail, 14 
April 1927(sic)o 
The Flag (Vigilance) Committee Organization (here-
after usually referred to as the Flag Organization) 
originated in May 1926 when th.e first Committees were 
established in Cape Town and Joha.ru1esburg to protest 
against the :B'lag Bill and insist on the inclusion of' 
the Union Jack in the national flago In the same 
month these two Com.I'littees sent roneoed letters to 
prominent citizens throughout the country inviting them 
to call public meetings to elect similar committees. 
Soon. such committees were established in many towns 
under the direction. of four Provincial Committees in 
Johannesburg, Cape Tm·a1, Bloemfontein and DL1rban. The 
Provincial Committees sent delegates periodically to an 
Executive Committee which met at the Organization's 
headquarters in Johann.esburgo The members of' the 
Executive Committee, elected at the FJ.ag Organization's 
first national Conference in September 1926 were: 
Ho Pim (Chairman), W .K. Rees (Hon. Secretary), CoF• 
Stallard (Transvaal), H.EoS. Fremantle (Cape), ToM. 
Wadl.ey (Natal), and J .A. Dean (Free State) (Fremantle 
Collection, volo 9, W.K. Rees folder)o The Flag 
Organization was to play a significant role in the flag 
struggle o 
14. Natal Mercury, Cape Times - 7 September 1926. 
15. Daily Despatch, 14 (report), 15 September 1926; Die 
Burger, 18 September 19260 
ThP Natior.aJ ist _Ilress and the crown proposal 
Even if' division within the ranks of the opposition 
had not guaranteed the defe2.t of the crown plan, divided 
164 
opinion amone;st the Nationalists dido Though the Trans-
vaaJ. and Free State organs of the Party supported the 
proposal, arguing that a crown would exactly reflect the 
constitutional position, 16 their Cape counterpart was 
criticalo On 8 September it declared that if the crown on 
the national flag was intended to express their British 
relation.ship, ther_ it was not convinced that the Cabinet's 
decision was either suitable or necessary. That reJ_ation-
ship was already adequately symbolized by the Union J-ack. 
There ,,ould therefore be two symbols- to express the same 
ideao Furthermore, a crown on the national flag would 
detract f'rom tte :flag's purely domestic character. 
It would be naive to believe that Die BurgerWs views 
did not ref'Ject Eal.ani s. Malan later made no secret of 
his dislike of the crown proposal. 'Ek was weinig 
ingenome daarmee', he wrote, Wmaar was bereid om dit te 
etanvaar as dit ons eie geledere weer aanmekaar sou sluit, 
en ons teenstanders sin verswal~., 1 7 Probably, Malru1 dis-
liked the crown proposal because he did not share Hertzog1 :, 
view that a crmvn denoted no onderborigheid, and because he 
16. Ons Vaderland, 10 September 1926; Die Volksblad, 8 
September ·1926. 
17. Malan, p. 114: Die Burger (Malan), 31 January 1957, 
beli ev·ed that for mar..y it would be an unwelcome reminder of 
the past. 
However, Malan had to take the views of his Premier 
and of Roos into account. Apparently Hertzog wished the 
Flag Commissionis terms of reference to include the 
incorporation of the crown, while Roos suggested that the 
Prime Minister should simply Vdecree•, in a public state-
ment, that the crown had been adopted. Malan was opposed 
to both these procedures in favour of the crown proposalo 
He did not, he said, want to go over the heads of the Flag 
Commission. It was therefore decided to instruct the 
Commission that it was free to incorporate the crown in the 
national flag, but only if it so desirect. 18 
In view of Malan's dislike of the crown, the possi-
bility cannot be overlooked that his concern for the views 
01~ the Flag Commission may have been merely a manoeuvre 
whereby he hoped to reduce the crown planVs chances of 
success. In 1925 he had been quite prepared to decree a 
flag by executive fiato He was now prepared to limit the 
Commission to a clean flago It is therefore not likely 
that he (enjoying additionally t_he support of Hertzog and 
Roos for the crown) wouJ.d have felt misgivings about tying 
the Com.'llissionv s hands on the crown proposal - had he 
180 Malan, PPo 114-5: Die Burger. (Malan), 31 January 1957., 
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favoured the crown. 19 
However there was probably little need for Malan to 
work against the crown plan. The objections of the 
Natalians, Smuts and others in the opposition soon made it 
clear that the failure of the plan was virtually certain 
20 
and that his efforts would be superfluous. Nor can it 
be doubted that Mala.n's dislike of the proposal was shared 
by many Nationalistso At the beginning of November the 
Orange Free State Congress of the Nationalist Party declared 
that it viewed the crown on the national flag as a symbol 
of conquest, and it resolved that Wlless the UnionYs status, 
as expounded by Hertzog, was recognized, and Wlless the 
significance of the crown was acknowledged in terms of this 
status, it would reject the crown. 21 Thus, in the Free 
State, the Party had challenged Die VolksbladYs unqualified 
support of t1.1.e Government's flag policy; in the Cape 
Province, Die Burger had criticized the GovernmentYs flag 
policy. The crown plan had failed to gain general support, 
both among the opposition and the Nationalistso 
therefore seemed certaino 
Its demise 
19. Deneys Reitz alleged that Malan bad earlier rejected a 
flag which contained a lion and a crown on the grounds 
that neither he nor the Goverrunent would accept a crown 
(2aily De5patch, 9 September 1926, Reitz). 
200 Some opposition newspapers that had initially favoured 
or been non-committal on the crown proposal also soon 
expressed misgivings concerning its value as a solution 0 
See The Friend, 12 September 1926; Cape Argus, 14 Sep-
tember 19260 
210 Die Burger, J November 1926. 
The opposition and the referendum proposal 
As with the crown, the proposal for a referendum 
aroused a mixed responseo Only one opposition newspaper, 
The Friend of 18 September, gave it a p~edominantly 
favourable welcome. Though several opposition leader 
writers sprinkled their criticisms with praise - 'a mag-
nificent gesture', ta good principle in itself', ta 
22 distinct advance towards reasonableness' - these polite 
statements apart, the proposal was roundly condenmed. 
Even The Friend, which thought that Hertzog could hardly 
have gone further, short of dropping the Bill, was careful 
to point out that the value of the referendum would depend 
largely on how it put the flag question to the peopleo 
This last point was made by several newspapers which 
believed that the choice offered by the Government, that is, 
a choice between its own flag and no flag at all,.was 
wifair and hypocriticalo It did not provide for the free 
expression of that 'will of the peopleV which Hertzog had 
spoken of 'so glibly'; all that it conceded was the chance 
to accept or reject a measure that had been steamrollered 
through parliament. 2 3 To ask the people to vote for or 
against a design which, because ·of the restriction imposed 
on the Flag Con~ission, enjoyed the respect of nobody, was 
22. Rand Daily Mail, 18 September 1926, De Volkstem, 20 
September 1926; The Star, 17 September 19~6, 
respectively. 
23. Natal Mercury, 18 September 19260 
24 to play around with the people. 
Not only the merit of the choice offered but also of 
the sequence proposed - first the passage of the Bill, then 
the referendum - was queried; it was likely to sway voters 
25 to support a flag that all but existed. And these mis-
givings apart, the instrument of a referendum as a means of 
arriving at a national flag was challenged: a mere 
26 
majority could never create a national flag; could tso 
sacred a thing as a man's flagt be thrown to •the conflict-
ing caprices of a plebiscite taken from peoples of two 
conflicting racest? 27 And what of the four and a half 
million Natives, were they to have no say in the matter?28 
Only if the Government used. a system that was truly 
democratic could permanent benefit be expected from this 
step. 29 
Furthermore, Malan's contention that the referendum 
would isolate the flag issue, was rejectedoJO It would 
24. The Star, 17 September 19260 
25. Rand Daily Mail, Pretoria News, Daily Despatch - 18 
September 1926; Sun.day Times, 19 September 1926; De 
Volkstem, 20 September 1926. 
26. Ons Land, 18 September 1926. See also Cape Times, 18 
September 19260 
27. Cape Argus, 20 September 1926 citing Natal Advertiser. 
28. Daily Despatch, 18 September 1926. 
29. De Volkstem, 20 September 1926. 
JOo Cape Arguo, 20 September 19260 See Sunday Times, 19 
September 1926. 
prolong rather than shorten the political and social 
unrest.3 1 They would be confronted with all the bitter-
ness of a general election, intensified by the fact that 
the issue would be purely racialo 32 The measure was as 
likely to repair the damage already done as a mustard 
plaster was to extirpate a deep-seated cancero 
should be droppedoJJ 
The Bill 
This too was Smutsis adviceo The Government should 
drop the Bill 'right here and now', he warnedo On the day 
after the proposal was published, Smuts criticized it as 
unfair: all alternative designs would be excluded and 
Parliament would first pass flag legislation which would 
then be presented to the people with tall the dice loaded' 
in favour of the Government's designo Above all, it would 
protract the conflict: 'This country will be kept in 
turmoil and strife and in universal commotion for the next 
two yearso.aoNothing is more against the interests of South 
Africa, nothing is more against the unity and peaceful co-
operation of its peopleor34 
J 1 • 
32. 
JJ. 
J4o 
At the same time as Deneys Reitz described the 
See Cape Argus, 20 September 1926 citing Natal 
Advertiser; Natal Mercury, Ons Land - 18 September 
1926; Cape Argus, 20 September 19260 
Rand Daily Mail, 18 September 19260 
Cape Times,. 18 September 1926; Sunday Times, 19 Sep-
tember 1926; Cape Argus, 20 September 19260 
Sunday Times, 1 9 September 1926; Cape Ti!Tle.§., Ca-12.£ 
Argus - 18 September 1926. 
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referendum as abso~ute bunkum35 the Chairman of the Empire 
Group declared it to be an insult to the intelligence of 
the South African people - so laughable that he did not 
want to enlarge on ito3 6 And, as with the crown, at the 
end of the month the Flag Organization resolved against 
·t 37 1 • 
Tho referendum and the Nationalist press 
Misgivings over a referendum were shared by the 
Nationalists. Only the Cape organ of the Party gave the 
plan its unqualified support, holding that it would remove 
the objection that the flag was being pushed through 
35. Die Bur2er, 20 September 1926; Cape Times, 18 Septem-ber 192 o 
36. Cape Tim~, 18 September 19260 
The Empire Group (or British Empire Group) was the 
most extreme anti-flag bill society to emerge during 
the controversyo It maintained that the question of 
the Union's national flag was an imperial one and 
therefore outside the competence of the Union Parliament. 
After the Imperial Conference of November 1926 it 
objected to the Dominion's 'new status', insisting that 
the Union was not 'independent'; and in mid-1927 it 
drew up a petition begging the King to intervene in the 
flag struggle. The Empire Group's jingoistic pro-
noWlcements embarrassed the opposition which attacked 
it as hysterical and insignificant; for the National-
ists, the Group provided an ·excellent target. 
The Empire Group camf'l into existence in mid-1926 and 
was very vocalo However its support appears to have 
been small, restricted almost entirely to Natal and con-
centrated in Durbano Its Chairman was George Hodge. 
See Natal Witness, 25, 27, JO May, 9 September 1927; 
Die Burger, 11 March, 9 June, 5 September 1927; ~ 
~, 6 June 1927. 
370 Cape Times, JO September 1926. 
171 
against the will of the people. Die Burger refused to 
accept that the choice offered - the Government's flag or 
no flag - was unfair; those who opposed the referendum 
were condenmed as politically bankrupt and Smuts and the 
jingo press were blamed for the agitationo The only way 
to raise the flag issue above Party conflict was through a 
ref'erendumo 38 
The Party's two other newspapers, however, had 
reservationso In late July Ons Vaderland had said that it 
could see no difference bErlween a general election and a 
referendum on the flag issue: both were unthinkable. Now 
its acceptance of' the proposal was lukewarmo3 9 As for Die 
Volksblad, it was not enamoured with the decision: the 
struggle would be exceptionally bitter; excited passions 
could produce a split in the social and political spheres 
which would not be easily healed; and most important, 
Natives and Coloureds could be dragged into the struggle. 
Finally, unlike its counterpart in the Cape, Die Volksblad 
thought a general election preferable to a referendum, for 
whereas in the former non-flag issues could be used to lead 
the public's attention elsewhere, in a referendum this would 
b . . bl 40 e 1mposs1 eo 
Thus, though both these organs gave their support to 
38. Die Burger, 18, 19 September 1926. 
39. 21 September 1926. 
40o 20 September 1926. 
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the proposal, it was clear that among Nationalists there 
was doubt as to the value of a referendum as an instrument 
of peace. Among the opposition, the objection to the 
measure was overwhelmingo 
Opposition to the Flag Commission 
As with the crown and referendum proposals, the Flag 
Commission !'ailed to gain the opposition's general supporto 
Its objection to this body was straightforward: its terms 
of reference precluded the incorporation of the Union Jack 
(or former republican flags) and therefore prejudiced the 
essential issue from the start. Thus the Commission was a 
compromised body. This view of the Commission destroyed 
in advance any prospect of it enjoying general confidence. 41 
As early as 7 June, that is, at the same time as 
Hertzog first indicated that a new body might be appointed 
to choose the flag design, the opposition had voiced its 
concern. It warned that it was impossible to speak of a 
body of wibiased men if that body were denied free choiceo 42 
Again, when Malan referred to the proposed CoDDilission in 
his Germiston speech at the end of July, misgivings were 
e~pressed as to the purpose and value of this bodyo 43 
410 G.H. Wilson, Gone Down the Years, p. 2260 
420 Cape Times, Rand Daily Mail - 7 June 1926. 
43u Natal Mercury, 2 August 1926. 
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As soon as-the Conunission•s terms of reference became 
known early in September, the opposition denounced them as 
wholly unacceptable and asserted that no man of independent 
mind could serve under them. The Friend comnu:mted on 8 
September that the Commission's hands would be tied from the 
outset because the Union Jack would be barred. Under such 
circumstances it could not see how non-political bodies 
like the Sons of England, BQEoSoL~, and Federated Caledon-
i~J1 Society could be represented on it •with sel:f-respectt. 
Others suggested that the 'racially intolerant' i:.1. the 
Government hoped to claim that they had consulted 
independent opinio:.1. before taking i'inal action. But the 
Conuui ssi Jl1. wa3 ' so much o ye-wash' ; its appointment was~ 
farce, and 'no man of a':1.y independence of' thought or 
judgement would d2mean him.sel:f to accept appoil1tm,int to 
4-'+ 
such a body' o On 13 September the Grand President of 
the Sons of Engla'J.d opposed the Cqmm.ission because its hands 
'
·'ould l)e t 1.· ed. 4 5 And f da lat · th h ,. our c ys er, in e same speec 
in ,vhich he criticized Hertzog~ s proposal for a referendum, 
Smuts attacked the Conunission' s terms of' reference as si::lo-
stepping the essential issueu 46 
In Lhe f'ace of this opposition, the Flag Conunission 
stood no hope of becomlng a truly representative body. So 
44g Nata.l Mercu,~x., 9 September 1926. 
4.So D,::i.iJ.y Despatch, 14 September 1926. 
460 Ca_l!.f:l_ Time.Ji, S~Llrgu~ - 18 September 1926 o 
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.long as its manda~e remained restricted, it could not enjoy 
general confidence. Not surprisingly, therefore, Malan 
encountered much dif'fi.culty in finding members of the 
opposition to serve on it. These difficulties, he alleged, 
came almost solely from the S,A.Po who behlnd the scenes 
made special ef'forts - 3ometimes coupled with threats and 
social boyco·~t - to h.:i..nder people who were prepared to 
accept office and to dissuade others from remaining on the 
C . . 47 ouun.1. s SJ.. on. Clearly, this proposal too had failed to 
gain general suppo~to 
It may thus be seen that Hertzog's three aids to a 
flag settlement - crown, referendum and Flag Commission 
were a.11 un.successfu.:. as i.-:-J.strument s of peace; each failed 
to gain sufficient general support to make it successful as 
a device for a flag settlemento While the underlying 
reasons for their failure are to be found in the 
47. Malan, Po 116: ~urger (Malan), 31 January 1957; 
Cape t\rgus, 14 September 1926; Cape Times, 18 Septem-
ber 192. 
Tho.3e who declined to serve on the Commission 
included Sir William Beaumont, Professors E.Ao Walker, 
W.Mo Macmillan and F. Clark, J. McQuade and D~ Young 
(editors of the Rand Daily Mail and Natal Witness, res-
pectively), Lady Beck, Jos. Franklin, J .Ho Hofmeyr 
(Administrator of the Transvaal), J.H. Pierneef, Eo 
Roworth, Mrs MoT. Stey.n (widow of the late President), 
Co,J. Sibbett, the Rev. GoS• Malan and the Bishop of 
Bloemfontein, Walter Carey (PoS.M.I. volo J; Norval 
Papers, Flag Commission Report, 1926/7). 
Some or the above declined to serve on the grounds 
of' ill-health or prior commitments. 
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op:positioD.' s mistrust o:f the Nationalists' intentim:1s48 and 
·the prevailing climate of ill-will, other considerations 
also played their part. 
O--:>po3.ition strc-rn.gthenod bv the Government's concessions 
Paradoxically, the vory proposals which Hertzog put 
forward as concessions, sti:ffened the opposition, and so 
decreased the possibility of a com::;:iromise agreementa The 
proposals, far :from being seen - as Hertzog had hoped - as 
the patriotic concessions or a Government wishi~g to 
satisfy public opinion, wore viewed as nothing more than 
the <lc3perate strategl°Hns of a Pact anxious to extricate 
itself from a dilenuna. Rather than genuine concessions, 
tho offers were desparate manoeuvres. The crown proposal 
was ! stamped as the price of a forlorn hope of salvation 
for th0 Pact.1 49 A.nd the Government, it was claimed, :far 
:from acting from a position of strength, was actually in 
retreat. 50 
This last belief was strengthened both by the 
48. For an example o:f how anxiety for the British relation-
ship supervened in a leader article on Hertzog's crown 
proposal speech, see Cape A:r:-gus, 7 September 1926. 
For fears of secessio;1 see also The Star, 8 September 
19.'26; Sundc.y 'T'imes, 12 September 1926; ~ Argus, 13 
Septem::.ier 1926. 
49. G.~e Times, 7 Septeml:.H,r 19260 
SO. Nata.1 Hercurv, 7 Reptcm!:.>er 1926. See also Ons Land, 
·1s September ·1926; Q~i.].v De:3patch, 10 ~rovember 1926. 
Government's Flag Conunission difficulties, and by the 
further offer of a referendum.. When Hertzog announced 
that a referendum would be held, the Cape Times maintained 
that ever since the end of the last parliamentary session 
(when Malan had declared that the Flag Bill would be forced 
through in its existing :form), the Government had been 
driven ifrom pillar to postto First had come the revolt 
of the National Labour Council and its dual flag plan; 
then had come the Flag Cormnission - with desperate attempts 
to constitute it ever since; next appeared the crown offer; 
'and now there is this referendum offer': 
It is useless for the Government - facing the 
certai:.:1.ty of ruin on this issue, and producing 
one expedient after another to save its own bacon 
- to pretend that its sole motive in these 
successive retreats is genuine patriotism •••• 51 
Each concession, together with its :failure to gain 
general support, made the opposition more determined to 
accept nothing less than the inclusion of the Union Jack in. 
the national flago Awareness that the Government was not 
inflexible on the flag issue and that it could be forced to 
yield ground - as it unquestionably had with the crown 
offer - had the effect of stLff'ening the opposition's ranks 
and red11eing the appeal of any compromise plan. Further-
more, its awareness that diagreeement existed among 
Labourites, Nationalists and even within the Cabinet itself' 
- for instance, between Malan and Roos, :further encouraged 
510 18 SeptAm~er 19260 
it to resist. 
_Smuts and the Government rs _concessions 
The failure of the three aids - Flag Commission, 
referendum and crown - to gain the support of the 
177 
opposition was soon laid at the door of Smuts. However, 
little if any of Smuts's influence was required to bring 
about the rejection of the ref'erendum and Flag Conunission 
proposals. To the great majority of the opposition who 
wanted an open choice, the restricted terms of reference of 
the Commission and the very limited option offered in the 
referendum seemed manifestly unfair. However, with regard 
to the crown proposal, the fact that some opposition news-
papers were prepared to consider it, while others did not 
immediately reject it - and were therefore possibly 
awaiting a lead - would seem to indicate that Smuts's 
immediate endorsement of the plan might have resolved the 
conflict. One may therefore be led to conclude, as Malan 
apparently dict,52 that Smuts failed to give a lead to the 
opposition at a moment when his approval of the plan might 
have ensured its success. 
Such a view overlooks several considerationso 
Neither the press in Natal nor Die Burger lost any time in 
coming out against the proposal. They, together with 
52. Hansard, vol. 9, 5440-1, 21 June 1927. 
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certain opposition newspapers, condenmed the measure at the 
very first opportunity. In such circumstances, and 
particularly with opinion in Natal likely to be hostile to 
the plan, it would have been most difficult for the Leader 
of the Opposition to have •taken the lead• - even had he 
wished to do so. 
For Smuts to attempt to lead flag opinion in Natal, in 
the prevailing political climate, could be dangerous. The 
S.A.P.•s defeat in 1924 had dealt a blow to his political 
prestige from which he had yet to recover.53 In Natal, 
dissatisfaction with Smuts's leadership of the S.A.P. (and 
with the Party's alleged Afrikaner orientation and lack of 
spirit), was openly expressed in i\.ugust, October and 
November 1926.54 Indeed on 13 November the Natal Mercury 
thought it necessary to make an appeal against the 'general 
distrust• of Smuts in Natal. Disillusionme~t with the 
s.A.P. was also betrayed when, in justifying the formation 
of their new patriotic society in Natal, an Empire Group 
spokesman declared that British sentiment and prestige in 
55 South Africa had been outraged - in spite of the S.A.P. 
Strongly •British' in sentiment and acutely sensitive to 
any form of 'Afrikanerization' or republicanism, Natal was 
53. Dw1ca:r1 Papers, to Lady Selborne, 19 March 19260 
54. See Die Burge£, 12 November 1926 citing Natal Advertiser 
of 20 August and 20 October 1926; Die Burger 12 and 16 
November 1926 citing Tiip.es of Natal, 10, 13, 15 ~ovember 
1926. 
55. The Star, 11 February 1927, letter from Major H. Dearden 
Matson. 
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in no mood to make sacrifices to Nationalist sen.timcnt; 
the political dangers for those who did, such a.sher Labour 
parliamentarians, were patentu If it was hazardous for 
Smuts to demand sacrifices from fellow Afrikaners, how much 
more so was it from apprehensive and critical English-
speakers? Here, then, it was not simply a matter of 
leading public opinion, but also of following ita The 
support of his followers in Natal was indispensible for the 
S.A.P.'s return to power and it would have been most 
imprudent to have risked alienating many of thema 
Probably, Smuts was not anxious to see the issue 
settled. The Pact had slid into a difficult position and 
he had no wish to assist it to his own Party's detriment. 
For, a,':i we have already had occasion. to observe, so long as 
the flag issue remained 1mresol ved the possibility of an 
early ee:q.Pral election on the colour question ,vas small. 
Unquestionably colour questions caused grAat difficulty in 
the S .A .P" where there w::i.s n.o firmly est ab.li shed un.i ty on 
colour policyo This had been one o.f its weE,knes:;0c:5 in I.he 
-t:6 
·1924 genera]_ election.:> and the weakness persisted. One 
year .ii'ter tho elections Duncan was worried that thr~ f i{:ht 
ovr,r 1;he Native question which lay ahead of' tho s.~LP; 
would take 1:,;Lace on g.cound wholly i'avourable to the P;:_i,ct. 
'lt is going tu be' a gr('a(; d:i:ffl<'U.l ty', he i.ec1r<}cl, 'l~oill.Lng 
Sc. O'Dowd, p~). GS, 70-72. 
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is so likely to drive a wedge between the Dutch and English 
elements of our party as this question and that again suits 
the Government party 0 157 In February 1926 he returned to 
this difficulty when he wrote of the Colour Bar Bill: 
Our party has been quite solidly voting against 
it - which is not a little surprising when one 
reallsos what a...'1. appeal the combined effect of 
the old colour prejudice and the idea of pro-
tection .for the white man makes to the ordinary 
member especially to those who were brought up on 
the principle of "no equality in church or state." 
It has taken some skilful stirring on Smuts's 
part and it would be very easy even now to stam-
pede the herd 0 58 
Finally, a week before the flag storm broke Duncan observed 
that Smuts had per.formed a great .feat in getting his Trans-
vaal Afrikaner supporters to vote with Cape M.P.'s against 
the Colour Bar Bill. He wondered what these Transvaalers 
would say i.f they were asked why they had done so, adding 
that one had let out, in an unguarded moment, that he was 
voting against it because it did not bar the Coloured as 
well as the Native. That, Duncan suggested, revealed the 
real sentiment o.f these men.59 Many Transvaal M.P. 's 
clearly sympathized with Hertzog's Native policies, while 
Natal M.P.'s were 'mortally afraid' of being suspected by 
their electors of not warmly supporting any Bill which 
. d t . t . I d . ·6 O impose res ric ions on n ians. All were afraid that 
57. Duncan PaE~, to Lady Selborne, 9 July 1925. 
58. Ibid. to Lady Selborne, 5 l<'ebruary 1926. 
59. Ibid. to Lady Selborne, 13 May 1926. 
60. Ibid. to Lady Selborne, ·1 April 1926. 
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in opposing Hertzog's policies the S.A.P. would be stig-
matized as a 'pro-colour party•. With the Government•s 
colour policies creating difficulties for the S.A.P. the 
flag controversy could not have been unwelcome to some of 
its members. As a Party which embraced both language 
groups, its appeal for a flag that also embraced symbols of 
both these groups was likely to have a unifying influence 
on the Partyo Thus the great value of the flag issue was 
that it precluded an early general election, focused 
attention on a non-colour issue, gave the S.AoPo a popular 
cause and a united purpose, and weakened the Pact. Such 
an asset was not to be surrendered lightlyo 
CHAPTER VII. 
!HE FLAG.CONTROVERSY DURING HERTZOG'S ABSENCF, 
SEPTEMBER - DECEKBER 1926 
The problem of the Bill's withdrawal 
It has been noted that as early as July there was 
growing discontent among Nationalists over the Union's dis-
traction with a flag question at the expense of more urgent 
problems. Though Congresses of the Nationalist Party in 
the Free State, Transvaal and Cape Province resolved in 
-favour o-f the Flag Bill, 1 there can be little doubt that 
nany of the less ideologically inclined Nationalists 
questioned Malants view of the Bill as the most important 
measure to come before the Assembly lfor many a yeart, and, 
like Labourites, woulrl have preferred a far greater concern 
with bread and ~utter issuesa 
Their discontent could not go unmarked by Roosa Nor 
could Labouritesi discontent fail to concern him, since it 
could threaten the Pactts survivale By the end of 
September, it was obvious that the Government's three aids 
to a settlement would not secure a genera~ agreement and 
1o Die Burger, 10 November 1926; Sunday Times, 28 November 
1926; Die Volksblad, 4 January 1927. 
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that the Pact 1 s difficulties were therefore likely to worseno 
For Roos the problem was to find a way out of the dilemma 
that would not suggest that the Goverrunent was weako Yet, 
as Du.ncan had observed six months earlier, with the passage 
of each day it became more difficult for the Government to 
2 go back. When in May 1926 the Government postponed the 
Flag Bill, Lewis Michell had commented that Hertzog was a 
weak man who had 'lost his nervetoJ Nationalist organs, 
to counter such views, and to spur on the Government, 
insisted that the Bill would be passed in 1927a Each new 
Government concession tended to be seen i:n. Michell ts light 
by the opposition; Nationalist newspapers, on the other 
hand, hastened to a.3sure readers that these same con-
cessions implied no lessening of the Government's resolve 
to pass the Flag Bill in 19270 Mala.n's dismissal of' the 
dual flag plan was another occasion on which Die Burger and 
Ons Volksblad maintained that any postponement of the Bill 
would be politically harm:fula Also, Ons Volksblad 
insiated, the Nationalist Party wa.J firmly based on prin-
ciples; 0:.1.e ot' these laid down that it would strive for a 
united and independent nationo If the Gov0rnment deviated 
rrom this principle, or was disloyal to the volksideaal, it 
wonld commit treason against the Afrikanervolko Thus the 
politj_cs of nationalist ideology further complicated the 
2o Dtu1can Papers, to Lady Selborn2, 20 May 1926 0 
Jo Lewis Michell <;ollection, Diary and Notebook, 1 December 
1925 - 3"1 Decem'.:.ier 1926, entry for 26 May 19260 
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problem of the BillVs withdrawal. Clearly the Bill's 
postponement could only be contemplated i:f there was a 
great decline in the political tension and the Goverrunent 
was able to act from a position of real strengtho 
It was Hertzog's good :forttme that at this jtL"l.cture of' 
the :flag struggle his popularity in the Union reached 
wiprecedented heights. Hopes of a resolution of' the flag 
problem, either through another concession or the BillVs 
withdrawal, began to take root" For the Premier's success 
at the Imperial Conflerence appeared to have transformed the 
:flag question and indeed the entire political picture in 
South Africao 
The e:ffect o:f the Imperial Conference's report 
On 22 November the Imperial Conference published its 
reporto 4 From this date, Wltil the beginning of ·1927, the 
political climate in the Union changed remarkably :for the 
better. For English-speakers, who had feared that at the 
Imperial Conference Hertzog would work towards the severance 
of the UnionVs imperial ties, the Imperial Conference's 
report, and more particularly Hertzog's W1equivocal accept-
ance of it, came as a great relief'. Commenting on the 
Conference and its report, Hertzog dec.lared that, with the 
4. CMD 2768, November 19260 For abbreviated reports see 
Cape Ti1™, Rand DailX Mail, The Friend - 22 November 
1926. 
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full co-operation of' his imperial colleagues, he had 
achieved all he wanted; everything the Hationalist Party 
had striven for had ':.>een achieved; 
'absolutely contentv 0 5 
that Party was now 
This content was generally shared by the opposition: 
'If' GenBral Hertzog is satisfied, then so are we•, the 
Natal Mercury declared on 22 November, for the report 
merely endorsed a situation that had existed for some yearso 
To the Pretoria News of the same date, the most important 
fact was that Hertzog was fully satisfied with the report's 
Bal:four :formula; this meant that in Hertzog's view the 
ideal of sovereign independence had been attai::-ied with 
So~th Africa remaining a British Dominiono Hertzog, then, 
was not the only one to feel satisfied; everyone ought to 
be satisfied. Other oppositio:!l newspapers also welcomed 
the report as bringing theory ru.d practice into lineo 6 
And on 8 December, at the annual Conference of' the SoAoPo 
in the Transvaal, Smuts expressed his Partyts approval; 
indeed, he quipped, the S~AaPo had been satisfied with the 
sam-2 so-called 'new statu.s' for the past six year so 7 
Nationalist Party organs, preparing the way f'or their 
.-------------------------------------
5.. Cape .Times, 22 November 1926; The Star, Cape Argus -
24 :'\l'ovcmber 1926; Sunday Times, 12 December 192. 
6. See The Friend, 2;2 November 1926; Cape Times, 23 
November 1926; Ran~.:!).y Mail, 3, 12 December 1926 .. 
7. The Star, Cape Argus - 8 December 1926; The Friend, 
Daily Despatch - 9 December 1926. 
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leaders, enthusiastically supported Hertzog's achievement 
in England. 8 Then, prominent Nationalists,9 notably Malan 
and Roos, gave their blessing to the 'new status•o At 
Uitenhage, ~alan told a gathering that they were entirely 
satisfied with what Hertzog had attained and accepted the 
position as define~o He hoped Nationalists had definitely 
made up their ::ui.nds that they had obtained all they had 
ever wantedo If the S.AoPo was prepared to maintain their 
present independence, they need never again squabble over 
10 independence and r~publican propaganda. 
Even more pleasing to the ears of' the opposition. was 
the unqualified approval of Roos, for no Nationalist had 
been a more ardent champion of republicanism. Already, on 
24 ~ovember, he had made a conciliatory speech at Heidelberg 
in the Transvaa1 011 3ut the views Roos expressed on 2 
December, at Springs, were even more widely welcomedo In 
the fortnight before Hertzog's return, he repeated these 
views on several occasions: the constitutional question no 
longer existed; they fully accepted what had been freely 
given and were greatly indebted to the 'Imperial Government• 
8. See Dle Burger, 22, 2J November 1926; Die Volksblad, 
Ons Vaderland - 23 November 19260 
9 .. These included J .C.Go !{emp (Die Burger, 23 November 
1926), E.Go Jansen (Jlie Volksblad, 8 December 1926), 
Colin Steyn (Die Burger, 7 December 1926)0 
10 u Rand Daily Ma.U, Die purger, The Star - 1 December 1926; 
Swiday Time~, 12 December 1926; L. Black.well, African 
Occasions: ReJ!!!~iscences of thirty years of bar, hen£!! 
and politics in South Africa, P• 1J4o 
110 Cape Argus, 25 November 1926, Po 14. 
for a ruling he had never expected; by its action, the 
Imperial Government had made the position of the Empire 
187 
stronger than ever before; the Nationalists were completely 
satisfied with the new imperial relationshipo The ques-
12 
tions of secession and republicanism were deado 
Everywhere Nationalists were wistinting in their praise 
of the outcome of the Conference a 13 Politics, Duncan 
observed at this time., was a iwonderful game ta The 
Natio~alists and Labour P~rty had evidently made up their 
minds that something had to be done to get them out of the 
bad odour into which the Flag Bill had brought them with 
the 'Britishi people in the towns.· They had therefore 
seized on the report and were boosting it 'for all they 
14 
are worth 1o There was probably much truth in Du;n.cants 
assessment, but regardless of motives, the Nationalists' 
praise for the Confere:ice and the resultant •new ::;tatus' 
contributed towards a dramatic improvement in the country's 
political mood durin~ December. 
120 Cape Arbus, 2 December 1926; The Star, 2, 4 December 
1926; The Friend, Die Burger - 3 December 1926; Ons 
Vaderland, .3, 7 December 1926; Rand Daily Mail, 7 
December 1926; Die Volksblad, 9 December 1926; Black-· 
well, Opo cito, Pv 133. 
130 For example, see Die Burger, 22, 23 November and 3, 7 
December 1926; Die Volksblad, 2J November, and 8, 9 
December 1926; Ons Vaderland, 2J November and 1, J, 7 
December 19260 
14. Duncan Papers, to Lady Selborne, 7 December 1925. 
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Moves towards Toenadering 
In the forefront of the attempt to create a better 
spirit stood Roos. His speech at Springs lawiched a fresh 
attempt to re-orientate South African politics. Talk of' 
the possibility of' re-orientation, therenigingt 15 and 
Vtoenadering' began to fill the air - Roos being seen as 
16 the key :figure in any political change. Thus, commenting 
on Roosts Springs' speech, the Natal Mercury of 3 December 
observed that the political situation was likely to undergo 
•curiously interesting developments in the near future•; it 
was most improbable that the conservative elements, which 
were the backbone of the Nationalist and South African 
Parties, would tolerate for much longer •the :false and 
wmatural li~es of' cleavage' which divided the political 
groups. Similarly, The Friend of 4 December thought that 
no reason existed f'or the continuance of the Pact, because 
the removal of' the question of secession had.removed the 
chief division between the Nationalist and SoA• Partieso 
15. Immediately af'ter the publication of the Imperial Con-
ference's report, the call went out :for 'hereniging' 
:from the Chairman of' 'Die Transvaalse Sentrale 
Herenigingskomiteet (Die Burger, 24 November 1926). 
It was Roosts speeches, however, which evoked nation-
wide interest. 
16. See The Star 2, 4 December 1926; Cape Times, Daily 
Despatch - 6 December 1926. 
That the appeal of' toenadering remained alive in 
1925/6 may be seen in the letters written to Hertzog 
advocating ito One letter :from the Moderator of the 
Dutch Reformed Church in the Cape Province in August 
1926 offered the services of the Church's moderature in 
order to bring Hertzog and Smuts together in the 
interests of toenaderingo (!L.!!.&. vols. 27, 280) 
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At Brakpan17 and Krugersdorp 18 Roos raised the possi-
bility of a political re-orientation. At Krugersdorp he 
reiterated his views that the col.Ul.try would no longer be 
disturbed by constitutional issueso If necessary, he said, 
Article 4 could be altered so as to read that their present 
independence would be maintained; and he issued an 
invitation to members ot' the s.A~P~ to join a new Party on 
the basis of the Nationalist Party. When interviewed on 
his invitation, Roos declared that he had thrown out the 
suggestion hopefully as a start towards bridging the gulf 
between the Nationalist and SoA. Parties, and towards this 
end, he suggested that a committee might be formed to alter 
the constitutions of both the Nationalist and S.Ao Parties. 19 
Perhaps the extreme positions taken by various groups 
in the flag struggle and the resultant restriction on the 
mobility of the Parties convinced Roos that the answer to 
South Africa's political problems lay in the establishment 
of a Centre Party which was free of extremist entanglements. 
With the constitutional issue apparently settled, the time 
seemed propitious for such a call. The new party might 
take as its slogan: South Africa first; however, its 
emphasis would fall not on (white) racial ideology, but 
17. Rand D9.il;l Mail, Tge Star.- 7 December 1926; The F'riend, 
8 December 1926. 
180 Rand D9.il;l Mail, 9 December 1926; ca12e Times, 13 
December 19260 
19. Rand Daill:; Mail, 9 December 1926; Ca12e Times, 13 
December 19260 
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rather on the Union's general welfare and economic 
progress. The basis of the new political division, though 
never defined, would be economic. 20 Bread and butter and 
not ideological issues would preponderate. To succeed, 
the Party would have to provide a home for moderate 
Nationalists and for English- and Afrikaans-speaking 
supporters of the other Parties. Roos therefore took 
pains to emphasize that he was opposed to any racial 
division in politics. He did not want to see, he said, an 
alignment of the Afrikaners against the English; the 'old 
S.A.P. Dutch element' would not budge but that was all to 
the good because if prevented a racial division. 21 
Clearly neither Malan nor Heaton Nicholls nor Madeley was 
to be included in Roosts Party. Not relying on their 
support, it could not be held in thrall by their supporters. 
In addition to the above considerations, as a shrewd 
political tactician Roos had probably concluded that 
political power could best be retained through a re-
orientation. The alliance with Labour had always had 
certain disadvantages. It had never been popular among 
Nationalists. 22 Their sensitivity to any form of socialism 
20. See The Star, 4 December 1926; Cape Times, Daily 
Despatch - 6 December 1926; Ons Vaderland, 10 December 
1926. 
In the general election campaign of 1924 he had main-
tained that the only issue before South Africa was the 
economic issue. O•Dowd, p. 61. 
21. The Star, 4 December 1926, p. 1J. 
22. See !h..f.i.. vol. 44, letter from E.G. Jansen to Hertzog, 7 
December 1923. 
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was shown by CreswellVs attempt in 1923 to remove the 
'socialist objective' from his Party's constitutiono 2J 
Particularly the 'country Boers' retained their fear that 
Wsocialist doctrines may infect the poor man on the land, 
24 the bywoner and the landless labourer'. It was also 
clear to Roos that the flag struggle and other difficulties 
had greatly weakened the Labour Party. Indeed Roos 
believed that support for this Party had become so small 
that Labour need no longer be taken into serious account. 25 
By emphasizing economic lines of delineation in a re-
orientation, Roos could dispense with the support of 
unpopular Socialists, whose reduced political prospects 
made them a doubtful asset. In sum, Roos had little to 
lose by putting out feelers for re-orientation, while much 
might be gained. 
In the forefront of those who welcomed Roosts call was 
the Rand Daily Mail. Its new-found enthusiasm for Roos 
was not unrelated to a shared interest in Labour's future 
on the part of Roos and Sir Abe Bailey. However, whereas 
Roos suspected that Labour's prospects were poor, Bailey 
feared that Labour's influence would grow. In the 1924 
general election Labour had failed to win seven seats by 
2J. The Star, 2 January 1923. 
24. !!.J!n.can Papers, to Lady Selborne, 6 January 1926. 
25. Malan, p. 120: }2ie Burger (Malan}, 1 February 19.57. 
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26 less than 150 votes each, and Bailey may well have been 
apprehensive that these and other seats would fall to the 
Labour Party at the next election. In reaching such a 
conclusion, Bailey wo:ild unquestionably have been 
influenced by what he would have seen as socialist threats 
in other parts of the world. 
Labourites had come to power; 
In 1924, in Great Britain, 
though the Labour Government 
soon fell from office, the votes cast for it later that 
year increased. 27 Since 1914 there had been the Bolshevik 
Revolution of 1917, the General Strike of 1926 and the 
growing activities of socia_lists and communists in Italy, 
Germany and .F'rance. Such considerations might well have 
greatly disturbed a man with Baileyis interests. In all 
events, at the en.cl of December 1926, Duncan wrote that 
Bailey was most anxiocts to see a strong anti-Labour Party 
in power and wanted a fusion of the Nationalist and S.A. 
Parties, 'as a means of gettin~ rid of Labour. 1 'Abe and 
his friends' , Duncan observed, 1 are all hot on fusion of 
the two parties and on paper o.f course there is very little 
dift'erence between them., 28 
Probably it was no co_:.nc idence that on the same day 
Ons Vaderland praised a c~ll by Bailey for all attention to 
26. See Qape Times, 20 Jw1e 1924, Pa 10. 
27. C.L. Mowat {ed.), The New Cambridge Modern Histoa, 
vol. XII, 'The Shi f'ting Ba.lance of World Forces, 1898-
19451' pp. 531-2. 
28. Dwican Pa~ers, to Lady Selborne, 29 December 1926. 
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be given to the Union's non-constitutional problems, the 
Rand Daily Mail began to boost Rooso 'Gladly and un-
questionably', the Rand Daily Mail of J December accepted 
Roosts recent assurances a.~d predicted that as a result of 
them, he (and the Government) would gain greatly in 
prestige. After all, it said, there could be no doubt 
that in advancing his views Roos had incurred some 
political risko Again on 14 December, it reminded its 
readers that nothing could have been more courageous than 
Roos's statements on the constitutional issueo As for the 
difference between the two largest Parties, on imperial 
relationships it seemed to resemble 'that which existed 
between Tweedledum an~ 'I'weedledeet. 29 
No doubt many shared Bailey's fear of socialismo And 
many wished to reduce the racial and increase the economic 
9ontent in the Union's politics. 30 All these would view 
Roos's feelers sympathetically. The Imperial Conference 
had already paved the way for a better atmosphere. Two 
days after it was published, a letter to the editor of the 
Potchefstroom Herald from a 'prominent Nationalistt 
appealed for the shelving of the Flag Bill 'as a token of 
appreciation to the British pubiict.3 1 Roost s Springs' 
290 Rand Daily Mail, 9 December 19260 
JO. For examples of leading articles that stressed the 
importance of concentrating on the Union's 'pragmatic 
problems', see Sunday Times, 12, 26 December 1926; 
The Friend, 10 December 1926. 
31. Daily Despatch, 26 November 1926 citing Potchefstroom 
Herald. 
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address on 2 December stimulated the growth of goodwillo 
The conclusion of a public meeting held under the auspices 
of the Nationalist Party at Worcester, a few days later, 
evidenced this goodwillo To the surprise of all, the main 
speaker, Senator Langenhoven, sprang forward, saying: 
"Let us sing 'God Save the King' - the King of' 
South Africa, also," and fthe Star reporteg/' for 
the first time in the local Methuselah's memory 
the National Anthem was sung at a Nationalist 
meeting, all rising, and the Senator gravely 
beating time from the platform.J2 
As Hertzog's return approached, the co-operative 
spirit was evident. At the Free State Congress of the 
S.A.P. one delegate urged that if the Nationalists moved 
forward one step, the s.A.P. should move forward two.J3 
And at the Cape Congress of the Party, Joel Krige, while 
rejecting the idea of hereniging on t~e basis of the prin-
ciples of the Nationalist Party, was careful to point out 
that there was a strong desire, especially in the backveld, 
for ta better understanding socially'. A resolution which 
welcomed all efforts to create ta better spirit socially' 
and bring together those who had common economic interests, 
was carried with acclaim.34 That Roos's invitation was 
debated at all at S.A.P. Congresses, indicates how much his 
appeal had a.roused public opinion. 
J2. 7 December 1926. 
JJ. Cape Times, 10 December 1926. 
J4 • .!12ig. 7 December 19260 
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On the day of Hertzog's return (13 December), the 
Natal Mercuu was to draw attention to the 'marked change 
in public sentiment and thought' that had occurred. It 
felt that tbe best omen for a brighter political future lay 
in the eagerness of the man in the street to ensure that 
Hertzog received the credit he deserved and an absolutely 
'square deal' from all Parties until he had had a chance 
to gauge the change in political feeling. Unless he was 
altogether lacking in political perspicacity, Hertzog would 
'very soon sense a very great change of "atmosphere" in the 
Union.' 35 
B.2£s influences a postponement of the conver;.ing of the Flag 
Conunission 
Roos had received an encouraging response to his 
feelerf>. But all efforts at re-orientation might fail if 
there was a recrudescence of racial feeling, such as the 
pressing of the Flag Bill was certain to evokeo If his 
plans were to succeed, postponement of the Bill seemed 
imperative - and to this Roos therefore directed his efforts. 
The Flag Corrunission was to convene on 6 December. 
When, with the publication of' the Imperial Conferer,ce ts 
report rL.·.mours began to circulate that the Conunission' s 
35. For tee improved political spirit see also The Star, 11 
December 1926; Car:,e Times, 13 December 19260 
sitting might be postponed, 36 Roos promptly furnished its 
Chairman, Campbell, with a further reason for querying the 
wisdom of its convening. In a speech at Heidelberg in the 
Transvaal,37 Roos's •almost benevolent references to the 
futv.re of the Empire'JS seemed to hold out the possibility 
of a change in policy o Three days later, on 27 November, 
Campbell telegrapl.ed. Malan that he strongly endorsed the 
view that the proposed sitting of the Flag Commission 
should Lot take place if there was any possibility of a 
chang'e in policy O 39 
In reply Malan asserted that the Commission's 
instructions were the result of' a. deliberate Cabinet 
decjsion and that the expectation in some quarters of a 
chMge in policy was absolutely wiwarranted. In any case 
the Commission was merely advisory, so that the Government 
wculd retain its freedom of action should a change in 
pol:icy occur. Any sign of wavering, Malan believed, was 
bound to be exploited and to complicate the position 
. 40 furcher. 
camrbPll thereupon drew Malan's attention to Roos's 
Heidelberg speech. This, he said, held out the possibility 
36. The Star, 24 November 1926, p. 9. 
37. Cape ArguE.,, 25 November 1926. 
38. The Star, 27 Noverr:ber 1926, in leading article. 
39. P.S.M.l. vol. 3. 
40. Ibid. 
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of' change, and he added: 'The view of' Cabinet Ministers 
here jpretori27 was conveyed on Saturday advocating post-
ponement c v Campbell asked Malan theref'ore to postpone the 
CommissionYs IDE.,eting or to accept his resignation as Chair-
mane Again Malan told him that the expectation of change 
was wholly unwarranted; as f'or postponing the Commission's 
meeting, this f'ell within the competence of Campbel1. 41 
On 1 December 1926, South Africans f'irst learnt that 
the meeting of the Flag Commission had been postponed. In 
a statement to the press, Campbell explained that he had 
been largely influenced by what he f'elt was the prevailing 
opinion among all sections, namely, that on his return 
Hertzog should have an unfettered opportunity to consider 
the flag question icte novo' and realise for himself' the 
effect on the Union of his success in England. If 
Hertzog were faced on his return with a finding of the Flag 
Comrr.ission, he would be faced to some extent with a fait 
~ompli. The possibility of a change in policy 
suggested that it would be better not to con.ver.e the 
. . 42 ComnussJ. on. 
Victory in this confrontation with Malan had gone to 
Campbell - backec by Rooso Roos had unquestionably played 
an important part in bringing about the postponement of the 
410 P.SoM.I. voloJ. 
420 The Star, 1 December 1926; Die Burger, Rand Daily Mail 
- 2 December 19260 
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meeting of the Flag Commissiono Indeed, Campbell was soon 
to explain to Hertzog that his justification for differing 
from Malan in this matter was based on an interview with 
Roos and a letter received from himo 43 
Roos, Labour and Hertzog 
If Roos was instrumental in persuading Campbell to 
postpone the meeting of the Flag Commission, did he also 
persuade Hertzog to favour postponing the Bill? There can 
be no doubt that when Hertzog returned to South Africa he 
was in favour of a postponement. 44 As Acting Prime 
Minister during Hertzog's absence, Roos was certainly in a 
favourable position to exert influence on Hertzog and, 
after the satisfactory conclusion of the Imperial Conference, 
he may well have fowid Hertzog receptive to arguments in 
favour of the Bill's withdrawalo Foremost amongst these, 
Roos could point to, and emphasize, the continuing 
difficulties of their ruling partners and their desire for 
the Bill's withdrawal. Labour's fortunes had worsened 
during Hertzog's absence. Indeed, by the end of October, 
it had to admit defeat: in the Johannesburg municipal 
electionA, Fordsburg, Malvern, Turffontein and Jeppe were 
lost. All were supposedly Labour strongholds. Their 
43. P.S.M.I. vol. 3, letter from Campbell to Hertzog, 8 
December 1926. 
44. See chapter Vlll. 
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opponents, it was mai.ntained, had been helped by the flag 
question. 4 5 The 'tremendous' campaign of the capitalist 
press was beginning 'to rattle our forces', Forward com-
plained on 29 October; unless Labour offered an antidote 
in tbe :form of 'bread an.ct butter politics' , it would face 
disruption. 
Three issues later Forw~ revealed even more frankly 
the strain which the flag struggle had imposed on the Party 
when it deplored the confusion within the Party and 
attacked Creswell for not supporting the National Council's 
dual flag plano It warned that the flag controversy had 
now, 
been raging long enough to prove clearly, to 
anyor.e not wishing to remain wilfully blind, that 
a large majority of the rank and :file still 
remain imbued with British instincts and senti-
ments •••• national pride and prejudice - which the 
journalists o:f capital understand so well - make 
it impossible for the rank and :file of the party 
to support the Flag Bill, or even discuss it 
calmly and intelligentlyo Trusted and respected 
as Col. Creswell is by the membership of the 
::_)arty, it will be found, when the testing· time 
comes in the shape o:f an election thtg national 
sentiments outweigh everything else. 
In the rc;nainin[: four weeks before Hertzog's return 
Forward made every effort to influence a withdrawal of the 
Bill. It seized upon the report of the Imperial Conference 
as rendering the Flag Bill superfluouc:, and (in boprlful 
45. The Friend, 29 October 19260 
46. 19 November 1926. 
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anticipation) declared on 26 November that Labour had every 
reason to thank Hertzog for removing from the sphere of 
practical politics the contentious issues of secession and 
the flag. 
Probably, partly towards the same entl, Labouritesl 
dissatisfaction with the Pact was stressed. If they 
believed they had accomplished a revolution with the ballot 
box, they now suspected that this had not come to pass and 
that 'Labour's fight had not changed in even one small 
detail. 1 Contentious and 'useless' questions, such as the 
Flag Bill, had been made the Pact's chief concern; and all 
along Labour's Ministers had followed Disraeli's formula 
for success: 1 "Ask for nothing; ref'use nothing; resign 
nothing. 11 1 All this, 'and much more', had slowly 
penetrated the brains of the rank and file. 47 Finally, 
three days before Hertzog's return, Forward made yet another 
strong appeal for the withdrawal of the Billo In this too 
Labourites' 'real and serious' disappointment with the Pact 
was stressed. The workers had been acquiescent and 
'played the game' with the Government; now they wanted 
tthe goods to be delivered'. tActions speak louder than 
words'ii and people were just beginning tto remove their 
gaze from the mouths of the rulers to watch their hands'" 
Properly handled, the political situation contained no 
47. Forward, J December 1926. Italics in origina.lo See 
also Swiday Times, 28 November 1926, p. 140 
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contentious matter - secession was dead, the Sedition Act 
was useless, and the Flag Bill Wlllecessary. Therefore, 
Labour expected the Government to turn at last to the 
things that really matteredo If' this was done, there was 
not the slightest danger of' any "split in the Pact 11 • 48 
These and other cries of' disappointment at the Pact's 
achievements and f'lag policy, when made by Labourites, were 
persuasive reasons f'or postponing the Bill, and Roos may 
have used themo However, Hertzog may have reached his 
decision f'ree of' any pressure stemming f'rom Roos or 
Labourites f'or the Premier was much gratified by his 
success and welcome in England. There, contrary to what 
he appears to have expected, he had gained, without the 
least unpleasantness, indeed, with f'ull co-operation, the 
recognition of' his country's status that he had f'or so long 
desired. Though in gaining this recognition Hertzog 
believed he had obtained no more than South Af'rica•s just 
rights, it would have been surprising if' he did not as a 
result f'eel well disposed towards the British Commonwealth, 
480 10 December 1926. Italics in original. See also 
Forward, 17 December 1926. 
'split in the Pact' was an allusion to Hay's recent 
warnings that the Pact was 'split f'rom top to bottom', 
a situation which he attributed to the links between a 
clean flag, the desire f'or secession and the Pact's 
failure to benefit Labourites (cape Times, Daily Des-
patch - 22 November 1926); ~ay also maintained that 
four-f'if'ths of' the Labour Party wished to end the Pact 
(The Star, 27 November 1926)0 For strong criticisms 
of' the Labour Party and the Pact by branches of' the 
Labour Party in the Cape Peninsula, see The Star, JO 
November 1926; Forward, 10 December 1926. 
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England and English-speakers back homee He knew that 
these English-speakers were lauding him. He knew that 
they (and the Labourites among them) wanted the Bill post-
poned or, like Athlone and the King, 49 desired the 
incorporation of the Union Jack in the national flago And 
he also knew that to pass his Native Bills he needed the 
help of the opposition.5° Having fulfilled one of his 
greatest ambitions, and enjoying unprecedented popularity 
among all sections back home, he may have decided independ-
ently that on returning he would try to bring about the 
Bill's postponement or, if this proved impracticable, 
attempt to incorporate the Union Jack in the new flago 
In all events it would seem that Roos either suspected 
or knew that Hertzog favoured a postponement of the Billo 
In the period between the publication of the Conference's 
report and Hertzog's return, he repeatedly asserted that he 
was prepared to leave the future of the Bill to Hertzogo 
On this matter, he declared, he was prepared to follow 
Hertzog blindly. In the same address from which Campbell 
concluded that there was a possibility of change in policy, 
Roos declared that Hertzog was the man best qualif'ied to 
settle the Flag Bill's future: he had been to the Imperial 
49. HoP. vol. 64, Athlone to Hertzog, 1 September 1926. 
50. See Cns Vaderland, 29 December 1926, for emphasis on 
the need for the Opposition's support to pass the 
Native Bills whi.ch it maintained was more urgent than 
flag legislationo 
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ConI'erence and knew what its prevailing spirit waso 
ever Hertzog decided, Roos told the audience, 'I am 
prepared to accept fully and freely•.5 1 
What-
Again, on 2 December Roos suggested to his Springs' 
audience that if bitterness arose they should wait till 
Hertzog returned, •and he will then tell us in the light of 
h d l . th h . ~2 what has happened in England ow to ea wi tis question.r 
Two days later he repeated similar views.53 Finally, he 
told a Krugersdorp audience t4at the only man who could 
decide on the future of the flags was Hertzog: he was the 
man to tell them what to do; whatever he decided, he, Roos, 
would follow blindly.54 
Though Roo~ did not categorically state that he 
favoured the Bill's postponement in any of these speeches,55 
cumulatively, the effect of the above statements, together 
with his open coolness towards the Bill and his efforts at 
re-orientation, encouraged a belief that the Flag Bill 
510 Cape Argus, 25 November 19260 
52. The Star, 2 December 1926; Cape Times, 6 December 1926. 
53. The Star, 4 December 1926. 
540 JJli.g_. 9 December 19260 Several of Roos•s supporters 
adopted the same attitude. These included Colin Steyn 
(Cape Times, 7 December 1926), Pirow (Ons Vaderland, J 
December 1926) and Barlow (The Star, 10 December 1926)0 
55. Cf. Malan, Po 118: YQp •n publieke vergadering het hy fRoo;J verklaar dat daar alle kans bestaan dat die 
Vlagwetsontwerp teruggetrek sal word, dat hy persoonlik 
ten gunste daarvan was.a., No report of these state-
ments has been found in any of the main newspaperso 
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would be withdrawn on Hertzog's return. Malan' s reply to 
this was to try to dispel the growing public uncertainty on 
the Bill's future. Repeatedly, he emphasized that the Bill 
would not be withdrawn; on the contrary, he insisted that 
it would definitely be passed in the next parliamentary 
session. As he later wrote: 1.0.hoe nadrukliker hy {Rooi} 
sy koudheid en onverskilligheid verkondig het, hoe beslister 
het ek weer aan die antler kant herhaal dat die Regering 
besluit het om met die Vlagwetsontwerp voort te gaan, en dat 
ek van daardie besluit geen duimbreed sou afwyk nie.,56 
Thus, soon after its publication, he argued that the 
Imperial Conference's report had made a national flag even 
more necessary;57 then, at Steytlerville, on 3 December, 
and again at Graaff-Reinet, a few days later,58 he insisted 
that the Bill must become law, while Die Burger on 10 
December maintained that the new status had made a national 
flag a logical necessity. 
Corr..menting on these events thirty years later, Malan 
wrote that he opposed postponement because it would have 
resulted in an unresolved question left open for genera-
tions and that racial peace would have been disturbedo 
While the NationaliFts' attitude towards the Union Jack 
56. Mal.an, Po 117: Die Burger (Malan), 31 January 19 57 o 
57. Ons Vaderland, 26 November 19260 
58. Die Volksblad, Die Burger - 4 December 1926 (steytler-
ville); The Star, Die Volksblad - 7 December 1926 
(Graaff-Reinet)o 
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would have remained a grievance among this f'lag's 
supporters, their ol'.111 :foJ.lowers would have had every reason 
to 2.ccuse tbem of l\·e2.k.ness and the pclitical consequences 
would hc:~ve been disastrous o 59 
But in addition to these broader considerations, there 
were those more directly reJ.ated to Malan' s own position. 
To him, as the most ardent a.dvoca.te of' a clean :flag who had 
publicly insisted that the Bil.l would be pe.ssed, post-
por;.ement would have been a personal humiliation. At on.e 
stroke it would have raised Roos•s popularity and brought 
re-orientation closer, while his own stature would have been 
dim:nishec among supporters and enemies alikeo He could be 
1.ef't with no honour8ble alternative but to resign. Not 
onJ.y the Union's po1.i tica.l :future was at stake, but also 
his own. 
The day of Hertzog's returr, could clearly be decisive. 
Recognition of' this fact brought Malan to Hertzog's ship at 
six o'clock in the morning. Ee :feared that Roos might 
gain Hertzog's ear first, influence him, and that Hertzog 
1 . . h" lf 60 wou ct compromise imse • Indeed, as Malan realized, 
and the press pointed out t.b.at same morning, Sollth Africa. 
wa.s star.ding on 'tiptoe ·with expectation' :for the Prime 
YJ.nister•s words 0 61 Three days earlier, the Natal Mercury 
59. :r.!alan, PPo 117-8: Di.e Burger (:r.'..alan), 31 January 1957. 
bO. Malan, PPo 118-9: Die Burger (Ma.Ian), 1 February 1957. I 
61 0 Natal Mercur~, ca12e Times 
-
13 December 1926. 
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had written that the whole i:,oli ti cal future of the coLmtry 
lay in Eert.zog's hands: he could bring it to success or 
rt:..in. Now, on the morning of his return, it declared 
that Hertzog enjoyed a greater opportunity than any South 
African Premier h&d ever had - by a generous concession to 
English-speaking sentiment, he could achieve an enduring 
political settlement. 
That Hertzog had a chance to give the Union •a new 
62 lead' was a view expressed el5ewhere, but nowhere more 
eloquently than in the Cape Times of 13 December: 
His opportun.i ty is very great o He comes back 
with the power to exorcise for ever from South 
Africa that dark malignant shadow of racial 
an.tagonism which has been the potent curse upon 
the happiness, prosperity and harmony of his 
country. Almost everything for the immediate 
and distant future, depends upon the course .he 
will steer now that he is among us again. If 
he has the mind of a statesman, if he shows that 
generosit) and patriotism are the guiding motives 
of his future, then indeed South Africa may enter 
or. a new era in politics ••• oSouth Africa awaits, 
respor.sive to his toucho 
620 For example see The Star, 11 December 1926; 
Times, 12 December 1926. 
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CHAPTER VIII 
HERTZOGi S RETURN AND THE DENISE OF TOEKADERit}G; 
Hertzog's return and the Billfs future 
Hertzog received a herors welcome. Apart perhaps 
from Botha in 1910-1911, never bef'ore had a South African 
Prer.1ier' s popularity reached such heights. English- and 
Afrikaans-speakers enthusiastically feted him. At a civic 
lwicb.eon in Cape Town on t.te day uf his return, Hertzog 
confessed that t:e no longer had any fee.r of the British 
Empire; indeed, there was no way along which their 
interests could be safeguarded better than that of the 
E . 1 mp1re. At a banquet in his honour that evening, he was 
2 
warmly received by the Cape Town Chamber of' Commerce. 
The Friend of 15 December thought his speech to the Chamber 
confirmed the hopes present in the hearts of Soutt Africans 
and that so far as his reference to ta totally new adapt-
ation of ••• our political life' was concerned, the possibi-
lity of this was open to him. The Cape Times of 14 
December declared that Hertzog's speeches on the day of his 
return would unquestionably influence the course of South 
1o The Star, 13 December 1926; Rand Daily Mail, Cape Times 
- 14 December 1926. 
2. Cape Times, Die Burge~ - 14 December 19260 
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African politics. 
On the following day a huge crowd a.waited the Prmaier 
at Paar]. Orche strHs play(~d, folk bOr.gs were sung and 
refreshments served to thousandso In view of the freedom 
the Union had achieved, f!.ertzog told this gathering of Cape 
Nationalists, it wou.ld be stupid to say farewell to the 
Empire; they could enjoy no e;reater liberty than the 
British liberty they now enjoyed.J In Durban, E.ertzog's 
speeches were welcomed. 4 In Pretoria, on 20 Deceraber, he 
rece.::.ved la more than royal reception• • 5 
Duncan observed, 
He had returned, 
as the Liberator, the man who had got for South 
Africa the national freedom and independence for 
":hich she has striven so longo It is not the 
republic his supporters have always looked for 
but something just as good, possibly even bettero 
So he sa6s and so say all his nationalist col-leagueso 
His colleagues' approval was magnified in the almost 
fulsome praise of the Nationalist press: the Premier hc.d 
returned as a statesman of inunovable conviction who had in 
the midst of the falsity and depravity of worJd politics 
J. Die VoJ.ksb1.ad, Cape Times, The Frier..d, Die Burger - 15 
December 19260 
4. Die Burger, 1 5 December 1926; Cape Times, 15, 22 
December 1926. 
5o For reports of Hertzog's speech and Pretoria's great 
-welcome see The Star, 20 December 1926; Die Burger, 
Cape Argus, The Friend 21 December 19260 
6. Duncan Papers, to Lady Selborne, 22 December 19260 
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once again bravely preached the gospel of moral loftiness 
and truth; 'so kom huistoe Vn volksman, gelouter deur 
lydingsware nasie-werk, en onomkoopbaar van siel, •n volks-
man wat in donker ure diep benoud was om die siel van die 
Afrikanerdom'o7 The new 'Convention Spirit', the cordial 
reception Hertzog received from English-speakers and their 
presence at a Dingaant s Day festival - allegedJ.y for the 
first time since Union - all evoked gratified comment in 
8 the press. Smuts was later to refer with a touch of wry 
humour to the welcome Hertzog received and the way in which 
the English section 'most liberally embraced him in a flood 
of generous emotionvo9 
In view of the unprecedented stature Hertzog enjoyed 
on his return it seemed that the Flag Bill could at last be 
withdrawn f'rom a position of strength and that a new era in 
the Union's politics was a practical possibiiity. Not 
only the opposition, but Nationalists too were calling for 
b .p t· 1· . 10 a new epoc~ oi pragma 1c po 1c1es. That the pursuit of 
7. Die Volksblad, 13 December 19260 Italics in original. 
See also Die Burge~, 13 and 14 December 1926. The 
more inflated rhetorical passages have not been quoted. 
For many letters from Nationalist Party officials 
welcoming Hertzog back from the Imperial Conference and 
praising his achievements there see !h.f.t. vol .. 280 
80 See Die Volksbla.d, 18, 23, 31 December 1926; !1!.£_ 
~ger, 17 December 1926; Ons Vaderland, 4 January 
1927; Rand Daily Mail, 17, 18 December 1926; ~ 
Friend, 22 December 1926. 
9. S 2 P. volo 39, noo 290, to Gillett, 11 May 1927. 
100 See On.s Vaderland, 18 December 19260 
such policies would improve his chances of passing his 
Native Bills could not have escaped Hertzog. 
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In all events, when he returned to the Union, Hertzog 
favoured a postponement of the Flag Bill. He openly 
confessed it in Parliament. 11 At Prieska, in October 
1934, he again admitted as much. 12 Havenga, too, on his 
return from England with Hertzog favoured tbe Bill's with-
drawal - a charge he did not deny when Smartt made it in 
the Assembly in June 1927. 13 Why then did the Government 
re-introduce it? At the second reading of the Bill 
Hertzog declared that hardly three days after his return 
the demands of the Empire Group for the inclusion of the 
Union J·ack had disillusioned him. 'I immediately felt 
that we could wait one, two, and even seventeen years, and 
yet forty years more, and would not get the flago Then I 
said: "Now we are going on and no more going back. 11 ' 
Also, the opposition press, through its criticism, had 
issued a challenge to the Goverrunent that could not be 
ignored. 14 However, Hertzog was being less than truthful. 
On returning from his Paarl reception on 14 December, 
11. Hansard, vol. 9, 4228, 27 May 1927; seep.342. 
12. 
13. 
Die Burger, 11 October 1934; G.D. Scholtz, Dr. Nicho-
las Johannes van der Merwe, 1888-1940, pG 64. This 
was in response to a question arising from statements 
made shortly before at Heilbron by Malan, who had by 
then broken with Hertzog. 
Hansard, vol. 9, 5604-5, 
Burger, 11 October 1934; 
Hansard, vol. 9 4228, 27 
Smartt, 23 June 1927; 
Scholtz, lococito, P• 
May 19270 
Die 
64. 
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Hertzog invited Malan and Beyers15 to dinner at Groote 
Schuuro Though the flag question probably weighed 
heavily on the minds of all three, the subject was 
mentioned more in passing than directly and Malan began to 
fear the worsto On the following day, Malan and Beyers 
were invited again to Groote Schuur, where Roos too was a 
guest. During lunch the conversation ranged mainly over 
the question of the Labour-Nationalist relationship, the 
continued value of which Roos, the Party's expert on the 
Labour Party, questionedo He argued that Labour's 
following had become so small that the Nationalists need. 
• • 16 ' I d • • not seriously consider it ana ite advocate a joining of 
r 1 7 f'orces between the Nationalists and S.A.P. 
After lunch Hertzog led the cor.versation. He had 
18 been visited by Sir Ernest Chappell and been_ told that 
the satisfactory settlement of the status question meant 
that many S.AoPo supporters were prepared to join the 
15. Beyers was a close f'riend of Malan and generally shared 
and supported th{:) latter's flag policies. Or.e week 
before Hertzog's return Beyers had insisted at Edonburg 
that the FlaG Bill would bo passed in 1927 (Ons Vador-
land, 7 December 1926). For Eeyer's earlier activities 
o~ betalf of a new flag see pp. 14-15,n.32. 
160 Malan, pp. 118-120: Die Burger (Malan), 1 February 
1927. 
17. Creswell Papers (envelope no. 7), letter to wife, 20 
December 19260 
180 On tr.is poir.t Mala.n and Hertzog· later differed: I'-'!alan 
maintained that Hertzog stated that Chappell had led a 
deputation to him (Malag, p. 120); Hertzoe; insisted 
that Chc:.,ppell' s approach had been personal (Die Burger, 
11 October 19J4). 
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Nationalists and to accept Hertzog as their leadero All 
that remained to bridge the gap and make co-operation 
possible, was the withdrawal of' the Flag Bill. 19 Without 
further ado Hertzog declared himself' in favour of' this 
course; the Bill should be withdrawn. At once he was 
supported by Rooso . d ·1 t 20 Beyers remaine si en o 
Hertzog and Roos appear to have been using their 
combined skill to have the Bill withdrawno Perhaps the 
passing reference to the Flag Bill on the previous evening 
had been made as a gentle f'eeler. Roos's opening 
reference to the small importance of' the Labourites on the 
following day may have been intended to strengthen 
Hertzog's hand in the subsequent discussion, for if the 
fortunes of' the Labour Party were on the wane, so too might 
be the fortunes of the Pact in the next general election. 
A more promising alliance was therefore desirable~ At 
this juncture Hertzog could reveal that just such an alli-
ance had become possible. 
Hertzog had proposed withdrawal; Roos had concurred; 
Beyers had remained silento Malan now spoke, He 
asserted that his positive declarati.ons on the Flag Bill 
190 Malan, Po 120. It is dif'f'icult to accept Hertzog's 
later contention that ChappeJ.l is attempted rapTroche-
ment had nothing to do with the f'lag question Die 
~er, 11 October 1934)0 As events showed, ·the 
pressing of' the Bill was certain to revive ill-feeling 
and destroy the atmosphere necessary f'or a rapproche-
~. 
20. Malan, Po 120: Die Burger (Malan), 1 February 19570 
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had always beer~ made after consultation with the Cabinet 
and with its full authorityo Withdrawal at this stage 
wou.ld place him in an untenable position with :friend and 
foe alike and he would not be able to remain in the Cabinet 
if the Bill were withdrawn. 21 
The effect of this threat, Malan stated, was immediate. 
He had not realized, Hertzog replied, that Malan would 
adopt this attitude; he would not say another word about 
his own proposalso On the contrary, they should now 
unyieldingly insist that the Bill should become law and 
solely consider what form it might tzJ<:eo Here they might 
be more compromising. They could consider whether the 
Union Jack as a whole might not be incorporated. Again, 
Roos immediately supported Hertzo&, suggesting a Union Jack 
in the centre of a blue background: beams would radiate 
from the Union Jack to the flag's borders. Malan objected 
at once to this design in which he saw the Union Jack as a 
rising sun. 
accept it. 
He also doubted whether their supporters would 
Beyers strongly supported him and the dis-
22 
cussion ended without agreemento 
We may take leave to doubt that Hertzog was surprised 
by MalanYs opposition to the withdrawal of the Billo 
21. Malan, PPo 120-121: Die Burger (Malan.), 1 February 
1957. 
22. Malan, p. 121: Die Bu:;:g?,.£ (?v:alan), 1 February 1957. 
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Indeed, only three days earlier, Malan had publicly insisted 
that he would proceed with the measure. On the evening of' 
the day Hertzog returned, Malan told a meeting in the Cape 
Town City Hall that there was absolutely no substance to 
the belief' that the future of' the Flag Bill was in doubto 
This was merely opposition tactics. Or. the contrary, 
Hertzog had given no indication that he proposed to deviate 
f'rom accepted £lag policy: 'I think I can say there has 
been no change in his attitude and that there will be no 
change in the f'uture., 2 3 In his determination to have the 
Flag Bill passed, Malan was deliberately choosing to over-
look developments since the Imperial Conference and trying 
to make it as dif'f'icult as possible f'or Hertzog to retract. 
But, throughout, Malan's deeds and words had plainly 
revealed his determination to push the Bill through. In 
May, when an anxious Creswell had sought postponement, it 
was Malan who bad opposed delayo It was Malan too who had 
insisted that before postponement Labour must give an 
unqualified promise to support the Bill in the next 
parliamentary session. From Germiston, in July, to Cape 
Town, three days before the Groote Schuur meeting, he had 
given public expression of' his <:le.termination to see the 
Bill enacted. In what other light was Hertzog to interpret 
his dawn visit to him? Or his City Hall speech? 
2J. The Star, ca~e Times, Die Burger, Die Volksblad - 14 
December 192 o . 
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Thus Hertzog's contention in May 1927 that he decided 
to proceed with the Bill because of demands from the Empire 
Group and criticisms, particularly the Cape Times's, must 
be rejectedo The Empire Group's request for the inclusion 
of the Union Jack was first published in Johannesburg in 
24 
the late afternoon of 15 December, that is, after 
Hertzog had agreed to support Malan. If Hertzog had prior 
knowledge of the request, this would merely reveal that 
despite it he still favoured the Bill's withdrawal when the 
vital discussions began. As for offensive press criticism,' 
there was none between Hertzog's arrival and his decision 
to proceed with the Bill. 2 5 
said: 
Writing home two days after the meeting Creswell 
The Flag Bill is !.!:.Q.:t to be dropped but is to be 
gone on with; This is a defeat to {sic)oeoRoos 
and was due to Malan saying flat footed that if 
it was dropped he would be dropped too - I think 
H[ertzog] was hoping a way out without this might 
be possible but he takes the view that the worst 
happening for S.A.' would be a split in the 
24. The Star, 15 December 1926, p. 9 .. 
25.· It is not quite clear whether Hertzog was referring to 
the Cape Times's articles during these three days or 
generallyo Eowever, from Hertzog's return until the 
annowicement nearly three weeks later that the Bill 
would be pursued, the opposition press was unusually 
subdued in its comments on the Government's flag policy. 
An wiofficial 'truce' on the flag question appears to 
have been observed by opposition newspapers until the 
beginning of January when the Government annotmced that 
it would proceed with flag legislation {see Cape Times, 
5 January 1927). 
NatLlon.alis.!] Party at this juncture with the 
constitutional matter settled •• o.2b 
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If' Hertzog had settled the constitutional matter, what did 
he have to fear from Malan? On the other great question 
of the time - the Coiour question - Malan would have found 
it difficult to oppose himo It would therefore seem that 
Hertzog had less to gain by yielding to Malan than by 
placing himself' at the head of the toenadering movement., 
Throughout the country it was strongly hoped and even con-
fidently expected that Eertzog would grasp the opportunity 
to introduce a new era of pragmatic policies as the leader 
of a large new centre party. 2 7 However, the fact was that 
thollgh Hertzog might assure Creswell that the constitutional 
issue was 'settled', it had. only recently been settled, and 
it bad not been settled, as Dur..can observed, in the manner 
many Nationalists had expected. The constitutional issue 
was in £act settled only so long as the leaders of the 
Nationalist Party chose to accept it as settled. Proof' of 
t.r...is came seven years later. The difference between what 
had been expected and what had been achieved could be 
exploitedg In May 1927, E.G. Jansen, while frankly 
26. Creswell Papers, vol. J, letter to wife, 17 December 
1926; Mo Creswell, An epoch of the political history 
of South Africa in the 1.ife of Frederic Hugh Page 
Creswell, p~ 112. The quotation has been taken from 
the original source and differs slightly from that 
appearing in the latter work,.. Underlining in the 
original" 
27. For example see Sunday Times, 19, 2b December 1926; 
Die Vo1.ksblad, 22 December 1926, editorial and views of 
prominer..t Free State Nationalists.· 
admitting that it would have beer ... better to postpone the 
Flag Bill in 1926, declared that the Government had not 
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been able to do so in 1927 because it could not allow itself 
to be dictated to 'by the people Kho call themselves the 
Sons of England' o This variation of Hertzog's spurious 
argument was followed by the real reason for Hertzog's 
decision: the Governmer..t •was bowid to go on with the 
matter or see its Party smashed through internal dissension 
and a strong rE publican party [be inil formed.' 28 
Malants assurance (given at the Groote Schuur meeting) 
that he would continue to support the Government if he were 
forced to resign, 29 must have been treated with some 
scepticism by Hertzogo His Minister's departure from the 
Cabinet was certain to raise republican and racial feelings 
and very likely to lead eventually to his being joined by 
Beyers, NoJo van der Merwe and other ardent republicans in 
a new republican party. It could stigmatize Hertzog as 
unprincipled, opportwiistic and a betrayer of the~; 
these were the hazards of a political ideology based on 
group distinctiveness. Despite his personal preferences 
on flag policy, Hertzog was not prepared to rely on the 
uncertain future of the ~nadering movement - whose~ 
qua non was tl:.e postponement of the Flag Bill - at the risk 
280 E.G. Jansen Papers, volo 573, letter to Sir Thomas 
Murray, 18 May 1927. 
290 Malan, p. 121: Die Burger (Malan), 1 February 19570 
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of' disrupting his own Partyo In the present circumstances, 
a bold step in tLe direction of' toenadering could in the 
long run be hazardous for him. 
It is indeed difficult to see how Malan could have 
remained in office in the face of his former statements. 
In view of' bis continued declarations to the contrary, for 
him the Billis postponement would have been an even greater 
personal bmEiliation now than in Hay 1926 o However, Malan 
later cited the new imperial relationship as a reason for 
his insistence on flag legislation. It could be argued, 
he said, tha-c up to 1926 South Africa had no need of' a 
national flag, because during t~at period it was still a 
dependent countryo After 1926, this lack became a 
humiliation and a proof of defect in the nationVs self'-
respect. From 1927, a flag became a question of honour 
and duty. 
It would surely be wrong to depreciate these views as 
insincere. Doubtless such views influenced Malan at the 
time of the struggle. Pride in one's group is the hallmark 
of' nationalism and Malan probably saw the absence of a flag 
which would reflect this pride as a real shortcoming. But 
Hertzog and Roos were ardent nationalists tooo Why then 
were they prepared to postpone the Bill? The answer must 
be that their nationalism was of a somewhat different cast. 
Perhaps the fact that they were lawyers rather than 
predika.nts wa.::; not nnrelated to the fact that their 
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nationalism was less narrow and exclusiveo Desire for the 
equality of tbe Afrikaner - politically, socially and 
culturally - lay at the centre of their nationalism. While 
Mala.n's nationalism embodied this element, the exclusiveness 
of the Afrikaner lay at its hearto With the equality of 
the Afrika.P..er seemingly secured and the status of South 
Africa recognized, Hertzog and Roos could readily embrace 
English-speakers in the same partyo For Malan this was 
more difficult. The coming together of English and 
Afrikaners in one party could dilute Nationalist principles 
- as he conceived them - and pose a threat to the Afrikaner-
volk. Since :Malan and Die Burger's brands of nationalism 
were th0 same, the latter was doubtless accurately 
reflecting the former•s opinions when in reply to Sir 
Ernest Oppenheimer's appeal for a hereniging of the conser-
vative parties, it replied: 
Ons irmige begeerte dat diegene wat een was en 
e0nders dink en eenderse belange bet, in een 
p2..rty mog bymekaar kom, het ons nooit verberg nie. 
Maar met die Oppenheimers en die Abe Baileys, die 
Drmr...mond Cha pl ins en die David Harrise s, die 
Slllartts en die Marwicks, was ons nooit een nie en 
wil ans nie verenig wees nie •••• 
Vir Sir Ernest Oppenheimer om te pleit vir 
v hercrd.ging' van elemente wat nooi t een was nie 
en ook nie saam hoort nie is niks anders nie as 
verregaande vermetelheid.,o 
Malan therefore did not support toenadering., To what 
extent, ii~ any, this influenced his stand on the Flag 
JOo 16 F'et,ruary 1927. Compare with Die Volksblad's (22 
DecembPr 1926) preparedness to cor.sider Party re-
orientation o 
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Bill's future one cannot for the present sayo However, in 
threatening to resign he did achieve a dual purpose: he 
forced the Government to proceed with his Bill and thereby 
dealt a mortal blow to toenadering. So long as the 
possibility remained that the Bill would be withdrawn, 
hopes of' toenadering remained alive. 31 However, as 
December drew to its end with no of'f'icial statement on the 
future of the Bill, some members of the opposition, growing 
more an . :x:ious, began to call attention to the relationship 
between the continuance of' the new spirit and the with-
drawal of the Bill. 3·2 
hando 
Their disillusionment was near at 
Reaction to the decision to proceed with the Bill and to 
the proposal to incorporate the Royal Standard 
On 1 January 1927, at the opening of' Labour's annual 
congress, Creswell announced that the Premier had 
authorized him to say that the Goverrunent would proceed 
with the Flag Bill; this decision, he said, sprang from 
the Government's desire to settle the flag problem once and 
for a11. 33 The annom1.cement came as a great disappointment 
31 o See Rand Daily Mai]_, 14, 18 December 1 926; The Friend, 
22 December 1926. 
320 See The Star, Natal Mercury, Rand Daily Mail - 21 
December 1926; Sunday Times, 26 December 1926e 
330 Sunday Tines, 2 January 1927; Die Volksblad, 3 January 
1927; Cape Times, ~tern Provi~~e Herald, Daily Des-
~~Q. - 4 January 1927 o 
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to many members of the oppositiono As the Eastern Province 
Herald commented on 8 January, the signs in favour of 
to,enadering had been encouraging: 'on all han.ds people 
began to discuss the prospects of a new partyooooPlans of 
all kinds were discussed, and people went into details as 
to which Ministers wo•.1.ld have to go.,' Particularly, Hert-
zog's conciliatory speeches and his widely reported 
reference at Pretoria to the Union Jack as •our flag1 34 
encouraged hopes, and Stallard expressed the feelings of 
many when he declared: 
When General Hertzog returned and actually said 
at Pretoria that the Union Jack was 'our flag', 
we did indeed feel that those old misconceptions 
were removed and that he had only to be given 
time to do the right thing in connection with the 
Flag Bill of his own will. 
The shock is therefore greater and the dis-
appointment keener when we findooothat we are 
apparently back in the old slough, that the Flag 
Bill is to be forced through willy-nillyo.035 
Since the Government had decided to continue with the 
Bill it was necessary for it to find a new flago Though 
this task had been set aside for a Flag Commission, on 17 
December Creswell put forward a suggestion to Malan. 
Later the same day Creswell informed his wi£e: 
3 5 0 
••• I think his £Malan•;;;} appreciation of my 
l1aving played the game with him as opposed to his 
own co.lleague' s trick::; has made him much more 
inclined to listen to any suggestion or advocacy 
'.[he Sta_£, 20 December 1926; The Friend, Cape Argus, 
Die Burger - 21 December 19260 
Eastern P::'ovince Herald, 4 January 1927. See also 
Hansard, volo 9, 5604, Smartt, 2J June 1927. 
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I may have of any mollifying measureso He is 
quite willing to quarter the R9yal Standard on 
the Flag for iistance - if the King will give his 
permissiono •• J 
Thus the immediate inspiration for the incorporation of the 
royal standard in the national flag appears to have come to 
the Government fro~ Creswello But, as before, the plan 
probably originated amongst fellow-Labourites, a suggestion 
for its use occurring in a letter to Forward on J September 
1926. 
No doubt Malanvs feelings towards the crown a~d royal 
standard were similar, as were his reasons for accepting 
them. 37 The support his Prime Minister had given him two 
days earlier would additionally have made his rejection of 
the p.lan more dif'ficul t. Hertzog favoured the royal 
standard and it appears to have soon gained the support of' 
the Cabineto On 1 January, at the same time as he 
declared that the Government would advance with the Flag 
Bill, Creswell announced that it was prepared to accept the 
royal standard on the flag, so that they might have a flag 
under which all would 'stand in absolute equalityta How-
ever, incorporation of the royal standard would depend on 
the cessation of Party strife over the flagvs design as 
they could not ask the King's permission to use the stand-
ard if it gave rise to political strifeo 
J6o Creswell Papers, volo 3, letter to wife, 17 December 
1926: Creswell, opucito Po 1120 (The colleague refer-
red to was Roos.) 
37 o See PP. 164-5. 
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was satisfied with the proposal, Creswell said, the Govern-
ment would be prepared to adopt ito 38 
However, the royal standard failed to gain general 
approvalo The Cape Argus, Natal Mercury, Rand Daily Mail 
and Eastern Province Herald were undogmatic on the merits 
of the standard as a solution but thought it less approp-
riate than the Union Jack because the standard symbolized 
only the King and not the Empireo39 However, the Pretoria 
~, Daily Despatch, The Star, Cape Times, 40 and Natal 
Advertiser41 rejected the plan outrighte While they too 
maintained that it was inappropriate to prefer the King's 
personal symbol to the Union Jack, their criticisms were 
more forthright and often harsh. The Cape Times, strongly 
objected tto this proposal to drag the King into the 
unpleasant racial and political quarrel'. The Pretoria 
~ insisted that the standard was unacceptable to the 
English throughout South Africa; having sworn to be true 
to the Union Jack, they would not tolerate its removal, 
either through force or parliamentary majority. The Star 
was at a loss to understand how 'complete elimination• of 
380 Stu1day Times, 2 January 1927; Die Volksblad, 3 January 
1927; Cape Times, Eastern Province Herald - 4 January 
1927. 
390 3, 4, 7, and 8 June 1927, respectivelyo The ambivalent 
attitude of these newspapers to the incorporation of 
the royal standard resulted in them being generally 
ambivalent towards the decision to press the Flag Dill. 
40. 3, 4, 12, and 4, 7 January 1927, respectivelyo 
41. Cape Argus, 4 January 1927 citing Natal Advertiser. 
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the Union Jack from the flag would remove all feelings of 
bitternesso It would certainly not occur among those who 
made a point of cherishing such feelings, and •among all 
classes of the British South African population it would 
leave a sense of soreness and resentment•. 
Patriotic societies were very critical. The Central 
Executive of the Flag Organization asked 'in amazementr. why 
the Union Jack was excluded when it was the only flag that 
more than half the population had ever known? It was 
similarly •amazed• to find the royal standard welcomed when 
the Union Jack was banned; if one was acceptable then why 
not the other? Suitable for a school badge the royal 
standard might be; but it was not acceptable on a national 
flag if it £ailed to express the traditions 0£ the 
42 people. In a strongly worded letter to Hertzog, the 
Empire Group declared: 
You jHertzog,7 are still determined that the 
wishes of the British section of the public shall 
be totally disregarded, and we have now to advise 
you that if, as you appear to favour, the country 
is divided ou racial lines, the fault will be 
entirely that of the extremist section of the 
Nationalist Party. We are satisfied that Natal 
is quite unQnimous in the determination that no 
flag that does n~t embody the Union Jack shall 
fly in Natal •• o. 3 
Prominent members of the SoAoPa who spoke out against the 
proposal included l":ic1.rwi,:.:k and Duncan while Stallard 
420 Sunday Times, 9 January 1927; Natal Mercury, Natal 
Witness, Cape J'j·!!1ll - 10 January 1927. 
43. Cape Times, 6 January 19270 
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d . b d . t . . f' . t. ' 44 escr1 e 1 as •a piece o imper 1nence. 
All the above ensured the demise of' the plano How-
ever it must be noted that, as with the crown proposal, the 
plan to include the royal standard did not evoke warm 
Nationalist supporto Ons Vaderland made no editorial 
comment on the proposed compromise during Januarye And 
although Die Volksblad and Die Burger had no objection to 
the incorporation of' a portion of the standard, the haste 
with which the latter told its readers 
it first informed them of' the proposal 
on the same day as 
that the plan 
would surely £all away because of' opposition, suggests that 
it had little desire to see the measure succeeda 45 The 
royal standard, even if' it lacked the associations of' the 
Union Jack, was no doubt a concession unwelcome to Malan 
46 
and many of' his supporterso 
Thus like the crown and dual flag proposals, the royal 
standard failed to resolve the conflict. Once again the 
opposing sides were unable to accommodate one another. To 
44. Rand Daily Mail, J January 1927; Eastern Province 
Herald, 4 January 1927; Cape Times, 6 Jamuary 1927; 
Fremantle Collection, Stallard file, Stallard to Fre-
mantle, 4 January 19270 
450 Die Vo.lksblad, 4 .January 1927; Die Burger, 5 January 
19270 
When Die Durger made its comment it was apparently 
aware of' the opposition of' only the Cape Times as it 
made reference to no other newspaper. Several had yet 
to comment. See Natal Mercury, 7 January 1927, for 
comment on Die Burger's 'indecent hasteto 
46. See, for instance, the comments of' NoJ. van der Merwe 
in Die Burger, 17 January 1927. 
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one side, the Union's new status under the crown alone made 
the royal standard a logical choice; to the other, the 
demise of secessio~ made the Union Jack the logical symbol. 
Whereas one side chose to symbolize its present status by 
means of a symbol of monarchy alone, the other wished to 
symbolize its continuing membership of the British Common-
wealth with the flag associated with the Empire. In 
reality, the overriding considerations were not points 0£ 
logic but questions 0£ sentiment and susceptibility and 
accordingly each side chose its own criteria for judging 
the plan. It seemed impossible to satisfy the sentiment 
of one group without offending the other. 
The renewal of ill-feeling and demise 0£ toenadering 
It would have been strange indeed if the dashing of 
the opposition's hopes had not resulted in a re-emergence 
and sharpening of hostility. 'The truce is ended•, the 
Cape Tim~ protested in response to Creswell's annowice-
mentso Hertzog had made a 'lamentable' concession to 
Malan and thereby failed the test of sincerity. By 
deciding to push on he would show the Bill's opponents that 
he had given way to the political-racial 'wire pullers' who 
surrounded him. 47 For many of the Bill's opponents this 
probably seemed fair comment for they had come to see the 
470 Cape Times, 4, 5, 6 January 1927. 
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Billis withdrawal as the crucial test of the Nationalists• 
sincerity towards the new status and of their good inten-
tions towards themo As the campaign for the forthcoming 
provincial elections - which were to centre around the flag 
question - began to gather momentum, ill-feeling mounted 
and the last hopes of toenadering faded. By mid-January 
both the Nationalist and opposition press were deploring 
the re-emergence of bitterness48 and on 28 January the~ 
Daily Mail reported that it was clear that the feelings of 
good will which had emerged after the Imperial Conference 
had evaporated and that talk of Party re-alignment had 
ceasedo 
For the failure of toenadering each side blamed the 
othero The 'other• side had failed to translate •words 
into deeds' and its leaders had not given a strong lead. 49 
However throughout December/January the attitudes of Die 
Volksblad and Die Burger towards reunion had been sceptical 
and lukewarmo50 The former thought there were differences 
between the two .largest Parties •wat geen mense-hand kan 
verwyder nie'; the latter maintained that so long as 
Unionists dominated the s.AoPo the differences between the 
48. See Ons Vaderland, 11 January 1927; Rand Daily Mail, 
Die Burger, Natal Mercury - 1J January 19270 
49. Compare Ons Vaderland, 25 January 1927 with Rand Daily 
~, 1J January 1927. See also Die Volksblad, 11 
January 19270 
50o See Die Volksblad, 8, 2J December 1926 and 8, 11, 17 
January 1927; Die Burger, 22 December 1926 and 18 
January 1927. 
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two Parties would remain deepo Only Ons Vaderland strongly 
favoured reunion but as it noted on 11 January, a new 
spirit of hostility had emerged, and by 25 January it was 
forced to admit that toenadering had failedo For this, it 
blamed Smutso 
However, Smuts does not appear to .have greeted the 
idea with .hostility, though he was certainly sceptical of 
it and concerned at the great popularity Hertzog was 
enjoying. He revealed these feelings to FoSo Malan: 
It looks to me as if our English friends are 
completely losing their heads over Hertzog in 
their joy at his now having accepted the Empire 
faith. We have every reason to be careful. 
Hertzog has given us very little indication of 
what he 'really meanso He may honestly mean a 
new orientationo But he may also, in his self-
satisfaction, only be using pretty phrases. I 
think we must, quite calmly and even with good 
will await the course of eventso Is Hertzog 
prepared to let the flag go? Is he willing to 
break with Labour? We know nothing of his real 
intentions O 51 
Again, at the end of December, he cautioned that it was not 
at all clear what Hertzog's plan was and that he doubted 
whether it was reunion. He strongly suspected that 
Hertzog's idea of reunion merely meant the S.A.P.'s tgoing 
over to the other side', but that in all events Hertzog was 
'caught in the snare of the Pact' and did not know how to 
escape ito 52 
510 ~ vol. 36, noo 221, 21 December 1926: van der Poel, 
no. 215. 
52. S 9 Po volo 36, no. 222, to N. Levi, 29 December 1926: 
van der Poel, noo 2160 
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But if Hertzog could not escape the 'snare of the 
Pact' or evade Malan's Flag Bill, Smuts could not accept 
the royal standard any more than the crown.SJ He was soon 
warned that the SoA.Po could not support the Flag Bill and 
remain a Party 0 54 However, once Hertzog decided to 
advance with a Bill that excluded the Union Jack there can 
be little doubt that many English-speakers in the S.AoP., 
who might otherwise have favoured rewiion, cooled towards 
the idea and took frighto Rewiion coupled with the 
proposed Flag Bill would have attracted Smuts's Afrikaans 
followers rather than his English and brought about a racial 
alignment in politics such as he had resisted in 19190 
Though in February he was to write that rewiion was of no 
use to the Party at present, for they would have to join 
the Cabinet with only three or four portfolios as dependents 
of the Nationalists and accept all the latter had already 
done,55 the essential objection was probably Smuts's 
opposition to a largely sectional partyo Accordingly it 
is not surprising that he did not speak out strongly for 
toenadering or that he soon publicly declared that he saw 
little chance of it materializingo As early as 12 January 
he was drawing attention to the atmosphere that prevailed 
5J. See PPo 159 ff. and 177 ff. 
54. Cape Times, 4, 5 January 1927. 
550 ~ volo 39, noo 19, to N. Levi, 21 February 1927: 
van der Poel, no. 2210 
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and was ruling out the possibility of reuniono56 
In all events it was Hertzog who was in command of the 
situation ruLd the first firm approach for toenadering - as 
Smuts repeatedly asserted57_ should therefore have come 
from himo But in yielding to Malan on flag policy 
Hertzog had gravely jeopardized the chances of reunion; 
the 'suspicion, distrust and acrimony' which the Govern-
ment's flag policy aroused in January,58 must soon have 
made it clear that there was little sense in pursuing this 
goal. 
However, other considerations may also have persuaded 
Hertzog not to pursue toenadering. Loyalty to colleagues 
- such as Kemp, Beyers, Malan and the three Labour 
Ministers - who were bound to lose office if reunion 
occurred, may have been oneo Though he was not tied by 
any agreement to share government with Labour, it was only 
through their co-ope.ration that he was in office and it may 
have impressed him as dishonourable to jettison them in 
these circwnstances. 
Once again, then, no advance had been made towards 
solving the flag dispute. The royal standard had been 
rejected, the hopes of the opposition dashed and moves 
560 The Star, Die Volksblad - 12 January 1927; 
land, 13 January 1927. 
Ons Vader=., 
.57. Cape Times, Natal Witness 1 2 , 1 3 , 1 7 January 1 9 2 7 • 
_58. Rand Daily Mail, 13 January 1927. 
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towards toenadering defeated. And with the campaign for 
the forthcoming provincial elections already under way, and 
centering on the flag issue, racial hostility was again 
growingu 
THE FLAG CONTROVERSY TAKES A ~EW TURN, 
JAi~UARY - FEBRUARY 1927 
The flag issue and the provincial elections 
Parliament met on 28 .Januaryo Five months later the 
sc~Hlon was to end - one-third of its bills having been 
diopped in the Assembly and three checked in the Senateo 1 
Though it was predicted that the session would be the most 
important in the history of the Union due to Hertzog's Native 
? 
I3:LJ.ls,'~ in fact, the session was to be dominated more by 
the l•'lag Bill than any other measure o In the first weeks 
of its life Parlia~ent moved forward slowly, devoting itself 
to measures that raised little heato No mention of the 
flag was made in the speech from·. the throne - an omission 
probably not u.11.related to the forthcoming provincial elec-
tions in the Transvaal, Natal and Cape. As was frequently 
observed, it was best for the Pact to avoid this issue until 
after the electionsoJ But the Pact's efforts to draw 
attention away from the flag and focus it on provincial 
1. Hansard, volo 9, pp. viii-xi. 
2. See Qie Volksblad, 25, 28, 29 January 19270 
J. See Tlrn Star, J, 11 February 1927; Dunca.Tl. Papers, to 
Lady Sclborne, 4 February 19270 
2JJ 
lj. 
matters such as education wcrn to have only limited 
success. From the momen L Cre :-;wel.l :u111ow1ccid Lita L Llw 
Government would proceed with a flag bill, the opposition 
recognized, as the Cape Times put it on 5 January, that the 
first round Yin the new phase of' the old conflictY would be 
the mid-February provincial elections. 
Even before nomination day on 20 January, the charge 
was levelled that flag passion was being worked up 
deliberately with a view to the forthcoming elections5 and 
.by 26 January the Natal Witness was deploring the fact that 
the S.A.Po had turned the election into a flag election. 
Its interview with the Natal organizer of the SoAoP., 
Col. Blaney, revealed that, 
the SoAoP. organization is determined that the 
flag question shall be made one of the principal 
issues in the provincial election campaign. 
This is confirmed by speeches such as that of 
Mro Frank Acutt, who began his address to his 
first meeting by declaring that "A vote for the 
SoAoPo is a vote for the Union Jacko" Colo Blaney 
explains that it is impossible for the SoA.Po 
candidates to ignore the flag question because 
silence on their part might be interpreted as an 
indication that the Party is "weak and wobbly" on 
the point. 
On the following day the same newspaper reported that SoAoPo 
4o For example, see Die Burger, 9, 11 February 1927; Die 
Volksblad, 15 February 1927; Cape Argus, 5 February 
1927, Malan 1 s Parow addresso 
5. Die Burger, 13 January 1927; SoAo Nation, 8 January 
1927. As early as October 1926 it was suggested that 
the flag committees should make the flag question the 
central issue in the provincial elections (Fremantle 
Collection, volo 9, letter to WoK. Rees, Hon 0 Sec. of 
the Johannesburg Flag Organization, 23 October 1927)0 
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candidates in Durban had asserted that i£ Labour won the 
election this would be greeted as a vote 0£ confidence in 
the Government's policies, and these included the Flag 
Bill. Finally, in the TransvaaJ., on the election day of 
15 February, the Rand Daily Mail regretted that provincial 
matters had been pushed to the rear and that this had 
become a purely flag electiono 
Yet to have expected otherwise was unrealistic. With 
the marked decline of secession as an issue, the distinc-
tion between the two largest Parties had lessened~ 'As a 
matter of fact', Duncan observed in mid-December, 'with the 
secession plank taken out 0£ their platform there is little 
or no difference in the programmes of the two parties., 6 
On 15 January, the Daily Despatch declared that though the 
greatest obstacles between the two Parties (secession) had 
been removed, others still remained. Yet it specified 
only three - an improper insistence on bilingualism in the 
civil service, Article 4 of the Nationalist programme, and 
the Flag Bill. Three days later Die Burger designated, 
apart from the flag issue, only £our areas 0£ conflict 
ArticJ.3 137 (the use of Afrikaans), the employment of 
foreign teachers, the purchase of German locomotives and 
industrial and political protection. This paucity of' 
political issues between the two Parties was again revealed 
when Smuts went on political tour of' the Transvaal plattela:n.d 
60 Dllllcan Paper--2,, to Lady Selborne, 15 December 1926. 
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in mid-January. Apart from the Wage Act of 1925, which he said would 
induce workers to leave the farms, almost the only issues he raised were 
those of socialist influence on the Government and the Flag Bill. 7 The 
appeal of Hertzog's Native Bills to many segregationists in the S .A. P. 
was likely to further erode the differences between the two Parties. 
Small wonder then that when the Empire Group asked Smuts after the 
Imperial Conference to give an undertaking that his Party would not make 
political capital out of a withdrawal of the Flag Bill, he refused. The 
Government, his secretary replied, had made the flag question a political 
one and, 
If the Government withdraw their preposterous proposal, 
and as a result find themselves sharply criticised by their 
followers or ridiculed by their opponents for the folly of 
their actions it is not for General Smuts to be held responsible 
for such a result. Do you expect General Smuts to give an 
undertaking that there should be no criticism? 8 
Unquestionably the flag question was important to the S.A.P. The issue had 
divided the Government to the point of a threatened Cabinet resignation and 
between the partners of the Pact there was increasing uneasiness because of it. 
7. See Daily Despatch, Cape Times - 12-15, 17 January 1927. 
8. Rand Daily Mail, 12 January 1927. See also The Friend, Cape Times -
6 January 192 7. 
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Unity ~as being maintained only with difficulty. With 
secession not a live issue, the flag was the obvious 
question for the S.A.P. to concentrate on in the provincial 
elections. 
Labo\J.;r under pressure 
If the flag was the obvious issue, the Labour Party 
was the obvious target and had to bear the brunt of the 
attack. When Labour mot at the beginning of 1927, its 
awareness of the imMinence of this attack, its loss of 
support over the past year, its vulnerability, and (at this 
tine) the possibility of toenadering-, all contributed to a 
less discorda:.1.t annual conference than in the previous year. 
Even so, signs of disunity and strain were obvious. In 
his opening address to the Conference, its Chairman admitted 
that 1926 had been one of the Party's most trying years. 
There had been bitter opposition from newspa~ers; but their 
greatest trial had come frora within: there was so much 
personal strife and so many of their supporters seemed to 
~ave thought that with the comin~ to po;ver of the Pact •the 
whole governmental structtire wou.ld be changed'. Then, 
because there was a strong feeling among delegates that the 
Party's General Secretary was not who.lly i::1. sympathy with 
the policy of sharing power with the Nationalists, he was 
replaced. 
criticism 
Labour Ministers came in for a good deal of 
as did their salaries. When Boydell declared 
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that these Mi::1.isters could not impose the.ir will on the 
CabinP-t, Hay interjected that they could. When Boydell 
explained that they did not want to wreck everything because 
they co'.lld not a.lways get their way, Karovsky interjected 
that the Pact would soon be smashedo The question of 
delegates' credentials absorbed a considerable amou.,._Lt of 
time; one speaker protested that sixty per cent of the 
delegates were present unconstitutionally .. Others attacked 
the Sedition Bill and the Nationalist-Labour alliance. And 
once again there was friction between the National ColL~cil 
and parliamentary caucus factions over the lack o.f co-
operation between the two bodies. 9 
Further diswiity was revealed over the flag question. 
The Chairman described it as the subject that had worried 
the Party more than any other in the past year and it was 
tl f . t t . d · d 1 O 1e 1rs ques ion 1scusse .. To many delegates Hertzog's 
decisio~ to proceed with the Bill was quite unexpected~ 
And particularly to those who ~ad tabled a motion calling 
9. Mi:1.ute s of the A.lL."1.ual Conference of the South Af'rican 
Labour Party held at Bloemfontein, 1 2 2 2 J January 1927 
(hereafter cited as SaAeLePa Conference, 1927); ~ 
Etl~l,1., J, 4 January 1927; _Cape Times, Eastern Prov~ 
Herald, Daily Despatch - 4 January 1927. See Natal 
Witness, 7 January 1927, interview with Strachan, for 
the replacement of the General Secretaryo (Wo Wanless 
replaced Archie Jamieson.) 
10. At the Conference o.f the Labour Party in the Transvaal 
in September 1926 a resolution was tabled calling .for 
Labour M .. P .. 's to use their influence to bring about a 
withdrawal of the Bill until a 'substantial' measure of 
agreement on the subject could be reached and requesting 
the Government Vto get on with the serious business of 
the countryo' McPherson Papers, vol. 32., 
2J8 
for the Bill Is wi thdrawa_l it was unwelcome o Two delegates, 
Ho Haynes and C. Kingdom, complained that the matter was 
once again being forced on the Labour Partyo Haynes 
asserted that few had any mandate on the subjecto Kingdom 
warned that they wore going back to the weapon which their 
arch-enemy had used to cudgel the Partyo He wanted to l:crlow 
what the Party's position would be if they went to the 
co'ID.try on a sentimental issue like the flag, without a 
poweri'ul press, without finance and with power and wealth 
against them? They should tell the Government that unless 
they got the Red Flag, they should cut the flag question 
right outo However, through the stratagem - not 
1r:1challenged - o.f a broad resolution which combined praise 
for Hertzog's success at the Imperial Conference with the 
hope that 'the same statesmanlike wisdomY would be used for 
the cstabLLshmont o.f a nation.al flag, a lengthy and acri-
monious debate on the f'.lag question was avoidedo After a 
plea from Reyburn, various amendments were dropped, and the 
Nation3...l Council's broad resolution carried by a large 
. . 11 
maJorityQ 
If Labour Is e annual wrangle Y supplied le s ~ ammunition 
------------------------------------
11. SoA.Lo_Po Confef.£!!.Ce 1 1922; The Friend, J, 4 January 
1927; Cape Times, Eastern Province Herald - 4 January 
1927; Forwar<1_, 11 March 19270 Haynes and Kingdom 
were delegates for Bezuide:nhout Valley South and City 
and Suburbs, respectivelyo 
Some delegates were doubtless relieved by the Govern-
ment1s decision to pass the Bill as this virtually 
removed the threat which .t2onadering posed to the Partyo 
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than usual for the opposition, it nevertheless provided 
sufficient evidence of disunity for them to utilize in the 
six weeks before the provincial electionsD With their 
eyes fixed on this event, the opposition drew attention to 
the Party's internal strife, to Labourites' discontent with 
the Pact ai"'.'l.d to the 'imminent danger' of the Party breaking 
up because of its leaders' support for the Flag Billo 
Also, the close relationship between the future of the Flag 
Bill and the electio~s was stressed in cartoons and by 
maintaining that a resounding defeat for Labour at the 
polls could bring about the end of the Billo 12 
Again the Party's leaders, and particularly Creswell, 
were assailedo Creswell was out of touch with English 
opinion, with feelings in his own Party, and (with Boydell's 
support) had enabled Malan to pressure Hertzog into forcing 
the Billo Had he from the start had the courage to stand 
up against Malan•s proposals, nothing would have come of 
them; but fear of toenadering had driven him and Boydell 
to throw their weight behind Malane 1J 
As the election drew near, Labour and SoAoP. candidates 
120 See, for example, Cap~_!.~, 5, 21, 28 January, 8 Feb-
ruary 1927; The Friend, 5, 14 January 1927; Rand Daily 
Mail, 5 January 1927; The Star, 9, 14 February 1927; 
Cape Argus, 11, 15 February 1927. 
1Jo See, for example, Cape Times, 4, 5, 6 January, 8, 9 Feb-
ruary 1927; Daily Despatch, 12, 22, 29 January 1927; 
Rand Daily Mail, 7 January 1927; Cape Argus, 9, 14 Feb-
ruary 19270 
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began to hold their meetings: the subject of the flag 
14 
usually figured prominently and audiences were often rowdyo 
Patriotic societies too began to express their views shortly 
before the electionso The Johallllesburg branch of the 
Caledonian Society urged the Government to withdraw the 
Flag Bill or incorporate the Union Jacko 1 5 Greetings of 
solidarity sent to the chief of this Society from the 
Joharmesburg branch of the Empire Group were published: 
'•oofully conscious of our duty to the land of our birth 
and adoption, let us move forward with a united thought 
imbued with a pride of race and spirit of Empire and with 
the grand ideal: One King, one fl l . d t. 16 ag, one g or1ous es 1ny., 
In Durban and Cape Town, letters were sent to candidates 
by the Empire Group and by the Cape Town Flag Organization 
asking whether they would oppose the adoption of a new flag 
which excluded the Union Jack. The names of those who 
agreed to do so (and some of those who did not) were pub-
lished just before the elections. 1 7 
Finally, three days before the elections began, the 
Grand President of the Sons of England declared that they 
14. See Cape Argus, 8, 11, 12, 14, 15 February 1927; The 
Star, 8, 11 February 1927. 
15. The Star, 12 February 1927; The Friend, 14 February 
19270 
The Star, 5 February 19270 
The Star, Cape Argus - 14 February 1927; Natal Witness, 
16 February 19270 (The Natal elections took place a 
day after those in the Transvaal and Cape Provincea) 
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would be tantamount to a referendum ~n the Bill. Why was 
it, he asked, that Malan was so insistent that the Union 
Jack should disappear from the country? 
Is it not because he stands for a clique who 
nurse ambitions for Dutch dominance, and thereby 
hope to signalise their victory? Have not the 
Minister's words and general demeanour throughout 
the controversy borne ample testimony of this? 
••ooOur Premier has submitted; Colonel Creswell 
has not only acquiesced, he has had the temerity 
publicly to urge Englishmen to give up their 
flagl.oeoAll South Africa knows that the great 
outstanding issue throughout the land next week 
is this: Is the Union Jack in some form to 
remain or to be wiped out?18 
The Pact, he regretted, haq unhappily joined the hand of 
the worker with those who wished to wipe out the Union 
Jacko The tenor of his speech was clear: Labourites 
should vote against the Pact or not at all. 
To the further embarrassment of Labour, in the week 
before the elections an unedifying conflict broke out 
between Barlow and Alexo Eaton, a former Natal Labour 
M.P.Co who had recently resigned from the Partyo 19 The 
dispute received nation-wide publicity and revealed once 
more the Party's internecine strifeo At a public meeting 
in Durban, Eaton declared that at the 1926 Labour Conference 
18. The Star, 12 February 1927; Cape Times, 14 February 
19270 
19. Eatonis position in the Party appears to have become 
uncomfortable mainly as a result of his anti-Semitic 
remarks at the 1926 Annual Conference; anticipating 
expulsion, he resigned (The Star, 3 February 1927; The 
Friend, 10 February 1927; The Labour Congress 1926)0 
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Barlow and Kentridge had offered him the administratorship 
of Natal if he would support them in removing Creswell and 
20 Boydell from their positions in the Partyo To substan-
tiate his story, Eaton published on 9 February a personal 
letter from Barlow, written in May 1925, in which the 
latter candidly set forth his claims to the eleventh port-
folio which was then under consideration. In his letter, 
Barlow had made unflattering comments on several colleagues 
and claimed to have been approached by prominent Labourites, 
including Archie Jamieson, then General Secretary of the 
Party, to take over the Party's leadership. Barlow had 
refused Jamiesonis offer but declared that if he failed to 
get the Cabinet post he wanted, he would •reconsider his 
. t. , 21 posi ion•. In defence, Jamieson denied that he had 
backed Barlow and pointed out that at a Labour Conference 
in June 1924 no-one had spoken more eloquently against 
Labourites taking portfolios in a Nationalist Cabinet than 
Barlow and Madeley; yet, Vto-day the latter is a member of 
the Cabinet and the former sorry that he is not.• 22 
The opposition press naturally gave the widest pub-
licity to Barlow's letter and all the charges and counter-
charges arising out of the affairo Barlow hastened to 
20. '.Ih.e Star, 3 February 19270 
21. The Star, Cape Argus - 9 February 1927; The Friend, 
Daily Despatch - 10 February 1927; Natal Mercury, 9, 
10 February 1927; Rand Daily Mail, 10, 11 February 
19270 
22. The Star, 11 February 19270 
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Durban to defend himself aµd faced some rowdy pre-election 
meetings where he endured a good deal of hecklingo 23 The 
conflict revealed to all the jockeying for position in the 
Party in 1925 and the intrigues at its 1926 Conference, and 
doubtless lent weight in the minds of many to Eaton's 
charge that the Labour movement was being manipulated by 
people who were using it f'or their own ends and had sub-
merged its ideals by allowing it to become a 'Pact partyt 0 24 
The result of the elections was a crushing defeat for 
Labouro In Natal, all but one of its candidates were 
swept asideo The one exception, J.Wo Coleman, had an 
unblemished record of opposition to the Flag Billo Holding 
six seats in Natal before the election, Labour had been able 
to retain only one; all had been lost to the SoA.Po In 
the Cape Province the result was similar: three of Labour's 
four seats were lost to the SoA.P. In the Transvaal, yet 
another seat was lost to the Opposition and without 
Nationalist support its losses might have been greatero 
In all, Labour's representation on the three Provincial 
Councils had been cut by almost halfo 2 5 
That Labour owed its great defeat almost entirely to 
2Jo The Friend, The St~ - 15 February 19270 
24. The Star, 9 February 19270 
25. Daily Despatch, Cape Times - 21 February 19270 
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th ~1 . ·ct l . d 26 e i ag issue was wi e y recognize o In Durban there 
was jubilation at the result. One prominent SoA.Po 
supporter wired Malan: 'Durban heartily thanks you ••• o 
Carry on with the Flag Bill', while the Natal Advertiser 
triumphantly declared that the flag had smashed the Pact, 
Yas it will smash bigger men yet who lay profaning hands on 
. t , 27 i 0 ForwardYs Cape Town representative was no less 
emphatic in his views: 
had been 'disastrous•. 
the results in the Cape Province 
Even the margin by which Salt 
River had been retained was alarming; old Party stalwarts 
were rubbing their eyes in disbelief' at the result and 
asking Y"Could it be true?"' And what was the reason for 
this '"sudden conversion of' Labour voters to the South 
African Partyism? Why, the Flag Bill, of' coursel" t At 
Rondebosch too the Flag Bill was blamed for Labour's defeat. 
Several Labour supporters there had stated that they were 
sorry to have to vote against Labour but on this occasion 
they had to '"vote British."' Local Labourites were 
asking themselves: t "Are they going to stand by and allow 
the Labour movement to be sacrificed for the sake of' the 
passing of' a useless Flag Bill? Nol The Bill must be 
26. See, for example, Daily Despatch, 16, 17, 21 February 
1927; Forward, 25 February 1927; The Friend, Natal 
Witness - 18 February 1927; Cape Times, 19 February 
1927, interview with Creswell; Sunday Times, 20 Feb-
ruary 1927. In certain Labour-held constituencies in 
the Cape Province (such as Kimberley and East London), 
which were lost to large S.A.P. majorities, the non-
white vote was probably much influenced by Hertzog's 
proposed non-white legislation. 
27. As in The Friend, 18 February 1927 (botb). 
23 dropped."' Even where comment was more restrained, 
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Labour and its leaders were castigated :for supporting the 
:flag measuresQ Thus the Rand Daily Mail observed that so 
:far as Creswell was concerned, 'His chickens have come home 
to roost with a vengeance.• As a result o:f his 'idiotic 
advice' to the Government on the :flag question, he had 
suffered the mortification o:f seeing the Labour Party 
practically wiped out in the Provincial Council in Natal 
and drastically reduced in the Cape Province. 2 9 
The opposition seized the opportunity to warn the 
Government against pursuing the Bill, insisting that to do 
so would incite racial passions; the wisest course there-
fore was to withdraw it.JO Both Duncan31 and Smuts ex-
pressed these views to friends immediately a:fter the elec-
tions. Commenting on Labour's defeat, Smuts drew attention 
to all the above :features when he declared: 'This result 
is in no small measure due to the :flag bill and the dis-
appointment with the Labour leaders in this connection. 
Perhaps this rude reminder may give the Government pause in 
their flag policyo I£ they proceed with their policy, I 
28. Forward, 25 February 1927. 
29. 19 February 19270 See also Natal Witness, 18 February 
1927. 
JO. See Natal Witness, 18 February 1927; Rand Daily Mail, 
19 February 1927. 
31. D~~can papers, to Lady Selborne, 18 February 1927. 
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foresee & very great recrudescence of r~~jal feeling.,3 2 
Hopes that the election results would cause Labour's 
Ministers to demand the BiJ_li s withdrawal, were to be dis-
appoint.ed. Having pledg-ed his support for the Bill, in 
return f'or its postponement in 1926, Creswell could not, in 
honour, break his word. Indeed, if' there was a lesson 
learnt by Creswell (and his supporters) from the election 
results, it was that the Flag Rill should be passed as 
speedily as possibleo Prolongation of the flag strife 
would harm Labour further. Rising passions would increase 
disaffection amongst rank and file so that parliamentarians 
would find themselves under increasing pressure. The 
already strained unity of' the Party could snap. So long 
as the flag issue was debated, Labour's f'ortw1es would wane. 
With a general election two years away, it had become highly 
desirable to settle the conflict in 1927 rather than 1928. 
Even the passing of an unpopular measure by means of a 
joint session had become preferable to prolonged negotiation 
with its concomitant excitement of the public tempera 
was of the essence. The rapid removal of this abrasive 
matter from the public's eye had become imperative. 
Support for the NationaJ_i f't s and a speedy passage of the 
Bill might gain time for tempers to subside, memories to 
J2. ~ vol. J9, no. 20, to L.M.S. Amery, 22 February 
1927: van der Poel, no. 222. 
Time 
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fade and the Party to recover. 
Paradoxically, as support f'or tr.e Party declined, it 
became all the more necessary for its parliamentarians to 
unite behind the Kationalists some of whom were partly 
responsible for this decline. Disintegration of the Pact 
at this stage, followed by a general election, was likely 
to prove particularly dangerous to Labour's M.P.'s. So 
many of them might lose their seats that Hertzog cculd be 
forced to unite with a section of the S.A.P. in order to 
stay in power; in such a party there would be little room 
for the few remaining socialists. Despite the disastrous 
flag policy, at least Labour was at present sharing power 
and might influecce legislation. To many this was the 
main consideration. To them, white Labour's right to pro-
tection was a principle as firmly held as a nationalist's 
belief in self determination. A clean f'lag was a price 
that could be paid for protective legislation and ~ocialist 
goals. To sacrii'ice concrete economic gains for symbolic 
rights was to .sacrifice the substance for the El1adow and it 
was probably such considerations that kept all but one 
Labour M.P. loyal to the Government's flag policy in the 
following months. 
The Flag Commission 
The election had been a flag election. Try a,:, :i r 
might the Government had been unable to avoid battle on 
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ground the enemy had chosen. Though the Nationalists had 
made a nett gain of two seats in the Transvaal,JJ the fact 
could not be ignored that the Pact as a whole had lost 
ground. In the next general election, these losses to the 
S.A.P. were likely to be repeated and Strachan's prophecy, 
when the Bill was introduced in 1926, that not a single 
Natal Labour candidate would be returned in the next general 
election if the Government persisted with its measure, could 
be fulfilled. 
the conflict. 
Mdre than ever, tho Pact needed to resolve 
Its hopes of doing so were now centred on the Flag 
Cornmission. We have already seen that Malan had expcri-
enced some difficulty in establishing this body. The 
first difficulty arose out of the refusal of many English-
speaJ.~ers to serve on it because its terms of reference 
seemed to pre-judge the central issue by excluding the 
Union Jack from any recommended design.34 Then in the 
midst of the electorate's pleasure at the outcome of the 
Imperial Conference, the Commission's Chairman, Sir William 
JJ. See Cape Times, Daily Despatch - 21 February 1927. 
(In the Transvaal, the S.A.Po gained one seat each from 
the Nationalist and Labour Parties and lost three to 
the Nationalists.) 
J4. For the Conunission•s terms or reference seepp,154-5. 
Actually, these did not specifically exclude the in-
clusion of the Union Jack in the new flag, but wheE 
viewed in the light of Malan's statement, at the end of 
the second reading, tbat thn new flag would not contain 
the Union Jack (see pp.lffi-2 ) , it is not surprising that 
the public concluded that tLw Commission could not re-
commend the Union Jack'·s in,~lusion. 
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Campbell, had declded to postpone the Commission's first 
sitting. However, when on the first day of 1927 Creswell 
a.nnoU11.cecl that the Government would pursue the Bill, it 
became imperative for Malan to bring this body to lif'e. 
Before this could talce place, the country was rocked by the 
news that Campbell had resigned. 
Campbell resign.eel on 8 February. On the following 
day the reasons for his resignation appeared in the press. 
Campbell explained that he had hoped that the change in the 
political mood created by the Imperial Conference would 
bring about a withdrawal of the Bill. Failing this, he 
had desired to reconstitute the Flag Commission with twelve 
members nominated by the Leader of the Opposition and twelve 
by the Government, under a mutually agreed upon Chairman; 
and he had wished that two designs, representing both 
schools of thought, would then be selected and submitted to 
referendum. Because these arrangements, which he believed 
to be fairer than the existing ones, had been rejected by 
Malan, he had resigned.JS 
Perhaps the lack of confidence of many English-speakers 
in the Connnission convinced Campbell that a large section 
of the population would inevitably reject its ultimate 
design. The Commission could therefore never produce a 
truly national flag and its de_liberations would consequently 
·----------------------------
35. Cape Times, The Star, Die Bnrger, Die Volksblad - 9 Feb-
ruary 1927. 
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be of dubious value. But though Campbell's own proposals 
offered the electorate a wider choice, it is difficult to 
see, as Malan pointed out, how they would have lifted the 
issue above Party politics, which Campbell apparently hoped 
they would. Each of the two designs chosen was almost 
certain to be associated with either the Government or the 
S.A.P. So far as the reconstitution of the Commission was 
concerned, Malan. argued that such a proposal should come 
from the Opposition; in view of the way in which the 
Government's previous proposals had been made to fail, he 
said, the offer could hardly come from it.36 
Campbell's resignation neither surprised nor dis-
::ippointed Malan.. Six weeks earlier he had confided to the 
Flag Commission's Secretary, Norval, that he was dis-
illu1:ioned with Campbell who clearly wished to see the Bill 
withdrawn.37 Anticipating his resignation, Malan. was able 
to annow1ce, at the same time as Campbell's resignation was 
made public, that the Commission's new Chairman. would be 
W. Blommaert, Professor of History at the University of 
Stellenbosch, and that the Conunission would meet on 22 Feb-
ruary - one week after the provincial elections. 
However, the difficulty of finding prominent members 
36. Rand Daily Mail, Cape Times, Die Burger, The Star - 9 
February 1927. 
37. Norval Papers, letters .from Malan to Norval, 24 Decem-
ber 1926 and 28 January 19270 (Norval was appointed 
Secretary to the Flag Commission in October 1926.) 
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of the opposition to serve on it had not been overcome38 
and its membership was sharply criticized. The Natal 
Mercury of 8 February claimed that the personnel of the 
Commission twas from the first a travesty' and that 
invitations to join it had been 'hawked' to such an extent 
that it was an honour not to receive one. Members of the 
Commission were described as 'amiable nonenities (sic) or 
those looking for a little cheap advertisement• while 
Blommaert, as its Belgian-born chairman, was alleged to 
have less claim to interpret the Union's wishes than 
hundreds of thousands of its English-speakers.39 Unques-
tionably, the Rand Daily Mail concluded on 14 February, his 
appointment had given the Commission its death blow; it 
had reduced it to the level of a farce. On the morning of 
its first sitting, the Cape Times alleged that the 
Co~nission was - with one or two exceptions - a packed body; 
it was no rn.ore than a device for forcing the will of one 
section of the people upon the other. 
Against this background, Norval prepared for the 
Commission's sitting. The three to four thousand designs 
submitted by the public were classified and the best in 
J8. Recent refusals included J.P. Logan, Morris Webb, 
L. Padmore, and E. Roworth (Norval Papers, 'Flag Com-
mission Report, 1926/7 1 , 25 February 1927; Hansard, 
vol. 8, 318, Malan, 15 February 1927; Rand Daily Mail, 
12 February 1927). 
39. See also Rand Daily Mail, 8, 10 February 1927. Blom-
maert had been a South African subject for many years 
(Hansard, vol. 8, 247, Malan, 11 February 1927). 
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each group were then selected by him, the artist Stratford 
Caldecott and J.J. Smith, Professor of Afrikaans at 
Stellenbosch University, and exhibited on the walls of the 
40 Commission's chamber. The Corrunission met in Cape Town 
from 22-25 February. It had eighteen members 41 and met 
each morning and afternoon; though the talks were sometimes 
difficult, Blommaertts chairmanship was impartial and urbane 
and his efficiency was appreciated by all. First, the 
precise meaning of the Commission's terms of reference was 
discussed. How were they to interpret the crucial instruc-
tion that the flag should symbolize 'bonds of union rather 
than conflicts of the past'? Did it mean that neither the 
Union Jack nor the republican flags could be included in 
toto in the selected design? Blommaert and n.J. de 
Villiers maintained that it did, while Cory, Agar-Hamilton 
and Nathan disagreed with this view. When the question 
was put to the vote, it was decided by a majority of 
thirteen to four that neither the Union Jack nor the repub-
lican flags could be incorporated in toto. The meeting 
40. Norval Papers, 'Flag Conunission Report t, 25 February 
1927; P.S.M.I., vol. J, 'Report of the Flag Commission, 
1926-71. According to one of the members, the walls 
were 'plastered over with designs, most of them ex-
tremely crude.o •• I really thought a kindergarten class 
had been turned loose. My eyes were offended.a.every 
time I looked around •••• I don't think anyone gave 
serious attention to these designs' (Manfred Nathan, [2_i 
Heaven Itself, an Autobiography, p. 272.) For Calde-
cott's part in the flag controversy see J. du P. 
Scholtz, Strat Caldecott 1886-1929, pp. 15-16. 
41. Malan originally hoped for twenty-one members. See 
n.43 and n.44 for the Commission's members. 
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then adjourned so that members might examine the submitted 
designs. In the remaining three days, members devoted 
nearly all their time to submitting, championing and voting 
on various de signs. About fifteen were discussed, several 
of them apparently being designed by members of the Com-
mission 42 themselves. Finally, as there was no general 
agreement, two reports were submitted. A minority report 
approved of none of the selected designs because it held 
that none met the requirements of a national flag, which, 
according to the terms of referAnce, had to unite the popu-
1 t . 4 J Th . . t t d f th d . 44 a ion. e maJor1 y repor approve o ree es1gns. 
Only one of these designs - the St. George's cross fim-
briated white on a green shield - was to be of further 
significance in the flag strue;e;lc. 4 5 
42. For example compare Kolbe Papers, 71A, 1 , flag design, 
and P.S.M.I., vol. 3, minutes of the meetings of the 
Flag Commission. 
43. Its signatories were Professor Sir George Cory, J.A.I. 
Agar-Hamilton, J. Curran, Monsignor Dr. F.C. Kolbe, Leo 
Marquard and Dr. Manfred Nathan (Norval fafers, 'Flag Canmiss:bn 
Report', 25 February 1927; P.S.M.I. vol. J, 'Report of 
the Flag Commission, 1926-7,.) 
1+4. Signatories of the majority report were: Blommae:::-t, 
Caldecott, Smith, de Villiers, H.A. Fagan, W. Lategan, 
E. Webb, Mrs. F.J. Fahey, Mrs. Percy Fischer, Mrs. E.G. 
Jansen, Mrs. H.D. van Broekl;luizen, Mrs. J.S. van der 
Lingen. 
45. This was later known as the 'Red Cross' or 'hot cross 
bun flag'. For flag de signs see pages 2 62-3. Only one 
of the flags (and not two, as maintained in Malan, 
p. 121) was basAd on the van Riebeeck flag. The Com-
mission, which had been instructed to deliberate with 
Hertzogis crown proposal in mind, decided that the 
question of the crown's incorporation should be left 
entirely to the Government. However, the matter had 
become of little relevance as the crown had been super-
seded by the royal standard proposal. 
The press were excluded from all sittings of the 
Conunission and its reports on its deliberations were 
often inaccurate. 
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The de.1Ju.tation from the Flag Organization 
Meanwhile, on the third day of' the Conunissionts 
deliberations, a fresh development had occurred. Six 
weeks earlier, the r.entral Executive of' the Flag Organiza-
tion had abandoned a decision to approach Hertzog as soon 
as he returned from England believing that the visit might 
embarrass him if' he had already decided to withdraw the 
Bill. However, when the Government decided to pursue the 
Bill, the idea of' a deputation to appeal for its withdrawal, 
or, alternatively, for the inclusion of the Union Jack, was 
revivP.d. Having obtained the approval of their Provincial 
Committees for this step, and the Premier's agreement to 
46 
see the deputRtion, it met Hertzog and Malan on 24 February. 
While the idea of' a deputation was inspired by the decision 
to pass the Bill, its timing was probably related to the 
recent provincial elections - one of the first subjects it 
raised. 
46. Fremantle Collection, Rees to Fremantle, 6 December 
1926, Sturrock to Fremantle, 8 January 1927, H.L. 
Burrows to Rees, 12 January 1926, A.E. Wayt to Rees, 11 
February 1927. 
The members of the deputation were Frema.~tlc, F.K. 
Weiner, JoCo Hirsch, Dr. P.P.J. Ganteawne and H.M. 
Quigley (for the Cape Province); Go Hodge, A. Eaton 
and R. Fobb (for Natal); Pim, E. Rooth and Miss c. 
Meeser (for the Transvaal) (~. 'Deputation to the 
Prime Minister on the Flag Question, 24 February 1927i). 
The Free State representative was unable to attend. 
Newspaper reports on the membership of the deputation 
were not always correct. 
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As leader ,)f' cho deputation Pi.n 47 began by maintaining 
that they represented a no.n-politi~al organization which in 
September 1926 had resolved. that ::i. flag which excluded the 
Union. Jack would be a sectional emblem. The results of' 
the provincial elections had clearly shown that in a 
re:ferendum n'? majority large enough to endorse present flag 
policy would be won. OmL,sion of' the Union Jack would 
affront every British subject and all :i.e asked was that the 
Government should. hand.le the flag problem in the same 
spirit as it had recently handled the Indian question. 
The implication of this request - repeated by other speakers 
- was obvious: whereas the Government conciliated Indians 
it refused to accooonodate the English section. Hertzog 
denied ~hat the Goverr~ent had not been conciliatory 
towards the latter and declared t~at it was wiable to with-
draw the Bill ':>ecause of t.he threats o.f the opposition and 
because or the possible i~ference that the Government was 
running away from its goals. The question had to be 
settlAd as so(>n as possible and he would be grateful for 
any suggestio:a pu-: forward Yby the other side' which showed 
that they were prrjpared to meet the Government. When the 
47. Pim, who was born i:~ Ireland in 1862, came to South 
Africa i:1. 1890 and opened a practice as an accowitant 
in Johannesburg in 1894, later £011..~ding the Transvaal 
Institute of Chartered Accow1.tants. He played an 
important part i:-:1. establishing cn.l tural f'acili ties in 
Johannesburg. After se:r.vi:,.g on several national com-
missions he was awarded a C.!3.E. in recognition o:f his 
serviceso For many years a member of' the Johannesburg 
To,m Council, he was a man of' broad interests and his 
strong hum3.nitarianism was much ~espected. 
deputation proposed a design, Hertzog asked in the course 
of the discussions whether the Union Jack and republican 
±~lags had to appear :Ln the design in toto? Could they not 
be represented through their colours alone? Pim replied 
that they were not authorized to agree to any design or 
even to offer one. However, they would be happy to trans-
mit any proposition to their members and they were sure 
that it would be most carefully considered. Deputation 
members then suggested that the best way to solve the ques-
tion would be through a commission which would be subject 
to no qualification whatsoever. Such a commission, 
Fremantle said, would satisfy the whole nation; it would 
be wli versally felt that the Premier had gone out of his way 
again to extend the hand of' friendship to the people they 
represented; it would greatly calm feeling in the country 
and it might arrive at a solution. When Hertzog left the 
room, Malan remained to continue the discussions. Despite 
Hertzog's rejection of the deputation's original plea for 
the inclusion of' the Union Jack, it continued to insist 
that it was in favour of further negotiation a.'1.d, as a step 
towards settling the controversy, then suggested that 
representatives or the Flag Organization and members o.f' the 
Government's Flag Commissj_on should meet together in a flag 
conference and freely arrive at a flag design. 48 
48. Fremantle Collection, vol. 9, 'Deputation to the Prime 
Minister on Flag Question, Thursday, 24 February 1927., 
For very brief references see Hansard, vol. 8, 800, 
Hertzog, 28 February 1927; Die Burger, 26 February 
1927. 
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At a Cabinet meeting after lwich, this new development 
was reported by Malan to his colleagues and was doubtless 
received with pleasure by Roos, Havcnga, Creswell, Boydell, 
Madeley and other Ministers, 49 in addition to the Premier. 
They had good reason to feel pleased. Pim•s point con-
cerning the provincial electio~ results - the shock of 
which was still fresh - needed no tmderlining. A quick 
examination of the voting figures revealed that in the 
three Provinces in which the elections had taken place the 
s.A..P. ~ad polled only a few hundred votes less than the 
Nationalist, Labour and Independent candidates together.SO 
In a referendum many who had supported Independents would 
vote for a clean flag as would many Labourites who had 
thought it advisable to support the Party in the provincial 
elections but would not do so .in a vote confined to the 
flag questiono Though in the Free State the Governmentts 
design was likely to gain the support of by far the greater 
part of the electorate, and though some S.A.P. supporters 
might also support it, the essential point Pim had made 
49. These probably included c.w. Malan, P.G.W. Grobler and 
Gen. J.C.G. Kemp. Though Kemp was to support Malan in 
the recess political campaign of 1927, the Kemp Papers 
contain very few references ·to the flag question and do 
not indicate that he shared Malan•s views on the urgent 
need fo~ a new flag. Similarly, the ~robler Papers 
and c .. w. Malan Papers contain few references to the f'lag 
question. It is significant that in D.F. Malan•s 
account of the flag conflict, the only other Minister to 
emerge as a strong supporter of flag legislation was 
Beyerso 
50. The figures were S.A.P~ 82 053, Nationalist Party, 
55 416, Labour Party, 20 141, Independents, 7 442 (~ 
~, 19 February 1927). 
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remained true: the Government would not obtain a majority 
large enough to just.Lf'y the design's adoption as a national 
flag. As members of' the Cabinet were well aware, no flag 
could be made national, in the true sense of' the word, by 
mere legislation. If' the flag were imposed by virtue of' a 
small majority, it would remain a source of' conflict. If' 
the referendum were lost, it would at the very least 
embarrass the Pact and give the s.AgP. a powerrul election-
eering weapono Accordingly, a breath of' compromise, 
blowing from i the other side t, a.'1.d from so u.nexpected a 
source as the Flag Organization, was to be welcomed and 
utilized. 
There was a further reason for favouring the proposal 
that a joint conference should choose a design. By Thurs-
day it was already certain that no general agreement on a 
f'lag design would be forthcoming from the Government's Flag 
C • • 51 omm1ss1on. A minority report, refusing to reconnnend 
any of' the Commission's designs, would further reduce its 
authority in the eyes of' many members of the public. By 
allow·ing Fla$ Organization representatives to consult with 
Flag Commission nominees in recommending a design, the 
Government's situation might be improved. For if the new 
body reached agreement on a design, the Government would 
51. P.S.M.I. vol. 3, Minutes of' the meetings of the Flag 
Co:nmission. The late Lea Marquard informed the writer 
that throughout the Commission's deliberations Malan 
was in touch with certain of' its memberso 
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have a strong case for maintaining that its design had the 
support of the great majority of white South Africans. If 
it did not, it could present the convening of the joint 
conference as further evidence of its desire to meet the 
wishes of the electorate. 
It is difficult, in the absence of further evidence, to 
know whether or not Malan welcomed the new development. 
That the flag issue had weakened the Pact could not be 
denied; proof lay in the previous week's election figures. 
This clearly placed Malan in a weak.er position to oppose 
negotiations than might have been the case earlier. 
Perhaps, too, Malan, and the Cabinet, realized that the 
freshly concluded Indian ~greement was likely to arouse a 
good deal of criticism from Nationalists and others in the 
coming months and provide an additional source of discomfort 
for Malan, as the responsible Minister, and for the Govern-
ment. The decision of the Flag Conference would not be 
binding. ~nd, most important, Malan knew that he could 
nominate as Flag Co:nmission representatlves those members 
who had already opposed the inclusion of the Union Jack and 
could be relied upon to do so again. Thus apart from some 
delay, which would not preclude the Bill being presented in 
Parliament in the present session, the new move seemed to 
be to the advantage of the Par:t. 
After the Cabinet meeting further discussion took 
place between Malan and the deputation and on the .following 
day an official statement was released to the press. It 
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declared that the Government was impressed by the impor-
tance of' having a national flag but strongly desired that 
the matter should be settled by conse~t if possible. To 
this end, the Government, which had been approached by the 
dep'..l.tation, was inviting the co-operation. of the Flag 
Organization. The statement proposed that a meeting of an 
equal number of representatives from the Flag Orga.~ization 
and the Flag Commissio:i should consider the designs recom-
mended by the latter, together with any designs the flag 
committees might wish to put forward. It added that the 
deputation had agreed to consult its flag conunittees 
throughout the Union and that its Central Executive would 
inform Malan as soon as possible if' the proposal was 
unacceptab.le. 52 
Thus the choice o:f the f+ag's design had been shifted 
to a more representative body whose terms of reference were 
unrestrictedo Some progress seemed to have been made 
towards the possibility of a general agreement. However, 
any optimism felt by the two sides was based o~ miscon-
ception. To the flag committees - even if not to some of 
the members of their deputation ,vho appear to have been 
swayed by the good feeling that emerged in the discussions 
- the gaining of' a.Tl. wirestricted conference was interpreted 
as a victory. Here was a move away from the restrictions 
imposed on the Flag Commission and a step towards the 
52. Cape Times, Die Burger - 26 February 1927. 
inclusion of the Union Jack in the new flag. To Malan, on 
the other hand, the initial demand of Pim for the inclusion 
of the Union Jack was probably seen as a formality. Far 
more important was the subsequent statement from represen-
tatives of this formerly unyielding Organization. that they 
were prepared to take back any flag to their committees for 
serious consideration. Was this not a tacit admission 
that they no longer clung to the inclusion of the Union 
Jack as a sine qua non for their acceptance of the national 
flag? 
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CHAP':'ER X 
THE FLAG CONFERENCE AND AGITATION 
BEFORE THE FIRST READI~G 
The Flag Conference 
The proposa.l to hold a Flag Conference was not greeted 
with enthusiasm. On the same day that details of the pro-
posed Conference were released, Die Burger hastened to 
assure its readers that its convening would not mean any 
de.lay in passing the Bill or that the Union Jack would be 
incorporated. Too many concessions had already been made, 
Die Volksblad maintained on 1 March; it felt certain that 
the Conference would achieve nothing as it was impossible 
to negotiate with people who were not ,prepared to give and 
take. The care Times thought that if the Flag Commission 
had proposed o?.1ly clean flags, then there was little hope 
of success, while the Natal Mercury, in welcoming the 
Conference, declared: tone must be grateful for anything 
which may help to end the imbecile folly of the Pact's past 
flag policy and give the government an opportunity to make 
honest reparation to the English-speaking citizens of the 
Union, without loss o:f prestige, for its repeated affronts 
to them. t Somewhat more hopeful than the others was the 
Rand Daily Mail, which concluded that if the two bodies 
could be made to work together on the·principle that South 
Africa would have a flag, the desired goal would be 
1 
reachedo However, the general feeling of the press was 
not optimistic. 
Immediately after the Government's announcement, the 
Central Executive of the Flag Organization sent flag 
committee branches throughout the country a brief summary 
of the deputation's talks and invited a mandate from them 
to allow representatives to participate in an unrestricted 
Flag Conference. While permission to participate was 
forthcoming, all flag committees insisted that the Union 
Jack must form part of the new flag. Consequently, 
though the Flag Conference was supposed to be an 
unrestricted one, the hands of the Flag Organization's 
representatives would not be free. When Pim informed the 
Government of this on 19 March, Malan advised him that the 
2 Conference should nonetheless take place. Probably Malan 
reasoned that whereas he could rely on his own represent-
atives to the Conference to block any move to incorporate 
the Union Jack, the Flag Organization representatives, in 
the calm of a conference chamber, might be persuaded to 
adopt a more conciliatory attitude - as had occurred with 
1o Cape Times, 28 February 1927; Natal Mercury, 26 Feb-
ruary 1927; Rand Daily Mail, 28 February 1927; 
respectively. 
2. Fremantle Collection, Sturrock file, Pim to Sturrock, 
12 March 1927 - regarding the statements by the 
Minister of the Interior re "restricted referenceo••"; 
The Star, 28 February 1927. 
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the deputationis representatives, several of whom were 
likely to return as deputies to the Conference. All this 
was in fact to occur. However, should the Conference fail, 
its propaganda value to the Government would remain and, as 
Parliament was expected to be prorogued late in Jwie, there 
appeared to be no need to terminate negotiations abruptly. 
The Conference met in Cape Town on Saturday, 2 April 
and continued its deliberations until the following 
Thursday. The Central Executive of the Flag Organization 
had nominated six members and the Government had nominated 
an equal number from the Flag Commission.3 After Hertzog 
had briefly welcomed the members and impressed on them the 
need for give and take on both sides, 4 he and Malan with-
drew, Smith was elected Chairman, and the deliberations 
begano The three designs recommended by the Flag 
Commission were presented for consideration while the first 
of three designs (all containing the Union Jack) which the 
Flag Organization was to propose was put forwardo5 Also, 
Jo The representatives of the Flag Committees were: Pim, 
Fremantle, Wiener, Eaton (all former members of the 
deputation), Capt. H.H. Witherington and Archdeacon 
F.H. Hulme. Flag Commission representatives were: 
Blommaert, Smith, Caldecott,' Lategan, de Villiers, and 
Mrs Janseno (P.SoM.I., Minutes of the Flag Conferenc~) 
Also present at the deliberations were Norval, who 
acted as the Conference's Secretary and A.E. Wayt (Hon. 
Sec. of the Flag Organization's Central Executive). 
In the interests of clarity and brevity the re-
presentatives of the Flag Commission are referred to as 
the Government's representatives. 
4. The Star, 2 April 1927; Rand Daily Mail, 4 April 1927. 
5. See pages 262-3 for flag designs. 
a written statement entitled ,'To our Dutch Fellow Citizens' 
was handed to the Government's representatives. This 
statement presented the views of the flag committees orr the 
subject of a national flag and maintained, inter alia, that 
a flag that did not include the Union Jack would not be 
recognized by English-speaking South Africans. 6 
When the Conference met again on Monday, the Flag 
Organization's design was discussed and Smith later read a 
reply to the Organization's written statement. He noted 
that they agreed on many principles but regretted that 
these had not always been logically applied to the 'Dutch' 
section. J:i'or instance, the Union Jack would not bring the 
desired harmony because it: 
unfortunately does raise a host of unpleasant 
memories in the minds of a very large number of 
Dutch-speaking South Africans, and it is futile 
to disguise this fact. Under its sway wars have 
be0n waged in quite recent times against the 
Transvaal and the Orange Free State; under its 
domination the Dutch language for many years lost 
all its rights and privileges in the Cape Colony; 
and, rightly or wrongly, the Dutch people look 
upon it as a Flag of aggression and annexation. 
The period that has elapsed between the last 
Anglo-Boer hostilities and the present ••• is much 
too short for one to expect the Dutch people as a 
whole to welcome the Union Jack on a Flag which 
is to symbolize our national unity •• o 
In the circumstances the best policy was to start with a 
clean slate.7 
6. P.S.M.I. Minutes of the meetings of the Flag Conference, 
2-7 April 19270 
7. Ibid. 
On the following day Pim declared that the inclusion 
of the Union Jack in toto was the I irreducible minimum• so 
far as the Flag Organization was concerned and on Wednesday 
he presented their second flag which the Government's 
representatives also rejected since, in addition to 
aesthetic and other shortcomings, it included the Union 
8 Jack. 
The two sides had reached a deadlock. The Govern-
ment•s representatives made it clear that regardless of 
this deadlock the Pact would pass the Bill; if the Con-
ference did not choose a flag the Government would simply 
proceed with the Flag Commission's first choice, design 
no.1. However, the Government would be prepared to accept 
any of the Commission's three designs if the Conference 
would agree to oneo9 Faced by this fact, the Flag 
Organizationls representatives began to consider design 
no.2 since this did at least contain, and as its most 
prominent feature, an English symbol and part of the Union 
Jack - the Cross of St George. If the Government was 
going to pass a Flag Bill, it was surely better for it to 
enact this design rather than one of the other two. 
Though the Government's represeritatives would have pre-
ferred design no.1, once the Flag Organization's deputies 
8. P.S.M.I. Minutes of the meetings of the Flag Conference, 
2-7 April 1927. Their third design was presented by 
Hulme on the final day of the Conference but received 
little attention. 
9. The Star, 26 April 1927, Witherington. 
began to consider design no.2 and it was thought that a 
compromise might be reached through it, the design gained 
. 11 . d 1 O increasing support on a si es. Perhaps too, the Flag 
Organization's deputies - temporarily divorced from the 
public hurly-burly of the flag strife - were not 
uninfluenced by the excellent spirit that prevailed in the 
1 1 
seclusion of the conference chamber and by Pim's strong 
belief that failure to reach some agreement could have the 
t d . 12 mos ire consequences. Rather than incur opprobrium 
for a deadlock - had the Flag Organization not requested an 
unrestricted Conference only to arrive at it with a 
restricted mandate? - was it not wiser to keep the door to 
agreement open by adjourning, submitting a design to their 
committees and consulting with them as to what action 
should be taken when the Conference reconvened? 
not better than an irrevocable break? 13 
Was this 
On Thursday, the Flag Conference was able to comp.lete 
its report. It declared that the Conference was convinced 
of the necessity of a national flag, that its design should 
be settled by mutual understanding, and that representatives 
of the flag committees recognized the inclusion of the Cross 
10. The Star, 22 April 1927, Smith. 
11. IE..!£. JO April (Pim), 6 May (Smith) 1927, commenting on 
the good spirit at the Conference. 
12. Rand Daily Mail, 4 April 1927, Pim. Pim did not rule 
out the possibility of bloodshed if the Conference 
failed. 
13. See The Star, 15 April 1927. 
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of St George in dec:,ign no.2 1 as a genuine gesture of good-
will and a real help to further discussion'. It added 
that the Conference should be adjourned to enable Flag 
Organization deputies to inform their committees of the 
position and to consult with them 
another design embodying the same 
about desie,n noo2 
. . l 14 pr1nc1p es. 
Rejection of the Flag Conference's report 
or 
Unfortunately, the conciliatory atmosphere of a con-
ference chamber could not be re-created in the country at 
large. When the Flag Conference's conclusions were 
published, a storm broke over the heads of Pim and other 
Flag Organization deputies and design no.2 was rejected by 
the opposition. In many quarters the GovernmentYs willing-
ness to meet the deputation and to agree to a Conference 
had been taken as proof of a change in attitude necessitated 
by hard political facts - such as even Nationalists could 
not .ignore. It was the threat from Natal, manifested in 
the provincial election results, the Natal Mercury declared 
on 26 February, that had forced the Government to accede to 
the deputationis requesto Man~ had come to believe that 
14. P.S.M.I. YReport to the Minister of the Interior of the 
Flag Conference, 7 April 1927. 1 ; Rand Daily Mail, IQ£ 
§.t§£. - 12 April 1927. 
Compare Mala.n's statement that the Flag Organiza-
tion's representatives were prepared to recommend (taan 
te beveeJ.Y) design no.2 (Malan,. p. 122: Die Burger 
{Malan), 2 February 1957). 
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if the Government was prepared to treat with so avowedly a 
pro-Union Jack body as the Flag Organization, then 
Nationalists could no longer be so opposed to the Union 
Jack and that the Co~ference would be chiefly concerned 
with the quest ion o.f' whether the Union Jack or crown ;:hould 
be incorporated. 
Consequently the anger that greeted the Flag Con-
ference•s report was all the greater. YT.he pass must not 
be sol.d' was the ti tl.e of the first Rand Daily Mail 
editorial dealing with the new situation. It feared that 
the Conference's report represented 'quite the most 
dangerous development that has yet taken place in connec-
tion with the flag controversy.• While it disliked !2.:i£. 
Burger's note of rejoicing, it disapproved far more 
strongly of the 'conversion of Howa~d Pim': 
hls uncompromising attitude of less than two 
months a~o is in such bewildering contrast to 
the position he has taken up to--day that we 
cannot help wondering what has happened in the 
neantime to bring about this astowiding change in 
point of view. To-day this perfervid whole-
hogger for the Union Jack comes to his Couunittees 
practica.lly to seek approval for a de sign which 
con ta.ins nei t.h.t,,r the Union Jack nor a Crown, and 
is in no sense a symbol of the British Empire or 
of the imperial connection. In other words.~. 
[the report7 concedes the utmost for which the 
mc•st extreme men behind the Minister and the 
Gover::1.ment ever dared to ask. 
Hertzog, it added, had scored most ha~.1.dso1r.ely; all 
that th.-J mer.tber.s of the Flag Organization had gone down to 
fight fo1~ hac. becm given awayo }iowever, the flag y_Uestion 
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was a matter that would be settled by the citizens as a 
whole. And so far as they were concerned, there would be 
no settlement on the basis of design no.2. If they 
accepted that, the last symbol of the British link would be 
gone. 'After that, anything may happen., 15 
Roundly condemning the report on 14 April, the Cape 
Times declared that the F'lag Organization's deputies had 
disregarded their mandate and made sacrifices without 
c omper~sa tion. One section was dictating to the other what 
form its sentiment should talce. As for the compromise, 
since the majority of Afrikaners were apathetic about the 
incorporation of the Union Jack, there had not been the 
slightest need to give ~ay on its inclusion. Other 
opposition newspapers made the same or similar criticisms: 
the deputies of the Flag Organization had not had the 
authority to agrP.e to any flag whicr.. did not embody the 
16 TTnion ,Tack; the Cross of St George meant little or 
nothing to mu.st English-speakers; Smith's view of the 
Union Jack was the result of 'morbid brooding•; design 
no.2 could only be accepted on the basis of good faith -
and tt.at, as the provincial elections had shown, the 
Government had lost. 17 
·-----·-·----·-----------------
15. 13 April 1927. See also 14 April 1927. 
16. 0f courf:e, they had not in fact tagreedi to any flag. 
17. See 9~2e Argus, 12 April 1927; Natal Witness, 1J April 
1927; The Star, 15 April 1927. 
273 
Lack of good faith between the Government and a 
portion of its citizefis was al8o evinced in the attitude of 
the s.o.E. towards deEign no.2. In a St George's Day 
message, its Grand President described the Conference as a 
'painful farce' and its design as a 'meaninelessi flag 
which was •entirely and absolutely' unacceptable. Ee 
demanded the British section's equal share of the flag 
which •must be the Jack, the whole Jack, nothing but the 
Jack, even though it constitute only one-quarter of the 
flag. t So long as British people remained in South Africa 
so long would the Union Jack have to remain. 18 At the same 
time, the President of the Society in the Free State wired 
the Flag Orgru1izati_on: 'Twelve hundred SonR of England in 
the Orange Free State insist on the Union Jack being 
19 included in the ne"\\r flag. t 
The new threat to the Union Jack s.wung the patriotic 
societies into combined action. On 24 April reprA~entatives 
met in Johannesburg from some half dozen societies including 
the s.o.E., Cambrian, Cornish, Caledonian and B.E.S.LQ 20 
Constituting themselves into the Co-ordinating CoLU1cil of 
Patriotic Societies of South Africa, they resolved that in 
18. Cape Argus, The. Star - 22 A.pril ·1927; Die_Ji,yrger, Rand 
Daily Mail - 23 April 1927. 
19. The Star, 23 April 1927. 
200 Strictly speaking the B.E.S.L. was not a patriotic 
society. However as it alignec. itself' witl1 tho 
patriotic societies throughout the controversy and 
joined the Co-ordinating Council of Patriotic Societies 
(see below), it has been included in this cateeory. 
future they would concert their efforts to secure the 
inclusion of the Union Jack in the new flago They 
unanimously rejected design no.2 and agreed that any 
attempt to :pass a flag bill without general consent would 
be strenuously resisted by all possible constitutional 
21 
means. 
By this time a large nwnber of flag committees had 
made it clear that nothing less than the inclusion of the 
Union Jack would satisfy them. And by the beginning of' 
May, the Transvaal, Natal and Cape branches of the Flag 
Organization had rejected design no.2. No flag that did 
not contain the Unio~ Jack was acceptable and there was to 
be no departure f'rom the princip'.Les which had brou6ht the 
22 Organization into being. A breakdown in the negotiations, 
due to resume on 14 ~ay, between the Flag Organization and 
the Government's representatives had become inevita1,1.le. 
In the last days befo,re this breakdown a futi_le drama 
was played out which was to arouse much ill-feeling. ~t 
the e::id of the Flag_Con:ference some Flag Organization 
deputies had p!"ivately regretted to Smith, the Chairman of 
the Conference, that the Afrikaans-speakers' po.int of view 
was not better known by the English section. As one after 
21. The Star, 27 April 1927; Die Burger, Cape Time~ 28 
April 19270 
22. 1'he _§_tar, 22, 2J, 26, 29 April, 4, 5, 7 May 192'7; !Li£ 
Burger, 23, 25, 29 April, 5 May 1927; ~~, p. 123. 
275 
another flag committee branch resolved against design no.2, 
SmithYs disappointment increased. Wishing to do every-
thing possible in order to achieve a settlement, he told 
Fremantle that he and Mrs Jansen were anxious to present 
the Afrikaans-speakers' viewpoint to the Organization's 
Central Executive before it took its final decision on the 
design. The outcome was an invitation from the Central 
Executive and Smith and Jansen's controversial addresses to 
it on 6 May. T.h.ough Fremantle and Smith had anticipated 
Ya perfectly private conversation' with only Central 
Executive members preEent, a considerable number of other 
people also attended and 'the meeting assumed a character 
quite different -from that contemplatedt. 2 3 Smith and 
,Tonsen maintained, inter alia, that the Union Jack was 
associated with a vast tradition that was foreign to the 
country and which could never form part of its national 
tradition; but most of all, thoy frankly stated the dis-
like of many Afrikaners for the Union ,Jack and their 
reasons for it; they appealed to the Executive to be 
generous enough not to insist on placing something on their 
national flag that was objectionable to their feelings. 
23. Fremantle CoJ_lection, vol. 9, Fremantle to Smith, 14 
May 1927: •Central Executive of the Flag Committees 
Papers re Prof. Smith's and Mrs Jansen's interviews'; 
The Star, 4, 5, 6 May 1927; pie Burger, 7 May 1927. 
The following members of the Executive were preE:ent: 
Pim, :b"remantle, F.C. Sturrock (alternate for the Cape), 
Stallard (Trm1svaal), A. Law Palmer (alternate for 
Natal), F.E. Colenutt (alternate for Free State). 
Mrs Jansen went on to warn: 'We are on the eve of' a great 
racial war. A new era of' resentment against England and 
the English is looming•. Unless the English accepted the 
Government's proposals tbey would cut themselves off' from 
b "k ak 24 co-operation wit . Af'r1 aans-spe ers. 
On the following day the Central Executive declared 
that the flag committee branches had unanimously resolved 
that a flag without the Union Jack in its entirety was 
unacceptable; accordingly the Executive had unanimously 
rejected design no.2 and all designs which included only a 
portion of' the Union Jack. With regard to Smith's and 
Jansen's statements, they had considered them carefully and 
could find no vital reason for the exclusion of' the Union 
Jack. Their speeches clearly showed that there was a 
'complete and dangerous lack of' understanding' in the minds 
of Smith and .Jansen, and those for whom they spoke, as to 
the reasons and sentiments that compelled the British 
section and many Af'rikaans-speak.ers to demand the incor-
poration of' the Union ,Tack and republican flags. 2 .5 When 
the Flag Committee's reasons f'or rejecting the 'Dutch point 
of viewv were published on 11 May, with Smith's and Jansen's 
equally forthright views, the press on both sides joined in 
24. Cape Argus, 12 May 1927; Hansard, vol. 9, 4267-8, 
Giovanetti, JO May 1927. 
25. Ffemantle Collection, vol. 9, 'Minutes of' meeting of' 
the Executive of the S.A. Flug Committee held in 
Johannesburg on the 6th-7th May, 19271; The Star, 7 
May 1927. 
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'.~ ~ the fray. Smith's and J,_i11:,<!n! s visit had failed in iLs 
intended pU}'))O'"<': unintc!niionally, l1owever, it succeeded 
in adding to Lile 1_.cilit.i.cal tnmper which rapidly rose i.n tlle 
week before the Flac Bill was first read on 16 May. 
On the day after the Central Executive rejected design 
no. 2, Malan cancelled the Flag Conference. Though tlie 
Central Executive favoured its re-convening, the restricted 
reference of its representatives would have contravened the 
original conditions dem.anded by the Flag Organization itself. 
In all events, deadlock appeared to be certain. 27 Further-
more, as the parliamentary session was so well advru1ced, 
Malan was probably anxious to introduce his Flag Bill 
without delay. He had expected the Flag Conference to 
28 
report by the end of March; it had only met at the 
and it was now nearly mid-May. Time beginning of April; 
was running short. In the circumstances, design no.2, 
recognized by the Flag Conference •as a genuine gesture of 
goodwill', seemed to be the best choice the Government 
could make for the new flag. 29 
26. _Ihe St.££, 11, 13, 15 May 1927; Die Burger, 12, 13 May 
1927; Daily Despatch, 13 May 1927; Cape Argus, 14 May 
1 9 2 7 ; Die Volk s b 1 ad , 1 6 , 1 7 , 1 8 May 1 9 2 7 • 
27. P.S.M.I. letter from Malan to Pim, 4 May 1927; The 
~tar, 7 May 1927; ££.Pe Argus, Daily Despatch 10 May 
1927, telegrams betwf'en Malan mld Pim: N0tal Witness, 
11 May 1927. 
28. The Star, 28 February 1927. 
29. For a fuller discussion of this choice ,:;ee chapter 11. 
Agitation against the Flag Bill immediately before the 
first reading 
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The break.down 01 the Flag Conference, the Government's 
declared intention to force the Bill through Parliament, 
Malan' s annou_11.cement that design no.2 would be pressed -
in short, the obduracy of which each side stood convicted 
in the eyes of the other, contributed before the first 
reading to great excitement. In 1926 the combined efforts 
of the opposition press and protest meetings had forQed the 
Bill's withdrawalo Now, before the first reading, these 
instruments were used again to achieve this goalo 
The press attacked Malan, Hertzog and Labour.JO It 
denied that the flag committees were responsible for the 
failure of the Flag Conference, insisted that a national 
flag could not be settled by forcing a Bill through Par-
liament and complained that Nationalists alone could not 
decide what constituted South African patriotism. Smith's 
and Jansen's statements inspired eight and three column 
headlines: MRS. JANSEN THREATENS RACIAL WAR 
DELEGATES CONFESS TO DISLIKE OF UNION JACK, 
much heat. 31 
and generated 
But, in general, the press stressed four aspects: the 
question bad fallen into the har,ds of extremists, the 
JO. 
31. 
See Cape Argus, 6, 10 May 1927; 
14 May 1927; Cape Times, 16 May 
See Rand Daily Mail, 12 May 1927. 
The Friend, The Sta£ -
19270 
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country's mood precluded clear thought, forcing the matter 
would have regrettable results, and the wisest course was 
to withdraw the Bill. Thus on 6 May the Rand Daily Mail 
regretted that the f'lag question had been allowed to dri:ft 
into the hands o:f extremists and could now be settled only 
on Party lines, while The Star, on 12 May, stated that the 
movement to :force the Bill had made it impossible to put 
the extremists on either side in quarantine. Indeed, 
instead o:f the public being protected, •a sort o:f contag-
ious hysteriav was being given a clear start; ardent 
proponents o:f the Bill were getting into a hysterical state 
in which threats were being used and opponents were being 
denounced as intolerant and jingoistic. It was plain, it 
observed, that a section in the Union, including Malan, was 
losing its sense o:f proportion. 
On 9 May the Nata.l Witness thought it was too late in 
the day to expect any clear thinking on a question that had 
become a political and racial counter. Four days later it 
charged that no argument, whether o:f decency or sel:f-
interest, seemed able to turn the Government aside :from the 
course it had set: 'It is determined to achieve the unity 
o:f the country, which is the pro.f'e ssed object of' its bill, 
by dividing it more deeply than it has been divided :for 
twenty years.• Other newspapers agreed: no greater 
blunder could possibly be imagined, than to press the 
matter; it would be ?suicidal :folly'; racial hatred would 
be aroused; patriotism demanded that the matter be 
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restect. 32 The 'great High Priest of Little Afrika.nderism' 
was urged to carefully weigh the consequences of pursuing 
the Bill. He was dealing 'not with braggarts and 
roisterers who pass their word lightly ••• but with tolerant 
and justice loving pe(ll>ple, with whom, as all history shows, 
it is easy to make peace but fatal to pick a quarrel'.33 
On the morning of the first reading the C_ape Times 
warned that that day would in all probability live in the 
history of South Africa as a day of disaster, a day on 
which South Af'rica had taken a f'atal turn towards greater 
bitterness and hostility. Posterity would fix responsi-
bility for this strife on Malan, the representative not of' 
Dutch-speaking South Africa, but of a small unforgiving, 
narrow-minded minority, for it was he who had first raised 
the flag question; on Dr van der Merwe, Malan, 'and 
other political fire-brands of the same type', for it was 
they who had deliberately enflamed hostility towards the 
Union Jack; on Labour's leaders and their rank-and-file, 
for they had supported the Bill; and on Hert~og and his 
Cabinet, because no matter how great the detestation of the 
Union Jack, the welfare of South Af'rica, not the satisf'action 
of' one section's enmity, had demanded sacrif'ice. 
J2. See cape Argus, 6, 10 May 1927; . The Star, 13 May 1927; 
lhe Fri~, 14 May 1927; The Star, 12 May 1927 citing 
Ons Land. 
3 J • fiat ;.i l Mer c u.r y- , 1 4 May 1 9 2 7 • 
13 May 1927. 
See also Natal Witness, 
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The press attacks on the Government's Bill reflected 
and stimulated the protest meetings which occurred before 
the first reading. That feelings had been rwllling high 
was clear. Towards the end of April, flag committee 
representatives in country areas in the Transvaal had 
journeyed three days by horse and cart to meet.34 In 
urban centres, such enthusiasm could be harnessed readily. 
With the introduction of the Bill i~ninent, a new urgency 
was imparted to the situation and the opposition acted. 
In the week before the first reading, in Natal, the 
Cape Province and Transvaal protest meeti:-1.gs were held. 
Prominent citizens who were members of patriotic societies 
generally took the lead in petitioning mayors to call themo 
Usually meeti::ig in the t01vn hall, under the chairmanship of 
the mayor or deputy-mayor, the meetings attracted large 
audience so While most of the speakers were English-
speaking supporters of the S.A.P., some were Afrikaners or 
Labouri tes. At nearly twenty such meetings strong 
resolutions were passed demanding the incorporation of the 
Union Jack and Vierkleurs. At Kimberley, Estcourt, King-
williamstown, Barberton, Greytown, Grahamstown, Dundee, 
Port Alfred, Newcastle, and other centres, the Flag Bill 
was condem~ect. 35 At Pretoria, where some pro-Government 
34. I.he Star, 26 April 1927, p. 8. 
35. See The Star, 10, 12, 13, 14, 16 May 1927; 
Despatch, 13 May 1927; Die Burger, 13, 16 
Die Volksblad., c_ap_e Times - 1b May 1927. 
Daily 
May 1927; 
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speeches were made, the Bill was rejected by a large 
majority.3 6 At Pietermaritzburg, a strong Labour area in 
1924, not a dissentient voice was raised at the meetirig.J7 
This was generally the case. At Port Elizabeth, hundreds 
stood outside the over.flowing Feather Market Hall listening 
through loudspeakers.JS At Vryheid, a Labourite {and 
friend of Creswell) proposed the resolution, 39 while at 
Umbilo, the Labour MoP. ~as instructed to oppose the Bill 
and not to 'further betrayv his con.stituents. 40 At 
Kokstad, the Rev. G.R. Veel warned that the substitution of 
any flag for the Union Jack would Vstink of disloyalty to 
the King• and prejudice the Dominions and Britain agai!l.st 
41 them. 
The moat distinctive of the meetings was the service of 
re-dedication held in Durban a few hours before the first 
reading. Between 11 and 12 a.m., all business in the city 
halted while some ten thousand people met before the City 
Hall. 'All wore a look of severe faith that the flag of 
the British Commonwealth is not now and never hence to be 
de throned. • At precisely 11 a.~., ministers of several 
36. ~J2aily Mail, The Star - ·13 May 1927; Natal Witness, 
14 May 1927. 
37. The s~, 14 May 1927. 
38. I._he Friend, ~:l.a:12e Times, Die Volksblad - 1 6 May 1927. 
39. The Star, 13, 14 May 1927; Cape Time§_, lli_ Volksblad 
16 May 1927. 
40. Cape Argus, The Star - 10 May 1927; Natal Witness, 12 
May 1927. 
41. The Star, 14 May 1927; Cape Times, 16 May 192'7. 
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religious denominations, led by the Mayoris Chaplain, filed 
on to the platform attended by the Mayor and most of the 
City Councillors. l_leveille, t amid a reverent silence', 
was then soun.ded against the backgrow1.d of a sixty by forty 
foot Union Jacko The hymn, VOh God, our help in ages past' 
opened the service which the Mayor's Chaplain conducted. 
There were those of all races, he said, who found the Bill 
'unwise, unmerciful, mn.just, and unnecessary, and con-
stituted a violation of Christian principles'; it was the 
old policy of ithe mailed fist•. As loyal South Africans 
they were 'aghast at this deliberate attempt to crucify 
their finest feelings' and usher in a period of strife such 
as they had never known. Amid a hush, the flag was 
dedicated: 'To the Glory of God ••• we solenmly re-affirm 
our u.""1.cea.sing devotion to the Union Jack of the Dritish 
Empire which we cherish as a symbol of liberty and justice.' 
Then, receiving back the folded Union Jack, which he had 
handed to the Chaplain for blessing, the President of the 
Empire Group thrust it forward towards the gathering in 
token of its being entrusted to the keeping of the people 
of Natal. A.t the same instant, the Union Jack was run up 
the masthead above the City Hall. Wild cheering was 
followed by 'Rule Brittania' and the national anthem. 
The igreatest meeting ever held in Durban' was the verdict 
4? 
of its Mayor. -
42. Cape Argus, The Star - 16 May 1927; Natal Mercury, 
London Times - 17 May 1927. The meeting did not 
escape censure in the July issue of the Anglican 
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~ationalist support for the Bill 
Political agitation was not confined to those who 
opposed the Billo Those who supported the measure were 
also moved to action. Throughout the controversy, however, 
Nationalist support for the Bill fell f'ar short of the 
opposition's agitation against it. Public meetings in 
support of the flag measures were never to occur on the 
same scale, in number or size, as those which opposed 
them. 43 Several reasons may be suggested for thiso While 
for most protestors a wide range of fears were aroused by 
the threat to the Union Jack, for the Nationalists no com-
parable threat existed. Furthermore, Nationalists 
possessed no strictly comparable symbol. Though each of 
the former republics had enjoyed its own flag, none had 
commanded the respect of all Afrikaners. Enthusiasm for 
flag legislation often had to be aroused on the negative 
basis of dislike of the Union Jack rather than on positive 
affection for the new flag. But since most rural 
publication Churchman, which declared that the absten-
tion of some clergy from the service was not to be 
regretted. While it recognized and approved of 
Natalis claim to retain the Union Jack in the national 
flag, it deplored many of the methods used to achieve 
this end and stated that .its· distrust of public 
demonstrations had not been diminished by the meeting. 
4J. Tn 1926 only one large meeting, called specifically to 
support the Governmentis Flag Bill, was reported in the 
press. This was held at Newlands in Johannesburg. 
(Die Vo.lksblad, 26 May 1926; The Friend, 27 May 1926; 
Daily Despatch, 28 May 1926). Though Malan addressed 
meetings at the Koffiehuis in Cape Town (8 June 1926) 
and at Stellenbosch (10 June 1926), these dealt with 
the Governmentis policies generally. 
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Afrikaners seldom saw the Union Jack, the flag issue 
pro~ably seemed of secondary importance to many. Perhaps 
too the fact that the Government was dominated by the 
Nationalists made the need to form Nationalist pressure 
groups to influence flag legislation seem less necessary. 
Certainly important was the fact that Nationalist support 
was strongest .in the rural areas and not in the towns, 
where it was far easier to organise protest meetings. 
Finally, because of the smaller circulation of the 
Nationalist press, fewer Nationalists were exposed to press 
influence. 
In the Transvaal this influence was further reduced by 
the very limited coverage given to the flag question by 2!!§. 
Vader land 
Province. 
the only official organ of the Party in the 
When at the beginning of March, Pretoria 
Nationalists feared that the Flag Conference presaged more 
concessions and called for a joint meeting of their district 
committees, Ons Vaderland expressed support for the Bil1. 44 
But its true feelings on the subject and those of Roos 
were probably better revealed in its almost complete 
avoidance of the flag issue in the following two and a half 
months. Even before the first ~eading it failed to raise 
the issue. 45 
44. Ons Vaderland, 4 March 1927. 
45. Its last (short) leading article on the flag question 
had appeared on 19 April. 
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However, both Die Volksblad and Die Burger gave the 
question ample attention often in lengthy leading articles. 
In the month before the first reading the former devoted 
seven leading articles to the flag issue; the latter 
. 46 devoted six. In general these stressed the cowitry's 
rights to a national flag and insisted that the opposition's 
motives for denying them were ulterior; they were based on 
a refusal to recognize the legitimate rights of the 
Afrikaner and the status of the cowitrye But if~ 
Volksblad had the edge on Die Burger on the number of 
leading articles devoted to the flag question, the tone of 
the latter was more aggressive and it gave far more 
coverage to the controversy in its other columns. There 
was certainly no lack of material on the issue in Die Burger. 
On 23 April it declared that the Bill should be pressed 
without further delay if the flag committees rejected 
design no.2. Five days later it maintained that this 
rejection would enable the Government to accept design no.1 
(which had no British symbol) or any other design. On the 
last day of April it drew attention to the lack of organi-
zation of the Bill's supporters and the possibility of its 
remedy in the near future. Then, on 5 and 9 May, res-
pectively, followed two evocative full page headlines in 
capitals. The first: NASIONALISTE WORD WAKKER OOR VLAG, 
46. See Die Volksblad, 23, 25, 29 April, 9, 10, 13, 14 May 
1927; Die Burger, 18, 23, 28, JO April, 10, 13 May 
1927. Each also devoted one leading article to the 
Union's status in which the country's right to a 
national flag was argued. 
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headed a report that Malan was receiving telegrams of 
support from all quarters of the country. The second: 
FLAG COMMITTEES SMYT DIE HANDSKOEN NEER, headed the Flag 
Committee's rejection of design noo2• On 10 May a strong 
editorial identified by implication all those who opposed 
the Bill as enemies of' Soath Africa, jingoes and followers 
of Pitcher (Grand President of the S.O.Ea). It warned 
that blind intolerance and hateful jingoism were begrudging 
South Africa its flag. Finally on the morning of the 
Billis first reading it argued that by settling the flag 
question they were settling the racial question. There-
fore, if ever a measure had been brought before parliament 
which the people had asked for, it was the Flag Bill. In 
1919, Smuts had wanted it; the S.A.P. had wanted it. But 
jingoeE;, led by Pitcher, were denying their recently 
recognized status and their right to a clean flago The 
choice before the S.A.P. and its supporters was: would 
they remain true to the Party's own principles of 1919 or 
would they range themselves under the banner of Pitcher? 
The remaining type of agitatio::i in favour of the 
Governmentis flag policy and one which Dle Burger took 
pains to report came from Nationalist Party branches 
mainly in the Cape Province and took the form of resolu-
tions in support of flag policy. In the period between 
the Flag Committee's final rejection of design no.2 and the 
first reading, resolutions in support of the Government's 
flag policy were passed by some eighty-five Nationalist 
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Party branches. Many of these stemmed from executive 
committees, but most had been passed at branch meeting.s. 
Nearly all demanded both the pressing of' the Bill and a 
47 clean flag. In the Free State, the Nationalist caucus 
of the Provincial CoW1.cil similarly resolved in favour of' a 
48 
'skone onvervalstet flag. 
Atmosphere before the first reading 
The combined effect of these activities, for and 
against the Bill, was to create a most unfavourable 
political atmosphere before the first reading. Ever since 
the first day of 1927, when Creswell announced that the 
Bill would be pressed, the Government's pursuit of a new 
flag had kept the issue alive and stimulated ill-feeling. 
Campbellis resignation, the provincial elections, the Flag 
Commission, the deputation all in February followed 
by the Flag Conference, the canvassing of flag committee 
opinion, the statements of' Smith and Jansen, the Central 
Executive's decision in April/May all served to keep 
a potentially explosive issue before the public. 
Additionally that section of the public (whether 
favouring or opposing the Government) which had made the 
47. Die Burger, 4-7, 9-14, 16-17 May 1927. 
48. The Star, Die Burge~ 
May 1927. 
12 May 1927; Natal Witness, 1J 
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issue its chief political concern, was probably strengthened 
by the failure of any other issue in 1927 to sustain the 
electorate's attention, and so divide its interesto When 
Hertzog's Native Bills were sent to a Select Committee, 
they were removed from the electorate's attention and con-
cern for what might have proved a strong rival interest 
diminished. Other measures, in an unusually dull session,4 9 
were debated at length but did not capture the public's 
. . t. 50 1mag1na ion. On 25 April, the parliamentary corres~ 
pondent of the Rand Daily Mail reported that •the shadow of 
the flag controversy, has, in fact, hung heavily over 
parliament since the start, and its work has been conducted 
in an atmosphere of· unreality and lassitude'. Earlier in 
April Die Burger had reported growing excitement over the 
flag issue both in and out of Parliament. Almost the only 
subject discussed in parliamentary corridors was the flag 
and amongst Nationalist M.P.ts an enthusiasm prevailed twat 
byna opgewondenheid kan genoem word •••• Selfs lede wat voor-
heen nie veel geesdrif vir die saak openbaar bet nie, kan 
byna van niks anders praat nie; almal is opgesaal vir die 
stryd, en baie is al wrewelig van wag.,5 1 
490 See The Sta~, 8 March 1927, Deneys Reitz. 
50. These measures included the Precious Stones Bill, the 
Iron and Steel Industry Bill and the Medical, Dental 
and Pharmacy Billo 
51. 7 April 1927. See The Star, 5, 6, 11, 1J May 1927, 
for interest in the flag question before the first 
reading. 
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All in the last few days before the first reading 
against the background of protest meetings and Natio!lalist 
Party branch resolutions there was evidence of strained 
feelings in certain parts of the country. In the Trans-
vaal, at Boksburg, a protest meeting had to be cancelled 
because of threats of violence.52 In the Cape Province, 
at Cape Town, a bootblack and former pugilist came to blows 
in Adderley Street over the flag issue; at Kimberley, the 
protest meeting was marred by disturbances.53 In Natal, 
where the Provincial Council had just demanded the 
inclusion of the Union Jack,54 the Natal Advertiser called 
on English-speaking Natalians to swear a covenant to 
recognize the Union Jack alone and to teach their children 
to revere no other flag. Ought not Natal to begin to 
organize its opinion, 'so that the spirit and the text of 
such a covenant could be made known to all men from the 
smallest villages to the largest towns?' it asked.55 On 
13 May F.s. Malan told a gathering of S.A.P. supporters at 
the Strand that the flag issue seemed to have overshadowed 
everything to such an extent that it was difficult for the 
moment to think of anything else.5 6 
52. The Star, 13 May 1927. 
53. Die.Burger, 18 May 1927 (Cape Town); Cape Argus, 17 
May 1927 (Kimberley). 
54. Its o~e Labourite member seconded the motion while its 
two Nationalist members abstained from voting (Natal 
Witness,· Natal Mercury, Die Burger - 12 May 1927~. 
55. The Star, 14 May 1927, citing Natal Advertiser. 
56. Cape Argus, 14 May 1927. 
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The deteriorating political temper is also revealed in 
the letters of' Smuts throu~h his direct comments on the 
atmosphere as well as his misgivings for the future. We 
may recall that after the provincial elections in February, 
Smuts told Leo Amery that if' the Government persisted with 
its Bill he foresaw ta very grave recrudescence of racial 
f'eeling.,57 One month later, he was describing the 
political mood as 'hopeless'; he doubted if any fair 
solution would be accepted in it.58 In another six weeks, 
he was referring to 'the tumult of passion on which we are 
now being launched'.59 'Die vruEte van die Nat bewegingt, 
he said, 'sal nou deur die arme land gepluk word in 
60 bitterheid en ordeeldheid.' Finally, on the eve of the 
rirst reading he cor,fided to his wife 
Moere (sic) kom die flagwet voor en sal die poppe 
onmiddelik begin te dans. Ons gaan oppeneer van 
die begin af en by elke stadium. Die gevolge 
van bierdie clwaasheid van die Regering gaan 
verreikend word en die klok vir jare agteruit sit 
in Suid Afrika. Hul handelwyse is niet alleen 
dwaas nie maar positiefs krimineel. RassegevoeJ. 
gaan erger word as enige tyd na die boere oorlog.61 
On the day of the first reading the aged Le"is Michell 
wrote in his diDry: 'Flag Bill re-introduced out of spite, 
--------·------- ------------------------
57. See pp. 245-6. See also Dunc~papers., letter to Lady 
Selborne, 18 February 1927, for Duncan's similar fears. 
58. S.P. vol. 39, no. 70, to Father Ryan, 29 March 19270 
See also ibJc.d. no. 51, to Dr Kolbe, 22 March 1927. 
59. Ibid. no. 1J7, to Archdeacon Hulme, 12 May 1927. See 
also ibJd. no. 288, to Gillett, 1J May 1927. 
60. Ibid. no. 138, to Mrs Smuts, 1J May 1927. 
61. Ibid. no. 140, to Mr.:: Smuts, 15 May 1927. 
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6') 
and against the wish of all decent people of both races.• ~ 
Thus, since the Government first raised the question 
of a new flag in 1925, there had been no advance towards 
general agreement. Though the past twelve months had seen 
several compromise moves, the position remained unchanGed. 
But not completelyo. In at least one sphere an ominous 
change had occurred. Racial antagonism over the flag 
issue, strong in May 1926, and quiescent on Eertzog's 
return in December, was becoming more intense than ever. 
Politics of virtuous passion had begun to grip the nation 
and, as this gathered strength, appeals to reason and 
moderation were to be heard with increasing difficulty. 
62. Lewis Michell Collection, diary no. 2J, 16 May 19270 
CHAPTER XI 
THE FIRST READING OF THE BILL 
AND ACTIVITY BEFORE THE SECOND READING 
The F'lag Bill and Government strategy 
On the a:fternoon of 16 May 1927, the new South African 
Nationality and Flag BilJ was introduced in the House of 
Assembly. It laid down that the design of the national 
1'lag woulc1. be the Cross of St George, f'imbriatec white, on 
a green field divided quarterly: thus the Flag Conunission 1 s 
design no.2 was to Le the national :flag. It further 
proyidecl that the Union Jack, as a symbol o:f the association 
between the Union and •the British Community o:f Nations', 
would be rlown on the monarch's official birthday, on his 
actual birthday, on Empire Day (24 May), on Union Day (31 
May) and on such other occasions as the Governor-General 
might appoint. The referendum was to be decided by a 
1 
simple majority of the votes cast. 
Thirty years later Malan wrote that the Government's 
choico of this design rather than the Conunission's first 
preference a clean flag and also MaJ.anis :favourite 
1. A.Ik_ 52-27, clauses J-5. The design had been submitted 
to the Flag Commission by a Bloemfontein businessman, 
1'lr A.G, Wood (The Friend, Die Burger. - 20 May 1927). 
sprang from tl0 e de13ign' s tentative acceptance by an 
') 
irrportEmt section of' the opposition led by Pim.'- However, 
immediately after the Flag Conference Pim denied that 
either he or the Flag Organization's other representatives 
had over accepted this design, and the Report of the 
Confc,rence does not bear out Malan I s claim. J Also, since 
.Flag Organization branche2 throughout the country, without 
exception, rejected the design, Malan's contention that 
the design had been tentatively accepted by an important 
section of' the opposition (led by Pim) seems faulty. 
Nevertheless, it is likely that some members of the 
public, particularly those who were less emotionally 
responsive to the Union Jack, believed that the Flag 
Organization's representatives had regarded the design as a 
reasonable compromise. The latter's acceptance of the 
design as ia genuine gesture of' goodwill' would have 
strengthened this view. By offering the same design the 
Government could claim to be acting in harmony with this 
1 genuir1e gesture of goodwilli and capitalize on the support 
o.f those who jude;ed that the Flae; Organizationis deputies 
2. Malan, p. 123: Die f:lurge:,t.~ (Malan), 2 February 1957. 
3. Tho Star, 13 April 1927, letter to the editor from Pim; 
P.S.M.I. 'Report to the Minister of the Interior or the 
Flag Conf'eronce, 7 April 1927. 1 ; Rand Daily Mail, The 
~ - 12 April 1927. 
As Pim himsel:f was not completely opposed to the in-
corporation of' a portion of' the Union .Jack (Rand Dai-1..;i: 
Mail, 4 April 1927), he may well have privately 
indicated that he was not opposed to design no.2. 
However, this would still not justify Malanis assertion. 
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had originally favoured. the desivi and there:fore that it 
could noL be a compromise w.holly without merit. The 
greater the support of' English-speakers f'or the Govern-
ment, s de sign, the more difficult it would be to stigmatize 
it as the product o:f one group alone; design no.2 clearly 
offered the best hope of attracting more general support. 
The same Cabinet meeting which decided on the flag's 
design, also considered the Government's broader flag 
strategy. Given the strained situation and the knowledge 
that in its existing form the Bill would definitely be 
rejected by the Senate, the Government considered it 
wise~t to avoid an acrimonious debate and to speed the Bill 
to a Select Committee. Therein appeared to lie the last 
opportW1ity for general agreement. In Malan's view a 
Select Committee could also serve another purpose. In it, 
the S .A. P. could be f'orced to present a de sign of its own 
that would be generally acceptable. He was convinced that 
it would not be able to do so and that its demand (failing 
withdrawal of the Bill) for a flag which equitably combirn-id 
the Union Jack and former republican flags would be exposed 
as impracticable. 4 Such a revelation, he seemed to think, 
would strengthen the Pact's stand. 
4. See M~1 p. 
Hansard, vol. 
123: Dio Burger, 2 February 1957; 
9, 4227, Hertzog, 27 May 1927. 
The first reading 
When Malan :formally in traduced the Bill ( on 1 6 May), 
the ~alleries were crowded, the atmosphere strained. The 
Cape Times observed that the House had never been so 
i thronged' and Die Vo.lksblad that it had never been so 
tense. •Die hele atmos:feer', the latter added, twas al 
vroeg in die m;re af swanger van verwagting en opgewonden-
heid, en niemand in en om die Parlementsgebou kon van iets 
anders as die vlag praat • I 5 nie. 'The question which has 
held this country in its grip ever since last year', The 
Friend reported the next day, had been brought to a head. 
Amidst a roar of' cheers Smuts rose to oppose the 
motion for leave to introduce the Bill. As in the 
previous year, the S.A.P. had decided to fight the measure 
in Parliament :from the start. The step which the Govern-
ment was tak::.ng was 'a grave mistake, a dire calamity, and 
it may produce disaster in this country,' Smuts complained; 
the S.A.P. had not been consulted on the flag question 
since the end of the 1926 parliamentary session and the 
Flag Commission had been ia joke'; it had been restricted 
on the one issue on which agreement depended. Now the 
Government proposed to force the Bill. Yet ever since 
Union there had been a tacit understanding that one group 
would not force its views on the other. The Bill was a 
breach of' this understandingo 
5. 17 May 1927 (both). 
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Smuts could see no urgent need for the Bill. And he 
regretted that Hertzog had missed a great opportlUlity to 
cement the two races by not dropping the Flag Bill on his 
retn:rn .f'rom abroad when he had been welcomed back by the 
whole natio:1. That he had not done so was due to the 
Y 1.U1bending obstinacy' o.f Malan. Pursuit of the Bill would 
re-awaken former suspicions and harm national unity. He 
appealed to the Government not to f'or8e the Bill tat a ti:ne 
when th.is coLU1try is rwrn.ing riot with passion' • . They had 
howed before the storm of 1926. For the sake of South 
Africa they should bow again ancl no:; take a step which would 
u·1.do the work o.f the past sixteen years 'and once more 
la1.mch U:.3 on the stormy sei-is of passion, mistru3t, and 
. . 6 
suspicion' • 
Dc.U1.can, who followed, continued the appeal. 
str'es3ed that the time was not ripe for the Bill; 
He 
their 
inability to agree on a design proved this. !\.cceptance of' 
a nation3.l flag was a matte:r of sentimcmt and could not be 
i"11poseJ. by mere majorities in a referendum or Parliament. 
Nor was the se:n.timent· for the Union Jack artificial. To 
force the decisicrrr now was •almost criminal madness'. 
What would they lose if the flag came in tho process of 
tine? By forcing the decision the Government would raise 
6. Hansard, vol. 9, J6Jl.J.-J639. 
reported in Die Burge&, Die 
~ - 17 May 1927. 
The debate was also 
Volkab.lad, Cape Times,_ ~ 
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tho old issue of racial division and set tho country b1ck 
for twenty years.7 
rhe r,)1na.ining Opposition. speakers fo;_ir English-
spe:lking Na.talians and two Afrikaners i'rom the Cape 
Province spoke in similar vein. ::3 A national flag, 
they said, should be acceptable to all sections, they 
should ttierei'ore wait until the two white races couLl. agree;9 
forcing the measure would destroy racial goodwill and set 
10 the co1..mtry back for years; the Government should 
recognize the intensity and spontaneity of the feelings 
against the measure. 11 And both Malan and Hertzog were 
blamed :fo:r the prevailing unhappy situation. 12 
'1'houc5·h the reading saw calls for order and frequent 
interrupt Lons, in keeping with the Government's des.ire to 
expedite the reading 1 there was no reply from its benches. 
Within two hou~s the speeches ended. When the Speaker 
put the question, thv Opposition Whip called for a 
7. Hansar._g_, vol. 9, _J6J9-J64J. 
8. These \vBre G.H. Nicho.lls (Zululand), Tbid. ,, 36l+J-J6l.i-8; 
Majo?.:' G.B. van Zyl (Cape Town, Harbour), J648-J651; 
G.S. van Heerden (Cradock), Jb51-J65'2; Major A.M. 
Miller lDurban, Point)f J652-J65J; Brig.-Gen. w. 
Arl1ott Natal Coast), 365_'3-J654; Sir Thomas Watt (Dun-
dee), ~3J5l+.-J657. 
9. Jbi_ri•, vc.1.n Zyl, J649; vnn .Hcerden, 3651; Miller, 3653. 
1). Ibir!,., van Zyl, J650-1; van Heerden., 3651; Arnott, 
3634; Watt, 3654. 
11. Ibid_., Miller, J65J; Arnott, 3653. 
12. ill£., Nicl~olls, 3'5l+5; va.ri. zyl, 3648; 
Heerden 7 J'=>.51-2 and Arnott, 3651~. 
see also van 
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divisio:'1. and amid derisive s.A.P. cheers, Labour 1 s Members 
crossed to join the Nationalists. By seventy-two votes to 
fifty-o:'1.e the Bill was accepted f'irst as introduced, and 
thea as read .. The seco,1.d reading was set down for 23 May.13 
Protests against the Bill between the first and second 
readings, 17-23 ·MaY.. 
The week between the first and second readings saw a 
cont.Lrn1ation of those features that had marked the period 
immediately before the first reading. Once more there 
were strong editorials, protest meetings and resolutions o:f 
support. However>, one new feature to emerge, and which 
was to exacerbate feelings, was the call f'o:r a nation-wide 
orga11ization to ::,:-ival tho Flag Orga.11.ization. 
The co:1.duct o:f Members 0:".1 the Government benches pro-
vided a fresh source of attack for O?position newspapers. 
On tho day aI'tor tho reading, The Friend com9lained that 
the speeches had been received with laughter and jeers 
while the Cap,2 T.ime s ·accused Hortzoe; o:f 'studied insolence' 
for 'o.:3tontatiously rt~arl.ing' while S1n-.1ts and others spo~<e. 
In words tha~ betrayed the general temper, it added: 
Yesterday there was hardly a Nationalist Member 
who did not ope!1ly exult in the power which the 
Pact has to ~rvom1d the fee.lines of South Ai'ricant:i 
who disagr~le with it. The ugliest enjoyment of 
their ruthless use of this pcr~er sho:".1.e in the 
13. Hansard, vol. 9~ 3657-3659. 
JOO 
faces of these men, disfigured with hatred and 
scorn and malice ..... watching their faces ycc;ter-
dc1.y, it was terrible to think that they must 
indeed be typical of a large proportion of the 
people of this country. 
Because much criticism had been devoted to the ~lag's 
dnsign in the previou.3 six weeks, the referendum proposals 
attracted £ar more 1 l-1-at tent :i. on. Doth The Star and Rand 
D3.ily Mail 1 5 insisted that a minimU!n nwnber of votes 
The Star suggested two-thirds of those cast should be 
required for the approval of the flag measures. But the 
bulk of the opposition's criticism of the referendum 
centred ro1md the phrasing of its ballot paper's question. 
It argued that a single •yest or 'no' answer had to be 
16 give:i to a question which was in. fact not one, but many: 
It asked the voter whether he was in favour of a national 
flag which would consist of design no.2; whether he 
was in favour of the Union Jack being flown separately as a 
symbol of the British association; and whether he was in 
favour of this association being celebrated o~ the 
specified days? Several 3.1'1.swers were thus possible~ A 
voter might approve of a national flag, disapprove of the 
14. Before the first reading, very few criticisms had dealt 
with the referendwn. See, however, Ons Land, 11 May 
1927, which complained that a re.ferendu..'11 would be worse 
than a furious general election. 
15. 17 and 18 May 1927, respectively. 
16. The question was: 'Do you approve o:f sections three 
and four of' the South African Nationality and Flae Act 
as printed below?' Section three dealt with the 
occasions on which the Union Jack would be flown and 
sect.io~ four de.t'ined the design. (A 52-27, p. 12.,) 
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design, approve o:f the defined symbolism of the Union .Jack, 
a,.d disapprove of the days provided for it;:; displayo The 
Pretoria News wanted to know whether the question's 
phrasing was the resul.t of Malan' s carelessness, ior a 
slim manoeuvre to bamboozle the electors'. 1 7 Both the 
Cape Times and Sunday Times had no qualms about calling 
the referendum a 'fal~e,. 18 
Criticisms of the referendum's wording and its 
provision for a majority decision were related by the 
opposition press to the question of secession. Thus, on 
18 May the Rand Daily Mail stated that the involved 
p!l.rasing o:f the referendum's provisions merely deepened 
the suspicion of' the Government's motives; and the Sund~ 
Ti1!1.£.§. asked, 'if the Union Jack is to be virtually wip~ 
Q.Ut of' existence ip. South A t'rica by a bare ma.j ori ty this 
year, what is to prevent South Africa itself from being 
wiped <lli:L_of existence as a member of the British Common-
wealth of Nations by a bare majority next year, or some 
f'uture~te? ' That, it said, was the real issue at stake 
:for the republicans whom the Bi.11 was intended to placate •19 
From December 1926, when the Nationalists had 
acclaimed the report of the Imperial Conference, fear o:f 
17. Cape Argus, 20 May 1927, citing Pretoria News. 
18. 18 and 22 May 1927, respectively. 
190 22 May 1927. Italics in original. 
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secession had largely subsided. 20 Now it bega.'1. to grow. 
But it was the GovernmentVs llllremitting pursuit of the 
co~tentious Bill as a whole, rather than its controversial 
referendum proposal £Gr se, that caused re-emergence of 
this apprehension. As the Bill's opponents could see no 
u~gent need to press the measure, it came to be held by 
some that it m1.1st hide an ulterior motive such as 
secessiono Particularly The Star and Cape Argus took 
this view, 21 as when the latter warned that in raising the 
flag issue 'almost before the echoes of the great secession 
controversy have died away', Hertzog and his colleagues 
were fomenting suspicion. The exclusion of' the Union Jack 
from the national flag made sense, it said, when seen as 
the first step towards secession 'Ly a new and more devious 
22 
ro:itc'• 
In the 1r:iain, however, the opposition press arraigned 
the Government on earlier charges. Accordingly the Pact 
leaders were denotu1ced, the Labour Party rebuked, the 
20. There was a brie~ revival of the issue in March, when 
J.H.H. de Waal, M.P. for Piquetberg, expressed pro-
republican sentiments in the Assembly (Hansard, vol. 8, 
1658, 21 March 1927; T.h,..e Star, 22, 23 March 1927; 
Rand Daily Mail, Natal Witne.ss - 23 March 1927). 
See also The-~~, 25 April 1927, for the expression 
of strong suspicions of a relationship between the 
desire for a clean flag and secession. 
2 ·1 ~ In the two weeks before the first reading, they were 
among the few newspapers to relate the Bill to secession. 
See Cape Argus, 6 May 1927; The Star, 13 May 1927. 
22. 16 May 1927. See also The St~, 17, 19 May 1927. 
JOJ 
Government's arguments dismissed. as insincere and the 
pressing of the Bill declared to be a 'political crimei. 23 
Yet if the same issues were raised, the tone in which they 
were handled had become general1.y sharper, and in Natal, 
the press remained de-f'iant. In thousands o.f homes in 
Natal the Natal _Advertiser warned, the youth would :from 
then on be taught that there was but one flag worthy of' the 
24 
sacrifice of one's life the Union Jack. And on 17 
May the Natal Mercury threatened that if the Government 
refused to obtain a 'clear' majority for its 'revolutionary 
change, Natal will not hesitate to trample under her feet, 
any banner of' hate with which little Afrikanderisrn vainly 
endeavours to replace the national flag of the people.' 
In the week between the two readings, protest meetings 
continued unabated. Durban's re-dedication meeting a few 
hours before the first reading, was followed a few hours 
after the gatherin~ by a mass protest meeting in the Cape 
Town City Hall. An 'enormous' audience crammed the Hall, 
giving vent to its feelings by fervent singing. When the 
strains of' 'The Red, White and Blue' were heard, •the 
whole assembly jumped to its feet. ' Enthusiasm was 
intense. The demand for tho i.ncJ.usion of the Union Jack 
23. See Cape Argus, 16, 17, 18 May 1927; 
1927; The Friend, 18 May 1927; Ca,12e 
May 1927. 
The Star, 17 May 
Times, 1 7, 1 8, 20 
24. Die Burger, 19 and 21 May 1927, citing Natal Advertiser. 
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and for a flag by consent was approved unanimously. It 
was a meeting Yin such deadly earnest that there seemed a 
palpitating tension in the atmospherev. 2 5 Three days 
after the meeting the London TimEJ:..§. reported: ta most 
impressive meeting of protest •• othe finest of the kind 
ever he:Ld in Cape Town. It was crowded to the doors, 
orderly, enthusiastic and resolute•. 
At Simonstown, the protest meeting was roused •to the 
utmost enthusiasm' by a local clergyman who declared that 
the time for words was rapidly passing and that action was 
required: the soul of their existence was being threatened. 
And at Rondebosch, a speaker declared that Die Burger in 
printing a placard which stated that the first shots in the 
flag war had been fired, had stated the truth: 'And that 
war is civil wart. Malan had brought a sword among them 
and he who b1'ought tho menace of war to the cowitry was a 
traitor. 26 
Protest meetings also took place at other centres 
which includ0d Uiten~age, Queenstown, Vryburg, Mossel Bay, 
Pietersburg, Umtata and East London. 2 7 East London's 
meeting was •absolutely packed to the doors'; even Komgha 
enjoyed a •very large and enthusiastic meetingi. 28 Most 
25. Soe Cape Ti.mes, Cape Argu2_, The Star - 17 May 1927. 
26. Cape Argus, Q.~ee Times - 21 May 1927. 
27. CaRe Time~, 19, 20, 21, 23, 24 May 1927; The Star, 18, 
20, 21, 23 May 1927; Die Burger, 21 May 19270 
28. Cape Times, 23, 24 May 1927; The Star, 21 May 19270 
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of the larger centres in Natal had already protested. 29 
Howover, Ladysmith's meeting, where the first part was 'of 
30 
a religious nature', took place on 21 May,· the same day 
on which the London Times reported that protest meetings 
were continuing in the villages of Nata1.3 1 
As before, then, the main centres of protest had been 
in the Cape Province and Natal. These meetings were not, 
however, the only forms of protest. Several s.A.P. 
branches in the Transvaal and Cape Province had, since 
mid-April, expressed support for their Party's stand and 
protested against the Flag Bill. Branches at Turffontein 
and von Brandis (in April), and Troyeville, Middelburg 
(Transvaal), Langlaagte and Cradock (immediately before or 
after the first reading), all called for a flag by consent 
or withdrawal of the Bill .. 32 In Mala.n's constituency of 
Calvinia, tho Cape Times reported that a S .. A.Po meeting, 
attended by Afrikaans-speakers only, refused on 21 May to 
approv-e of any flag that did not include both the Union 
29. See pp. 281 ff. Durban had arranged to hold a protest 
meeting on 25 May .. 
JO. The Star, 23 May 1927; Natal Witness, 25 May 1927. 
J1. See SoP. vol. 37, no. 162, resolution from Isipingo 
Beach township, 20 May 1927; The Star, 23 May 1927, 
Port Shepstone. A public meeting also condemned the 
Flag Bill at Weenen; however no date was given for the 
meeting (Hansard, vol. 9, 4282, JO May 1927). 
J2. The Star, 26 April, 14, 16, 19, 21 May 1927; Rand fl&l_y 
Mail, Cape Times - 20 May 1927; S.P. vol. 38, no. 127, 
Turffontein branch resolution. (The von Brandis branch 
re-passed a January resolution.) 
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Jack .:md the Vierkleurs. JJ Similarly, the Witwatersrand 
Executive Co1mcil of the Women's s.A.P., which claimed to 
represent 1 400 members, appealed for a flag that included 
the Vierkleurs and Ytbat flag upon which the SWl never 
SC t S 1 • J4 
The patriotic societies channelled their efforts in 
the period inunediately before and after the first reading 
chiefly into the protest meetings in whose calling and 
organization they played a leading part. Indeed, at 
least six months earlier, the Flag Organization had decided 
to promote and co-ordinate public demonstration against the 
Bill, when it came before Parliament, and to seek publicity/5 
However, the societies also expressed their views outside 
the medium of protest meetings. Accordingly, before the 
first reading, a combined meeting of local patriotic 
societies in Ladysmith re-affirmed its opposition to the 
Bill, while the Co-ordinating Council of Patriotic Societies 
of South Africa sent a letter calling for the inclusion of 
the Union Jack to all M.P.'s.3 6 Branches of the Empire 
Group in Durban and JohaJU1esburg passed resolutions 
33 o Cape Times, 2l~ May 1927. 
34. The Star, 18 May 1927; Die Burger, 24 May 1927. 
35. Frema:ntle Collection, YMinutes of meeting, at Bloem-
:f'ontein on 29 September 1926, o1~ the S.A. Flag Committee', 
Rees to Frema.ntle, 18 November 1926 and JO May 1927; 
The Sta~, 10 May 1927, P• 12. 
J6. The Star, 12 May 1927; Die Burger, 1J May 1927; Cap.£_ 
Argus, 16 May 1927. The Co-ordinating Council also 
appealed to be heard at the bar of the House on the 
subject of a national f'lag (SoP• vol. JS, no. 117, 18 
May 1927). 
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demanding the incorporation of the lfuion Jack and sent 
these on to M.P.•s. 3 7 Tho Group itself telegraphed the 
Premiers of Britain and the Dominions and despatched an 
appeal to the London Times: 
Tell England the :first stage of the attempt to 
lower the~ Union Jack in South Africa is set for 
Monday May ·16. Our hearts are sad at the 
tho~ght that a British Government will stand by 
and witness the great betrayal, and fw<:;] look 
with confidence to the people of England to rise 
in their might a~d help us.JS 
After the Bill's introduction, Bloemt'ontein represent-
atives of the local patriotic societies jointly rejected 
the Bill,39 a move soon followed ;::>y the Grand President of 
the s.o.E. who passionately protested that the expulsion of 
the Union Jack from their daily life amounted to an act of 
secession and warned that they were approaching a •rormid-
able crisis in the national life•. Mass meetings, he said, 
.had already 1:::een held in twenty-six centres and bee:n 
attended ~y 24-25 000 people. The figure was not complete 
and further protest meetings wore still to take pl.ace in 
Joha1U1esburg, Durban and other centres. Any attempt to 
wrench the Union Jack.from them might be followed by 
40 
'calamitous cons,equence s'. 
37. 3 1 P. vol. JS, no. 40, 10 May 19'27; Tue Star, 5, 13 May 
1927; Die Burger, 13 May 1927; E.G. Jansen Paryers, 
vo.l. 573, telegram to E.G. Jansen, 11 May 1927. 
JS. The Star, 14 May 1927. 
39. §_.P. vol. 39, no. 369, 21 May 1927; The ~, 21 May 
1 927; Cape Tim~, 23 :\fay 1 927. 
4). ~ay Time_§,, 22 May 192'7; 
Burger - 23 May 1927. 
Caue Times, Cape Argus, Die 
J08 
Nationalist agi taJ.::h.£!1 between the r~adings 
The Nationalist offensive in support of the Bill took 
a similar i.f less intense form. Its newspapers supported 
tho Bill, Party branches resolved in favour of it 1 an,1 
wheels wer,~ sot in m,yt;j_on to establish a~'1. organization to 
support the Flag Bil] .• 
On the day af~er the .first reading, all three 
!JationalL,t newspapers played down the Opposition spoeches, 
Die Burger de scribing them 3.S a wearisome repetition. of 
tedious platitudes, and Die Volkablad declared: 
van die hel2 toespraak getuie van 'n papbroekige 
'Die toon 
Smu-::;siaa.nse konsiJ.iasiegees waa-rvan die volk alreeds sat is.i 
Editorial emphases, however, differed. Whereas Ons Vade.£::. 
~, on 17 ::md :20 May, emphasized that the Opposition was 
using the J'lag is"lue purely for election purposes, and 
tb,cire:fore r,:.,-t:ailed the occasions be tween 1919 and 1921 on 
which Smutc:o and the S.A..P. had allegedly stated that they 
\vcre in f'avour oi' a clean flag, it.5 Nationa.list con.tern-
poraries stressed the co~stitutional issue, maintaining 
that the Union Jack ·,.,,-·as really wanted as a symbol o:f the 
Unio:1.ts suho:rd.L1.ation to Britain. 41 
Addition~lly, tho Nationalist press maintained that 
th,ci Government had done its bost to compromise, that th0 
Union Jack did arou~o painrul n8marios, that the proposed 
desl_;::;:is which .inc.ludcd the Union Jack and former republican 
41. Die Volksbl~d, 16 May 1)27; Die 13.urgeJ:., 1 7 May 1 927. 
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colours were impractica1:)le they resembled a Malay 
maid's headcloth and that Smuts's contention that 
agreement should precede the introduction of' a contentious 
1.,.2 
measu:r-e -.vould concle.m1 any Government to impotency. In 
all events, the Government was not forcing the issue since 
the referandu.n would decide the matter, 
dwn ',vas perfectly fair. 43 
and this referen-
La3tly, Die Bu.rgor argued that by oppo.::;ing the Dill at 
its introductory stage, that is, even before its contents 
had been debated, the S.A.Po had proved that it wanted no 
national flag at all. When the Cape Times vigorously 
assailed Die Burger for 'lying', the latter insisted that 
its contention was correct: The Pitchers and Nicholls of 
So'.lth Africa hari denied the Union's constitutional right to 
its own f'lag; indeed, a league had been formed in Natal 
Hhose members would swear never to acknowledge a'1.y flag 
other than tl.1.e Un.ion ,Jack. Smuts, the S.AoP., indeed all 
those who opposed tho Government's Bill, were grouped 
together as 'die vyande van Suid Afrika' 0 
41
-t-
Against the backgro•.1.nd of the opposition's protest 
meetings, Nationalist Party branches continued to pass 
----
L~2. pi" Hurg~, 17 May 1927; Ons Vaderland, 1 '7 ' 20 May 
---
1927. 
43. Die Burger, 17 May 1927; Die Volksblad, 21 May 1927. 
4li. Die Bur~e • .r, 1 7, 21 May 1927; CaEe Times, 20 May 19270 
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resolutiona su~porting the Bill. However, a3 before the 
first reading, the great majority of these came from 
bra'lches in the Cape Province. Of the eighty-five 
resolutions passed in the six weeks before the first 
reading, . 45 Pighty-one had arrived from the Cape ProvJ.nce& 
Only two had come from the Transvaal, and one each from the 
46 State a'1.d Natal. For a measure that was partly 
justified 0::1 the grou::1.ds that it was demanded by people 
thro1.1gh0l.1t South Africa, this response was undoubtedly an 
emharcassmento From the start of the controversy the 
opposition had maintained that there was no large scale 
demand f'or the Bill; at the beginning of May the Natal 
Witness, :for instance, argued that the lack o:f public 
support for the Bill fro~ Natio~alists proved that the bulk 
of Af'rikan.ers were not interested in the attempt to exclude 
h7 the Onion Jack. 
45. Die Bu!:£..~, 4-7, 9-14, 16-17 May 1927. Seven of the 
total had been passed by women ts brancho s (Ibid. 12, 14, 
16, 17 May 1927). 
Between January and March 1927 only three branches 
appear to ~ave resolved in favour of pressing the Bill; 
these were Barberton (Ibid. 16 March 1927), Bosk.loof 
(Caledon) and Pretoria (H.P. vol. 28). 
46. They were from Potgietersrust and Standerto:c1., in the 
Transvaal, Dealesv.ille, in the Free State, and Pieter-
maritzburg (Womenis bra':1.ch) in Natal (Die Burger._, 12 
May 1927). 
47. J May 1927. See also Watt's assertio~ that most 
Afrikaners were indiff'erent towards the flag question 
and the attempt of Die Volksblad on 23 April to rebut 
this view on the grounds that Afrikaners, ibeskou die 
saak as te ernstig en te heilig om op die hoeke van die 
strate daaroor te staan en skreeu.ij 
The establis~"t...2.f. Our Own Flag 01:e,:apizati.9.n. 
In the Cape P:::'.'ovince, Mala:1.' s and ~urger 1 s 
influence had unquestio:iably gone a long way towards 
stimulating Party branches to act, but no equivalent 
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stimulus had operated elsewhere. In the Transvaal, Roos 1 s 
lack o.f' enthusiasm for the measure was well known. In the 
Free State, Roos's coolness was probably tho~ght to be 
shared by Havenga, who had made no public co:nment on the 
sub.ject. Though Hertzog was supporting the measure, his 
public utterances on. the subject had been designed to con-
ciliateo Many NationaliAts in the Free State and Trans-
vaal also probably suspected that there was some truth to 
the Opposition's frequent contention that Hertzog, Roos and 
Havenga 1~avoured the postponement of' the Bill, but were 
being forced to support Malan. 
In view oi' the vigour of' the oppositio~Rs protest and 
the lack o:f response from Nationalists in the northern 
Provinces, it seemed desirable to some of the Bill's 
champions to awaken more widespread public support f'or the 
Bill. This might be don.e through a nation-wide organiza-
tion that would act both as a cowiter-prossure group to the 
Flag Organization and patriotic societies and as a 
mobilizer of supporters in the referendum. Not surpris-
ingly, the f'ir2t pui.)lic intimation that such an organization 
might be established came from Die Burgor, 48 when at the 
48. Its editor, Dr~ A.L. Geyer, was soon to be a foundation 
member of' the oreanizationts Central Committee. 
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end of April it declared that aE a result of the latest 
dcV<'! lopmeo1t ~, the establishment of an organization to work 
for their own flag was being strongly urged. The silence, 
f0r 1vhict1 there may have been good reaso:: in the past, was 
bnin,ri; mi sunclc::.· stood by their oppo:nen t 3 who in tcrpreted it 
as a ::::ign of irre 3ol1d;ion and weakness. Those who were in 
favo~r of an organization were enjoined to remain patient a 
l.ittle longer and to 'hou jul kruit droog en julself 
ge:::eed 1 ' 
Two ·N°eeks later, immediately after the :first reading, 
South .Africans learnt that a new :flag organization was 
being formod. Known as '0ns Eie Vlag Organisasie/Our Own 
Flae; Ore;anizationt (herer.1fter cited as O.OoF,O.); it was to 
con:-~ist of' a central corrnnittce which would institute 
provincial co.mnittoes throughout the provinces. The nameE 
of' the members of tho central a~1.d provincial committees 
were to be aru1ounced soo•1., and there was to be an appeal 
.for f'unds. The '.loclarcd object o:f the organization was to 
propagandi zc throughout the com1.try in favour of' the Govern-
m::mt' s F'lag Bill, but 'outside the realm of' party politics' 
and with both races rep:rcs,)nted on its com:nittcos. 49 
l.:-9. C~I?O A.:t:£:~.:J, P..1..£?. n.u_:r.:g(;r., Die Vo.Lksblad - 17 May 1927. 
l'be first meotin[; of tho Central Committee took place 
in Cape Town on 1J May 1927. Present were Dr A.L. 
Geyer, Prof'essor ,J .J. Smith and Hrs H.J. Conradie 
f0r the Cape Province; Goneral J. Piena::1r, Mrs H.D. 
van Droekhuizen f'or the Transvaal; Dr N Q,J. van d£•r 
Me.r.ve f'or the Free State; T. G" Strachan ror 
No.tal. Smith was elected Chairman a...--i.d he together with 
GeyAr anrl. Dr T.F.o D~nges (both of Die Bu:~:.-~er) constituted 
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Two day:; later, the Central Committee puhlished a 
f'ightinc; manifesto over the prestigious n:-tm0 of the widow 
of the ex-,Prc.~~idPnt 01· the Pree State, Mrs :rvr.T. Steyn. 
Addre3secl to tall South Af'ricans, English- as well as 
Dutch-speak.int::', it declared, in nationalistic idiom, that 
the proposed flae met all the requirements for the Union's 
national flag: it recognized the cot.U1try•s independent 
status and true friendship with Great Britain, and stood 
for peace, a united South Africa, just treatment of her 
Native population in accordance with the highest principles 
01· we stern civilization and a genuine patriot.ism coupled 
with national pride. Had they loftier ideals than these 
to f'ight for? If not, it was their sacred duty to them-
selves and to subsequent generatio::-Ls -i.;o support the move-
ment for their own flag. UnfortlUlately, though their 
independent status required a national flag, 'the enemies 
of South Africa, the instigators of racial hatred', would 
not have it. They wanted to k0ep Sonth Africa dependent, 
and for thr1.t re::ison, exp.loited the J ogitimate love of 
Entslish-speakors for the Union Jack. The specious argu-
men~s of 'the enemies of South Africa' must not mislead 
tbom: 'Wees wakk.erl Werk! OrgaYJiseerl J 1 '50 
tho Pnblication Committee. N,J. van de:r:_ Merwe Papers, 
vo_t. 2, 'Notule van die• oerste vergadering van die 
sentrale k.ommissie wat }T\ver vir die aanname van die 
rogering vlagontwerp, cehou in die parlomentsgebou op 
Vrydag 1J Mei 1927 om 8.JO n.rn.• 
50. Th~. Star,:, The Friend, Cane Argus, Die Burger, :gie Volks-
)?laq_ 19 May 1927. 
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Strong and immediate support came from Die Burger on 
19 May and from Die Volksblad. On the day after the 
announcement of the organization's establishment, the 
latter declared that it was time Afrikaners in the Free 
State began to bestir themselves over the flag question. 
It appealed to them to form connnittees which would pass 
strong resolutions and show that Afrikaners were in 
earnest over the flag, correcting the impression that the 
flag idea 'net in die brein van 'n klein minderheid broei'. 
Women were encouraged to assist. 
Daar mag nie uitgestel word nie. Suid Afrika 
staan op 'n kritieke tydstip in sy ontwikkelings-
geskiedenis. Hy het elke ware Suid-Afrikaner en 
elke opregte patriot nodig in hierdie stryd. 
Die een seksie veg vir oorheersing, die ander vir 
sy volksbestaan, en ons will vertrou dat die volk 
die erns van die aangeleentheid sal insien. 
Organiseer dusl Staan bymekaar en praat, so dat 
die res van Suid Afrika kan verneem wat the Vry-
staat te s~ het I 
The establishment of the organization, the encourage·-
ment of' certain individuals.5 1 and the publicity and 
excitement surrounding the first reading doubtless contri-
buted to the greater response of Nationalists to the Flag 
Bill in the week between the first and second readings. In 
the Transvaal, Nationalist Party branches responded with 
some ten resolutions supporting the Bill; in the Free State 
some fifteen were forthcoming~ and in the Cape Province, 
51. For example see Die Volksblad, 11 May 1927, Senator 
W.J.C. Brebner and DrH.J.Steyn (Mayor of Bloemf'ontein); 
Natal Witness, 12 May 1927. 
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over .fi.ftyo 52 Thus about three-quarters of the branch 
resolutions passed in favour of' the Bill since April had 
come from the Cape Province.53 It seemed that much work 
remained for O.OoF.Oo in the northern Provinces. Still 
the areas or re:-;ponse had broadened and f'or Malan and 
other ard~nt advocates of the Bill these resolutions must 
have been a welcome encouragement and counterbalance to the 
protests of the opposition.54 
The appearance on the political scene of a body to 
rival the Flag Organization, wa:.:; bound to heighten tension. 
Mor0.over, its timing it appeared in the week between 
the first and second readings helped to aggravate feel-
ings as did the wording of its manifesto. Particularly 
its identification of the opponents of the Bill with •the 
enemies of South Af'rica' gave offence. Commenting on the 
flag question on 20 May, the day after the manifesto's 
publication, The Friend alleged that the Government's 
52. Die Burger, 17, 18, 21-24, 26, 27, 29, JO May 1927; 
~Volksbla-9., 18, 2J, 26 May 1927; P. s, M, I. vol. J; 
H.P. vol. 28. 
The date of the passing of a resolution was not al-
ways published; as a few days to several weeks could 
elapse between its passing and its publication, it has 
not always been possible to determine with certainty 
whether the resolution was passed between 17 and 2J May. 
53. See p. 310 for resolutions passed before the first 
readin~. 
54. Public meetings in support of the Bill were held in two 
places, Reddersburg and Boshof (Die Volksblad, Die 
BurgeF. - 2J May 1927). 
supporters had begun propaganda to confuse the issue: an 
attempt was being made, and would be intensified as the 
controversy progressed, to persuade Afrikaners that English-
speakers opposed the principle of a national flag and were 
theref'ore anti-South African. This was not true, it 
protested. The protest of the Cape Times, on the same day 
and against the same allegation, could hardly have been 
~tronger: 'grossly misleading', a 'bold and barefaced lie', 
ta false assumption, a lying accusation', were some of the 
terms used. Politicians, such as Malan and van der Merwe, 
with their 'helot-paper', Die Burger, were labouring night 
and day to persuade the backveld that opposition to the 
Government's flag design was opposition to a national flag 
for South Africa. iThey continue repeating their lie, 
knowing that it will have a fair run through the country 
districts of South Africa and will never be caught up. 
All the same the lie is deliberate and reiterated'. As 
for the statement that the opponents of the flag wished to 
keep South Africa dependent on Great Britain, their 
Dominion status had been won on the battlefields of the 
Great War by Afrikaans- and English-speaking South Africans, 
by soldiers who in their lifetime were 
slandered, vilified and traduced by the very men 
who now claim to be the only South Af'ricans with 
'lofty ideals., •••• For their love of South Africa 
they fought and died. How can Dr Malan, a Party 
politician, set his patriotism up in comparison 
with theirs? They died to vindicate the unity ot' 
the two white races of South Africa. He lives 
to brandish a sword of division between themo 
They died for the Union Jack as a symbol of that 
freedom which South Africa has m1der the British 
J17 
Crown. He lives to whet his hatred of the Union 
Jack at any cost in disllllion, enmity, discord 
between tho races. They died, Dutch and En.glish, 
side by side, in quixotic oblivion of each others 
race. He lives to insult those of his own blood 
wllo dare to oppose him ••••. 5'.> 
Thu j_denLification of' thosn who opposed the Bill with 'the 
Pnemic.s of' South Af'ricat did not escape Smuts. He, his 
wife and all thoce who opposed the Nationalists' flag, he 
wrote to Mrs Smuts, had been branded in the manif'esto as 
the enemies of South Africa. 
is die vy:.mde van Suid Afrikai 
.-;6 
•Begryp jou nou jy en ek 
Dit is waar dinge 
twengarin. i ~ 
In its last edition bof'oro the second reading The Sta£_ 
ob.served that seldom had conditions been worse for clear 
thinking and sensible action. 
rearlin G bcc;an, Smuts comp la.irwd: 
And, on the day the second 
1With wise guidance under 
General Botha, our w1.itl:d people weathered every storm, but 
within three y<:~ars a:Cter tho Nationalist ;:tdvent the country 
i.s seethlng with wild excitement and torn asunder by racial 
div~sions as never beforc.157 
-----------·--------------·----
Seo also Cape Argu~, 2J May 1927. 
56. s!..£.!. vol. J9, no. ·1'1-8, 18 May 1927 • 
. ~7. Ibid. no. ·1.57, to Sir Edgar Walton, 2J May 1927. 
CHAPTER Xll 
THE SECOND READING OF THE FLAG BILL, MAY - JUNE, 1927 
Main themes of the 0_2£osition speeches 
The second reading proved memorable. Starting on 23 May, 
it continued intermittently for seven sittings. Every Opposition 
Member who was able to be present, la spoke against the Bill. 
In the first week of the debate, that is between Monday and 
Friday, 23 - 28 May, only three days could be devoted to the 
measure. Nevertheless, the most important speeches, including 
the chief ministerial contributions which provided the highlights 
of the reading, were made during this period, and it is 
therefore convenient to consider it separately. 
la. Altogether fifty-six Members spoke of whom forty-eight belonged to 
the S .A. P. Only three of the Opposition speeches drew attention 
to the nationality clauses of the Bill, the most important of these 
being that of C. P. Robinson who was suspicious of the provisions 
for the renunciation of South African citizenship ( especially those 
absent from the corresponding Canadian Act) and maintained that 
dual nationality would create many problems (Hansard, vol. 9, 
4034-4042). His misgivings were not generally shared. 
In a caucus meeting the previous month, Smuts, while compliment-
ing Robinson on his careful study of the nationality clauses of the 
Bill, said he thought the position was safe, as in order to get 
South African nationality one had first to be a British subject (Stanford 
faee!:e..., D 56, 5 April 1927). ---
Outside Parliament, only the Empire Group expressed concern 
at the nationality legislation and was taken to task for its criticisms 
by the opposition press. 
For a full list of the Members of the House of Assembly see pp. 701-3. 
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Before proceeding to the main speeches of this week, 
however, it is advisable to deal collectively with the some 
twenty-five speeches made against the Bill during these three 
days, for they constituted the backbone of the debate. 
Though the content of the speeches of Afrikaans- and 
English-speaking Members of the Opposition overlapped, 
there were certain differences. Afrikaans-speakers 
stated frankly that they opposed the Bill not because 
they loved the Union Jack, but because they loved their 
own flags, and they denied feeling inferior before the 
lb Union Jack. They also challenged the assertion that 
Nationalists spoke for the whole of the Dutch section. 
Hertzog had not received a mandate from all of it and 
Malan should not forget that in the 1924 general election 
the Nationalists had received 113 000 votes to the S.A.P. 's 
149 000 - the Nationalists' claim to represent all 
2 
Afrikaners was false. It should also not be forgotten 
that under the 'borrowed' Union Jack they enjoyed as 
many privileges as they had ever had. To meet the 
wishes of those who had been 'noble and generous' towards 
them was only fair. Every 'jot and tittle' of the 
lb. Hansard vol.9, 4029, 4031, Col.-Cdt. W.R. Collins (Ermelo); 
4180, Lt.-Col. H.S. Grobler (Bethal); 4059, Reitz. 
2. Ibid. 4031, Collins; 4059, Reitz; 4243, L. Geldenhuys 
(Johannesburg, North). 
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of the conditions laid down at Vereeniging had been 
carried out by the victors, but were they, the former 
vanauished, in removing the Union Jack, carrying out 
their promises? 
3 in the face. 
That was a question they should look 
Similarly, English-speakers did not claim to love 
the former republican flags, but, repeatedly, they 
emphasized their respect for them. They denied that 
the Union Jack was a symbol of oppression, that the 
protest meetings had been fomented by politicians, and 
that the S.A.P. had been uncompromising - to call them 
obstinate because they refused to compromise on an 
4 
essential point was to strain the meaning of words. 
5 
Suspicion of republicanism was again raised and Labour 
Members were assailed for political expediency and 
6 betrayal of their electors. Hertzog, Malan, and 
van der Merwe were also criticized. Hertzog had allowed 
himself to be swayed by extremists and had lost a great 
. 7 
opportunity of bringing harmony to South Africa. Malan 
was attacked for his 'rabid fanaticism', 'vindictiveness', 
3. Hansard, vol.9, 4243,Geldenhuys; 4179,4184, Grabler. 
4. Ibid. 4168,R.H. Struben (Albany); 4167, The Hon. W.A. 
Deane (Umvoti); 4190, Marwick; 4138-9, Sir William 
Macintosh (Port Elizabeth,South); 4158, Chaplin. 
5. Ibid. 4169, 4171, Deane; 4015, 4018, Smartt;4158-9,Chaplin. 
6. Ibid. 4l9lff., Marwick; 4170-1, Deane; 4134-5, Macintosh; 
4044ff. Brig.-Gen. the Hon. J.J. Byron (East London,North). 
7. Ibid. 4015ff., Smartt; 4103,R.H. Struben (Albany); 
4164, E.Buirski (Swellendam). 
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and'perversity' , 8 and van der Merwe for his provocative 
9 
statements and attacks on Natal. 
Yet, despite differences, the content of Opposition 
speeches, whether of English- or Afrikaans-speakers, was 
largely similar. Both demanded the inclusion of the 
Union Jack and former republican flags. Both complained 
h h f d f · d ld lead to di'scord.
10 
tat t ere eren um was un air an wou 
And both denied that the republican flags were dead and 
11 
condemned this as a strategem to exclude the Union Jack. 
One Afrikaans-speaker read telegrams received from former 
concentration camp inmates requesting the inclusion of 
the Vierkleur, another related that the Nationalists 
in his tovm had four years earlier dedicated the Vierkleur 
and handed it over to the Dutch Reformed Church minister 
8. Ibid. 4189-90, Marwick; 4103, Struben. 
9. Ibid. 4168-9, Deane; 4190, Marwick. Van der Merwe had 
allegedly referred to Natal as a 'kaffir and coolie 
location' and, a few days h::fo,.-e the second reading, 
declared that if the Union became a republic the 
proposed flag would not have to be altered in any way 
(see Die Burger, Die Volksblad, Cape Times - 21 May 1927). 
10. Ibid.4167, Deane; 4173, E.Nathan (von Brandis); 4187-8, 
~tuttaford (Newlands); 4161, Chaplin; 4178-9, 4182-3, 
Grobler; 4142, O.R. Nel (Newcastle); 4058-9, Reitz, 
4243ff., Geldenhuys. 
11. Ibid. 4030, Collins; 4167, Deane; 4195-6, Col.Sir David 
Harris (Beaconsfield); 4156, 4158, Chaplin; 4123, 
A.O.B. Payn (Tembuland); 4164, Buirski; 4106, Struben. 
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for safe keeping, and, 'for resurrection when the time 
came' . 
12 The Vierkleur was being'trod on' merely to 
banish the Union Jack, and this banishment, both groups 
insisted, . . 13 was a breach of faith of pre-Union assurances. 
Both warned that exclusion of the Union Jack would alienate 
British territories to the north, sacrificing South 
Africa's position as the 'natural leader' of the southern 
b . 14 k d su continent. And finally, they attac e the Govern-
15 
ment for pressing ahead without a mandate from the people 
and strongly urged Hertzog to postpone or withdraw the Bill. 
Highlights of the first week of the second readin9 
Yet, any account of the main themes of a debate 
must largely fail to convey its fluctuating atmosphere 
and drama, which, in the second reading, had influence 
beyond the confines of the Assembly itself. For, as 
Malan was careful to stress in the opening speech, the tone 
of the debate inside the House would set the tone of the discussion 
12. Hansard, vol.9, 4182, Grobler; 4143, Nel. 
13. Ibid. 4160-1, Chaplin; 4020, Smartt; 4167, Deane; 
4140-2, Nel. 
14. Ibid. 4159-60, Chaplin; 4033, Collins; 4143, Nel. 
15. Ibid. 4182-3, Grobler; 4172, Nathan; 4058, Reitz; 
4243, Geldenhuys. 
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outside it. However, his own example of subdued expression was 
not always followed. Nor was it only S .A. P. back-benchers who 
sometimes fell short. Their intemperate remarks aroused little general 
interest compared to those of Cabinet Ministers. Indeed, the latter's 
addresses, together with those of other Party leaders, were to fall 
with great effect in the House, and, against a background of good, 
bad, and indifferent back-bench speeches, strongly colour the debate 
and mark its points of prominence. 
When Malan rose to move the second reading of the Bill, on the 
afternoon of Monday 23 May, the public galleries were again packed to 
capacity and 'hundreds of people' had to be turned away. Never, the 
press alleged, had public interest in a parliamentary debate 'been so 
keen. Never have speeches been listened to with such avid attention.' 
Every Member who was able to attend was present and an atmosphere 
of the 'tensest excitement' prevailed. Speaking 'very clearly in 
vigorous English' and, 'with the spirit which complete self-conviction 
alone can give', Malan carefully maintained a moderate tone throughout. 16 
Further delay, he said, was not likely to bring agreement; in matters 
involving taste and sentiment discord was to be expected, but this did 
not mean they should remain withqut a national flag. Other 
countries had not. Furthermore, it would be fatal to the acceptance 
16. g~e Times, Die Burger, The Star, Natal Witness - 24 May 1927. 
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of their independence if they remained without one. At the root of 
the nation's trouble lay divided sentiments, and these could be brought 
to an end only by the creation of a new unifying symbol which all 
sections would come to revere. He detailed the Government's efforts 
to effect a solution, complaining that the opposition had 'not budged 
an inch'. Its comparison between South Africa and other Dominions 
was not fair, for here , 'the Union Jack stood for conquest'. The 
closest parallel lay in the experience of the Irish Free State where its 
exclusion had so satisfied Irish sentiment that old wounds were now 
healing. South Africa's experience would be similar. The Union 
Jack would still be flown on certain days when it was desirable to 
signify their relationship with the British community of nations for, 
only as part of the national flag itself was it unacceptable. The 
Government's policy, Malan continued, was not an extremist one, 
and the design was a carefully thought out compromise. As for the 
referendum, it disposed of the objection that an unwilling people 
would have a flag forced on them by Parliament; it would separate, 
so far as it was still possible to do so, the question of a national 
flag from Party politics; and, finally, it would force the Opposition 
to accept the expressed will of the people. 17 
Malan had presented the Government's case clearly, and probably 
17. Hansard, vol.9, 3991-4012. 
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no other member of the Cabinet, the Cape Argus declared the next day, 
could have handled the subject more clearly. Though the sitting continued 
for another five hours, providing a scene that was 'extraordinarily 
animated and dramatic' 1 only one other speech was to arouse a 
comparable degree of interest. After Smartt, who followed Malan, 
had re-iterated S.A.P. objections to the Bill, Hay rose to speak. 
In an atmosphere, 'electric with tension', he assailed his own Party 
and the Bill. He condemned the referendum as unfair, refused to agree 
that their status demanded a new flag, and warned that the Bill re-
aroused fears of republicanism. Whatever Malan might say, it was 
a 'coercion Bill'. 
independence. 
This was the Government's first act of sovereign 
He did not blame the Nationalists, however. They 
had lived up to expectations. 'No, the Labour Party to which I belong, 
is wholly and :3bsolutely responsible for this mad business •..• They 
could have stopped it • It is to them that final responsibility attaches.' 
Hay insisted that the Pact agreement had been broken by pressing the 
Bill and rejected the view that the Afrikaners were a conquered people: 
from the day responsible government had been obtained they had ruled 
the country. So long as they governed constitutionally, preserving 
secured rights, the British section was content. But they would not 
be content to be governed with a rod of iron. They could not be ridden 
with spurs: 'When the general election comes those who sit in the seats 
of the might may remember with sorrow that they put on spurs to rough-ride 
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this country.'18 Hay's denunciation of his Party was heard in almost 
total silence, and the remaining speeches on this day were perhaps 
inevitably less dramatic. 
Two speeches had dominated the first day's sitting and two were 
also to dominate the second - those of Smuts and Havenga. The former 
contained an offer, the latter its rejection. When the debate 
recommenced on Wednesday - once again in an excited House and 
amidst crowded galleries - the first n,ew speaker was Smuts. He 
began by stressing that he would like to keep before the House the 
'larger African point of view'. They should therefore not take any 
decision in this 'grave matter' that would preclude the Union from 
maintaining a united front with the other 'civilized communities' on 
the continent. 
The Union Jack, he said, did not stand for conquest. It had 
once done so. But that was long ago. Ever since Vereeniging the 
British had extended a helping hand. He appealed to those who 
opposed the Union Jack not to identify it with old grievances but 
rather to associate it with British magnanimity. After the Boer War, 
the Union Jack was, 
no longer a flag of injustice, a flag of the conqueror, a flag 
of the superior over the subject race, but always the helping 
hand, always the friend, anxious to help, anxious to extend 
liberty, anxious in every way to further our rights. 
It would be ungrateful if Afrikaners failed to recognize this. 
18. Hansard, vol.9, 4021-28; Cape Argus, Cape Times - 24 May 1927. 
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Because the vast bulk of Afrikaans-speakers had kept faith, South 
Africa today enjoyed equal nationhood in the Empire and in the world. 
Yet even greater than this achievement, was the tradition built up 
between English- and Afrikaans- speakers - a tradition of honour, 
loyalty and co-operation based on the understanding that great national 
issues affecting the races would be settled by consent. 
this tradition was to invite grave danger. 
To depart from 
Smuts agreed that they should have a flag to represent their status 
as an independent nation; but they should remember that the flag should 
also represent certain traditions. The present design did not represent 
Afrikaans-speaking South Africa: 'We Boers have no lot or part in it.' 
As for the English-speakers, it was only fair that they themselves should 
say how they wished to be represented. Even at this late hour it 
was possible to reach agreement, not on a basis of compromise, which 
would merely lead to mutilation, but simply by giving each section 
its due. If agreement could not be reached, they should pause and 
recognize that the time was not yet ripe for a flag. 
Smuts attacked the referendum as a 'dangerous proposal' because 
it did not give a fair choice, while those who voted against it would 
be told they were voting against a national flag. It was also not 
constitutional - the South Africa Act did not provide for it; additionally, 
it would create a precedent enabling a majority to use its force against 
a minority in matters of grave national difference. 
once again 'let loose the dogs of racialism'. 
And , it would 
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The flag was not a matter of tremendous urgency and the Govern-
ment had not received a mandate on the subject. All this suggested 
that the Government should not force the Bill through. Though it 
had been said that the Government's withdrawal of the Bill at this 
stage would be greeted with insults, taunts, and sneers, they 
could rest assured, Smuts said, in proposing an amendment which 
declined to accept the Bill, that this would not be his reaction. 
I say that they will be doing a statesmanlike thing, a 
patriotic thing - something which is wise and fair and 
proper in the interests of this country - and they need 
not fear that there will be any sneers or jeers from me 
on this matter ••.• When they take this step and pause 
and reconsider the whole position it will be the duty of 
all of us, and it will be my duty, to give them such 
assistance as ffeeyin our power in this very difficult 
matter. 
On this note, Smuts ended. 19 
At this stage it would seem that an end to the controversy 
would not have been unwelcome to Smuts. He was concerned at 
the mood that was gripping the country and had become 'benoud 
. h' d' ff · ·20 v ir 1e r 1e a a ire . On 17 May he complained that never 
before had he seen such a spirit of suspicion and resentment in 
the country and three days later was warned: 'A number of private 
1 9 • Hans a rd , v o 1. 9 , 41 0 9 -412 1. 
20. S.P. vol.39, no. 151, to Mrs. Smuts, 23 May 1927. 
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persons .•. have the hatching of a kind of Jameson Raid in their 
minds •.. they are getting the names of those prepared to defend 
the northern part of the Transvaal and Natal if Malan's flag is 
hoisted. •21 Even Forward , whose policy was to play down the 
controversy, declared on the same day that despite its absurdity , 
flag excitement had reached a height of some concern to peace-
loving citizens, 'and hints of civil war have not been entirely 
wanting.' 
Whatever weight Smuts chose to give these rumours, it 
could not be disputed that the 'wild excitement' in some areas 
gave cause for concern and needed to be dampened in the interests 
of nation and Party. An over-excited Party - such as one containing 
a jingoistic wing might become - could be an uncontrollable Party. 
In a letter to Sir Edgar Walton, in which Smuts held Hertzog and 
the Nationalists responsible for the excitement, Smuts urged 
moderation but was careful to draw attention to the danger of extrem-
ists on both sides: 
Hertzog L'.fie said _7 funked standing up to his extremists 
and also funks a General Election. And so this poor 
people are to be distracted and divided over a subject 
involving deep passions •.•. We shall have to do our 
best to calm and pacify public opinion and to prevent 
the extremists on both sides from getting control, for 
in that event everything in this country will be in 
jeopardy once more. 22 
21. S.R_. vol.39, no. 290, to Gillett, 17 May 1927, and vol. 37, no. 20, 
Joan to Smuts ,20 May 1927. Joan§oardmaul was a secretary to Smuts. 
22. Ibid. vol. 39, n0.157, 23 May 1927. See also ibid. no. 145, to Dr 
Edington, 18 May 1927. Walton was chief editor of the Eastern Province 
Herald. 
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Similarly, he appealed to the influential journalist Vere Stent to 
use his journalistic talents towards restraint and moderation so 
that no offence was given 'to the milder section of our supporters' 
for unless they were careful 'we may be seriously weakened by 
extremists' influence. • 2 3 Smuts had to steer a middle course and 
keep the controversy within manageable limits. Excessive jingoism 
could be as harmful to his Party as excessive nationalism to Hertzog's. 
Thus, when Crewe proposed in May that the opposition press should 
make a concerted onslaught on the Bill, Smuts opposed it. Once 
again he enjoined moderation: 'Let the press be firm, but calm and 
unprovocative. The passions are there among the people and will 
soon be boiling over in all directions. •24 
However, Smuts's 'olive branch 125 represented the limits to 
23. S.P. vol.39, no. 178, 30 May 1927. 
Vere Stent was a former editor of the Pretoria News. He was now 
freelancing and had written several jingoistic articles on the flag 
question (see Daily Despatch, 13,16,19,21,23 October 1927). 
These articles were published in a flag pamphlet entitled, A Hundred 
Years of Humbug. A reply to "A Century of Wrong". Open letter to 
South Africans of British Descent. See also Daily Despatch, 10, 24 
June and 13 September 1926, containing 'An open letter to Sir 
William Campbel 1 by Vere Stent··, 'An open letter to my fellow work-
men of the South African Labour Party' and an 'Open letter to my 
Brethren of the Gran::iLodge of the Order of the Sons of England in 
Council', resp. Some of these articles also appeared in the Pretoria News. 
24. S.P. vol. 38, no. 85, John Martin to Smuts, 23 May 1927, and no. 165, 
Smuts to Martin, 28 May 1927. Martin ,who was head of the Argus 
group of newspapers, also opposed the idea. 
25. By this term Smuts meant both his undertaking not to make political 
capital out of the Bill's withdrawal and the S.A.P. 's proposed amendment 
to the Bill in the second reading. This amendment included the assertion 
that it was desirable to adopt a national flag based on a large measure 
of general agreement and which embodied 'as far as possible' the 
historic flags representing the races (Hansard, vol.9, 4121). 
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which his Party allowed him to go at this stage. One may wonder 
whether Smuts believed it to be a practical aid to a settlement. 
With regard to the S.A.P. concession, contained in its amendment, 
that the new flag should embody historic flags of the two races, 
'as far as possible', it would seem that this was never intended 
to concede more than the possible slicing off of edges of these 
flags, possibly in order to avoid overlapping and to fit them into 
d . ·1 1 l' . d 27 a curve or s1m1 ar y 1m1te space. And so far as Smuts's offer 
not to make political capital out of the Bill's withdrawal was concerned, 
did Smuts really believe the Government could withdraw its Bill at 
this stage? It had postponed it two years earlier - in 1925. 
Again in 1926 it had done so. Each postponement had been opposed 
by Malan and been accompanied by cries of indignation from ardent 
supporters of the Bill and firm assurances from the disappointed 
Die Burger and Die Volksblad that postponement in no way meant 
abandonment. These newspapers (and Malan) insisted that the 
Bill would be passed. in the next session; national honour and national 
pride demanded it; failure to do ·so would be tantamount to treachery 
to the volk; to abandon the quest for a national flag was to abandon 
26. That Smuts's offer not to make political capital out of the Bill's 
withdrawal was not popular amongst a significant section of the 
opposition is indicated by the failure to comment on it editorially 
during the reading by The Star, Natal Witness, Daily Despatch 
and Cape Times. 
27. See chapter 14. 
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a cardinal Party principle; the acquisition of a national flag was 
a sacred mission. Most important, postponement of the Bill was 
certain to raise once more the question of Malan 's resignation and 
Its consequences. As we have seen, immediately after the first 
re3ding Jansen declared that the Government had had to carry on with 
the Bill or see itself smashed through internal dissension and the format-
. f bl. 28 10n o a strong repu 1ean party. 
Furthermore, in assessing the loss of face which would inevitably 
accompany the Flag Bill's withdrawal, 29 the Government had to 
take into account the prestige it had already lost amongst supporters 
who, instead of the Indian ~grecment, had expected it to take 
strong action against Asiatics. Hertzog's much vaunted Native Bills 
had yet to reach legislative form. The Government's Iron and Steel 
and Precious Stones legislation would definitely be thwarted in the 
present session. The above increased the Pact's need not to appear 
dispirited or weak. Three months earlier Hertzog had told the flag 
deputation that though there may have been a time when it would 
have been wiser to delay the Bill, the Government could not do so now 
'_,ecause the inevitable inference would be that threats had made it 
2 8. See p. 21 7. 
29. Ironically, Malan maintained that this loss of face would be 
even greater because of Smuts's offer. See below. 
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abandon its goals. 30 Thus warnings of an impending racial clash 
could not stay the hand of the Government. Withdrawal of the Bill 
would bring too great a Joss of prestige and, above all, precipitate 
a dangerous Cabinet cri.sis. 
Smuts must have been aware of the above factors when he put 
forward his 'olive branch'. That it would be rejected was virtually 
certain. However the offer would retain propaganda value. For 
instance, in January and then in April he had been requested by 
opponents of the Bill to give his personal undertaking not to make 
political capital out of the Bill's withdrawal. 31 This he had now 
done and he could therefore claim to have proved his bona fides 
and the Government's intransigence. His offer therefore came 
as a further embarrassment to the Government and its bitterness, 
at what it regarded as a deliberately belated and purely propagandistic 
offer, was very soon revealed. 
. , 32 Smuts thought his address had made a great 1mpress1on. 
Certainly, its 'lofty' tone and sentiments were lauded in the opposition 
30. Fremantle Collectiqn, vol. 9, 'Deputation to the Prime iv1inister 
on the flag quest.ion Thursday, 24 February, 1927.' 
31. See p.235 and Natal Witness, 27 April 1927. 
32. S.P. vol. 39, no. 162, to wife, 28 May 1927. 
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press. But in the House itself, its effect was soon overshadowed 
by a bitter speech from a most unexpected source which took the 
Opposition completely by surprise. Coming during the evening 
sitting, the address was doubtless made after discussion with 
Hertzog and other leading Pactites and betrayed their e m.speration 
with Smuts and disdain for his 'olive branch'. 
Havenga 's high reputation with the Opposition was largely based 
on his moderation and it was hoped that his speech on the Bill would 
be in the same character and perhaps smooth the way towards a 
settlement. Many believed that his attitude towards the Bill was 
lukewarm and that he was being forced to support the measure because 
of Malan 's threat to resign. However, when he began to address 
the House it was evident at once from the bitter tone in which he 
immediately attacked Smuts that a side of him was being revealed that 
was rarely exposed. With a 'pale and set facP., and an intensity of 
feeling which at first gave the appearance of nervousness', 3be began. 
Smuts, he said, had stressed the necessity for give and take, 
but he should not think that he would be able to evade responsibility 
if they failed to reach an agreement. Though he was pleased to learn 
that Smuts was now prepared to co-operate, he regretted that he had 
not come forward to help them out of their difficulties months ago. 
33. Cape Argus, 26 May 1927. 
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For example, when at the end of the last session it became 
necessary to find representatives of all sections to select a design, 
the Opposition had done their best to make it impossible to find a 
representative commission. 
Havenga denied that enthusiasm for a flag was new; Smuts 
himself had stressed the need for a national flag, and, what was 
more, for a flag that did not contain the Union Jack. On 1 December 
1919, he had said at Ventersdorp: 'Dutch- and English-speaking 
South Africans are unanimous that we should have our own Union 
flag. The Union Jack hurt some people, and a change would come 
with thei.r own flag.' And at Paulpietersburg, in 1920, he had told 
a questioner that he was in favour of a clean flag. Smuts interjected, 
accepting the Ventersdorp but rejecting the Paulpietersburg statements, 
and he denied Havenga 's further contention that in 192 0 he (Smuts) 
had believed that it was impossible to get Afrikaners to agree to 
the incorporation of the Union Jack because it would hurt them. 
They had been told, Havenga continued, about the intense 
feeling of the Opposition for the inclusion of the Union Jack, but the 
Opposition should realize the equally intense feeling that no settlement 
was possible with the Union Jack. The real reason for the uncompromis-
ing opposition was that the majority of Smuts's followers did not 
accept the present constitutional position: the English-speakers 
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would really prefer not to become South Africans; they would prefer 
to remain British subjects if they could renounce South African nation-
ality without leaving the country. One Member had claimed the inclus-
ion of the Union Jack as a right. What would he say if they too 
demanded the right to include an unacceptable emblem - such as 
the national monument to the Boer Women at Bloemfontein? 
He had no bitter feelings against the British, but what he did 
resent was the absolute refusal to appreciate their feelings in the 
matter. The design was being opposed not because it failed to recognize 
British traditions and sentiments, but because 'hon. members 
opposite ... think that if that symbol does not appear they will no 
longer occupy a dominent (sic) position in the country.' For that 
reason, if the Government were now to withdraw the Bill, it would be 
treason to South Africa. He supported the Bill because he was convinced 
it contained nothing unfair to English-speakers. Moreover, unless 
a sufficient number of English- speakers supported the Bill, it would 
be rejected at the referendum, and it was therefore wrong to say 
that the Bill would be forced through - the people would decide. 34 
Perhaps it was less the sentiments expressed than the fact that 
it was Havenga who had stated them and, 'with a freezing bitterness 
and a passion long repressed until it had become icy cold', that 
34. Hansard, vol. 9, 4151-4157. 
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stunned the Oppositio,-,. Havenga, the Cape Times reported on 
the following day, had thrown his reputation for moderation to the 
winds and emerged, to the bewilderment of those who had looked 
to him for a lead, as an embittered antagonist of the Union Jack 
and an opponent of any compromise. His bitterness of tone, 
particularly when dealing with Smuts, was stressed: he had rejected 
the latter's overtures 'with something akin to contempt'. Whatever 
hope there may have been of an eleventh hour settlement, declared 
the Cape Argus's parliamentary correspondent, had been destroyed: 
'An evil spirit had entered the House. In a single hour South Africa 
went back thirty years. ' 
But Havenga 's speech was merely the prelude to a far more bitter 
attack on the Opposition on the next day of the reading. The despond-
ency which his speech produced in the Opposition was changed to 
despair two days late~ by Hertzog's three hour 'tirade'. Hertzog's 
address on Friday more than dominated the day; it climaxed the 
week, even the entire reading. The intensity of its passion and 
the bitterness of its personal attacks were perhaps unique in the history 
of the Assembly. Reporting the debate on the following day, the 
Cape Argus's parliamentary correspondent declared that, in the main, 
35. Cape Times, Cape Argus - 2 6 May 192 7. 
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the day had belonged to Hertzog: 
He dominated the sitting to an extraordinary degree. His 
speech alone covered half of the six and a quarter hours 
through which the debate ran. Yet he was not content with 
that. He was hardly silent for five minutes throughout the 
entire afternoon and evening. He fought for his own point 
of view with searching questions, caustic interjections, and 
vigorous explanations. Single-handed he did battle with the 
entire Opposition, interminably reiterating his own case, and 
trying to whittle away theirs .... It was a remarkable performance, 
begun in the middle of the afternoon and continued far into 
the evening. 
When Hertzog began his address on the third day of the reading, 
excitement had been heightened by the rumour that he was to drop 
a 'bombshell' that would confound the Opposition. 'll'he Prime·Minister 
began by declaring that he intended to be straightfoJ'Vllard. He dismissed 
Smuts's argument that it was their duty to include the Union Jack out 
of gratitude to England. When, before the 1921 Imperial Conference, 
Smuts had consulted people in England about a South African flag, they 
had told him that the question did not concern the Conference and was 
a matter for South Africa. From this he concluded that the people of 
Great Britain were nof so anxious for them to express gratitude in this 
way. 
English-speakers, he insisted, did not have a monopoly of 
sentiment, and Smuts had dealt with only one side of the Union Jack. 
He would give other facts: the Union Jack was not the original fiag 
of South Africa and its western civilization; it was an intruder - in all 
four provinces it had pushed out an older flag, in each case with 
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violence. Those who wished to incorporate the Union Jack should 
consider what they expected: 'How dare that be asked? How can 
anyone with any reason ask a Dutch-speaking South African whether 
he feels in such a way that the Union Jack shall be included on the 
national flag and that they should then love the national flag?' 
Irrevocably, for Afrikaans-speakers the Union Jack recalled griev-
ances and pain. 
Since Union, not only the Nationalist but also the S .A. P. had 
favoured a n.1.tional flag. This appeared possibly most of all from 
the speeches of Smuts who in December 1919 had said that there 
would be objection to a national flag, 'because even amongst our 
British brethren the feeling exists that it is not the British flag that 
we should have here.' In the same year he had told a S .A. P. Cong-
ress that English- speakers were as much in favour of a national flag 
as Afrikaans-speakers. Again, on 2 December 1919 he had said 
at Ventersdorp: 'The Union Jack was a stumbling block to some people, 
but a change would come with our own Union flag. ' Furthermore - here 
was Hertzog's 'bombshell' - he had irrefutable proof that in 1921 
Smuts had concluded that they required 'a distinctive national flag' 
apart from the Union Jack, and without the Union Jack. The proof 
was to be found in a document Smuts had drafted in connection with 
the 1921 Imperial Conference in which he had written: 
To mark the fundamental change in the status of the dominion, 
the re solutions should provide that besides ... a common 
Imperial flag (which may be the Union Jack) each dominion 
should have it (sic) own distinctive national flag. 36 
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Here, Hertzog insisted, was the proof. Repeatedly he demanded to 
know from Smuts in what respects the latter's proposal clashed with 
the Bill; he would warn Smuts to be careful because not only did he 
have several copies of the document, he also had the original in 
Smi.l.ts 's own handwriting. A heated exchange followed, Smuts demand-
ing to know who had allegedly told him (Smuts) that the flag was a 
purely South African affair, while Hertzog accused Smuts of prevaric-
ation: 'If there is one thing I object to and to which the whole people 
can object to in the hon. member for Standerton it is that he has hardly 
done or said a thing than he tries to find a backdoor to run away 
from it.' Smuts denied ever proposing the idea; Hertzog insisted 
that he had nevertheless been in earnest about it. And he persisted 
in identifying Smuts's 'distinctive national flag' with a clean flag. 
Denying Smuts's contention that his documents were private, Hertzog 
described Smuts's behaviour as 'contemptible'; ordinary political 
necessity had made him change his views since 1921 - 'Then the hon. 
member comes here and stands on a pedestal with a pious face'; 
the only reasonable interpretation of Smuts's proposal was his own. 
On his side, Smuts accused Hertzog of indulging in 'wastepaper 
basket espionage', something for which he was fitted; his conduct, 
36. Hansard, vol. 9, 4211; see also pp. 5-ll. 
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he said, had been 'contemptible'; he had no sense of honour. He 
rejected Hertzog's interpretation of the document and denied ever 
having stated that he wanted a clean flag. 
Their opponents, Hertzog continued, had asked for the inclusion 
of the Union Jack as a right of that flag and because failure to do so 
would wound their sentiments. But the Union Jack was the flag of 
Great Brita in, not South Africa, and he wished to know in what way 
the sentiment of English-speakers was being hurt. In what way was 
an atom of the Union Jack's might and authority being lost? The fact 
was that it was not really a question of British sentiment but of 
haughtiness and 'because they - if we have our national flag in South 
Africa - will no longer be able to see themselves represented as the 
dominating people in South Africa. That is at the root of it all. ' 
Political reasons, not sentiment, lay at the bottom of the opposition: 
' ... 90 per cent. of the agitation against the South African national 
flag without the Union Jack on it is based on the fact that they are 
being wounded and that.their object is to destroy the constitutional 
independence of South Africa. ' 37 
When the debate recommenced that evening, Hertzog returned to 
the same arguments. Amidst disturbances, he accused English-
speakers of suspicion, distrust and anti-Afrikaner hysteria. Distrust 
37. Hansard, vol.9, 4204-4219. 
had made them suspect secession as a motive for the Bill, while 
'anti-Dutch' hysteria did not even allow the opposition to enquire 
whether Afrikaans-speakers had a right to sentiment. And Smuts 
had not lifted a finger to help: 'Has he in all those years, in all 
the bitterness since 1921 said a single word to give a lead in the 
matter? .... That is the great complaint which the people have and 
are entitled to have against the hon. member - Dutch-speaking 
South Africa at any rate. ' 
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Amidst further disturbances, Hertzog declared that the Government 
would make the Bill law; there was no chance of an amicable agreem-
ent. On returning from Europe, he declared, 'I intended to let 
it C the Flag Bill.7 stand over .... I was hardly here three days when 
I was disillusioned . ' The Empire Group 'and others' had immediately 
demanded the incorporation of the Union Jack to put matters right 
again, 'and then I immediately felt that we could wait one, two, 
and even seventeen years, and yet forty years more, and would not 
get the flag. Then I said: Now we are going on and no more going 
back. ' First it had been the Empire Group, then, the newspapers 
had joined in. The Cape Times, in particular, had published the 
most insulting articles towards Afrikaans-speakers that had ever 
appeared. Under such conditions the Government could not allow 
itself to be led to a postponement; it had to go on. 3 8 
38. Hansard, vol.9, 4221-4228. 
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Though there were other speakers, it was on the disturbing chord 
struck by Hertzog that the week's debate ended. Never before had a 
South African premier assailed a leader of the opposition with such 
bitter taunts, insults and scorn. Indeed, Parliament had never witnessed 
an attack of such length or so lacking in restraint. On the following 
day the parliamentary reports of the opposition drew attention to the 
extraordinary hostility Hertzog had shown towards Smuts: 'Every 
line of argument he began, every bypath into which he strayed', had 
led him to Smuts, who was 'the hidden cause of every movement, 
the sinister figure behind every trouble.' Repeatedly Hertzog had returned 
to renew his attack on Smuts, 'each time with a vehemence of denunciat-
ion which has hardly been excelled even in his own stormy past. •39 
Doubtless, it had been Hertzog's intention to jolt the Opposition 
into recognizing the str~ngth of sentiment that opposed their own. 4 O 
Respectful references by the Opposition to the former republican flags 
may have struck him as spurious; it was ridiculous, he had said, 
to believe that by sweet words they could flatter each other into a 
solution. But he had allowed his emotions to carry him 
39. Cape Argus, Cape Times - 28 May 1927; see also London Times, 
28Mayl927. 
40. See Havenga Papers, vol. I, letter to wife, 31 May 1927. 
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forward 41 so far that his near concluding appeal: 'We ought merely 
to restrain ourselves from anything which would stir up feelings', was 
the very antithesis of his own example. On the Opposition, the 
overall effect of his speech was to deepen the despondency which 
Havenga's address had done so much to create, and the week's debate 
ended on a note of despair. 
The charges against Smuts 
The vehemence of Hertzog's attack on Smuts, even if unique in 
its degree of personal enmity, was but part of a general condemnation 
of Smuts's stand on the flag by the Pactites. They had repeatedly 
accused him of political opportunism on the subject. The chief charges 
against him were that he had favoured a new flag, even a clean one, 
in 1919-192 0, but objected to it now. As these accusations reached 
k t h . . 42 a pea a t 1s Juncture , it is appropriate to turn to them now 
Smuts never denied having made speeches in which he held out 
the possibility, even the desirability, of a new flag. Thus, in the 
second reading he acknowledged the correctness of Havenga 's 
allegation that in 1919 he had said that both races were in favour of 
41. A comparison of Hertzog's typewritten speech and the one he delivered 
supports this statement (see H .F'. \roL 85). 
42. For example see Ons Vaderland, 17, 20 May 1927; Die Burger, 25,26 
May 192 7; Die Volksblad, 2 8 May 1927; South African Nation, 
28 May 1927. 
their own flag and that a change would come with a new flag. But, 
he denied ever having advocated a clean flag. When Havenga in the 
same speech charged him with having declared himself in favour of 
a clean flag at Paulpietersburg in December 1920, Smuts denied the 
accuracy of the report and challenged M.P. 's who had attended the 
meeting to corraborate it. None did. 43 Indeed, none of the evidence 
the Pact adduced to prove that Smuts had advocated a clean flag was 
conclusive. Hertzog's 'bombshell' proved to be a damp squib. For 
Smuts's proposal for a 'distinctive national flag' (contained in the 
memorandum he prepared for the 1921 Imperial Conference), did not 
preclude the inclusion of the Union Jack: a South African flag could 
be characteristic and distinguishable, and therefore distinctive, 
without excluding the Union Jack. 
Similarly, Smuts I s reply to Col. E. M. Greene of Natal, which the 
Pactites adduced as further evidence, failed to prove the charge, 
When in January 1920, in response to Smuts's references to the 
possibility of a new flag,· Greene warned that the 'loyal section' would 
not tolerate a flag which came into existence 'on account of the Union 
Jack being obnoxious to the older members of the population, 44 
43. The person who had questioned Smuts at Paulpietersburg on the 
presence of the Union Jack in the national flag was E.G.Jansen -
the Speaker in the Assembly in 1927 ( Die Afrikaner, 7 January 1921). 
Comrare Die Burger, 26 May 1927, 
44. Die Burger, 25 May 1927 quoting Natal Witness, 3 January 1920. 
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Smuts replied as follows: 
My first offence is that I have spoken about a flag for South 
Africa. The Colonel does not object to Australia having a 
flag of her own. But South Africa .... is going to have it, 
and, I feel sure with the complete goodwill of both English 
and Dutch. It is the design for a new flag which troubles 
the Colonel. ... I hope that ... he will compete when designs 
are called for •... I am sure he will not forget in his design 
to introduce some substantial reminder of our 4onnection 
with the Imperial system to which we belong. 5 
Greene's letter was cited as evidence that there could be only one 
interpretation of Smuts's remarks on the flag, namely, that it should 
be free of the Union Jack, while Smuts's reply was held to endorse 
this con cl us ion. 4 6 Yet neither letter proved the point; indeed, it 
may be argued that Smuts's reply, with i'ts reference to a flag obtained 
'with the complete goodwill' of both races, its suggestion that Greene 
should submit his own design, and above all, its invitation to 
include in it 'some substantial reminder of our connection with the 
Imperial system to which we belong', invites the opposite conclusion. 
Written at a time when Smuts was hoping ultimately to unite his Party 
with the Unionists, and shortly after Smartt had voiced his concern 
47 
on the question of a new flag, Smuts could hardly have intended 
his reply to be seen as endorsing a clean flag. 
45. Cape Times, 14 January 1920. 
46. See Die Burger, 25 May 1927; South African Nation, 28 May 1927. 
(Both these articles contained factual errors.) 
47. See pp. 9-10. 
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Yet there was often a measure of ambiguity in Smuts's flag utterances 
I 
- doubtless not unrelated to his political position and aims. This applied 
particularly to those declarations in which he mentioned the Union Jack 
and may be seen in three statements he made in December 1919 . In 
the first, he was reported to have said that the Union Jack hurt some 
people and a change would come with their own flag;4 8 in the next, 
that the Union Jack had unpleasant memories for many;49 in the last, 
that English-speakers also desired a new flag because they trusted the 
S .A. P. and knew that their own flag did not mean a declaration of war 
against the Empire, or the Union Jack. SO Thus, though it cannot be 
categorically said that Smuts advocated a clean flag - 'our own flag', 
for instance, could incorporate a small Union Jack or other imperial 
symbol - it is not difficult to understand how those who were disposed 
to do so concluded that he had advocated one. 
The charge that Smuts advocated a clean flag can be no more proved 
than the ambiguity of his statements denied. This difficulty of proof 
had caused Hertzog to accuse Smuts in the second reading of 
48. De Volkstem, 2 December 1919, at Ventersdorp. 
49. Ons Land, 6 December 1919, at Rustenburg. 
50. _f)_~olkstem, 19 December 1919, at Bloemfontein. 
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'contemptible' behaviour; ordinary political necessity , he said, 
had made him change his views. His own actions, Hertzog claimed, 
had been determined by questions of sentiment and constitutional 
status: the incorporation of the Union Jack in their national flag would 
have been tantamount to treason. Though he had favoured a postponement 
of the Bill on his return from England, he told the House, the demands 
of the Empire Group and the insults of the Cape Times had made him 
change his mind and continue with the Bill. But , as we have seen , 
it was Malan 's threat to resign that had made Hertzog change his 
mind. 51 Fear of a split in his Party had been his overriding consideration, 
for in the three days between his return and his yielding to Malan, there 
had been no approach from the Empire League and no insulting articles 
in the Cape Times. Hertzog had condemned Smuts for giving first place 
to Party considerations, yet hid his own surrender to the same need. 
Indeed, by supporting the incorporation of a Union Jack in the national 
flag at the Groote Schuur meeting, he had, by his own yardstick, 
supported 'treason'. Pragmatic political considerations had made him 
continue with the Bill, and his 'holier than thou' attitude towards 
Smuts must be questioned. 
51. See pp, 210 ff. 
Second half of the second reading 
In the remainh.g four days of the seco•]d reading there were another 
thirty-one speeches. 52 Yet, if this week could claim three more speeches 
than the previous, it lacked its drama. Some of the fire had gone out 
of the debate. Nonetheless, the galleries remained crowded, public 
interest persisted and Opposition speeches were sometimes hard hitting. 
The addresses of Afrikaans-speaking S .A. P. Members, particularly, 
were subjected to frequent interruption. As little purpose would be 
served in retailing the individual speeches, whose content was often 
similar, a broad survey of these is given. 
As was to be anticipated; Hertzog, Havenga and Malan were 
sharply criticized. The criticisms against the first two were many: 
' ... God knows there was trouble enough in the country about the 
division caused by this unhappy Bill', but the gloom had been made 
'deeper and more sombre' by their speeches. 53 Both had been made 
with the deliberate intention of rousing passions, and if strife followed, 
the responsibility would be their's. Havenga 's bitterness had proved 
that while some men could be reasonable on most occasions, 'the 
moment the British connection comes into the question they entirely 
lose all reason.' 54 And Hertzog's deadly enmity towards Smuts seemed 
52. Of these, only those of Malan, Beyers and Allen opposed the Bill. 
53. Hansard, vol. 9, 4300-1, R.W.Close (Rondebosch). See also 
4312, L.D. Gilson (Griqualand). 
54. Ibid. 4445, Major G.B. van Zyl (Cape Town, Harbour). See also 
4 2 81, Major G. R. Richards (W eenen). 
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'to be a nightmare with him.• 55 
Criticism of Hertzog went further than a denunciation of his speech. 
He had lost'the chance of a lifetime' in failing to unite the people on 
56 his return from England. But he had always 'failed to rise to a big 
occasion', and he rad now finally forfeited any influence he may have 
had with the English section. 57 The trouble with him was that when it 
came to putting his glowis1g principles - such as South Africanism should 
override sectional interests - into practice, he fell very far short of 
his principles. 58 He was not a statesman, but a politician, 'and a 
59 
second-rate one at that~' 
The attacks against Malan took a different form, for unlike Hertzog 
and Havenga he had delivered his address with studied moderation and 
his 'uncompromising attitude' could hardly be greeted with surprise 
at this stage, Instead, he was taken to task as the instigator of 
racial discord and doubly condemned by virtue of his background. 
55. Hansard, vol.9, 4357, Lt.-Col.N.J.Pretorius (Witwatersberg). See 
also 4315, J.P.Louw (Stellenbosch); 4279,J.Nieuwenhuize (Lydenburg). 
56. Ibid, 4398, Blackwell. See also 4258, F.J.Lennox (Durban, Stamford 
Hill); 4273, W.J. O'Brien (Pietermaritzburg,South); 4309, C.A.A, 
Sephton (Aliwal); 4312, Gilson; 4344 ,Major R.Ballantine O<ingwilliamstown). 
57. Ibid. 4398, Blackwell. 
58. Ibid. 4452-3, Watt. See also 4249, H.E.K. Anderson (KUp River). 
59. Ibid. 4 398, Blackwell. (Blackwell was quoting from an article, 
allegedly written by Barlow.) 
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They lived, a Member said, in a most beautiful country, 
a country blessed with all that man could have, and cursed 
by politicians, may I say, at this moment by the parson polit-
ician .... While I admire their work ... when they become polit-
icians then I begin to fear. I would remind the Minister of 
the Interior that if he had lately read the Sermon on the Mount 
and remembered that -
Blessed are the peacemakers, for they shall be called 
the children of God, 
he would have been doing much better than piloting a Bill 
through this House which is going to send the people of this 
country to the devil. 60 
Malan had also to face an alleged contrast between an earlier and a later 
political credo: between that of 1915 and 1927. In 1915, Jagger said, 
Malan had held that the Union's primary need was for internal peace 
and that if the country was happy under the British flag, 'that flag 
will never be in danger.' At that time, Malan had held that the calming 
of the English section by convincing them that the flag was secure 
would be a task of the next parliament. ' I must confess he ffea1a_whas 
gone a long way since then. Where is the attempt at "internal peace"?' 
Instead of uniting people, his Bill would divide them. 61 What was 
Malan 's professed objec;t? asked another Member. 
He says it is to build up a great South African nation. No, sir. 
His real object is to build up a little Afrikanerdom, and every-
thing he has done is making it impossible to build up this great 
nation he talks about but which he is far from desiring. 62 
60. Hansard, vol. 9, 4423, W. Rockey (Parktown). See also 44 04, 
G.A.Louw (Colesberg); 4435, L.Moffat (Queenstown). 
61. Ibid. 4289-4291. See also 4404, Louw. Jagger was quoting from 
a manifesto, signed by Malan, which had been adopted by a Cape 
Province Nationalist Party Congress at Middelburg (Cape) on 
16 September 1915. 
62. Ibid,4284, Richards. 
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The Government's lack of a mandate, the referendum, the exclusion 
of the former republican flags and of the Union Jack were all lively topics. 
Forcing the Bill through without a mandate was a 'trick'; 63 the referendum 
64 
was a 'sham and a mockery'; and the alleged demise of the Vierkleurs 
was a transparent strategem to exclude the Union Jack. 65 Apart from 
earlier arguments that the exclusion of the Union Jack was a breach of 
the spirit of 1910, and a betrayal of the trust Natalians had placed in 
their ,Afrikaans-speaking friends, 66 a more assertive argument was 
presented: English-speakers had the right to demand the symbol of their 
choice for they too had pioneered South Africa. 'Who built our railways? 
Who developed our mines? Who established industries in the country? 
Who even introduced improved methods of agriculture? Very largely the 
English-speaking section of the population, and very largely with money 
corning from Great Britain', Watt told the House. 67 No less forthright 
63. Hansard, vol. 9, 4256, Lennox. See also 4260, Brown; 4267, Giovanetti; 
4315 , Louw; 4339, Nicholls; 4345, Ballantine; 4350, Henderson; 
4427, Rockey; 4430, .Miller; 4435, Moffat. 
64. Ibid. 4398-9, Blackwell. See also 4258, Lennox; 4263, Brown; 
4272, 0 'Brien; 4314, Louw; 4 345, Ballantine; 44 24, Rockey; 44 30, Miller; 
4448-9, G.B.vanZyl; 4456, Wat_t. 
65. Ibid. 4345, Ballantine. See also 4311 Gilson; 4292, Jagger; 
N.J.Pretorius, 4354, 4358. 
66, See ibid. 4265-6, Giovanetti; 4272, O'Brien; 4282ff., Richards; 
4348, 4350, Henderson; 4453, Watt; 4345, Ballantine; 4256, Anderson. 
6 7 . Ibid . 4 4 51. 
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was Jagger. English-speakers, he said, had 'just as great a moral 
right to have their sentiments emblazoned on the national flag as the 
Dutch-speaking people ... We demand it as a right - I do not want 
to go round corners - to have our sentiments embodied in the flag. 
The PRIME MINISTER: Do you mean to say you have a right to 
demand that, no matter what the other 
side thinks? 
Mr. JAGGER: Certainly, At least 4 5 per cent. of the 
people of this country are of British extrac-
tion. These people have done their full 
share to build up South Africa. We have 
spent blood, Take the Eastern Province .•.. 
take Natal. .•. Take any section of work, 
it may be industry, farming, mining or 
trade. Have English-speaking people not 
taken a full share of the burden.,.? 68 
Free to chose a symbol, English- speakers would undoubtedly chose 
the Union Jack, which was not a foreign flag - as Hertzog had alleged. 
To the English section it, 'is South African by sacrifice. It is South 
African by achievement. It is South African by every principle of justice 
and freedom which it implies .... It is part of the soul of the British people 
of this country ... •69 And both the aversion to it and the demand for 
a new flag had been exaggerated. Equally spurious was the claim 
that South Africa's new status demanded a new flag. Canada and 
68. Hans~rd, vol.9, 4292. See also 4300, Close. For the influence 
of Jagger's speech on the Government, see 5435, Malan, 21 June 
1927, andp.400, n.119. 
Though Jagger's strong views on this point were shared by other 
English-speakers (see Stanford Papers, D 56, 14 May 1927; ~Argus, 
10 May 1927), they were not often expressed openly, 
6 9. Hansard, vol. 9, 4 344 , Nicholls. 
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Australia - countries whose status was every bit as high as their own -
had not adopted new flags. 70 And as for the oft-cited Irish flag, this 
alleged endorsement of the Government's flag was, in fact, a flag of 
division, for so long as it flew northern and southern Ireland would 
remain divided. 71 Moreover, an unpopular flag would simply be ignored, 
72 
and the proposed flag would definitely be unpopular: 'Is that hot-cross-bun 
a repository of national sentiment is that hot-cross-bun going to create 
the greatest enthusiasm, is it going to move to the deepest springs of 
action and inspire to the noblest ideals? That flag means nothing to 
the English or the Dutch ••• • 7 3 Behind the alleged need for it lay the 
desire for a republic. Thousands of English-speakers saw the Bill as 
the final severance of the imperial connection; Natal, in particular, 
was suspicious, and felt that the proposed flag would be the one 
under which, when the time came, a republic would be proclaimed. 74 
70. Hansard, vol.9, 4455, Watt. See also 4295, Jagger. 
71. Ibid. 4286, Richards; 4295, Jagger; 4345, Ballantine; 4428, Amott. 
72. Ibid. Ballantine, 4345; 4352, Henderson; 4358, Pretorius; 4401, 
G.A.Louw; 4429, Arnott; 4454-5, Watt. 
73. 4310, Gilson. See also Nieuwenhuize, 4277-8; 4430, Miller. 
Gilson was, of course, parodying Malan 's second reading speech of 
May 192 6 - see p. 102. 
74. Ibid.4285, Richards; 4297, Jagger; 4347, Henderson; 4422, G.B. 
van Zyl; 4433, Heatlie. 
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By insisting that the flag be designed on the principle of exclusion 
and not inclusion, the Government, from the start, had frustrated 
all attempts at agreement. Under the circumstances, patience and 
not compulsion should be their watchword. The Bill should be post-
poned and the solution left to the future. 
These, then, were the main arguments of the Opposition, and 
when Malan rose on the afternoon of 2 June to refer the Bill to a select 
committee and to conclude the debate, most of his speech attempted 
to rebut some of them. A large number of the Opposition's arguments, 
he said, had not been reasoned at all. On the Government's side, 
however, it was a question of 'logical reasoning of the whole position.' 
The Opposition had chiefly stressed the strong feelings for the inclusion 
of the Union Jack and argued that because these precluded agreement 
the matter should be dropped. But they had to recognize the strong 
sentiment that oppose~ this flag, and that the problem could be 
resolved only by agreeing that the design should offend no one. They 
had also to recognize that at the root of the matter lay a conflict of 
ideals: Afrikaans-speakers were above all South Africans; with English-
speakers the interests of South Africa did not occupy the same exclusive 
position,,and their ideal, which was fused with their attitude towards 
the flag, was not acceptable in the interests of South Africa. 
Those who had emphasized magnanimity, were unable to appreciate 
the state of mind of others. Those who held that the English section 
was sacrificing everything and the Nationalists nothing, were ignoring 
both the Nationalists' abandonment of their republican ideals and the 
fact that the Union Jack would still symbolize the British connection. 
And those who pointed to the Canadian Government's withdrawal of 
its flag measure, failed to see that South Africa and Canada did not 
provide parallel cases. As for the referendum, the circumstances 
justified its use as a special measure and its question was not unfair. 
Nor had there been a breach of faith with Natal: he did not think that 
it had ever been intended that they should maintain one design for ever 
and, as the British link was as safe now as it ever had been, where had 
there been a breach of faith? 
He regretted that Smuts had failed to give a lead and he depreciated 
his offer. All it appeared to amount to, was that if the Bill were 
withdrawn, Smuts and his Party would not make any 'sneers and taunts' 
against the Nationalist Party. He did not know whether this was such 
a great offer, for if they accepted it, it would show that they were 
worthy of 'sneers and taunts' and were running to Sinuts for protection. 
After Hertzog's speech, Duncan had asked the Prime Minister to 
give a lead, the implication being that if another compromise were 
proposed, Duncan would be prepared to co-operate. Also, shortly 
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after the last session Duncan had stated that he did not wish to say 
that a flag that omitted the Union Jack but contained some symbol 
of the British tie would be unacceptable to him. He (Malan) wished 
to take this as an indication that in the opinion of some Members of 
the Opposition every method of reaching agreement had not been 
exhausted. For this reason, the Government was prepared, at the 
conclusion of the second reading, to send the Bill to a select oommittee. 7 5 
There he would very much like to see a design containing the Union 
Jack and former republican flags such as Smuts proposed, but he 
suspected that it would look ridiculous. However, one aspect of 
Smuts's S .A. P. amendment could be greeted as the greatest advance 
that had been made Jn the debate; this was the prepare:ire ffi to accept 
that the three flags need not be included in their entirety. Here was 
an attitude, Malan said, that provided a basis for discussion. 76 
When Malan began to enlarge on the Opposition's present acceptance 
of the Vierkleur and past rejection of the Walker flag on the grounds 
that it was nothing other than a disguised Vierkleur, Opposition Members 
protested that his prolongation of the debate was more likely to harm 
than assist the chances of settlement in the Select Committee. 1'-1:ilan 
therefore brought his speech to an abrupt end, and shortly before six p, m., 
on the seventh day of the reading, the House divided. Voting strictly 
on Party lines, with the notable exception of Hay who crossed the floor 
7 5. 0£ course the Government had decided to send the Bill to a relect 
committee well before Duncan's address (see p.295). 
76. For Malan's speech see Hansard, vol.9, 4458-75. 
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to vote with the Opposition, the second reading was carried by sixty-
. f 'f f 77 nme votes to 1 ty - our. 
77. Hansard, vol. 9, 4475-6. 
CHAPTER Xl 11 
THE EMERGENCE OF THE 'SHIELD FLAG' 
Press comment on the second reading 
Public interest in the flag debate had remained strong. Apart from 
detailed press reports of the speeches, the subject received much 
attention from both leader writers and parliamentary correspondents. 
The latter, on all sides, commented not only on the extraordinary 
excitement inside Parliament but also on the great interest outside it. 
It was undoubtedly, Die Volksblad 's correspondent declared of the 
opening day, the great day of the session. 'Vir dae en weke en selfs 
maande het die lede and self die publiek uitgesien na hierdie dag .••• 
en die atmosfeer van sentiment wat rondom die kwessie ontstaan het, 
het nou die hele bevolking, vaders, moeders en kinders, so beetgepak 
dat dit nou die algemene onderwerp van bespreking geword het,, l 
As the debate progressed, interest hel0. On 31 May the Cape Argus 
observed that the Bill 'exhibits wonderful vitality. ' On its fourth 
day 'one should expect it. .. to fall like dough instead of soaring into 
1. 24Mayl927. SeealsoOnsVaderland, 25Mayl927; TheStar, 
Natal Witness - 24 May 1927. 
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the colours of the sunrise. Yet once more tonight it thrilled crowded 
galleries with surprising and dramutic incidents.' At the end of the 
reading even the correspondents of Die Bur~ and Cape Time_~ were 
agreed that the reading hud been most exciting. The final stages of 
the debate had been no less interesting than the early, the latter's 
correspondent wrote, adding that it was remarkable for a discussion 
on one theme to have been maintained with such 'extraordinary 
vigour' 2 Equally remarkable, in his opinion, had been the generally 
moderate tone of the debate. This view of the reading - Hertzog's 
and Havenga 's speeches always excepted by the opposition - was 
generally shared. 
But here agreement ended. 0 n almost every other point each side 
insisted on the sole merits of its own case. Each day, 
correspondents claimed the honours of the debate for their side. 
Accordingly, of the first day, against the efforts of two powerful 
government speakers victory was claimed by the opposition on the 
d f ·+ t . d th . 't · i • ' th d 3 groun s o i.s argumen s an e spin m w111cn ey were use , 
Malan' s introductory speech, unable to stand critical examination by one 
. 4 
side, was declared by the other to have crushed all contrary arguments. 
2. 3 June 1927. See Die Burger, 3, 7 June 1927. 
4. Cf. TheStar, Die_Burger- 24Mayl927. 
Smuts's speech, acclaimed by one party as having given those privileged 
to hear it 'that peculiar thrill which seems to be compelled by great 
utterances', was dismissed by another as not having made the least 
. . 5 H 1mpress10n. avenga, according to one side, had spoken 'with a 
recklessness of phrase which seemed intent only to wound'; to the other, 
his speech had been brilliant. 6 Lastly, Hertzog's 'bombshell' was 
described as a total failure and his arguments as 'rather jumbled'. 
They were not so to the Nationalist press: Smuts had received, ' 'n 
verdiende pak slae' and Hertzog's 'bombshell' had sent him 'Bolmakiesie'. 7 
Wider-ranging and more strongly expressed were the disagreements 
in the opposing sides' leading articles. Their content was largely 
determined by already familiar issues, reiterated in the Assembly. Was 
the Bill a breach of the spirit of Union? 8Had the Government really 
compromised ? 9 Was the referendum a suitable means of settling the 
question? 1 O Had the sentiments of English-speakers been taken into 
5. Cf. Cape Times, 26 May 1927 withOns Vaderland, 28 May 1927. 
6. Cf. Cape Argus, Die Burger - 26 May 1927. 
7. Cf. Cape Argus, Cape Times with Die Burger, Die Volksblad - 28 May 1927. 
8. Cf. Daily Despatch, 31 May 1927 with Ons Vaderland, 2 S May 1927. 
9. Cf. Natal Mercury, Natal Witness - 25 May 1927 with Die Burger, 
23Mayl927. 
10. Cf. Rand Daily Mail, 24 May 1927 with Die Burger, 27 May 1927. 
proper account? 
11 
Should Government wait for general agreement? 
12 
On whose side did logic lie? 13 As these, and other issues, 
had been put forward and argued earlier in the controversy, little 
purpose would be served in repeating the opposing editorial arguments 
on them. 
However, the reading had raised some new issues. What, for 
offer 
instance, was the value of Smuts 's ... not to make political capital out 
of the Bill's withdrawal? The editorial columns of Government news-
papers, during the reading, chose to ignore the question. 14 Both the 
Cape Argus and Rand Daily Mail welcomed the offer as giving the Pact 
the chance to withdraw from an impossible position: 15 but the latter 
regretted that Smuts had not seen fit to make the offer earlier: 'had he 
done so, instead of giving the impression ... that the flag question was 
not altogether unwelcome as a party asset, the whole course of this 
miserable business might have been altered. 1 
11. Cf. Rand Daily Ma·il, Cape Times, Natal Mercury - 24 May 1927 
with Die Burger, 23 May 1927. 
12. Cf. Cape Argus, 2 8 May 1927, Sunday Times, 29 May 1927, 
The Star, 31 May 1927, with Die Burger, 24 May 1927. 
13. Cf. Cape Argus, 24 May 1927, The Star, 2 June 1927, with 
Die Burger, 24 May 1927. 
14. Only after Malan I s concluding speech, in which he rejected the 
offer, did the Nationalist press follow suit. (See, for example, 
Ons Vaderland, 7 June 1927.) 
15. 26and27May,resp. 
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If it ignored his 'olive branch', the Nationalist press did not 
fail to draw attention to Smuts's 1921 memorandum proposing a distinct-
ive flag for each Dominion and insist that his present attitude contradicted 
his former. 16 'Well, what of it?' 'fhe Star declured of the memorandum 
on 2 June; no one denied there had been discussions on the suitability 
of dominion flags, but whatever theoretical ideas Smuts may have 
held on the subject, he soon realized the futility of making definite 
proposals except by agreement. Similarly the Cape Argus submitted 
on 2 8 May that the division of the Union into two hostile camps over 
a national flag would never have been contemplated: 'That is a stupendous 
act of folly which could only be committed by a Prime Minister of 
impetuous and ill-balanced temperament, living in a perpetual state 
of mental fog ... ' 
Further aspersions on Hertzog's temperamental suitability for 
his office were sparked by his explanation that he had been persuaded 
to persist with the Bill because of press and Empire Group criticism. 
This explanation, The Star found 'so amazing, so fantastic, so 
utterly inadequate and so deficient in any sense of proportion, that 
if it had been forthcoming from any other person than General Hertzog 
we would quite frankly have regarded it as incredible.' If they were 
to accept his explanation at its face value, 'we can only arrive at 
16. Die Burger, 28 May 1927; Die Volksblad, 30 May 1927; 
Ons Vaderland, 3 June 1927. 
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the conclusion that he is temperamentally unfitted for the high office 
he holds, and that his occupancy of it today is little short of a 
. 1 . f , 17 na t1ona mis ortune. 
It was ironical that these and similar sentiments should be expressed 
against the background of Union Day. On this day the Daily Despatch 
complained that self-seeking politicians had created a state of chaos 
comparable only to that existing at the outbreak of the Anglo-Boer War. 
Properly speaking, Union Day should be a day for rejoicing, 
Not so this year: 
An irresponsible Government, put into power with the traitorous 
assistance of parliamentary Labour leaders, is stoking up the 
fires of racial hatred that mc1.y lead, if unchecked, inevitably 
to civil war. Is this, then, a day for holiday-making? Rather 
should it be a day of humiliation and prayer. We cannot see 
the end of this tragic quarrel: a quarrel, be it noted, that was 
none of our seeking; and who shall say through what dark 
shadows of despondency and horror our country will not have 
passed by the time another Union Day comes round? 
Even if strong feelings had, on the whole, been moderated inside 
Parliament, it seemed to many that the chances of a parliamentary 
select committee reaching an agreement were slim. That Malan himself 
entertained small hope for its success is perhaps shown by the limited 
time he initially allowed for its effectual deliberations. After the 
17. 2 June 1927. See also Cape Times, 2 June 1927. 
second reading he called for a relect aommittee that would report 
back in one week. As Smartt pointed out, this would have allowed 
it some eight hours for its work. Smuts immediately denounced the 
idea of four effective days in select committee as a mockery - evidence 
that the Government did not genuinely seek a settlement. When other 
Members supported an extension of the time limit, Malan agreed 
that the GOmmittee should have an extra week and report back on 17 June. 18 
Influences for change from within the Pact 
However, before setting out on an examination of the Committee's 
deliberations, it is important to examine the factors that were at work 
during the Committee's life and which caused it to introduce a significant 
change. Sevaral factors were influencing change. Some came from 
within the Pact's ranks, others from within the opposition's. Within 
Nationalist ranks , design no. 2 had never been popular. 19 Though 
Party branches expresse~ support for the Bill as a whole, there were 
many that criticised the flag's design. The presence of the English 
cross of St George and the absence o~ any symbol of the Free State 
were the two chief objections. 
18. Hansard, vol. 9, 4475-9, 2 June 1927. 
19. See Round Table, vol.XV! l, 838-9. 
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In mid-May, it was reported at Stellenbosch that it was feared 
that hundreds of Afrikaners would rather abstain than vote in the 
referendum for the St George's design. 20 At the same time it was 
disclosed that in Pretoria feeling among Afrikaners 'is wsinlg gees-
driftig vir die Rooikruis-vlag. Hulle voel hier veel meer vir die Walker 
ontwerp. •21 These feelings in Pretoria were shared by many Nationalists 
in the Free State. The resolutions of many Free State branches, 22 
such as those of Wolwepan and Odendaalsrust, demonstrated this. 
The farmer's resolution declared that it wanted no St George's cross·; 
the latter's declared that it wanted the Walker flag if possible. 23 
The two declarations were not unrelated: preference for the Walker 
flag was closely associated with dislike of the St George's cross. 
This was openly stated at the Bloemfontein public meeting in support 
of the Bill w;1ere a considerable section of the audience voted for the 
Walker flag 'omdat hulle hul nie met die insluiting van die St. George 
kruis in die vlag kan vereenselweg nie. •24 
20. Die Burger, 16 May 1927. For other evidence of misgivings about 
the design amongst Cape Nationalists see ibid. 15 April and 
3, 4 May (letters to the ed.), 1} May (resolutions), 18 May 
(leading article). 
21. Die Volksblad, 16 May 192 7. For general lack of enthusiasm for 
the design in the Transvaal see Die Burger, 23 May 1927. 
22. See Die Volksblad, 23 May, 6, 10, 13, 14, 23 June 1927; The Star, 
10, 19 May 1927; P.S.M.I. vol.3. 
2 3. Die Volksblad, 16 June 192 7. 
24. Ibid. 28 May 1927; Ons Vaderland, 7 June 1927. 
The omission of any symbol of the Free State in design no. 2 was 
strongly related to its unpopularity in that province - and to the 
preference for the Walker flag which had contained a Free State colour. 
In April van der Merwe received an angry letter from a constituent who 
asserted that he expressed the op inion of a 11 in the Win burg district 
when he insisted that the Free State should be represented in the design; 
they would rather have no flag at all than design no. 2. 2 5 Disappointment 
with this omission was openly stated or implied in Party resolutions. 
Some made the point indirectly by favouring a design 'van meer nasionaal 
aard ';others requested 'dat ons dierbare oranje-kleur' should not be 
omitted; the remaining group simply stated that the national flag should 
26 
contain a symbol of the Free State. Bloemfontein's Mayor, H.J.Steyn, 
declared that Free Staters felt very strongly about the flag's failure to 
symbolize the Province. 27 As Die Burger's correspondent pointed out 
in May, 'prejudice' against design no. 2 amongst Nationalists was 
something Malan could not fail to take into account. 28 
The second influence for change from within the Pact came from Labour. 
2 5. N. J. van der Mervve Papers, vol. 2, letter from J.(? )E. Barnard, 
22 April 1927. 
26. Die Volksblad, 14, 16,21, 22, 23 June 1927. 
27. Ibid. 20 June 1927. See also Die Burger, 22 June 1927 7 Chairlady 
of the O.V.S. Nasionale Vroueparty. 
28. 16 May 192 7. 
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Ever since its crushing defeat in the Provincial elections in February, 
the opposition had maintained its attack on the Party. Its chief target 
remained the same - Labour's responsibility for the flag conflict. The 
ma in features of the assault are already familiar. 29 In brief, Labour's 
'self-seeking' Ministers, Parliamentary Labour, and the Party as a 
whole were held to blame for the Bill: without their support -
particularly that of its leaders - the Bill could not have been brought 
forward. 30 All these charges had been repeated in Parliament. 31 
. 32 At several protest meetings Labour had been vigorously criticised, 
and when prominent Labourites themselves condemned Party policy, 
their views received wide publicity. A statement attributed to Barlow 
which accused Labour's Ministers of being 'the real villians of the 
piece' was one such condemnation. 33 Another came from Jamieson who 
declared: 
In my opinion, the Labour Party, which is no longer the Labour 
Party .•. is wholly responsible for the introduction of the Flag 
29. See pages 132ff., and 238ff., for example. 
30. See for example The Star, 11, 22 April, 23, 26 May 1927; Natal Witness, 
13 April 1927; Cape Argus, 6, 10, 16 May 1927; Cape Times, 10,16,17 
May 1927; '!'_he Friend, 18 May 1927; Sunday Times, 22 May 1927; 
Natal Mercury, 25 May 1927. 
31. See for example Hansard, vol. 9, 4 351 ,Hmderson; 
4364, Coulter; 4346, Ballantine, 
32. Cape Times, 26 May 1927; Natal Witness, 28 May 1927; ~nd Daily Mail, 
Cape Argus - 7 June 1927. 
33. The Star, Cape Argus - 11 April 1927. See also Hansard, vol. 9, 
4044, Byron, 23 May 1927, for other criticisms by Barlow. 
Bill. The Party could have nipped it in the bud by telling General 
Hertzog that Labour would vote against it. But thm the salaries 
of £2,500, or £700, per annum, as the case may be, would 34 have been in danger, and they were not prepared to take the risk. 
Such criticism, coming from a Labourite who until January had been the 
Party's S.:!cretary, provided telling propaganda for the opposition. 
That Jamieson' s remarks were made between the first and second 
readings was not accidental for as the parliamentary debate approached, 
and then began, feelings for the Union Jack ran high. Labourites were 
conspicuously present, both in the audience and on the platform, at 
35 protest meetings such as those at Cape Town and East London. 
The latter was addressed by a Labour M. P. C. , while, when the Natal 
Provincial Council called for the inclusion of the Union Jack, the resolution 
was seconded by a Labourite whose feelings for the Union Jack moved 
him to tears. 36 Only on the very eve of the first reading did the 
National Council give its approval to the Bill, and then only after 
lengthy discussion and the withdrawal from the meeting of C. Kingdom -
37 
a strong opponent of the Bill. 
In Parliament, whatever Labourites did during the second reading 
34. Cape Argus, The Star - 2 0 May 1927. 
35. Cape Times, 18, 23 May 1927; London Times, 19 May 1927, 
36. Die Burger, Natal Witness, London Times - 12 May 1927. 
37. Die Burger, Cape Times, The Star - 16 May 1927. Kingdom was 
Chairman of the Johannesburg District Committee. 
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was assailed. If they remained silent they were taunted for their failure 
to speak out. 38 If they tried to defend their Party's stand, as Boydell 
and Allen did, they merely provided new targets for their opponents 
outside 39 and in the House. Thus Boydell's argument that a referendum 
was a safeguard against coercion was ridiculed as spurious and Allen's 
speech was condemned as an attempt to villify, mock and degrade the 
40 Union Jack; he had out-Hertzoged Hertzog and was a liar. 
Valuable as these attacks were to the opposition press, perhaps 
nothing was more helpful to it than Hay's open defiance of his Party. 
His second reading speech in which he held his own Party 'wholly 
and absolutely responsible for this mad business' was widely hailed 
by the opposition and made him a hero to many of the Bill's opponents. 
The Empire Group conveyed warm greetings. 41 Even the Labour branch 
42 
of Creswell 's constituency sent him a resolution of support. 
38. See for example Hansard, vol. 9, 4280, Richards and 4390, Blackwell. 
Initially the Labour Caucus decided to leave the advocacy and defence 
of the Bill during the second reading entirely to its Nationalist allies 
(Cape Times, 22 June 1927, letter to the editor from Hay). Boydell' s 
and Allen's speeches indicate that1his policy was later revised, 
perhaps in response to the S ,A. P. 's challenges. 
39. See for example Cape Argus, 2 June 1927; Daily DesI?atch, 
Natal Witness - 3 June 1927; Cape Times, 8 June 1927, p. 9. 
40. For attacks in the Assembly see Hansard, vol. 9, 4246, Rockey; 
4272, O'Brien; 4346, Ballantine; 4312, Gilson; 4386, 4391-2, 
Blackwell; 4448, G.B.van Zyl. 
41. Cape Times, 9 June 1927. 
42. Ibid. 20 June 1927; Cape Argus, 17 June 1927. This was the 
Malvern-Denver branch of the Party. 
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The latter cm;J:ra1ulate::l Hay on his 'heroic stand' while others suggested 
43 
that a public testimonial to him should be placed in Pioneers' Park. 
Hay's defence of his stand, and his subsequent criticisms of the Bill 
and the Pact generally - a partnership which he denounced as one-
sided - were widely reported and certainly reflected the disillusionment of 
many Labourites with the Pact. 44 
Hay's dissension may be seen as a symptom of the Party's general 
malaise. Its weaknesses were unquestionably due to many circumstances 
additional to the flag conflict. But that the conflict tended to bring 
them to a head was indicated by the Party dissension that broke out 
immediately after the strain of the second reading - while the Select 
Committee was still in session. In Johannesburg, 'Expulsions and 
suspensions and rumours of expulsions and suspensions' continued 
to be one of the main topics of speculation amongst Labourites. 45 Small 
46 
wonder this was so. Hay had been expelled from the caucus. There 
4 3. Die Burger, Cape Times - 13 June 1927. Wemmer Pan Park had been 
re-named and dedicated to the memory of the Rand and Transvaal Pioneers. 
44. Monthly Herald and Industrial Record, June 1927, p. l; P"o:rvvard, 
17 June 1927 , letter to the editor ·from D. Davies; The Star, 9, 11 June 
1927, letters to the editor. 
45. Cape Times, 13 June 1927. 
4 6. Cape Argus, The Star- 3 June 1927. The Labour Caucus had pledged 
its support for the Bill on 10 May 1927. Hay refused to be bound by 
this decision mainly on the grounds that he would not be violating any 
pledge under the Party's constitution as the flag issue formed no part 
of the Party's principies; also no reference had been made to it in the 
Party's general election manifesto. (When asked for its opinion, his 
constituency had given none, while his branch had resolved that the 
question should be dropped by the Party. The Star, 11 May 1927; 
Cape Times, 9 June 1927.) 
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was talk of the expulsion of Karovsky, and of the temporary suspension 
of J.P. Madden and J. Duthie - two prominent Johannesburg Party members. 4 7 
At the same time, H. G. Trollip, Chairman of the Kensington branch of 
the Party, was expelled and the branch dissolved; that other branches, 
including one of the biggest in Johannesburg might follow suit, 
because election promises had not been met, was declared possible. 48 
The constitutional validity of these expulsions and suspensions was 
being questioned. Publicity was given to other Labourites who had 
left or were said to be thinking of leaving the Party, such as M. J. Green 
and M.E.Lang in Johannesburg, and H.H.Kemp, Eaton and Jamieson in 
49 Durban, and there were reports of movements to launch new Labour 
Parties in both Johannesburg and Durban - the latter possibly to be 
known as 'The Anti-Pact Labour Party of South Africa 1 • 50 The disillusion-
ment of many Labourites with the Pact was patent and vvas associated 
with a Bill that excluded the Union Jack from the national flag. 51 This 
47. Cape Times, 7 June 1927; The Star,11 June 1927. 
48. The Star, Die Burger·· 8 June 1927; Cape Times, 8, 9 June 1927. 
49. Forward, 17 June 1927. 
SO. Mon~hly Herald and Industrial Record, June 1927; The Star, 10 June 1927; 
Cape Argus, 11 June 1927; Cape Times, 10, 11 June 1927; 
Die Burger, 13 June 1927. 
51. See The Star, 9, 11 June 1927; Forward, 17 June 1927, letters to the 
editor. 
much was clear, and not least to the Pact members of the Select 
Committee which was meeting against this background. 
Influences for change from outside the Pact 
373 
The stimulus for change stemming from inside the Pact, was quickened 
by influences outside it. These included the fear of secession, talk 
of Natal seceding, the generally hardening mood, protest meetings 
and the possibility of violence. Attention will therefore be given to 
each of these in turn. 
Fear of secession served to bolster the opposition. The report 
of the Imperial Conference had been greeted with mixed feelings by some 
English-speakers who thought it had conceded too much to the 
D . . 52 omm10ns. Their sensitivities - especially strong under the 
Pact regime - were boui:id to react sharply to any question touching 
on the Union's imperial relations. Earlier in 1927 this had occurred 
53 
over such questions as the Union's contribution to the Royal Navy 
52. For example ffie E.G. Jansen Papers , vol. 2, 'Copy of Resolutions 
passed at Executive Meeting of the Empire Group of South Africa 
Monday 21st March 1927'; B.K.Long, Drummond Chaplin His 
Life and Times, p. 325 and In Smuts' Camp, pp. 33-4. Long was 
editor of the Cape Times during the flag controversy. 
53. _g~Ti~, 22, 25 January 1927; Die Burger, 26 January 1927. 
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and the purchase of German locomotives in preference to British. 54 
A clean flag bill brought in by a Nationalist dominated Government 
was certain to re-awaken earlier fears of secession. 55 As it became 
clear that the Government was intent on pushing through its 'Red Cross 
flag', these fears were revived, becoming particularly strong at about 
the time of the second reading. On the day before the reading the 
Sunday Times insisted that the Bill had been designed to placate 
secessionists and republicans. One week later it declared that 
thousands of South Africans were now convinced that the Bill was 
'only a stunned secession-and-republican issue revived in another, 
anq more subtle form. 1 It recalled that two years earlier, the former 
Minister of Fina nee, H. Burton, had warned of grave reasons for 
fearing that indirect methods of attaining a republic were being insid-
iously and systematically pursued while at about the same time, the 
Natal M. P. , Richards, had thought that not a single parliamentarian 
with full inside knowledge doubted that the Government aimed to 
54. For example, see Cape Times, 5, 12 January 1927; Die Burger, 
14 January 1927; South African Nation, 15 January 1927; The Star, 
5 February, 8 March 192 7; Hansard, vol. 8, 1133, Strachan, 
7 March 192 7. (When the previous government had preferred German 
to British railway tenders, the English press had not taken up the 
matter - evidence of their greater trust in the Smuts regime.) 
55. See for example pp. 55-9, 301-2. 
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establish a 'Dutch republic'. Despite assurances to the contrary -
56 
'This sus:e_icion cannot now be allavedksoft words.' 
In the Cape, newspapers were similarly suspicious of the Government's 
motives. At Stellenbosch, when N. J. van der Merwe argued that the 
cross of St George had no political significance so that if South Africa 
became a republic there would still be no objection to it, the Cape Argus 
responded: 'Exactly; it is not the past that the nationalist extremists 
are thinking about, but the future.' They could easily, at some future 
date, drop the flying of the Uni.on Jack, but it would be very difficult 
to change a design which included the Union Jack and had been solemnly 
chosen by the people was a whole. 57 What was the motive of the Bill? 
the Cape __ Ti~~-~ asked on 2 June. Thousands of people were asking 
themselves this question and inevitably very undesirable answers were 
being found: 'As Mr. Jagger said the other night, the memory of the recent 
Nationalist convcrs ion from Republican doctrine has its place in these 
speculations. ' 
In Pietermaritzburg, the Natal \Y.itnesg on 4 June approvingly quoted 
the Cape AlJl~S suspicions, adding _that fear of secession had become 
an important factor precluding agreement; what the British section might 
56. 29 May 1927. (Emphasis in the original.) See also~J~t~ Star, 3 June 1927, 
letters to the editor expressing fear of republicanJsrn. 
57. 23 May 1927. See also 24 May 1927. 
have accepted from Smuts, it would not accept from the Pact. And in 
Durban, on the same day, the Na_tal Merct!!JT wanted to know why 
controversial Article 4 had been retained if Hertzog genuinely uccepted 
58 
the permanent relationship between the Union and British Commonwealth. 
Why had 'little Afrikanderism' refused to sacrifice even 'this barren 
"ideal 111 for the sake of peace? 'Is not the reason', it suggested, 
'because in its heart of hearts it accepts the present status only as a 
stepping stone to complete secession?' 59 
From fears of secession from the Commonwealth, to demands for 
Natal's secession from the Union was a short step. The demand had 
been heard in May 1925, less than a year after the Pact came to power. 
During the 1925 Easter recess Richards complained bitterly about the 
'unfair treatment' of Natal. Natalians, he protested, had paid dearly 
for their patriotism in 1910; the things they had feared had become 
realities and they were seriously discontented and anxious about the 
future. To assume that Natal would not secede from the Union in any 
circumstances was a fundamental error, he continued; the letters Natal 
M. P. 's were receiving daily from their constituents demonstrated this, 
58. For interest in and the controversy surrounding the future of this 
article in the constitution of the Nationalist Party after the Imperial 
Conference, see The Star, 22, 24, 26 November, 1, 11 December 1926; 
Cape Argus, 23, 24 November, 2 December 1926; Daily Despatch, 
24, 26 November 1926; Sunday Times, 12 December 1926; Die Burger, 
25, 26 November, 3, 9 December 1926; Die Volksblad, 24 November, 
3, 9 December 1926; Ons Vaderland, 7 December 1926, 7 January 1927. 
59. See also The Star, 23 May 1927 (Pitcher); Die Burger, 25 May 1927 
{Stallard); Cape Times, 8 June 1927 (Col. G .A. Morris). 
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and the decision 
to which Natal may be forced by circumstances sooner than she 
imagines is that as to whether she is prepared to remain under 
the present intolerable circumstances, with the certainty sooner 
or later of being the Cinderella of a Dutch Republic, or whether 
slB would prefer to retain her nationality, her language, and 
her independence of action while there is yet time. 60 
The next month thoughtful correspondence appeared in the Natal Witness 
as to the advantages and disadvantages to Natal of seceding from the 
U . 61 Dl0,1. 
When the Flag Bill came before Parliament in May 192 6, talk of 
Natal seceding revived. Despite the Natal Mercury's condemnation 
of 'All this talk of Natal's Secession' on 22 June, it did not abate, and 
in July a Natal association was formed to work for the Province's secession. 62 
Again, as flag feeling grew in 1927, threats of Natal's secession were 
renewed. Or, the last day of May the London Times reported that 
ministerial addresses during the second reading, especially Hertzog's, 
had created 'a most unhappy state of feeling in Natal'; feeling, it said, 
had been strong in the p~evious week but since then, in both town and 
country, it had become more bitter and the possibility was being openly 
discussed of secession from the Union. A case in point was the large 
meeting of farmers at Richmond which resolved that if a flag without 
60. Rand Daily Mail, 16 April 1925 (Richards). 
61. 6 , 1 3 May 1 9 2 5 . 
62. Duncan Papers, to Lady SelbornG, 21 July 1926. 
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a Union Jack was fowed on Natal, it should secede. 63 Talk of Natal 
seceding continued in June with warnings that if the Flag Bill became 
lav11 the question might becomo cl real onP. 64 To 'Nhu.t extent the possibility 
of Natal sGceding was taken seriously by the Govr;mment it 1s not possibJe 
to say. Certainly Hertzog kept himself informed on the subject65 and 
the Government could not but fail to recognize its relationshop to the 
flag issue and that the sentiments it aroused were not in the interests 
of Union. 
These sentiments were symptomatic of the general hardening of 
attitude:. In Natal there wus u mple evidence of this. Durmg the 
first seek of the Select Committee's sitting, a letter from Col. S. 
Molyneux in th:; Nat.al Mercury warned Mal.an not to visit Durban 
to open its new Technical College. Molyneux wrote: 
He ha.d better know at once that he would not be welcome in 
Durban. Vvhy should we allow the future of that young institut-
ion to be blighted from its start by the presence of a politician 
who has done more than anyone else to revive racialism in 
South Africa? Every loyalist in Durban would regard his 
presence as an insult. 66 
63. tI~nsard, vol. 9, 4250-1, Anderson, 30 May 1927; C~e Times, 
28 May 1927. 
64. Ons Vaderland_, 3 June 1927; q_~~ Ti@~l', Die Q.urg2r - 14 June 1927; 
Grocott's Daily tv"iail, 15 June 1927. 
65. !f.P..: vol. 114. 
66. The Star, Cape 'Pmes - 11 June 1927; DJ.o )3L~rg:er, pie_Yolks_bla5). -
13 June 1927. Soa p. 81, 
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He called upon all men in Durban to pledge themselves to prevent the 
visit. The letter evoked nation-wide comment, both for and against, 
but in Durban feelings were so strong Uot the Council of the Technical 
College was obliged to withdraw its invitution to 1'v1alan as Minister of 
Education. 67 At the same time as this was announced, it was reported 
from Natal that a cornerstone containing Reyburn I s name had been 
68 defaced. 
Even if in Natal feelings against the Bill were on the whole stronger 
than elsewhere, opposition in other areas had also generally hardened. 
In the Albany district no flag committee had been formed in 1926; however, 
in the first week of June 1927 an enthusiastic Flag Comrniitee was established 
in Grahamstown. 69 About ten days later, in the same town, at the annual 
meeting of the local branch of the B. E. S. L. , a vigorously worded 
resolution against the Flag Bill was passed despite the opposition of 
the Committee I s Chairman and others who felt that the B. E. S. L. should 
not 'mix itself up with politics' . The final resolution concluded that, 
. . . this meeting considers that the time has come to clearly state 
that if the Flag Bill is persisted in, and a flag is forced upon 
the country which in no sense of the word can be regarded as 
a true national emblem by reqson of the non-incorporation of 
the Union Jack, that the vast numbers of people whose deepest 
feelings are thereby violently outraged, will be justified before 
67. The Star, Die Volksblad - 16 June 1927; Cape Times, 18 June 1927; 
Die Burger, 13, 14, 15, 20 June 1927; Cape Argus, 17 June 1927. 
68. Cape Argus, 16 June 1927; Die Burger, 17 June 1927. In the previous 
month a large meeting of Reyburn' s constituents had demundecl that he 
oppose the Bill tt'he Star, 10 May 192 7; Die Burger, 11 May 1927). 
69. Grocott's Daily Mail, 4 June 1927. 
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God in adopting whatever measures may be humanly possible 
to resist to the uttermost such an iniquity. 70 
As Grahamstown's Grocott's Daily Mail suggested on 1 June, since the 
Bill's second reading had commenced resistance to it had grown in both 
volume and strength. 
A more hostile mood was also evident in Cape Town. At Salt River, 
H. G. Lawrence had to face a rowdy meeting .71At Wynberg, Roos and Barlow 
received a rough reception with Roos complaining afterwards that 'all 
roads seem to lead to flags'. 72 In June Fremantle fell from office. 
Despite his opposition to the Government's flag measures and the conscientious 
service he had rendered the Flag Organization, he lost his position as 
a local representative on the Central Executive. Writing to Pim, he 
explained: 
The new organization for the Cape has been formed and I was 
not elected on to the executive. I do not think there is any 
doubt that this is due to the unwi.llingness of one section to 
co-operate with anyone who holds anything like my views as 
to the history and present character of the Nationalist Party 
and its leaders. 7 3 
With the new organization had come a new spirit, one reflected aga.in 
in the Transvaal by the refusal of the Imperial Light Horse to take part 
70. Grocott's Daily Mail, 16 June 1927. 
71. Cape Times, 31 May 1927. 
72. Cape Argus, Die Burger - 17 June 1927. 
73. Fremantle Collectiol)_, 24 June 1927. 
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in the annual Bisley because the Union Jack had not been raised 74 and 
by the great meeting of protest in Johannesburg. 
Continuing, as a bolster to the Opposition, and as a constant 
reminder to the Government of the unwavering opposition outside Parliament, 
were the public meetings of protest held during and after the second 
reading. Many outside parliament who opposed the Bill - whether 
from fear of republicanism or for other motives - saw the protests as 
the most effective way to pressurize the Pact and channelled their 
opposition into them. These protest meetings had lost none of their 
earlier fervour. Crowded, enthusiastic, ringing to the sound of patriotic 
song, they took place throughout the coL·.ntry. During the second reading 
alone, no less than sixteen such meetings were held. 75 Scottburgh's 
protest brought together the largest gathering the town had ever seen; 
even Witbank's attracted more than six hundredd people - not since the 
days of the Great War had it witnessed so large a meeting. 76 Scenes 
of'unbounded enthusiasm and fervid patriotism' marked the protest at 
Sea Point, while at Richmond, where Labour was vigorously attacked, 
74. Die Volksblad, 31 May 1927. 
7 5. These included meetings at Bloemfontein, Vereeniging, Claremont, 
Mowbray, Wynberg, Mooi River, Underberg, Howick, Kei River, 
Peddie, Cathcart and Barberton ( Die Volksblad, 28 May 1927; 
Cape Times, 26, 31 May, 2, 9 June 1927; Natal Witness, 2, 3 June J.'927; 
The Star, 27 May 1927; Die Burger, 31 May, 2 June 1927; Daily Despatch, 
31 May 1927; S.P. vol. 38, no. 126; P.S.M.I. vol.3. 
76. Natal Witness, 30 May 1927; The Star, 26 May 1927. 
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pledges were taken never to vote for any person who supported the Bill. 77 
At several meetings strong words were used. At Muizenberg, a speaker 
complained that the British section had been the under-dog for so long 
that their opponents thought they could kick them down still further; 
Hertzog might have ended the matter by putting his foot on Malan, had 
the Prime Minister had 'less of the backbone of a maggot and more of 
78 
the backbone of a man' . 
Largest and most enthusiastic of all the meetings held during the 
second reading was Durban's. Emotions reached a pitch not seen since 
the Armistice. Ninety minutes before the meeting began, the :tity hall 
was crammed with excited people and large crowds gathered in the town 
gardens outside to listen through loudspeakers. Patriotic songs were 
sung with 'extraordinary fervour'; scenes of 'unprecedented enthusiasm' 
greeted every mention of the Union Jack. The well-known J:.abourite;. 
J. W. Coleman, spoke with tears running down his cheeks. The crowd 
cheered for nearly four minutes following a rendering of Kipling's 
'English Flag'. An amended motion, substituting the word 'demand' 
for 'request' in calling upon the Government to abandon the Bill, was 
passed unanimously and the Mayor of Johannesburg, A. Law Palmer, in 
moving the principal resolution, warned that they were perhaps, 'on the 
77. Cape Times, 31 May 1927; Natal Witness, 28 May 1927. 
78. Cape Argus, Cape Times - 24 May 1927. 
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eve of a racial war. • 7 9 
During the Select Committee's deliberations, the protests continued. 
Hours after the Committee first met, a large and impressive meeting was 
held in Johannesburg. Two hours before speeches were due to start, 
people began to arrive, being conducted to their seats by some 380 
stewards. Their conspicuous presence was intended as a safeguard 
against possible violence, for feeling in Johannesburg was running high; 
branch leaders in the city had called upon fellow Nationalists to stay 
away from the protest in order to avoid a serious clash. On the morning 
after the meeting,reports declared that the roof, floors and walls of the 
city hall had reverberated to the sounds of British patriotic and other 
popular songs - sung with 'hearty fervour from the throats of thousands 
of people'. Beneath Durban's monster Union Jack~O the speeches, 
including those of three Afrikaans- speakers, were delivered. The 
Mayor declared that they were standing on sacred ground that night, 
writing the pages of history which might determine peace or strife in 
South Africa for a hundred years. He challenged Creswell to fight an 
election on the flag issue, attacked Malan as an 'unbending political 
theoretical fanatic' and declared that if passed, the Flag Bill would be 
79. The Star, Cape Times - 26 May 1927. 
80. This flag, which measured 60ft. by 30ft. and weighed 80lbs, was 
claimed to be the largest Union Jack in the Domlr1ions. It was slung 
horizontally from wall to wall like a ceiling. The republican flags 
of the Transvaal and Free State were hung above the platform where 
another Union Jack was pricked out by means of coloured lights in 
front of the organ { The Star, 6, 7 June 1927; Hansard, vol. 9. 54 5 7, 
Reyburn, 21 June 1927). ---·· 
J84 
'the most immoral political act ever perpetrated by a South African 
Parliament. •81 Though the Nationalist press tried to belittle the protest, 
82 
in the view of one generally objective observer it had been 'a very fine 
meeting'. 83 In the next few days, rr:ore protest meetings took place at 
84 Maitland, Pinetown, Ladybrand and Somerset West. 
At the time of the Select Committee's deliberations, a Nationalist 
Senator observed that never in his life had he seen the country 'so much 
in the boiling pot'; feeling amongst Afrikaners was more intense than at 
the time of the Jameson Raid, 85 On 26 May, the aged banker Lewis 
IVlichell noted in his diary: 'Flag Bill /)..y becoming more and more likely 
to break up the Union! •86 One week later, Smuts informed a close friend: 
'Feeling is running higher than it has run since the Great \Var - and that 
87 is saying a good deal.' Neither Michell nor Smuts was given to 
81. Rand Dail.v l\,foil, Cape Argus, Die Buraer :-. 7 June 1927. 
82. See Die Burger, 8, 10 June 1927; Die Volksblad, 8 June 1927; 
0 ns Vaderland, 10 June 192 7. 
83. S.P. vol. 40 , no. 233 , 11 June 1927, Cohn to Smuts. 
84. Cape Argus, 8 June 1927; Cupe Times, 8, 9, 11 June 1927; 
Die Volksblad, 9 June 1927; Die Burge._r, 13, 14 June 1927. 
85. The Star, 20 June 1927. 
86. Lewis Michell Papers, 26 May 1927, see also 27, 29 May,l June 1927. 
87. S.P, vol. 39, no.292, to Gillett, 2 June 1927. 
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exaggerated comment. Undeniably the mood of the country in many 
areas had become ugly. At Bedford, Union Jacks at a sports ground 
had been torn to pieces and trampled underfoot. 88 As we have seen, 
at Pietermaritzburg Reyburn' s narne on a cornerstone had been defaced 
and in Durban threats against Malan had forced a cancellation of his 
visit. At Johannesburg the presence of hundreds of attendants at a protest 
meeting and the appeal of Nationalist leaders to their followers to 
stay away from it, showed how seriously the possibility of violence 
was taken. 
References to the possibility of 'racial' and civil war, made at 
protest meetings, and also dealt with in the press, contributed to 
the threc1tening situation. When Bailey commented on events in the 
Union in the London Evening Standard, Die Burger published his 
views under a full page headline: SIR ABE BAILEY PRAAT VAN BURGEROORLOG. 
It reported him as saying: 'Die Suid Afrikaanse volk is rusteloos en 
lig ontvlambaar, en die geroep van burgeroorlog is op die lippe van 
89 
'n groat aantal verantwoordelike, nugtere mense.' At Durban's 
protest meeting there had been talk of the Union being 'on the eve 
of racial war', and at Johannesburg's of the possibility of peace 
or strife for the next hundred years. Elsewhere, comparisons were 
88. S. P. vol. 37, no. 65, letter from a Somerset East correspondent, 
8 June 1927; Cape Times, 27 May 1927, 
8 9. 9 June 192 7. See also p 3 64 (for talk of civil war). 
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drawn with conditions before the Anglo-Boer War and open reference 
made to the possibility of bloodshed. At a Mooi River protest meeting 
one speaker declared, to loud cheers, that the flag controversy 'was 
one that must be fought out. If it is forced upon us we will resist'. 
Another warned, amidst acclaim, that 'when we can see that, by 
pulling down our Flag we were meant to become republicans, there was 
going to be bloodshed.' He recalled the circumstances that had led 
to war in 1899 and saw the same conditions; he hoped the Government 
would see a way out, otherwise, 'civil war was coming.' Repeated 
cheers were raised for the throne and Union Jack. 90 
It has already been noted that after the first reading Smuts was 
warned that a number of persons had 'the hatching of a kind of Jameson 
Raid in their minds' if Malan's flag were hoisted. On 6 June, the 
Natal Witness's parliamentary correspondent reported that a 'man of 
thirty years political experience' had assured him that the Government 
was 'on the run'; 'certain developments' in the Eastern Cape had made 
the Government 'fearful of more than election excitement' if the country 
was exposed to a referendum. 
Whatever authority was attached to such information, the country's 
mood was undeniably disquieting. On the third day of the Select 
Committee's sitting, the Rand Daily Mail warned that the protest meetings 
90. Natal Witness, 2 June 1927. 
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being held throughout the country reflected the resentments and passions 
being experienced by the opponents of the Bill. 'Settle it now', was 
the title of its editorial. The advice required no emphasis. 
The Government'uroblem 
Yet how was the struggle to be settled? Several factors and 
circumstances had to be taken into account. Without the incorporation 
of the Union Jack, no flag was likely to be generally accepted by the 
opposition. This much had finally become clear to the Government. 
The unyielding resistance of the Opposition in the second reading, 
the spirited assertion of the opposition's right to be represented in a 
national flag in a manner acceptable to it, and the obvious sincerety 
of many of the Opposition speakers could not have failed to impress 
Cabinet members. In addition to the effect of this resistance inside 
Parliament must be added that of the agitation outside it and the 
threatening mood thereby produced in the country. A referendum 
- which the Government might well lose 91 - was certain to exacer-
bate matters and possibly lead to a serious disruption of peace and order. 
These were considerations of the very greatest importance. 
Furtl1ermore, immediately before the Select Committee met, the 
91. See pages 257-8 and. 284-5. 
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political danger of submitting the flag issue to a trial by votes was 
driven home in the clearest possible way. Taking advantage of an 
irregularity, the S .A. P. unseated the Nationalist M. P. C. for Hopetown 
and re-fought the election. It turned a Nationalist majority of 166 to 
a minority of 49. Though Die Burger's report tried to play down the 
role of the flag question in this surprising defeat, The Star attributed 
the victory to improved organization and to the flag question. The 
Nationalists, it said, had fully expected to win the seat because they 
believed people in the north-western Cape did not share the same 
feelings for the Union Jack as people elsewhere; the result had proved 
th . 92 o erw1se. The unexpected result evoked a great deal of discussion 
in the corridors of Parliament where it must have given much food for 
thought, particularly to those Pactites who were about to serve on the 
Select Committee. 
Amongst these was Hertzog. At just this juncture he received two 
private letters which probably gave him added cause for concern. The 
first arrived from Frankfort and came from a minister in the Dutch 
Reformed Church in the Free State. Declaring that he was interested 
in the flag question, he added: 
Ek merk, dat vooraanstaande plaaslike nasionaliste On Frankfo!Y 
bekommerd begin te word oor die ewentuele uitwerking van hierdie 
saak. Meer dan een het al die vrees geuit dat dit tot die val van 
ons Regering kan lei, daar vermoed word dat die arbeiders by de 
volgende eleksie die stem van die Engelse gaan verloor. Al te 
graag sien ek weer 'n Nat. regering aan die bewind. Daarom 
92. See The Star, 1,2, June 1927; Die Burger,l June 1927; Cape Argus,· 
6 June 1927. 
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skryf ek. Sal die vertraging van hierdie kwe ss ie nie die 
gevreesde afweer nie? Kan daar nie op die duur meer gewin 
word nie deur Festina Lente? 93 
The second letter was from one of these 'vooraanstaande' local 
Nationalists. He bluntly declared that the Flag Bill should never have 
been presented; the right time for it would have been after the next 
general election. He was very much afraid about the political future: 
'daar is 'n baie slegte gevoel en agteloosigheid en ek kan nie genoeg 
waarsku maar daar is baie van ons mense wat baie hard gewerk het 
wat verwaarloos is en wat nooit in ag geneem word'. Nationalists 
had lost their unity and spirit. Now they had lost Hopetown and he 
was convinced they would also lose the next general election. He 
concluded his pessimistic letter with an appeal for a flag 
94 
settlement. 
However, counterbalancing to some degree such appeals and 
the often vigorous and impressive agitation of the opposition, were 
the Nationalist Party resolutions supporting Government flag policy. 
During the period of the second reading and Select Committee nearly 
another sixty were passed by representatives of local or district branches, 
or, in a few cases, by the branches as a whole or public 
93. P.S.M.I. vol.3, letterfromDs. J.P. vanderWalt. 
94. H.P. vol. 28, letterfromN.J. vanWyk. See also Sen. D.J.MalanPapers, 
June 1927, for Free State Nationalists' general dissatisfaction with 
the Government's treatment of the Province. 
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meetings. 95 Though an examination of the gatherings at which these 
resolutions were passed reveals that many Nationalists would have 
preferred a flag other than the 'Red Cross flag', all final resolutions 
asked for the exclusion of the Union Jack. Thus, while the Government 
could with little embarrassment introduce a new design on the grounds 
that design no. 2 had not gained the wholehearted support of Nationalists 
- and had also been opposed by many English-speakers - it would be 
more difficult in the face of the resolutions against it to incorporate 
a Union Jack. Yet if the Government were to rid itself of the flag 
incubus a:1d turn the public's interest to more fundamental ( and 
politically advantageous} issues, like Native policy, some plan 
would have to be made for L1cluding the Union Jack in the new flag. 
Party resolutions had made this more difficult. But practical politics 
had made its inclusion imperative , and with ingenuity it was 
possible. 
95. P.S.M. I. vol.3; Die Burger, 31 May, 2-4. 7 ,14, 15 23 June 1927; 
Die Volksblad, 26, 28, 31 May, 6, 10, 13, 14, 16, 17, 20, 21, 24 
June 1927; Ons Vaderland, 3, 14 June 1927. 
Of these resolutions some 26 were from the Orange Free State, 
15 from the Cape Province, 14 from the Transvaal and 2 from Natal. 
Thus from the beginnbg of April 1927, altogether about 220 
resolutions supporting the Governmer1t' s flag policy had been 
passed. They were made up as follows: Cape Province - 150, 
Free State - 40, Transvaal - 30, Natal - 3 { see pp. 309-10 ,314-5). 
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The 1927 Select Committee 
96 
When the Select Committee met on 6 June 'to consider and report 
upon I the Flag Bill, the S .A. P. representatives had no intention of 
97 helping the Pact out of its dilemma. So long as racial feeling and 
jingoism remained within managable bounds, the flag controversy was 
an asset to the S.A.P. 98 It would probably be quite fair to say that 
Smuts saw his Party as being 0,1 a good wicket. 99 Two weeks earlier 
he had held out his 'olive branch'. Yet even this small offer had not 
beet1 generally welcomed by his supporters some of whom were now 
100 
condemning the Select Committee as mere 'eye wash' and as 
a gesture of despair on the part of the 'arch representative of little 
96. Its nine Pact members were Hertzog, Malan, Roos, Boydell, Barlow 
Kentridge, J. H. Conradie (Gordonia) , W. H. Rood (Barberton) and 
J.B. Wessels (Frankfort); the six Opposition merbErs were Smuts, 
Watt, Duncan, Krige, Close and Robinson. Hertzog was elected 
Chairman of the Committee which, after deliberating from 6 to 17 
June, brought out a report entitled, Report of the Select Committee 
on the South African Nationality and Flag Bill (hereafter cited as 
s.c. 12-27). 
97. See S.P. vol. 39, no. 195, Smuts to wife, 6 June 1927. 
98. See pp. 177 ff. 
99. For Smuts's use of this idiom with regard to the value of the new 
flag design to the S .A. P. , see below. 
100 . Cape Argus, 3 June 1927. 
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Afrikanerdom' who was, in effect, appealing to the S.A.P. 'to permit 
the Government to escape from the altogether impossible position in which 
it has placed itself. ,l Ol Clearly the Government was seen as being on the 
run and on 4 June the Nat~! Witne~ warned that even if the Pact were to 
meet Smuts by providing for the flying of the Union Jack on all occasions, 
one could not be sure that he would now carry the British section with 
him; Smuts might run the risk of splitting the S .A. P. if he accepted such 
an offer. On the previous day the Cape Times had enjoined: 'no compromise 
on the side of the opposition'. Thus even if it had wanted to, the S.A.P. 
would have found it most difficult to abandon its oft-stated position. 
Happily for the Leader of the Opposition, no such problem existed. 
The wishes of his supporters and the interests of his Party appeared to 
be one. 
In the first few days of the Committee's deliberations, 102 the S .A. P. 
representatives tried to persuade the Pactites of the wisdom of postponing 
the Bill; 103 when the latter proved immovable on this point it became 
politic for the S .A. P. to propose its own design in response to those of 
101. Natal Mercury, 3 June 1927. 
102. Unfortunately the SelE.ict Committee's Report gives very few details of the 
discussions on the flags and of the first week's deliberations declares 
only that it 'proceeded to the consideration of the various Clauses of the 
Bill.' This laconic formula was probably agreed upon to ensure that talks 
were as frank as possible, and it was probably for this reason too that 
the press was requested not to report any of the Committee's activities -
a request which it honoured. Consequently we learn little of the 
Committee's deliberations from the press other than of the fluctuating 
moods of optimism and pessimism the talks produced in Parliament, 
103. Hansard, vol.9, 5446, Smuts, 21 June 1927. 
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the Pactites. This the S.A.P. had so far avoided. If the Government was 
to 
determined..,give the country a clean flag despite the Opposition's advice, 
then the onus lay with the Government to provide it. However, a stage 
had now been reached where it could be disadvantageous if the Party failed 
to produce a flag in keeping with its requirements. Refusal to do so might 
give weight to charges that the S .A. P. had evaded its responsibilites and 
in practice could not produce a flag to meet even its own needs. 104 Thus 
f S d d . h C . 105 one week a ter its commencement, muts suggeste a es1gn tot e omm1ttee. 
Consisting of a white cross divided quarterly, its top left corner contained 
the Union Jack, top right - the Free State Vierkleur, bottom left - the 
Transvaal Vierkleur, and bottom right - a springbok on a blue field. 
They had put forward 'a rather nice looking flag', Smuts wrote a few days 
later, but the Government had rejected it because it said the old flags were 
too prominent and attracted too much attention. 106 
107 Having suggested - but not pressed - a design which met their 
own needs, and seen it rejected, the S .A. P. did not present another. 
Instead, towards the end of the Committee's deliberations it proposed 
the appointment of a new commission consisting of the President of the 
104. It had been the Government's intention to force. the S .A. P. to produce 
a flag in the Select Committee ( see Malan, p.123; Hansard, vol. 9, 
4227, Hertzog, 27 May 1927). 
10 5. S . C . 12- 2 7 , p. ix, 
106. Hansard, vol. 9, 544 6, Smuts, 21 June 1927; ibid. 54 52, Hertzog, 
21 June 1927; ~_._P. vol. 39, no. 226, to Stallard, 18 June 1927. 
This flag, with four stars substituted for the springbok, was to be 
proposed by the Senate. See page 2 63. 
107. See Hertzog's comment: ' ... they showed a flag in the select committee -
we heard nothing further about it ... ' Hansard, vol. 9, 5361, 20 June 1927. 
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Senate and Speaker of the Assembly who, with the aid of others chosen 
by them, would design a national flag. Its design would embody the 
Union Jack and former republican flags 'as integral and substantial 
portions' and, not later than six months after its publication in the Gazette , 
the design would be submitted for the approval of Parliament as the national 
108 flag. The S .A. P. representatives maintained that this plan would 
provide more time for the cooling of tempers and for dealing with the flag 
109 problem. But as its adoption might have carried the flag controversy 
into 1928, bringing it nearer to the general election, without any guarantee 
of a settlement, it is not surprising that the Pactites rejected the proposal. 
Instead they put forward their own plan. A Committee, appointed and 
chaired by the Speaker of the Assembly, would include the Minister and 
thirteen other Members of the House. It would try to design a flag subject 
to the same principles laid down for the Select Committee. Niajority 
acceptance of a design, approved by the Minister of the Interior, would 
be published in the Gazette ·10t later than 13 September; this design - which 
would therefore not require ·parliamentary approval - would become the national 
flag. 110 
108. S .C .12-27, p,xii. This proposed body was later referred to as the 
SpeabJr-President Commission. 
109. Hansard, vol.9, 5446. Smuts, 21 June 1927. 
110. The proposed Committee was known as the Speaker's Committee. S.C.12-27, 
p. xii. 
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Far more important was the Pact representatives' second proposal. 
On the same day as the S .A, P. representatives put forurard their flag, those 
of the Pact proposed an entirely new design. The 'Red Cross flag' was 
dropped; in its pluce appeared the 'shield flag' . Taking as its background 
the van Riebeeck colours - horizontal stripes of orange, white and blue -
it had in the middle of its white stripe, 'within a blue bordure and a white 
inner bordure', a shield divided quarterly containing the Union Jack, the 
Transvaal Vierkleur, the Free State Vierkleur, and four white stars on a 
blue field. 111 Thus, the Union Jack had finally appeared in the national 
flag. Furthermore, alongside it lay the republican flags. Though these 
three flags were small, on the face of it the Government had made important 
concessions and the S .A. P. had won a major victory. But the S .A. P. 
representatives objected to the small size of the flags and, more important, 
to their enclosure in a shield. This enclosure, they argued, meant that the 
flags were not integral parts of the design. Hence, when Hertzog, on the final 
day of the Select Committee's deliberations, offered to double the size of the 
Union Jack in the shield, 112 the S .A. P. 's chief objection (the enclosure of the 
flags) remained, and agreement between the two sides on the design for a nation-
al flag could not be reached. Nonetheless, the 'shield flag' was soon to appear in 
111. S.C. 12-27, p. xv111. See pages 262-3 for pictures of the various flags. 
One of the flags proposed by the Government's Flag Commission had been 
the van Riebeeck flag with a white cross. The shield had now been 
substituted for the cross ( Malan , p .124). 
The design was later report~·dto have originated with Hertzog (Di~ 
Volksblad, 2 July 1927; Qie Burger, 6 July 1927), but the idea of a shield 
(though with different contents) was suggested earlier by J .A. I. Agar-
Hamilton who served on the Flag Commission (Pierneef _Pap~!~ ,vol. 3). 
112. The Star, 4 August 1927, Kentridge. The Union Jack would then have 
occupi e:i the top half of the shield. 
the amended Flag Bill. The Government decided to adopt it. Despite 
repeated assurances to the contrar-y, the Pact had yielded on vital issues. 
How had this come about? 
The mechanics of compromise 
From what has already been said, it may be seen that a powerful 
argument could be made for flag concessions: the 'Red Cross flag' had 
not gone to the hearts of many Nationalists (and most Labourites); flag 
agitation had created a most unhealthy political mood; a referendum might 
deal a blow to the Pact and it could seriously disrupt public order; divided 
loyalties had created urgent problems for Labour and benefitted the S .A. P.; 
even the Nationalists might be losing support - as the loss of Hopetown 
seemed to indicate. 
There was a further argument that could be advanced. If a suitable 
flag design was found which included the three flags the Opposition demanded, 
it could be used to divide t_he S .A. P. and siphon off some of its supporters, 
particularly those Afrikaners whom Malan and other Nationalists were so 
anxtous to win. For while the S.A.P. a_s a whole was agreed on its demand 
for all three flags, there could be marked differences of opinion in it on, 
for instance, the required size of these flags or the manner in which they 
ought to be included. What English-speaking Natalians might reject 
outright, Afrikaans-speaking Transvaalers might fi.nd satisfactory. In this 
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way the S .A. P. might be manoeuvred into an unfavourable position. The 
Pact could maintain that it had given the S .A. P. the three flags it wanted 
and then attempt to drive a wedge between its'moderate' platteland 
Afrikaners and its dissatisfied 'loyalists'. Without the incorp<)rution 
of these flags, the S .A. P. would probably stand firm on the flag issue; 
with their inclusion, it might not. Such arguments could well have been 
presented in the Cabinet by Roos, Boydell, Madeley and others . 
Just before the first reading Smuts expressed fear to his wife that the 
Nationalists aimed to raise racial feelings so that they could coax his 
Afrikaans followers away from his English supporters. 113 During the 
Select Committee's talks he confided that the Nationalists 'sal seker 
net genoeg ingee om ons in een moeilike keuse te stel. •114 The press 
and others were soon to charge that the 'shield flag' had been designed 
115 for these reasons. Certainly Ons Vaderland was to make a strong 
appeal to 'ons vrinde (sic), die ou-Sappe' through the 'shield flag', 
while Roos put out a call for this flag to be used as a bridge over which 
'moderate' S .A. P. 's could cross to join the Nationalist Party. 116 
Finally, among all the arguments for concession one always 
113. S.P. vol. 39, no. 140, 15 May 1927. 
114. Ibid. no. 305, to wife, 11 June 1927. 
115. See b~low. 
116. 21, 24 June 1927; Die Burger, 2 5 June 1927. 
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dominated: the absurdity of a national flag which would divide the nation. 
Rejected in Natal, distasteful to roughly half the total (white) population, 
such a flag would be a grotesque contradiction of its purpose, Commenting 
on the second reading, one leader writer had declared: 
... one great fact has emerged and it is one which no sane government 
can afford to completely ignore. It is the strength of the opposition 
to the Bill and its increasing intensity. And another point that the 
Government cannot afford to overlook is that this opposition is not 
centred in one portion of the Union; it is scattered from one end 
to the other ... In these circumstances a measure pregnant with far 
reaching national consequences and carried by a majority of only 
fifteen with no proof that this exactly represents the division of opinion 
in the country, cannot with safety be forced upon the nation. In no 
sense can the flag adopted by the Government become a national 
flag, because it does not and cannot stand for the embodiment of 
a national consciousness, 117 
Once the Government had determined against any further pcstponement of the 
Bill, the only alternative, if a truly national flag was to be obtained, was 
to seek a speedy end to the conflict through compromise. Any imposed flag 
would be to its and the country's detriment. 
Hertzog was no stranger to compromise on the flag issue. After the 
Imperial Conference he had wished to postpone the Flag Bill. Malan' s 
threat to resign had precluded this move. When Hertzog had conceded that 
the Bill could go forward but suggested that a Union Jack should be included 
in the flag's design, Malan had objected to the form of the design containing 
117. Grocott's Daily Mail, 4 June 1927. 
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a Union Jack which Roos had immediately proposed. Although there can 
be no doubt at all that Malan would have preferred a flag that did not 
include a Union Jack, it cannot be definitely said, from Malan's account 
of the Groote Schuur discussion, that he opposed Roos 's design on the 
grounds that it contained a Union Jack. It could be argued that he 
objected to the design because its Union Jack seen against a plain back-
ground was too prominent. Its '.opgaande son 'was presumably too conspicuous 
f h . 118 or 1s taste. 
In all events, by June 1927 he was in a weaker position to make a 
stand against Hertzog on the flag issue than six months earlieij for all the 
problems arising out of the flag struggle could be laid directly or indirectly 
at his door. He was the Minister of the Interior who had inspired and 
introduced flag legislation. He was the Minister who, on threat of 
resignation, had opposed his Leader's desire to postpone the measure 
six months earlier, and there was no denying that as a result of the continued 
pursuit of flag legislation the Pact was in great difficulty. Benefit of 
hindsight had made it abundantly clear that it would have been prudent 
to accept Hertzog's suggestion in December; because Malan had not, 
the Pact was fighting with its back to th~ wall and it would continue to 
do so until the flag is sue was resolved. 
118. See Malan, pp.120-1: Die Burger ( Malan), 1 February 1927. 
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Perhaps Hertzog's belief that his judgement should have prevailed in 
December 1926, fortified his resolve to obtain his way in June 1927. 
In addition to all the considerations already mentioned, Hertzog could 
point cut to Mulan and others thut foere were several fectc.res in favour 
of the 'shield flag' from the Nationalists' point of view. As a Free 
Stater, the Premier could claim that it met the objection that the 'Red Cross 
flag' contained no symbol of his Province. He could stress that the 
flag's background (the van Riebeeck colours) was entirely Dutch. He 
could emphasize that the origin of three-quarters of the shield was South 
African. True, a small Union Jack had been included, but more than 
ninety-five per cent of the entire flag was derived from the background 
of the Afrikaner. As for this Union Jack, in their flag U had nothing 
to do with Great Britain, its Commonwealth or Empire; it had been 
i;1cluded to recognize English-speakers' past contribution towards building 
pa 
up South Africa . .1."Could one take exception to that? Finally, the shield 
too could be seen as an ameliorative feature: the symbols it encased did 
not represent the Union of the present, the country in which they lived 
and for which they would sacrifice themselves, but a South Africa of 
the past - a land whose existence had ended. Thus, on a small 
shield, would stand a still smaller Uoion Jack, with neither representing 
the living South Africa. 
119. £Ia nsard, vol. 9, 54 35, Malan, 21 June 1927. Malan maintained that 
the inducement to introduce the three flags on these grounds had come 
from Jagger's second reading speech (ibid.). 
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In the Cabinet Hertzog appears to have gained support for the 'shield flag' 
without difficulty. The Labourites, Boydell and Madeley, were doubtless 
in favcur of concession in the hope of lessening their Party's problems. 
With Creswell abroad, they may have felt freer to take a stand against 
Malan, if such a need arose. Hertzog could certainly count on the support 
of Roos and probably gained that of Havenga, Kemp and Grabler without 
difficulty - all were later to support further flag concessions. Indeed, 
Malan 's article's total silence on the Cabinet discussions which must have 
taken place on the 'shield flag' is noteworthy, and, if anything, tends 
to support the above view, perhaps even hiding the fact that the Cabinet 
decided to incorporate the Union Jack overwhelmingly if not unanimously. 120 
In making new concessions rather than withdraw the Bill, the Government 
chose what it believed to be the 'lesser of two evils'. Withdrawal would 
have brought greater loss of face, a perpetuation of the flag issue at 
election time and all th~ attendant disadvantages already discussed. 
Practical political considerations had been the determining factor and 
private susceptibilities on the Union Jack had been forced to bend to 
political needs. But to meet the inevitable - even if lesser - loss of 
face for the further concessions, and the bitter disappointment of those 
120. On 21 June 1927 Malan told the Assembly that he thought the 'shield 
flag' was beautiful (Han?ard, vol. 9, 5435-6). 
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who had come to believe that the flag would never contain the Union Jack, 
the Government had prepared a design in which the presence of the Union 
Jack had ~;een cushioned by several features. However, these very 
features - the shield and its small flags - were to be denounced by the 
opposition, and it was his anticipation of this that led Smuts, on the day 
after the Select Committee dissolved, to inform Stallard: 'we are on a 
fairly good wicket'. 121 
121. S.P. vol. 39, no. 226, 18 June 1927. 
